Com. v. Edwards, R. ( 2019 )

J-S31002-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RAYSHAWN EDWARDS :
:
Appellant : No. 546 WDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 21, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0008553-2011
BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JULY 03, 2019
Appellant, Rayshawn Edwards, filed a petition under the Post Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. The PCRA court dismissed
Appellant’s petition by order entered on December 21, 2017. Since no appeal
of the December 21, 2017 order was taken, Appellant subsequently sought
reinstatement of his PCRA appellate rights on March 8, 2018. Thereafter, on
March 19, 2018, Appellant requested reconsideration of the order that denied
reinstatement of his PCRA appellate rights. Ultimately, the PCRA court
reinstated Appellant’s PCRA appeal rights by order entered on March 29, 2018.
Upon review, we deem Appellant’s March 8, 2018 reinstatement request
to be a second PCRA petition. Because that petition was facially untimely and
did not plead any exception to the PCRA’s one-year time-bar, we conclude
that the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to award relief and we dismiss this
appeal.
J-S31002-19
Appellant was found guilty of third-degree murder, aggravated assault,
and recklessly endangering another person.1 On July 21, 2012, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate term of 20 to 40 years in prison.
We affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on July 29, 2014 and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of
appeal on March 23, 2016. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 105 A.3d 805 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum) at 1-11, appeal denied, 135 A.3d
583 (Pa. 2016).
On May 18, 2017, Appellant’s PCRA counsel (hereinafter “PCRA
Counsel”) filed a timely PCRA petition on Appellant’s behalf. Within this
petition, PCRA Counsel declared that he “intends to raise claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel and potentially after discovered evidence” and requested
that the PCRA court grant him “an extension of time of [90] days to file an
amended petition.” Appellant’s PCRA Petition, 5/18/17, at 1-2 (some
capitalization omitted). On June 6, 2017, the PCRA court granted PCRA
Counsel an “extension of time to August 18, 2017” to file the amended PCRA
petition. PCRA Court Order, 6/6/17, at 1.
On November 29, 2017, the PCRA court notified Appellant that it
intended to dismiss his petition in 20 days, without holding a hearing. PCRA
Court Order, 11/29/17, at 1; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). As the notice
declared, the court intended to dismiss the petition because: “[Appellant]
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 2702(a)(1), and 2705, respectively.
-2-
J-S31002-19
fail[ed] to file an amended [PCRA] petition by August 18, 2017, and
[Appellant] fail[ed] to request an extension of time to file the petition.” PCRA
Court Order, 11/29/17, at 1 (paragraphing and some capitalization omitted).
Appellant requested a further extension of time to file the amended
petition, which the PCRA court denied. See PCRA Court Order, 11/30/17, at
1. On December 5, 2017, PCRA Counsel filed an amended PCRA petition on
Appellant’s behalf. The amended PCRA petition asserted the following claims:
1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Lashaya White as a witness
and 2) the “unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has
subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome of the
trial if it had been introduced.” Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition, 12/5/17,
at ¶¶ 39-50; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii) and (vi). As to the latter claim,
Appellant averred that, after his trial, he spoke with three individuals and that
all three of these individuals would testify that Appellant “could not have been
the shooter in this matter.” Id. at ¶¶ 44-50.
The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition on December 21, 2017.
PCRA Court Order, 12/21/17, at 1. Appellant did not file a timely notice of
appeal from this order.
On March 8, 2018, PCRA Counsel filed a “Petition for Reinstatement of
Appellate Rights” on Appellant’s behalf. The petition requested that the court
reinstate Appellant’s PCRA appellate rights and alleged:
Within counsel moved offices in November, 2017. Despite
updating his address with AOPC, the Disciplinary Board and
-3-
J-S31002-19
Allegheny County Court Administration some mail continued
to be delivered to counsel's prior address.
Counsel's mail forwarding has been inconsistent, and counsel
did not receive a copy of the court's order dismissing the
amended petition.
Appellant’s “Petition for Reinstatement of Appellate Rights,” 3/8/18, at 1-2
(paragraph numbering and some capitalization omitted).
On March 8, 2018, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition. However,
on March 19, 2018, PCRA Counsel filed a motion for reconsideration on
Appellant’s behalf and claimed that Appellant was entitled to relief because:
[PCRA] Counsel's failure to perfect [Appellant’s] appellate
rights constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel as [PCRA
C]ounsel should have been diligent in monitoring the docket
for [the PCRA court’s] order denying [Appellant’s] amended
petition and/or response to notice.
Appellant’s “Petition for Reconsideration,” 3/19/18, at 1 (some capitalization
omitted).
