In the Interest of: Q.J.W., a Minor ( 2018 )


Menu:
  • J-S11029-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: Q.J.W., A MINOR             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: Q.J.W., A MINOR
    No. 2143 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered June 2, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
    Juvenile Division at No.: CP-09-JV-0000617-2016
    BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                           FILED MAY 17, 2018
    Appellant Q.J.W. appeals from the June 2, 2017 dispositional order of
    the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (“juvenile court”), which
    adjudicated him delinquent of driving under the influence (“DUI”) of a
    controlled substance (marijuana) pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2). For
    the reasons set forth below, we vacate the dispositional order, reverse the
    adjudication of delinquency, and remand for a new adjudicatory hearing.
    The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. On April
    1, 2016, Appellant was arrested for, among other things, DUI. On December
    1, 2016, the Commonwealth filed a petition alleging delinquency against
    Appellant, who was seventeen years old at the time of the incident, charging
    him with DUI offenses and possession of a small amount of marijuana.
    J-S11029-18
    On May 2, 2017, the juvenile court conducted an adjudicatory hearing,
    at which Appellant appeared with his attorney, Douglas Dolfman, and father,
    L.W. At the hearing, pursuant to Pa.R.J.C.P. 407, Appellant executed a written
    colloquy, admitting to the DUI offense.      The juvenile court also colloquied
    Appellant on the record.       In exchange for Appellant’s admission, the
    Commonwealth withdrew the remaining DUI and possession charges. On June
    2, 2017, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing, following which it
    placed Appellant on indefinite probation and ordered him to pay court costs
    and perform fifty hours of community service.
    Appellant pro se appealed to this Court. On July 19, 2017, the juvenile
    court issued an order directing Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
    of errors complained of on appeal.      Through Attorney Dolfman, Appellant
    complied, raising a single assertion of error.     Appellant claimed that the
    juvenile court “erred as a matter of law by accepting a plea on the record that
    was not voluntary or knowing.”         Rule 1925(b) Statement, 8/8/17.      In
    response, the juvenile court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, concluding
    that Appellant was not entitled to relief.
    On appeal, Appellant repeats the same issue.        In a one-paragraph
    argument section, spanning barely twelve lines and citing only one legal
    authority, Appellant claims that his admission was not voluntary or knowing.
    Appellant’s Brief at 9 (unpaginated). Appellant specifically claims:
    The judge erred by accepting the guilty plea because [he] did not
    understand the nature of the guilty plea. The trial judge failed to
    adequately apprise [Appellant] on all aspects of a guilty plea and
    -2-
    J-S11029-18
    or admission of the facts in this matter. This lack of a record
    demonstrates that the plea was not knowingly or voluntary.
    
    Id. (sic). Pennsylvania
    Rule of Juvenile Court Procedure 407 provides in pertinent
    part:
    A. Admissions. At any time after a petition is filed, the juvenile
    may tender an admission to some or all of the delinquent acts
    charged.
    (1) Requirements.
    (a) Before the court can accept an admission, the
    court shall determine that the admission is
    knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.
    (b) As a part of this determination, the court shall
    ensure:
    (i) an attorney has reviewed and completed the
    admission colloquy with the juvenile pursuant to
    paragraph C; and
    (ii) there is a factual basis for the admission.
    (c) At the hearing, the court shall conduct an
    independent inquiry with the juvenile to determine:
    (i) whether the juvenile understands the nature
    of the allegations to which he or she is admitting
    and understands what it means to admit;
    (ii) whether the juvenile understands that he or
    she has the right to a hearing before the judge
    and understands what occurs at a hearing;
    (iii) whether the juvenile is aware of the
    dispositions that could be imposed and the
    consequences of an adjudication of delinquency
    that can result from an admission;
    (iv) whether the juvenile has any questions
    about the admission; and
    -3-
    J-S11029-18
    (v) whether there are any other concerns
    apparent to the court after such inquiry that
    should be answered.
    Pa.R.J.C.P. 407(A)(1)(a)-(c) (emphasis added). Thus, under Rule 407(A)(1),
    the juvenile court must determine on the record whether a defendant’s
    admission is tendered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily by conducting
    an independent inquiry. The Comment accompanying Rule 407 provides:
    Under paragraph (A)(1), the court is to determine if the admission
    is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made by asking
    questions to ascertain the juvenile’s ability to comprehend the
    written colloquy and to make an admission.
    The written colloquy serves as an aid for the court in making its
    determination that the admission is knowingly, intelligently, and
    voluntarily made and it does not supplant the court’s
    responsibility to conduct a sufficient inquiry to support its
    determination pursuant to paragraph (A)(1).
    Nothing in this rule prohibits the judge from reviewing the entire
    written colloquy with the juvenile on the record or asking more
    questions than required under paragraph (A)(1)(c).
    The admission colloquy is similar to a guilty plea colloquy in
    criminal court; however, the juvenile court judge has special
    responsibilities under the Juvenile Act in providing a balanced
    attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of
    accountability for delinquent acts committed, and the
    development of competencies to enable juveniles to become
    responsible and productive members of the community.
    
