Com. v. Bird, M. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
MICHAEL JOHN BIRD, :
:
Appellant : No. 2100 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 25, 2013,
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
Criminal Division, at No. CP-36-CR-0004371-2012.
BEFORE: PANELLA, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2016
Appellant, Michael John Bird, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered following his conviction of two counts of indecent assault. We
vacate the judgment of sentence in part and remand for imposition of a
twenty-five-year period of registration under SORNA.1
The trial court summarized the history of this case as follows:
On or about April 20, 2012, [Appellant] was charged with
[one count each] of indecent assault under 18 Pa.C.S. §
3126(a)(1) contact without the complainant’s consent and [18
Pa.C.S.] § 3126(a)(4) contact where the complainant is
unconscious or the person knows the complainant was unaware
the contact was occurring. These charges arise out of a single
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-
9799.41.
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incident that transpired on September 16, 2011. On that date,
[Appellant] cut the pants and underwear off [of] J.A. . . . while
she was sleeping.
An offense under § [3126(a)(1)] is classified as a Tier I
sexual offense requiring a fifteen (15) year registration period.
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(b); see also 42 Pa.C.S.
§9799.15(a)(1). An offense under § [3126(a)(4)] is classified as
a Tier II sexual offense and requires a twenty-five (25) year
registration period. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(c); see also 42
Pa.C.S. §9799.15(a)(2). If a person receives a conviction on
two or more Tier I or Tier II offenses, that person is classified as
a Tier III sexual offender and lifetime registration is required.
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(d)(16); see also 42 Pa.C.S.
§9799.15(a)(3).
On April 9, 2013, the court ordered a pre-sentence
investigation upon [Appellant’s] entering of an open guilty plea
on the above counts. The court further ordered [Appellant] be
evaluated by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (“Board”).
The Board determined that [Appellant] did not meet the criteria
of a sexually violent predator [(“SVP”)].
On July 30, 2013, [Appellant] received the following
sentences:
[Indecent Assault] (§ 3126(a)(4); misdemeanor 1) 4
to 12 months incarceration + 4 years [of] probation
[Indecent Assault] (§ 3126(a)(4); misdemeanor 2) 2
years [of] probation consecutive to count 1
The total period of supervision totaled seven (7) years, and
[Appellant] was classified as a Tier III sexual offender requiring
lifetime registration.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/24/13, at 1-2.
Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on August 9, 2013,
arguing that the imposition of separate sentences was illegal because the
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convictions merged for sentencing purposes and that the trial court erred in
classifying Appellant as a Tier III SORNA offender instead of a Tier II
offender.2 On September 10, 2013, the trial court entered an order vacating
the sentence of July 30, 2013, and indicating that resentencing was
scheduled for October 25, 2013.
On October 25, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of
incarceration of five to twelve months, to be followed by a consecutive term
of probation of four years on the indecent assault conviction at 18 Pa.C.S. §
3126(a)(4). Also on that date, the trial court indicated that it was not
changing the imposition of lifetime registration under SORNA. This appeal
followed.
2
SORNA has three legislative predecessors: Megan’s Law, which our
Supreme Court held unconstitutional in 1999 in Commonwealth v.
Williams, 733 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1999); Megan’s Law II, which our Supreme
Court found constitutional in part in Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d
962 (Pa. 2003); and Megan’s Law III, which took effect in January of 2005.
On December 20, 2011, the legislature enacted SORNA, which became
effective on December 20, 2012. SORNA requires offenders to register with
state police and notify community authorities in the area where they reside.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15. The time period for which a particular offender must
register depends on whether the offender has been convicted of a Tier I, Tier
II, or Tier III sexual offense. Id.
Under SORNA, an individual convicted of a Tier I sexual offense must
register as a sex offender for a period of 15 years. 42 Pa.C.S. §
9799.15(a)(1). An individual convicted of a Tier II sexual offense must
register as a sex offender for a period of 25 years. 42 Pa.C.S. §
9799.15(a)(2). A Tier III offender must register as a sex offender for life.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a)(3). In addition, SORNA defines a Tier III offense as
“[t]wo or more convictions of offenses listed as Tier I or Tier II sexual
offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(d)(16).
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Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
DID NOT THE COURT COMMIT AN ERROR OF LAW BY
IMPOSING A LIFETIME SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION PERIOD
IN RELIANCE ON THE “TWO OR MORE CONVICTIONS”
PROVISION OF THE SORNA STATUTE, 42 Pa.C.S.
