Com. v. Houston, K. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
KINYATTA HOUSTON,
Appellant No. 455 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 22, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0401601-1990
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2016
Appellant, Kinyatta Houston, proceeding pro se, appeals from the
January 22, 2016 order dismissing his petition for habeas corpus/writ of
coram nobis. We affirm.
The PCRA court recounted the procedural history and rendered its
decision on the instant petition, as follows:
On January 3, 1991, [Appellant] entered into a guilty plea
before the Honorable Carolyn Temin to two counts of Aggravated
Assault, two counts of Criminal Conspiracy, and one count of
Theft by Unlawful Taking. [Appellant] was sentenced to an
aggregate term of imprisonment of two to five years. No direct
appeal was filed.
On March 11, 2015, [Appellant] filed the instant petition.
After conducting an extensive and exhaustive review of these
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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filings, the record and applicable case law, this [c]ourt found that
[Appellant] was no longer subject to a sentence for the
conviction. Therefore, this [c]ourt did not have jurisdiction to
consider [Appellant’s] [Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)]
petition.
PCRA Court Opinion, 1/22/16, at 1.
The PCRA court explained:
Eligibility for relief under the PCRA is governed by 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9543, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.-To be eligible for relief under this
subchapter, the petitioner must plead and prove by a
preponderance of the evidence all of the following:
(1) That the petitioner has been convicted of a crime under
the laws of this Commonwealth and is:
(i) currently serving a sentence of
imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime;
(ii) awaiting execution of a sentence of death for the
crime; or
(iii) serving a sentence which must expire before the
person may commence serving the disputed sentence.
(Emphas[e]s added).
Upon review, the record reveals that [Appellant] is not
currently subject to a sentence for the instant conviction. The
instant petition was filed on March 11, 2015, which is almost 20
years after [Appellant] finished serving his sentence. Therefore,
pursuant to the plain language of the statute, [Appellant] is not
eligible for relief.
[Appellant] argues that he filed a Writ of Coram Nobis and
should not be subject to the dictates of the Post Conviction Relief
Act. This position is contrary to the language of the PCRA, which
explicitly states that “[t]he action established in this subchapter
shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and
encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for
the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect,
including habeas corpus and coram nobis.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542.
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For the above reasons, [Appellant’s] claims are meritless,
and his arguments do not warrant any grant of relief from this
court, and the petition is therefore denied due to lack of
standing.
PCRA Court Opinion, 1/22/16, at 2 (emphasis in original).
Appellant raises seven issues for review:
1. Whether Judge Minehart erred in dismissing
Appellant’s Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition?
2. Whether the Writ of Habeas Corpus exist[s] where
there is no remedy under Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)?
3. Whether Appellant was charged with an aggravated
assault in the 1990 incident?
4. Whether Appellant can plea to a charge in which he
was never formally charged?
5. Whether Appellant’s Constitutional Rights [were]
violated?
6. Whether a court has authority to leave in place a
conviction or sentence that violates a substantive Rule?
7. Whether a court may deny a controlling right asserted
under the Constitution?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA
court’s determinations are supported by the record and are free of legal
error.” Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 603 (Pa. 2013) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 259 (Pa. 2011)).
Because our jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant’s petition is
at question, we address that issue ab initio. Having done so, we conclude
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.
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Descardes, 136 A.3d 493 (Pa. 2016), is dispositive. Therein, the High
Court stated:
[T]his Court has consistently held that, pursuant to the plain
language of Section 9542, where a claim is cognizable under the
PCRA, the PCRA is the only method of obtaining collateral
review. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 622 Pa. 318, 80 A.3d
754, 770 (2013) (“The PCRA at Section 9542 subsumes the
remedies of habeas corpus and coram nobis.”).
Descardes, 136 A.3d at 501 (some citations omitted). The Court
reemphasized that “where a petitioner’s claim is cognizable under the PCRA,
the PCRA is the only method of obtaining collateral review.” Id. at 503.
The allegations included in the instant petition for habeas corpus/writ
of coram nobis can be summarized as follows: 1) Appellant’s guilty plea for
aggravated assault was unlawful because he was not charged with
aggravated assault and did not commit this offense; 2) the guilty plea was
unconstitutional because it was without factual basis; 3) Appellant’s federal
due process rights were violated when he pled guilty to an uncharged
offense, and 4) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept the plea. Petition
for State Habeas Relief/Writ of Coram Nobis, 3/11/15, at 1–4. 1
Each of Appellant’s allegations is cognizable under the PCRA.
Regarding the lawfulness of Appellant’s guilty plea, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543
(a)(2)(iii) provides that one is eligible for collateral relief if a preponderance
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1
We note that the record certified on appeal indicates that Appellant was
charged with aggravated assault.
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of the evidence proves that the conviction or sentence resulted from “a plea
of guilty unlawfully induced where the circumstances made it likely that the
inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is
innocent.” Additionally, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i), affording PCRA relief
when a conviction or sentence resulted from a constitutional violation,
subsumes Appellant’s claims that his guilty plea was unconstitutional and
that his due process rights were violated. Finally, PCRA relief is available
when the conviction or sentence resulted from “a proceeding in a tribunal
without jurisdiction.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(viii). Therefore, as
Appellant’s claims are cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA court correctly
adjudicated his petition under the PCRA.
One of the tenets concerning eligibility for relief under the PCRA is that
the petitioner is “currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or
parole for the crime.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i). The PCRA court found
that the instant petition was filed almost twenty years after Appellant
finished serving his sentence. This finding is aptly supported by the record.
Therefore, the PCRA court properly dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction. See Descardes, 136 A.3d at 503 (where claim was cognizable
under the PCRA, petition should be dismissed when petitioner was no longer
incarcerated).
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/23/2016
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