Com. v. Conaway, C. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
COREY CONAWAY
Appellant No. 2975 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order September 19, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005366-2010
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 05, 2015
Appellant Corey Conaway appeals from the September 19, 2014 order
of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his petition
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541
et seq. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the following procedural history:
On February 10, 2012, following a jury trial . . . ,
[Appellant] was convicted of one count of first degree
murder, (18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a)), one count of robbery (18
Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i)), one count of burglary (18 Pa.C.S.
§ 3502(a)), and one count of possessing an instrument of
crime (18 Pa.C.S. 907(a)). The [c]ourt immediately
imposed the mandatory sentence of life in prison for the
murder charge . . . . No further penalty was imposed on
the remaining charges. [Appellant] was represented at
trial and at sentencing by Thomas McGill, Esquire.
On March 9, 2012, [Appellant] filed a pro se [n]otice of
[a]ppeal, which the [c]ourt received on March 19, 2012.
The [c]ourt subsequently held a hearing, pursuant to
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Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa.1998), on
April 24, 2012, and permitted [Appellant] to proceed pro
se on appeal, while Mr. McGill was to remain as standby
counsel.
On November 5, 2012, the Superior Court dismissed
[Appellant’s] appeal for failure to file a brief. [Appellant]
then filed a pro se petition under the [PCRA] on November
4, 2013. Stephen O’Hanlon, Esquire was appointed to
represent [Appellant] on May 20, 2014.
On June 3, 2014, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley,
550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super.1988), Mr. O’Hanlon filed a letter
stating there was no merit to [Appellant’s] claims for
collateral relief. See Finley Letter of Stephen O’Hanlon,
filed 6/3/2014 (“Finley Letter”). On July 31, 2014, the
[c]ourt issued notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 (“907
Notice”) of its intent to dismiss [Appellant’s] PCRA
[p]etition without an evidentiary hearing. [Appellant] did
not file either a request to amend his PCRA petition, or a
response to the [c]ourt’s 907 Notice.
On August 26, 2014, [Appellant] filed a document styled
as an “Addendum to PCRA” (“Addendum”) raising
additional claims. On September 19, 2014, the [c]ourt
formally dismissed [Appellant’s] PCRA [p]etition and
granted Mr. O’Hanlon’s motion to withdraw his
appearance.
[Appellant] has now appealed the [c]ourt’s dismissal of his
PCRA [p]etition, alleging: 1) the [c]ourt erred by not
granting a hearing on his petition; 2) ineffective assistance
of PCRA counsel; 3) that [Appellant] was arrested illegally;
4) that [Appellant’s] confession was illegally obtained; 5)
that trial counsel was ineffective; 6) that [Appellant] was
brought before a [m]agistrate [j]udge without counsel; 7)
that the trial court improperly instructed the jury; and 8)
that [Appellant] was illegally charged and sentenced for
murder since the Commonwealth withdrew its [n]otice of
[a]ggravating [c]ircumstances. Matters Complained of on
Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.Proc. Rule [sic] 1925(b)
(“Statement of Errors”) at ¶¶ 1-8(c).
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Opinion, 12/23/2014.1
Appellant raises the following issues in the question presented section
of his appellate brief:
1. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred in dismissing
Appellant’s PCRA motion without an evidentiary hearing?
2. Whether the assistance of PCRA counsel Stephen T.
O’Hanlon, Esq., was ineffective at critical stages of his
stewardship?
a. Whether the assistance of said counsel was
ineffective in evaluating Appellant’s issues and
subsequently declaring issues are without merit?
b. Whether said counsel was ineffective in refusing to
file [amendment] claiming an additional issue on
behalf of Appellant prior to being allowed to
withdraw?
c. Whether Appellant was illegally sentenced by the
[t]rial [j]udge as opposed to a jury of his peers?
3. Whether Appellant was illegally arrested when the
circumstances of said arrest compared with those issue(s)
found in [Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct.
1371 (1980)]?
a. Whether Philadelphia [p]olice gained consent from
Appellant’s [m]other to enter Appellant’s home under
false pretense?
b. Whether Appellant was then placed under arrest
as defined in [Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 123
S. Ct. 1843 (2003)] despite claims that Appellant
went voluntarily to the police station?
c. Whether Philadelphia [p]olice had sufficient time
between identifying Appellant and securing/arresting
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1
Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
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Appellant to require an arrest warrant and having
not done so arrested Appellant illegally regardless of
alleged probable cause?
d. Whether all material evidence as well as
Appellant’s statement/confessions were fruit of the
poisonous tree?
4. Whether the intent of judicial decision met in [Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)] was
respected when [Philadelphia] [p]olice arrested Appellant,
questioned him and gained statements and subsequently
mirandized Appellant and then led Appellant through the
previously acquired statement?
a. Whether the evidence ascertained subsequent to
illegally acquiring the aforementioned statement is
fruit of the poisonous tree?
b. Whether Detective[s] Keen and Sierra, committed
perjury in claiming that Appellant was immediately
mirandized upon arrival at the police station?