§9799.14(d)(16), WHEN IN FACT [APPELLANT] WAS PROPERLY
CONVICTED OF A SINGLE CRIMINAL OFFENSE THAT WAS
DESCRIBED IN THE CHARGING DOCUMENT AS SATISFYING TWO
ALTERNATIVE BASES OF CULPABILITY IN THE APPLICABLE
OFFENSE DEFINITION?
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
Appellant argues that the trial court improperly imposed upon him the
lifetime registration requirements of SORNA. Appellant’s Brief at 15-38.
Appellant concedes that his offense of indecent assault under 18 Pa.C.S. §
3126(a)(4) (occurring when the complainant is unconscious) requires a
registration period of twenty-five years. Appellant’s Brief at 15. However,
of particular importance is Appellant’s assertion that the provisions of
SORNA’s lifetime registration requirement should not apply to him because
the offenses for which he was convicted arose from a single act and because
he had no prior convictions predating the instant convictions. Id. at 35-38.
Appellant contends that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799(d)(16) must be interpreted as
embodying a recidivist philosophy requiring that Appellant be convicted for
an enumerated offense that antedated the commission of the current
offense. Id. Based upon recent precedent issued by our Supreme Court,
we are compelled to agree.
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Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law.
Commonwealth v. Concordia, 97 A.3d 366, 373 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing
Commonwealth v. Sarapa, 13 A.3d 961 (Pa. Super. 2011)). Accordingly,
our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary. Id.As previously noted, SORNA established a three-tiered system for
classifying sexually violent offenses and provided for corresponding
registration periods. Tier I requires registration for fifteen years, Tier II
twenty-five years, and Tier III lifetime registration. 42 Pa.C.S. §
9799.15(a)(1)-(3). Relevant to this appeal, indecent assault occurring when
the complainant is unconscious under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(4), is classified
as a Tier II offense. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(c)(1.3). A conviction of indecent
assault under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1), is classified as a Tier I offense. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(b)(6). However, pertaining to Tier III offenses, 42
Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(d)(16) requires lifetime registration for offenders with
“[t]wo or more convictions of offenses listed as Tier I or Tier II sexual
offenses.” Thus, Appellant had two convictions each falling within either Tier
I or Tier II. As such, the trial court concluded that Appellant’s two
convictions subjected him to lifetime registration under Tier III.
Recently, our Supreme Court issued rulings on the issue presented by
Appellant in A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, ___ A.3d ___, 2016 WL
4273568 (Pa. filed August 15, 2016), and Commonwealth v. Lutz-
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Morrison, ___ A.3d ___, 2016 WL 4273555 (Pa. filed August 15, 2016).
We find these two decisions dispositive of the issue presently before us. 3 We
are mindful that the Pennsylvania Superior Court “is obliged to follow the
precedent as set forth by our Supreme Court.” Commonwealth v.
Hayward, 756 A.2d 23, 38 (Pa. Super. 2000).
In A.S., the appellee was twenty-one years old when he met and
engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with a sixteen-year-old girl.
A.S. ___ A.3d at ___, 2016 WL 4273568 at *2. The minor victim took and
transmitted to the appellee sexually explicit photographs of herself. In
addition, the appellee photographed the victim and himself engaging in
sexual acts. Id. The victim’s father eventually discovered the photographs
on the victim’s computer and contacted the police. Id.3
Initially, our Supreme Court deferred briefing in A.S. pending its
resolution of the same issue in Commonwealth v. Mielnicki, 45 MAP 2013.
In Commonwealth v. Mielnicki, 53 A.3d 930, 721 EDA 2011 (Pa. Super.
filed June 13, 2012) (unpublished memorandum), a panel of this Court
found no merit to the appellant’s issue that Megan’s Law II’s lifetime
registration requirement should not apply where the offenses and
convictions arose from a single proceeding and where the appellant had no
prior convictions predating the instant offenses. On July 2, 2013, our
Supreme Court granted the appellant’s request for allowance of appeal,
Commonwealth v. Mielnicki, 71 A.3d 245 (Pa. 2013), and heard oral
argument on March 11, 2014. However, on December 15, 2014, our
Supreme Court issued an order dismissing the appeal as having been
improvidently granted. Commonwealth v. Mielnicki, 105 A.3d 1256 (Pa.
