In the Interest of: B.S., a Minor ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: B.S., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: A.S.-W., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 253 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered December 20, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County
Orphans’ Court at No.: 18-2017
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., NICHOLS, J., and PLATT*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED AUGUST 20, 2018
A.S.-W. (Mother) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas
of Mifflin County (trial court), entered December 20, 2017, which involuntarily
terminated her parental rights to her son, B.S. (Child) (born 8/08).1
Mifflin County Children and Youth Services (CYS) took Child into
emergency custody on March 16, 2016. The trial court adjudicated Child
dependent on April 11, 2016, based on allegations that Mother abused drugs
and alcohol, and she was unable to care for Child. Child has remained in the
legal custody of CYS ever since.
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The trial court confirmed the consent to termination of the parental rights
of Child’s natural father, J.P. (Father), in an order entered on December 8,
2017.
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The trial court held permanency review hearings on September 1, 2016,
February 3, 2017, and June 12, 2017, at each of which it found that Mother
had not complied with the goals and objectives set forth for her in her child
permanency plan.
CYS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on August 23,
2017. The trial court held a hearing on that petition on December 8, 2017.
The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent Child.
At the hearing, Mother testified she was incarcerated and had been since
June 12, 2017. (See N.T. Hearing, 12/08/17, at 68).2
Mother testified that she left Child in the care of S.S. (Putative Father)
in 2013 when she entered rehab, despite several PFAs she had entered against
him. (See id. at 76-77, 97). Mother testified that she only saw Child two
times in 2014. (See id. at 99). Mother was incarcerated for three and one
half months in the spring of 2015, after which she moved back in with Putative
Father and Child for two weeks. (See id. at 99-100). Mother testified she
did not see Child much in the remainder of 2015 other than a trip to the beach
in August of that year, and for Thanksgiving and Christmas. (See id. at 100-
01). During this time, Mother lived with various friends. (See id. at 101).
2 Mother was incarcerated at SCI Cambridge Springs at the time of the
termination hearing. Mother’s incarceration was not a material factor in her
failure to correct the conditions that led to Child’s removal from her care.
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By her own admission, Mother had no contact with Child during 2016, and she
was again using heroin. (See id. at 102-03).
Mother admitted that she did nothing to preserve her relationship with
Child from the time of placement in March of 2016, through her incarceration
in the spring of 2017, because she was on the run from an outstanding warrant
and not capable of caring for Child. (See id. at 107). She admitted to not
giving her address to CYS because of the same outstanding warrant. (See id.
at 103-04).
Mother has provided no financial support for Child while Child has been
in placement. (See id. at 105). Mother acknowledged that she never got a
mental health evaluation, never went to rehab and did not have stable housing
as provided for in the child permanency plans. (See id. at 108).
Nicole Patkalitsky, Child’s caseworker at CYS, testified that there is no
evidence of any bond between Mother and Child, and that Child has never
asked to see Mother. (See id. at 42). When asked if the termination of
Mother’s parental rights would have any negative impact on Child, Ms.
Patkalitsky answered, “None whatsoever.” (Id.). Ms. Patalinsky testified that
Child looks to his pre-adoptive foster mother, “for everything.” (Id. at 41).
Ms. Patkalitsky opined that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would
be in Child’s best interests. (See id. at 42).
The trial court entered its order involuntarily terminating Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b) on
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December 20, 2017. Mother filed her notice of appeal and concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal on January 22, 2018.
Mother raises the following question on appeal:
1. Whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of discretion
or error of law when it concluded that [CYS] established grounds
for termination of parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2),
(a)(5), and (a)(8)?
(Mother’s Brief, at 5).
Our standard of review is as follows:
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope
of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence
presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal
conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will
reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked
competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s
decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Further, we have stated:
Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by
competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court
even though the record could support an opposite result.
We are bound by the findings of the trial court
which have adequate support in the record so long as
the findings do not evidence capricious disregard for
competent and credible evidence. The trial court is
free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility
determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.
Though we are not bound by the trial court’s
inferences and deductions, we may reject its
conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are
clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court’s
sustainable findings.
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In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm the termination
of parental rights, this Court need only agree with any one subsection of
Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).
Requests to have a natural parent’s parental rights terminated are
governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard
to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on
any of the following grounds:
* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of
the parent by the court or under a voluntary
agreement with an agency, 12 months or more
have elapsed from the date of removal or
placement, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to
exist and termination of parental rights would
best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.—The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis
of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found
to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect
to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6)
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or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the
parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of
notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(8) and (b).
With regard to Section 2511(a)(8), in order to terminate
parental rights, an agency must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that (1) that the child has been removed from the care
of the parent for at least twelve (12) months; (2) that the
conditions which had led to the removal or placement of the child
still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights would best
serve the needs and welfare of the child.
In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights
bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by “clear and convincing
evidence,” a standard which requires evidence that is “so clear, direct,
weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Further,
[a] parent must utilize all available resources to preserve
the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness
in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-
child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for
a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental
responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her
physical and emotional needs.
In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
omitted).
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The Adoption Act provides that a trial court “shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The Act does not make specific
reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child but our case
law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481,
484 (Pa. 1993). However, this Court has held that the trial court is not
required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation
performed by an expert. In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super.
2008).
We have examined the record and are satisfied that it contains sufficient
credible evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).
Child was removed from Mother’s care in March of 2016 and has been
in foster care continuously since then. The conditions that led to Child’s
placement, Mother’s abuse of drugs and her inability to care for Child, exist in
that Mother admits to heroin use and has failed to meet any of the goals of
her child permanency plan. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion
when it terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to subsection (a)(8).
Although Mother did not challenge the termination of her parental rights
under subsection (b), our review of the record reveals sufficient evidence to
terminate her parental rights under that section.
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Ms. Patkalitsy’s testimony makes clear that there is no bond between
Mother and Child and that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would
have no detrimental effect on Child. Child is in a pre-adoptive foster home
where his foster parent provides for all his needs. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to
subsection (b).
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin
County that terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§
2511(a)(8) and (b).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/20/2018
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