5. Whether trial counsel [Mr.] McGill had adequate time to
prepare for trial having been reinstated as attorney of
record as opposed to Appellant proceeding pro se [on]
2/3/2012, and trial starting on [2/6/2012]?
a. Whether trial counsel [Mr.] McGill, should have
investigated the manner in which Appellant was
arrested and interrogated?
6. Whether [t]rial [c]ounsel was generally ineffective?
7. Whether Appellant[’s] [d]ue [p]rocess [r]ights were
violated when brought before a magistrate [j]udge in a
[j]udicial [p]roceeding as in [Rothgery v. Gillespie
County of Texas, 554 U.S. 191, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008)]?
8. Whether Judge Glenn B. Bronson’s jury instruction[s]
were unlawful compared to the judicial decision in
[Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S. Ct. 1965
(1985)]?
9. Whether [the assistant district attorney] amended or
withdrew the charge of first[-]degree murder, when she
withdrew the notice of aggravating circumstances of like
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document removing the “death penalty” from the table
since first degree is explicitly capital in its statutory
language?
a. Whether Appellant was illegally sentenced by the
trial judge pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a), 42
Pa.C.S. § 9711, 42 Pa.C.S. §9714, 18 Pa.C.S. §
4701?
b. Whether Appellant was illegally charged when he
was confronted with a non-specific charge viz,
“criminal homicide,” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2501, which
encompasses 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502[(a), (b), and (c)], §
2503, and § 2504, contrary to [Commonwealth v.
Little, 314 A.2d 270 (Pa.1974)] and [Albrecht v.
United States, 273 U.S. 1, 47 S. Ct. 250 (1927)]?
c. Whether the trial judge violated [Appellant’s]
rights when he amended the prosecution[’]s
charging instrument, changing criminal homicide 18
Pa.C.S. § 2501 into several specific charges, i.e., 18
Pa.C.S. § 2502(a), 2502(b), 2502(c), etc.?
Appellant’s Brief at 4-6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Appellant
raised the same issues in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Matters
Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1925(b), filed 11/5/2014.
In counsel’s Turner/Finley2 letter, counsel raised the following
issues: (1) Appellant was unlawfully arrested; (2) Appellant was not properly
advised of his Miranda rights; (3) Appellant had no counsel before a bail
commissioner; (4) trial counsel was generally ineffective; and (5) the jury
instruction regarding reasonable doubt was improper. Turner/Finley Letter
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2
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.1988); Finley, 550 A.2d
213.
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dated June 3, 2014 from Stephen T. O’Hanlon, Esq. to the Honorable Glenn
B. Bronson.
In Appellant’s “Addendum” filed after the trial court issued its notice of
intent to dismiss the PCRA petition, Appellant raised the following issues:
(1) Appellant was deprived of his due process rights when he was tried for,
and found guilty of, a capital offense after the prosecutor withdrew the
notice of aggravating circumstances; (2) Appellant’s due process rights were
violated when he was charged with “general homicide”; and (3) Appellant
was illegally sentenced because “he was sentenced outside of any
legislatively authorized sentencing statute, there was no presentencing
investigation and petitioner stood trial for a capital offense without the
prerequisite ‘aggravating circumstances’ being establish[ed] (being
withdrawn before trial).” Addendum, at 1-2.
Our standard of review from the denial of post-conviction relief “is
limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by
the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa.Super.2011) (citing
Commonwealth v. Morales, 701 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa.1997)).
Appellant first contends the trial court erred because it did not hold an
evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing his PCRA petition.
A PCRA petitioner “is not entitled to [an evidentiary] hearing as a
matter of right.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 945 A.2d 185, 188
(Pa.Super.2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1040
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(Pa.Super.2007)). “[T]he PCRA court can decline to hold a hearing if there
is no genuine issue concerning any material fact and the petitioner is not
entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no purpose would be served
by any further proceedings.” Id. (quoting Taylor, 933 A.2d at 1040).
The trial court found Appellant failed to specify any substantive claims
for which there are genuine issues of fact that would necessitate a hearing.
Opinion, 12/23/2014, at 12. This was not error.
Appellant’s second claim alleges PCRA counsel was ineffective because
counsel stated Appellant’s issues were meritless, refused to file an amended
PCRA petition, and failed to allege Appellant was illegally sentenced by a
judge, rather than the jury. Appellant’s Brief at 4. The addendum filed by
Appellant did not raise PCRA counsel ineffectiveness and Appellant did not
raise PCRA counsel ineffectiveness before the trial court, in either an
amended PCRA petition or a response to the trial court’s notice of intent.
