Com. v. Saunders, S. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
SHAWN SAUNDERS, :
:
Appellant : No. 3383 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered November 20, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-23-CR-0001537-2000
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DONOHUE and LAZARUS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED JUNE 8, 2015
Appellant, Shawn Saunders (“Saunders”), appeals from the order
dated November 20, 2014, denying his “Motion for Facts Relevant to
Sentence” (hereinafter, the “Motion for Facts”) as an untimely petition for
relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9541-46
(“PCRA”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On March 5, 2001, a jury found Saunders guilty of murder in the
second degree, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2502(b), robbery, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3701,
illegal possession of a firearm without a license, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6106, and
conspiracy, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 903. The trial court sentenced him to life
imprisonment. On August 27, 2002, this Court affirmed his judgment of
sentence, and on December 2, 2003, our Supreme Court denied his petition
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for allowance of appeal. Since that time, Saunders has filed three petitions
for relief under the PCRA, all of which have been unsuccessful.
On November 13, 2014, Saunders filed a “Motion for Facts Relevant to
Sentence,” in which he requests to be advised “in writing as to what
sentencing authorities and statutory authorization that was employed by the
Court to impose the sentence(s) and sentencing conditions upon Defendant.”
Motion for Facts, 11/13/2014, ¶ 19. In so demanding, Saunders goes to
some length in arguing that his request is “wholly outside of the PCRA,”
particularly since the PCRA only provides for challenges to sentencing where
the imposition of sentence is greater than the lawful maximum. Id. ¶¶ 4-7.
In the Motion for Facts, Saunders insists that he wants to make it
“abundantly clear that he is not currently challenging the legality of the
sentence and sentencing conditions imposed on him because … [he] has not
been provided with enough information to adequately determine if his
detention is illegal.” Id. ¶ 17.
The trial court concluded that the Motion for Facts was “an untimely
PCRA petition dressed up to look like something else.” Trial Court Opinion,
1/22/2015, at 3. The trial court determined that the Motion for Facts was a
challenge to the legality of his sentence, and that the PCRA is the exclusive
remedy for such a challenge. Id. at 2-3. Because the Motion for Facts was
filed well beyond the one-year time bar pursuant to section 9545(b), the
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trial court denied it as being untimely filed. Trial Court Order, 11/20/2014,
at 1.
On appeal, Saunders contends that the trial court erred in treating his
Motion for Facts as an untimely PCRA petition because his request for
answers to questions regarding his sentence falls outside of the PCRA, and
that his constitutional right to due process entitles him to be “properly
informed on exactly what statute(s) authorized the Court to impose the
sentence(s) and sentencing condition(s).” Saunders’ Brief at 4. Our
standard of review from the denial of PCRA relief is to determine whether
the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the record and free of legal
error.” Commonwealth v. Gacobano, 65 A.3d 416, 419 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Nero, 58 A.3d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2012)).
We cannot conclude that the trial court erred in treating Saunders’
Motion for Facts as a thinly disguised attack on the legality of his sentence.
Claims contending that Pennsylvania courts lack the statutory authority to
sentence are frequently leveled in PCRA petitions, although most of the time
they are untimely and thereby preclude merits review. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1037-1038 (Pa. Super. 2007).
We note, however, that in a recent decision, Commonwealth v. Stultz,
2015 Pa. Super. 99 (Pa. Super. May 1, 2015), a panel of this Court
thoroughly debunked a series of these claims, including the lack of a savings
clause in the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution, the absence of an express
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state constitutional provision providing authority to enact a state crimes
code, the lack of authorization for the adoption of criminal rules of procedure
and rules of evidence, and the lack of an enacting clause for Pennsylvania’s
criminal statutes.
In addition, while Saunders claims that he is not formally challenging
the legality of his sentence1 in the Motion for Facts, in paragraphs 14 and 15
he essentially does so. Specifically, Saunders points out that “the sentence
imposed on the sentencing Order for ‘Possession of a Firearm without a
license’ is inconsistent with the sentence imposed during the sentencing
hearing for the same offense. Motion for Facts, 11/13/2014, ¶ 14. As a
result, Saunders argues that the sentencing order “is void of any statute on
its face that would authorize the imposed sentences,” and that this
discrepancy “raises(s) immediate questions of merit concerning the
sentencing court’s true intentions, as well as the matter of “Statutory
Authorization.” Id. ¶ 15.
This Court has “repeatedly held that ... any petition filed after the
judgment of sentence becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition.”
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 521 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting
1
Although illegality of sentence claims are technically not waivable, this
Court may not consider them without a jurisdictional basis to do so. As we
indicated in Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237 (Pa. Super. 2014),
“[t]hough not technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] claim may
nevertheless be lost should it be raised ... in an untimely PCRA petition for
which no time-bar exception applies, thus depriving the court of jurisdiction
over the claim.” Id. at 242.
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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291, 1293 (Pa. Super. 2002)). In
the Motion for Facts, Saunders is, implicitly, challenging the legality of his
sentence, and the PCRA plainly provides for relief for “persons serving illegal
sentences.” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9542; see Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722
A.2d 638, 640–41 (Pa. 1998) (statutory remedy not available where claim is
cognizable under PCRA); Commonwealth v. Hockenberry, 689 A.2d 283,
288 (Pa. Super. 1997) (legality of sentence is a cognizable issue under the
PCRA). The PCRA provides that it “shall be the sole means of obtaining
collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory
remedies for the same purpose....” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9542. Therefore, the
trial court did not err in treating Saunders’ Motion for Facts as a petition for
relief under the PCRA.
Even if we were to treat the Motion for Facts in the way that Saunders
insists, namely as a petition only seeking information and not in any respect
challenging the legality of his sentence, we would still affirm the trial court’s
order denying it.2 Saunders has not referred either the trial court or this
Court to any authority suggesting that a criminal defendant may, at any
point in time whatsoever, demand that a court provide him with information
regarding the statutory basis for his incarceration (or, frankly, with the
answers to any other questions). This Court is unaware of the existence of
2
This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision on any basis. See, e.g.,
Prieto Corp. v. Gambone Const. Co., 100 A.3d 602, 606 (Pa. Super.
2014).
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any such authority, whether in connection with the right to due process
under the constitutions of Pennsylvania and the United States or otherwise,
that would provide Saunders with any basis to demand answers to the
inquiries set forth in the Motion for Facts. As a result, even if it should not
have been treated as an untimely PCRA petition, the trial court did not err in
dismissing it.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/8/2015
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