Com. v. Leister, C. ( 2015 )


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  • J-A26044-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    CHRISTOPHER L. LEISTER,
    Appellant                 No. 113 MDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 11, 2014
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
    Criminal Division at No.: CP-14-SA-0000082-2014
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:                         FILED DECEMBER 07, 2015
    Appellant, Christopher L. Leister, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence imposed pursuant to his summary bench conviction of harassment,
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1). We affirm.
    The background facts and procedural history of this matter are as
    follows.    On July 28, 2014, a citation was filed against Appellant for
    harassment.       On August 8, 2014, the magisterial district justice found
    Appellant guilty.     On September 5, 2014, Appellant filed an appeal of the
    summary conviction to the trial court. The court held a de novo hearing on
    December 11, 2014.
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A26044-15
    At the hearing, Vincent Perry testified that he and his wife were driving
    in their neighborhood on their way home when he noticed Appellant’s vehicle
    in his “rear view mirror coming up on [them] pretty fast flashing [its] lights.”
    (N.T. Hearing, 12/11/14, at 4-5).          He stated that when he pulled into his
    driveway, Appellant drove behind him, exited his vehicle, complained that he
    had run a stop sign, threatened to beat up him and his wife approximately
    three or four times, and said “he was going to kick [their] ass.” (Id. at 5).
    After Appellant threatened them, he started walking toward Mr. Perry and
    his wife, who told him to get off their property several times. (See id. at 7).
    When Appellant finally got into his car and drove back onto the road, he
    stated “I am not on your f’ing property now.           Come on out here and I’ll
    [kick] your ass.” (Id. at 8). Mr. Perry’s wife called the police, and Appellant
    “peeled out and headed down the hill to his house.” (Id.).
    Conversely, Appellant testified that he asked Mr. Perry to “please quit
    running the stop sign,” to which Mr. Perry reacted by threatening to assault
    him.    (Id. at 10).      The court did not find Appellant’s testimony to be
    credible. (See Trial Court Opinion, 3/09/15, at 2-3).
    At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court convicted Appellant of
    harassment and sentenced him to fines and costs totaling approximately
    $450.00. On January 12, 2015, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.1
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Appellant filed a timely concise statement of errors complained of on
    appeal on February 5, 2015 pursuant to the trial court’s order.     See
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -2-
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    Appellant raises two questions for this Court’s review:
    I.    [Whether] the trial court committed an error of law and
    abuse of discretion in finding [Appellant] guilty of 18 Pa.C.S.[A.]
    §[]2709(a)(1), when evidence admitted at trial presented doubt
    as to [Appellant’s] guilt[?]
    II.   [Whether] the trial court committed an error of law and
    abuse of discretion in failing to recognize the de minimis nature
    of [Appellant’s] conduct and dismissing the matter pursuant to
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §[]312[?]
    (Appellant’s Brief, at 2) (most capitalization omitted).
    In his first issue, Appellant argues that “[t]he evidence at trial was
    insufficient to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Appellant] actually
    threatened Mr. Perry.” (Id. at 4). This issue is waived and does not merit
    relief.
    It is well-settled that, “when challenging the sufficiency of the
    evidence on appeal, [an] [a]ppellant’s 1925 statement must specify the
    element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient in order to
    preserve the issue for appeal.” Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 
    981 A.2d 274
    ,
    281 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 
    3 A.3d 670
     (Pa. 2010) (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted).
    In the case before us, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement does not
    identify which element or elements of harassment the Commonwealth
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court filed an opinion on March 9, 2015. See
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
    -3-
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    allegedly failed to prove.       (See Statement of Matters Complained of on
    Appeal, 2/05/15, at 1 ¶ 1).           Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to the
    sufficiency of the evidence is waived. See Gibbs, 
    supra at 281
    . Moreover,
    even if Appellant had not waived his sufficiency claim, it would not merit
    relief.
    Our standard of review of this matter is well-settled:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
    the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
    evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
    crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test,
    we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
    the fact-finder.    In addition, we note that the facts and
    circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
    preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
    defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
    evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
    probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
    circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
    proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
    by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.         Moreover, in
    applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
    all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
    [finder] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
    and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all,
    part or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Harden, 
    103 A.3d 107
    , 111 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
    omitted).
    Section 2709 of the Crimes Code provides, in pertinent part that “[a]
    person commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy
    or alarm another, the person . . . strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects
    the other person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the
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    same[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1) (emphasis added). “An intent to harass
    may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v.
    Cox, 
    72 A.3d 719
    , 721 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
    In the case sub judice, Mr. Perry testified that Appellant followed him
    in his car, approaching quickly, and flashing his lights. (See N.T. Hearing, at
    4-5).    After following Mr. Perry and his wife to their property, Appellant
    exited his vehicle, uttered profanities at them, and threatened to physically
    attack them.     (See id.).   Although repeatedly asked to leave, Appellant
    refused to do so until the police were contacted, and he then yelled
    obscenities again before he “peeled out and headed down the hill to his
    house.” (Id. at 8; see id. at 7). While Appellant gave a different version of
    events, the trial court found that he was not credible, a finding that we will
    not disturb. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 2-3); see also Harden, supra at 111.
    Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances and viewing the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner,
    we conclude that the trial court properly found that the evidence was
    sufficient to support Appellant’s harassment conviction on the basis of his
    threat to physically harm Mr. Perry and his wife.      See Harden, supra at
    111. Appellant’s first issue would not merit relief.
    In his second claim, Appellant argues that, even if the evidence was
    sufficient to support his conviction, the trial court erred when it did not
    dismiss the harassment charge as de minimis because “[t]he harassment
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    sought to be prevented with the enactment of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1)
    was not one neighbor informing another neighbor about a genuine safety
    concern.” (Appellant’s Brief, at 8-9). This issue does not merit relief.
    “Our standard of review of [this issue] is to evaluate the trial court’s
    ruling for an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Lutes, 
    793 A.2d 949
    ,
    963 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). Section 312 of the Crimes Code,
    de mimimis infractions, provides, in pertinent part:
    (a) General rule.─The court shall dismiss a prosecution if,
    having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute
    an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it
    finds that the conduct of the defendant:
    *    *    *
    (2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil
    sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so
    only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of
    conviction[.]
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 312(a)(2). “An offense alleged to be de minimis in nature
    should not be dismissed where either harm to the victim or society in fact
    occurs.” Lutes, 
    supra at 963
     (citation omitted).
    First, we agree with Appellant that the purpose of the harassment
    statute is not to prevent “one neighbor [from] informing another neighbor
    about a genuine safety concern.” (Appellant’s Brief, at 8-9). However, by
    its clear terms, the statute does seek to prevent an individual from
    threatening to cause physical harm to another.           See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
    2709(a)(1).
    -6-
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    In this case, when declining to dismiss Appellant’s harassment charge
    as de minimis, the trial court stated: “Appellant’s behavior caused Mr. Perry
    and his wife annoyance and/or alarm by threatening to subject them to
    physical contact. Further, Appellant’s behavior is not of the type customarily
    tolerated by society.” (Trial Ct. Op., at 4).
    We agree. Therefore, in reviewing the totality of the circumstances,
    we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
    dismiss Appellant’s harassment charge as de minimis. See Lutes, 
    supra at 963
    . Appellant’s second issue lacks merit.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/7/2015
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 113 MDA 2015

Filed Date: 12/7/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024