Accordingly, Appellant has waived his PCRA counsel ineffectiveness claims.
See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 880 n.4 (Pa.2009) (Appellant
waived PCRA counsel ineffectiveness claim when not raised in response to
Turner/Finley letter or court’s notice of intent to dismiss).
Appellant’s third claim alleges Appellant was illegally arrested because:
(1) the police gained consent from his mother to enter the home under false
pretenses; (2) he was placed under arrest, and did not voluntarily go to the
police station; and (3) the police failed to obtain an arrest warrant.
Appellant’s Brief at 4. Appellant concludes that the evidence and statements
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obtained following Appellant’s illegal arrest were fruit of the poisonous tree.
Id. Appellant’s fourth claim alleges the police questioned him in violation of
Miranda, the evidence obtained after the illegal questioning is the fruit of
the poisonous tree, and the detectives committed perjury when they claimed
they read Appellant his Miranda warnings immediately after he arrived at
the police station. Id. at 4-5.
As presented, Appellant waived the claims raised in his third and
fourth issues by failing to raise them on direct appeal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b)
(“For purposes of this subchapter, an issue is waived if the petitioner could
have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review,
on appeal or in a prior state post-conviction proceeding.”). Further, even if
we view the claims as counsel ineffectiveness claims, the claims fail.
For ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the petitioner must
establish: “(1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no
reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered
actual prejudice as a result.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311
(Pa.2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa.2010)).
“[C]ounsel is presumed to be effective and the burden of demonstrating
ineffectiveness rests on appellant.” Ousley, 21 A.3d at 1244 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa.Super.2010)). “The
failure to prove any one of the three [ineffectiveness] prongs results in the
failure of petitioner’s claim.” Id. (quoting Rivera, 10 A.3d at 1279).
The PCRA court found:
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[Appellant] claims that he was illegally arrested, that
police obtained consent to enter his house under false
pretenses, that police had sufficient time to obtain an
arrest warrant, and that [Appellant’s] confession and all
material evidence derived from [Appellant’s] arrest was
the fruit of the poisonous tree. Statement of Errors at ¶¶
3-3(c), 4-4(b), 5(a), PCRA Petition at 10-11. The [c]ourt
will deem this claim to have been raised as the basis for a
claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.
Trial counsel vigorously asserted, in pretrial motions, all of
[Appellant’s] claims arising out his arrest, interrogation,
and the subsequent search and seizure of physical
evidence. N.T., 2/3/2012, at 22-105. Counsel argued that
[Appellant] was arrested without probable cause, that his
statement was the result of coercion, both psychological
and physical, that [Appellant’s] Miranda rights were
violated, and that the search warrant was tainted by
including information obtained from [Appellant’s]
confession. N.T., 2/3/2012, at 22-23. At the evidentiary
hearing held to address counsel’s motion to suppress the
confession and the physical evidence, counsel thoroughly
cross-examined the Commonwealth’s witnesses. N.T.,
2/3/2012, at 32-34, 66-77, 101-102. He conferred with
[Appellant], who advised counsel that he did not wish to
testify at the evidentiary hearing. N.T., 2/3/2012, at 103.
The record fails to demonstrate any manner in which
counsel failed to effectively assert [Appellant’s] claims to
the trial court. Accordingly, any ineffective assistance of
counsel claim premised upon [Appellant’s] claims
regarding his arrest, confession and the searches would be
clearly without merit.
Following the hearing, the [c]ourt found, based on the
evidence presented, that [Appellant] voluntarily went to
police headquarters after he was contacted by police, that
he was given Miranda warnings within eight minutes of
arriving at police headquarters, that he voluntarily waived
his rights and confessed, that the search warrant was
valid, and that the manner in which the searches were
conducted was lawful. N.T., 2/3/2012, at 103-105. As a
result, [Appellant’s] motions to suppress were denied.
That decision was fully supported by the record. While
[Appellant] could have had the Superior Court review that
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decision on appeal, his appeal was dismissed since
[Appellant], representing himself, failed to file a brief.
Therefore, [Appellant] is entitled to no further review of
this issue on this PCRA appeal.
Opinion, 12/23/2014, at 7-80. This was not error.
Appellant’s fifth claim alleges trial counsel did not have adequate time
to prepare for trial because his attorney was re-instated on February 3,
2012, and trial started February 6, 2012.3
The PCRA court found the following:
[Appellant] claims that counsel was ineffective as he did
not have “adequate time to prepare for trial having been
reinstated as attorney of record as opposed to [Appellant]
. . ." three days before trial began. Statement of Errors at
¶ 5(b), PCRA Petition at 13 -14. This claim is frivolous.