    Id. cmt. (emphasis
    added). As explained in the foregoing comment to Rule
    407(A), a written colloquy does not obviate the need for an independent
    inquiry by the juvenile court. Indeed, even if a defendant executes a written
    admission colloquy, the juvenile court still is obligated to conduct an
    -4-
    J-S11029-18
    independent inquiry to determine whether the defendant made a knowing,
    intelligent and voluntary admission.
    Instantly, as noted earlier, Appellant executed a written admission
    colloquy, affirming that he tendered his admission to the DUI offense
    knowingly and voluntarily. Additionally, Appellant affirmed that he understood
    the direct and collateral consequences of the admission.            Appellant also
    affirmed that he was satisfied with his legal representation by Attorney
    Dolfman and that he discussed the admission with his parent.             Attorney
    Dolfman also executed the admission colloquy, affirming that he has
    “reviewed this form with [his] client.” Admission Form, 5/2/17, at 4.
    As   required   under   Rule   407(A),   the   trial   court   conducted   an
    independent, on-the-record, inquiry to determine whether Appellant tendered
    his admission knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.       In this regard, our
    review of the adjudicatory hearing transcript reveals the following exchange
    between the juvenile court and Appellant:
    [The juvenile court]: [Attorney] Dolfman, did you have a chance
    to go over the admission colloquy with [Appellant]?
    [Attorney Dolfman]: I have, your Honor. I’ll have it marked as D-
    1.
    [The juvenile court]: [Appellant], you have gone over your
    admission with your attorney here and initialed each of those
    pages of that document and signed it. You understand that you
    have a right to a trial on these matters and require the
    Commonwealth to prove all of the elements of the remaining
    charges that are in the Petition and have not been withdrawn, and
    that you have the obligation for the opportunity to call any
    witnesses that you wish to call in your defense, and you have
    -5-
    J-S11029-18
    decided that you will admit that you committed the offenses as
    charged in the Probable Cause Affidavit; is that right?
    [Appellant]: Yes.
    [The juvenile court]: And you are not under the influence of drugs
    or alcohol that would give you any difficulty to intelligently and
    voluntarily participate in these proceedings; is that correct?
    [Appellant]: Yes.
    [The juvenile court]: You verify that the contents of the Probable
    Cause Affidavit as related to the remaining charges are true and
    accurate; is that correct?
    [Appellant]: Yes.
    N.T. Adjudicatory Hearing, 5/2/17, at 2-3.
    Based on the foregoing, we are constrained to conclude that the juvenile
    court’s independent inquiry fell short of Rule 407(A)’s requirements. Although
    the juvenile court substantially complied with Rule 407(A)(1)(b), it failed to
    satisfy the requirements of subsection (1)(c)(i),(iii), and (iv). Specifically, the
    juvenile court failed to ask Appellant sufficient questions to determine whether
    he understood the nature of the DUI allegations to which he was admitting
    and what it meant to admit them.         The juvenile court also failed to ask
    Appellant questions to determine whether he was aware of the dispositions
    that could be imposed and the consequences of an adjudication of delinquency
    that could result from an admission. Finally, the juvenile court failed to ask
    Appellant whether he had any questions about the admission. Moreover, the
    fact that Appellant executed a written admission colloquy is of no moment
    because it does not relieve the juvenile court of its obligation to conduct an
    independent inquiry that complies with Rule 407(A). As noted, the juvenile
    -6-
    J-S11029-18
    court here failed to comply fully with the requirements of Rule 407(A)(1)(c),
    and as a result, Appellant’s admission was not tendered knowingly,
    intelligently and voluntarily.   Accordingly, we vacate the June 2, 2017
    dispositional order, reverse the adjudication of delinquency, and remand this
    matter to the juvenile court for a new adjudicatory hearing consistent with
    this memorandum.
    Dispositional order vacated.   Adjudication of delinquency reversed.
    Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/17/18
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2143 EDA 2017

Filed Date: 5/17/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/17/2018