On March 29, 2018, the PCRA court entered an order that granted
Appellant’s Petition for Reconsideration and reinstated Appellant’s PCRA
appellate rights. PCRA Court Order, 3/29/18, at 1. Appellant then filed a
notice of appeal on April 16, 2018. We must vacate the PCRA court’s March
29, 2018 order and dismiss this appeal.
The PCRA contains a jurisdictional time-bar, which is subject to limited
statutory exceptions. This time-bar demands that “any PCRA petition,
including a second or subsequent petition, [] be filed within one year of the
date that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final, unless [the]
-4-
J-S31002-19
petitioner pleads [and] proves that one of the [three] exceptions to the
timeliness requirement . . . is applicable.” Commonwealth v. McKeever,
947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. 2008); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Further, since
the time-bar implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of our courts, we are
required to first determine the timeliness of a petition before we are able to
consider any of the underlying claims. Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d
581, 586 (Pa. 1999). Our Supreme Court has explained:
the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature
and, accordingly, a PCRA court is precluded from considering
untimely PCRA petitions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000) (stating that “given
the fact that the PCRA's timeliness requirements are
mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, no court may properly
disregard or alter them in order to reach the merits of the
claims raised in a PCRA petition that is filed in an untimely
manner”); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 220 (Pa.
1999) (holding that where a petitioner fails to satisfy the
PCRA time requirements, this Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition). [The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has] also held that even where the PCRA court does not
address the applicability of the PCRA timing mandate, th[e
Court would] consider the issue sua sponte, as it is a
threshold question implicating our subject matter jurisdiction
and ability to grant the requested relief.
Commonwealth v. Whitney, 817 A.2d 473, 475-476 (Pa. 2003).
In the case at bar, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final at the
end of the day on June 21, 2016, which was 90 days after the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal and when
Appellant’s time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court expired. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13(1). Appellant then had until
-5-
J-S31002-19
June 21, 2017 to file a facially timely PCRA petition. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1).
In the case at bar, Appellant initially filed a timely PCRA petition on May
18, 2017. However, the PCRA court dismissed this petition on December 21,
2017 and Appellant did not file a timely notice of appeal from this dismissal.
Instead, on March 8, 2018, Appellant filed a “Petition for Reinstatement of
Appellate Rights,” where he requested the reinstatement of his PCRA appellate
rights.
However, Appellant’s “Petition for Reinstatement of Appellate Rights”
sought relief available under the PCRA and, thus, the petition constitutes a
second PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 936 A.2d 497,
501 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“[a]lthough [the petitioner’s] request for nunc pro
tunc restoration of his PCRA appellate rights was improper [in] form, our
courts have consistently treated such requests as a PCRA petition”);
Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396, 391 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding
that, generally, “requests for reinstatement of appellate rights, including PCRA
appellate rights,” are PCRA petitions that “must meet the timeliness
requirements of the PCRA”); see also Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d
1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007) (“[t]he PCRA subsumes all forms of collateral relief,
including habeas corpus, to the extent a remedy is available under such
enactment”). Thus, Appellant could only obtain relief from his “Petition for
Reinstatement of Appellate Rights” through the PCRA – and Appellant could
only do so by complying with the PCRA’s timing requirements. See
-6-
J-S31002-19
Commonwealth v. Pagan, 864 A.2d 1231, 1233 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“[a]s
[a]ppellant's claim falls under the PCRA, he can only find relief under the
PCRA's strictures”); Fairiror, 809 A.2d at 397.
Appellant’s “Petition for Reinstatement of Appellate Rights” was facially
untimely under the PCRA, as it was filed more than one year after Appellant’s
judgment of sentence became final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Moreover,
within the petition, Appellant did not plead any exception to the one-year
time-bar. See id.; Appellant’s “Petition for Reinstatement of Appellate
Rights,” 3/8/18, at 1-2; Appellant’s “Petition for Reconsideration,” 3/19/18,
at 1; see also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 186 (Pa. 2016)
(“there is no statutory exception to the PCRA time-bar applicable to claims
alleging the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel”). “Thus, because
Appellant’s second PCRA petition was untimely, the PCRA court had no
jurisdiction to grant reinstatement of [Appellant’s] PCRA appellate rights.”
Fairiror, 809 A.2d at 399. We, therefore, vacate the PCRA court’s March 29,
2018 order, which granted Appellant’s Petition for Reconsideration and
reinstated Appellant’s PCRA appellate rights, and we dismiss this appeal.
PCRA court’s March 29, 2018 order vacated. Appeal dismissed.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
-7-
J-S31002-19
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/3/2019
-8-