The record indicates that Mr. McGill entered his
appearance on February 9, 2010, and represented
[Appellant] throughout the entirety of the proceedings
either as trial counsel or as standby counsel. It is true that
the [c]ourt agreed to permit [Appellant] to represent
himself following a hearing on October 3, 2011, but
required Mr. McGill to remain in the case as standby
counsel. In that role, Mr. McGill was required to remain in
the case and provide any assistance necessary in trying
the case, including the possibility of taking over if
[Appellant] was not permitted, or declined, to represent
himself. In fact, after [Appellant] refused to accept the
jurisdiction and authority of the [c]ourt at the motions
hearing on February 3, 2012, Mr. McGill was ordered to
take over to handle the motions. N.T., 2/3/12, at 20-22.1
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3
The subpart of Appellant’s fifth issue claims counsel should have
investigated the manner in which Appellant was arrested and interrogated.
This issue was addressed in the discussion of Appellant’s third and fourth
issues. The trial court did not err when it found counsel was not ineffective
in his handling of the arrest and interrogation issues.
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As stated above, Mr. McGill was ready and able to
vigorously argue the motions. At trial, [Appellant] claimed
that he was a “third party intervener” and was not the
defendant on trial. He advised the [c]ourt that Mr. McGill
could represent “the defendant,” while simultaneously
objecting to Mr. McGill speaking on [Appellant’s] behalf.
N.T., 2/6/12, at 39-40. Given defendant’s continued
nonsensical and obstinate behavior, Mr. McGill was
directed to handle the trial as primary counsel. N.T.,
2/6/12, at 40. Mr. McGill, having represented defendant
for two years, was fully ready to proceed to trial. No relief
is due.
1
For example, [Appellant] stated, “Let the record
reflect that the man sitting on the bench is not a
judge.” N.T., 2/3/12, at 18.
Opinion, 12/23/2014, at 8-9. The trial court did not err when it found
Appellant’s claim meritless.
Appellant’s sixth claim asserts trial counsel was generally ineffective.
Appellant, however, fails to provide any specific allegation to support this
bald claim of ineffectiveness. This claim, therefore, fails.
Appellant’s seventh claim asserts his due process rights “were violated
when brought before a magistrate judge in a judicial proceeding as in
Rothgery v. Gillespie County of Texas.”4 Appellant’s Brief at 5. The trial
court found this claim frivolous, noting Appellant had counsel at the
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4
In Rothgery, the Supreme Court of the United States reaffirmed that: “a
criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he
learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks
the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213.
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preliminary arraignment, where the public defender represented him.
Opinion, 12/23/2014, at 9. This was not error.
Appellant’s eighth claim asserts the jury instructions were “unlawful
compared to the judicial decision in Francis v. Franklin.”5 Appellant’s Brief
at 5. In the PCRA proceedings, he claimed the burden of proof instructions
were improper. Turner/Finley Letter at 5-6. We will review the appellate
claim as challenging the burden of proof instruction. As with the illegal
arrest claims, Appellant waived this claim by failing to raise it on direct
appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). Further, the claim fails if viewed as an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to object to the jury
instructions. The trial court used the standard burden of proof jury
instruction, and counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to object to the
standard instruction. N.T., 2/9/2012, at 23-25; Commonwealth v.
Kerrigan, 920 A.2d 190, 198 (Pa.Super.2007) (it is “presumed [the
Pennsylvania Standard Criminal Jury Instructions] are an accurate statement
of the law.”).
Appellant’s ninth claim maintains the prosecutor withdrew the notice of
aggravating circumstances document, which removed the death penalty as a
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5
In Francis, the Supreme Court of the United States found the defendant’s
due process rights were violated “because a reasonable juror could have
understood the challenged portions of the jury instruction . . . as creating a
mandatory presumption that shifted to the defendant the burden of
persuasion on the crucial element of intent, and because the charge read as
a whole does not explain or cure the error.” 471 U.S. at 325.
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sentence, and claims, based on the withdrawal of this document, the trial
court illegally sentenced him to life in prison. Appellant’s Brief at 5-6. He
further argues he was illegally charged with a non-specific “criminal
homicide” charge, and the trial court amended the charging instrument by
separating the criminal homicide charge into “several specific charges.” Id.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 802 requires that the
Commonwealth provide a defendant with notice of aggravating
circumstances that it intends to submit at sentencing. Here, the
Commonwealth submitted a notice of aggravating circumstances because it
intended to seek the death penalty. The Commonwealth then withdrew this
notice when it determined it would not seek the death penalty. N.T.,
10/3/2011, at 7-8. The trial court found that every charge of first-degree
murder need not be a capital proceeding, the withdrawal of notice did not
alter the homicide charge, and an information need not specify the degree of
murder. Opinion, 12/23/2014; accord Commonwealth v. Chambers, 852
A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa.Super.2004); 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 1102(a), 2502. This was
not error.
The PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition is support
by the record. Therefore, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/5/2015
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