Com. v. Lukehart, R. ( 2014 )


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  • J-A35034-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    ROBERT LEE LUKEHART,
    Appellant                  No. 1926 WDA 2013
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 6, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-05-CR-0000463-2011
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, and ALLEN, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                      FILED DECEMBER 30, 2014
    Robert Lee Lukehart appeals from the judgment of sentence of five to
    ten years incarceration to be followed by ten years probation imposed by the
    trial court after Appellant pled guilty but mentally ill to charges of
    involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”) with a child, aggravated
    indecent assault, and two counts of indecent assault. We affirm.
    Appellant entered a guilty plea based on his molestation of his two
    minor step-daughters, aged four and six. The court directed that Appellant
    be assessed by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (“SOAB”). Herbert
    Hays, a member of the SOAB for sixteen years, evaluated Appellant.       He
    testified as an expert in the treatment and assessment of sex offenders at
    Appellant’s sexually violent predator (“SVP”)/sentencing hearing. Mr. Hays
    reviewed the police reports and was present for an interview with Appellant.
    J-A35034-14
    According to Mr. Hays, Appellant demonstrated grooming behavior and used
    his position as the children’s step-father to enable himself to sexually abuse
    the children. Mr. Hays noted that Appellant claimed that his sexual activity
    with the children was for educational purposes and “training them to
    understand AIDS.”    N.T., 11/6/13, at 11. Appellant denied being sexually
    attracted to the children; however, the abuse occurred over a two-year time
    period.   Specifically, Appellant had the children perform oral sex on him,
    would fondle and digitally penetrate their vaginas, and make them touch his
    penis. He told the children that, if they reported the conduct, he would kill
    both the girls and their mother.   Based on these factors, Mr. Hays opined
    that Appellant met the criteria for pedophilia and that this condition made it
    likely that he would commit a sexually violent offense in the future.
    Appellant presented his own expert, Dr. Edwin Tan. Dr. Tan testified
    as an expert in psychiatry.   He earlier had provided a report in which he
    found Appellant incompetent to stand trial based on a delusional disorder.
    At the SVP hearing, he asserted that there was no indication that Appellant
    molested the children for purposes of sexual gratification.       This was in
    contradiction to Mr. Hays’ testimony.    According to Dr. Tan, there was no
    prior history of sexual abuse and that the molestation occurred as the
    “product of his mental illness.” Id. at 42. In his view, Appellant was not a
    pedophile.   However, Dr. Tan acknowledged he was not familiar with the
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    statute regarding SVP’s and did not know the definition of predatory
    behavior under that law.
    The trial court rejected Dr. Tan’s diagnosis and found that the
    Commonwealth established by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant
    met the criteria for being an SVP. It then proceeded to sentence Appellant
    to the aforementioned periods of incarceration and probation based on the
    plea agreement for the IDSI count.       The court also imposed concurrent
    sentences of three to six years to be followed by four years probation for the
    aggravated indecent assault charge, and nine months to two years
    incarceration followed by three years probation for both indecent assault
    crimes.
    Appellant timely appealed.    The trial court directed Appellant to file
    and serve a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on
    appeal.    Appellant complied and the court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) order.
    The matter is now ready for our review. Appellant’s sole issue on appeal is
    as follows.
    I.      Whether the trial court erred when it ruled that the
    Commonwealth demonstrated by clear and convincing
    evidence that Appellant is a sexually violent predator in
    contradiction to evidence to the contrary presented by
    Appellant?
    Appellant’s brief at 7.
    Appellant’s claim relates to the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes
    of his being classified as an SVP.     In considering the sufficiency of the
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    evidence with respect to an SVP designation, we “must be able to conclude
    that the fact-finder found clear and convincing evidence that the individual is
    a sexually violent predator.”        Commonwealth v. Morgan, 
    16 A.3d 1165
    ,
    1168 (Pa.Super. 2011).           In evaluating the evidence, “we view all the
    evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to
    the Commonwealth.” 
    Id.
    Our Supreme Court comprehensively and cogently discussed the
    requirements and burden of proof applicable in determining whether a
    defendant is an SVP in Commonwealth v. Meals, 
    912 A.2d 213
     (Pa.
    2006).1 Relevant to this case, Meals set forth that an SVP is a person who
    “due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder” is “likely to engage in
    predatory sexually violent offenses.” 
    Id. at 218
    .
    The Meals Court continued, “The statute defines ‘mental abnormality’
    as ‘a congenital or acquired condition of a person that affects the emotional
    or volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes that person
    to the commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the person
    a menace to the health and safety of other persons.’” 
    Id.
     Further, “[t]he
    term ‘predatory,’ in turn, is defined as ‘an act directed at a stranger or at a
    person with whom a relationship has been initiated, established, maintained
    or promoted, in whole or in part, in order to facilitate or support
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Meals discussed Megan’s Law II. Appellant is subject to a more recent
    version of Megan’s Law.
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    victimization.’”   
    Id.
       Pedophilia is considered a mental abnormality under
    Pennsylvania law.
    The High Court in Meals also delineated the governing law with
    respect to the clear and convincing evidence standard.       The Court therein
    opined that the standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence is “an
    ‘intermediate’ test, which is more exacting than a preponderance of the
    evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id.
    Under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be “so clear,
    direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a
    clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
    
    Id. at 219
    .
    Appellant argues that Mr. Hays could not determine the time frame for
    the offenses, thereby precluding a finding that the acts occurred over more
    than a six-month time frame. In order to be considered a pedophile under
    Megan’s Law, the abuser must have sexual fantasies, urges, or behaviors
    involving prepubescent children over at least six months. Appellant asserts
    that “there was simply no way to know whether these acts occurred in the
    course of one week or two months[.]” Appellant’s brief at 16. In addition,
    Appellant submits that Mr. Hays acknowledged that Appellant had no
    documented prior history of sex offenses.
    Appellant further suggests that the “trial court’s determination that he
    is a sexually violent predator flies in the face of the expert testimony to the
    contrary by an expert in the field of psychiatry.”     Id. at 24.   In essence,
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    Appellant asks this Court to reweigh and reconsider the expert testimony.
    Appellant’s entire argument disregards our standard of review.      Here,
    Mr. Hays found that Appellant did exhibit sexual behaviors involving
    prepubescent children for over six months.    He based this finding on the
    criminal information and police reports that indicated the abuse occurred
    between a one-to-two-year period. Since the trial court was free to accept
    Mr. Hays’ testimony, there was no abuse of discretion.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/30/2014
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1926 WDA 2013

Filed Date: 12/30/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021