2014). Subsequently, the appeal in A.S. proceeded before our Supreme
Court. In the instant matter, the Commonwealth suggested to stay the
decision in this appeal “pending the ultimate decision” of our Supreme Court
on the issue. Commonwealth’s Brief at 8.
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In December of 2000, a criminal complaint was filed in Montgomery
County charging the appellee, a first-time offender, with seven counts of
sexual abuse of children for photographing sexual acts, twenty counts of
sexual abuse of children for possessing child pornography, and one count
each of unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of minors, and criminal
solicitation. Id. at *2. On October 5, 2001, the appellee entered an open
guilty plea to single counts of sexual abuse of children and unlawful contact
with a minor—each of which was an enumerated offense for purposes of
Megan’s Law II reporting under section 9795.1(a)—and corruption of minors,
which was not an enumerated offense. Id. The remaining charges were
withdrawn. Id. On February 28, 2002, the appellee was sentenced to
concurrent terms of incarceration of five to twenty-three months on the first
two counts and a consecutive five-year probationary term for corruption of
minors. Id. at *3. The appellee also was advised that he was subject to a
ten-year registration period under Megan’s Law II. In addition, the appellee
was found not to be an SVP and not subject to lifetime registration under the
provision applicable to SVPs. Id.
After the appellee was released from prison in August 2002, he
registered as a sex offender with the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”).
Following completion of his reporting obligation in 2012, the appellee
requested the PSP to remove his name from the sexual offender’s registry.
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Id. The PSP refused, claiming that the appellee’s plea to both enumerated
offenses triggered lifetime registration under section 9795.1(b)(1) because
he was “an individual with two or more convictions.” Id. The appellee then
filed a mandamus action in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction.
In A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 87 A.3d 914 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014),
the Commonwealth Court addressed the issue of whether, pursuant to
Megan’s Law II, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1, the appellee’s two convictions should
be treated as a single conviction, warranting a ten-year sex-offender
registration, or as two separate convictions, mandating lifetime registration.
The Commonwealth Court found in favor of the appellee, and the state police
appealed.
On August 15, 2016, our Supreme Court rendered its decision in A.S.
and affirmed the award of mandamus relief. At the outset of its decision,
our Supreme Court held that “the statute, which sets forth a graduated
scheme of registration, encompasses a recidivist philosophy.” A.S., at *1.
Consequently, the Court concluded that “the statute requires an act, a
conviction, and a subsequent act to trigger lifetime registration for multiple
offenses otherwise triggering a ten-year period of registration.” Id. at *1,
*10.
On the same day, our Supreme Court issued its decision in Lutz-
Morrison ___ A.3d ___, 2016 WL 4273555. In Lutz-Morrison, the police
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executed a search warrant for the home in which the twenty-two-year-old
appellant lived, and seized four computers and an iPhone. Id. at *2. The
appellant admitted to downloading child pornography, and he was charged
with seventy-seven counts of sexual abuse of children for his possession of
the child pornography, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(d). Id. Ultimately,
the appellant entered an open guilty plea to three counts of possession of
child pornography, and the remaining counts were withdrawn. The appellant
was sentenced to consecutive one-year terms of probation on each count.
Id. The trial court notified the appellant that his convictions subjected him
to lifetime registration under SORNA as a Tier III offender. The trial court
determined that the “two or more convictions of offenses” necessary to
trigger lifetime registration under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(d)(16) may arise
from the same criminal information. Id. On appeal, a panel of this Court
affirmed the trial court’s decision, and our Supreme Court granted allowance
of appeal. Commonwealth v. Lutz-Morrison, 107 A.3d 230, 1659 MDA
2013 (Pa. Super. Sept. 18, 2014) (unpublished memorandum), appeal
granted, 112 A.3d 1209 (Pa. 2015).
As our Supreme Court explained, the issue presented was “similar to
the issue posed in A.S. v. Pa. State Police.” Lutz-Morrison, ___ A.3d at
___, 2016 WL 4273555 at *1. The Court stated that “A.S. involved the
proper construction of the lifetime-registration triggering language ‘two or
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more convictions’ in Megan’s Law II, Pennsylvania’s former sex offender
registration statute.” Id. The Court acknowledged that the appeal in Lutz-
Morrison “concerns nearly identical triggering language brought over into
Section 9799.14” of SORNA. Id.In reversing the decision of the Superior Court and remanding for the
imposition of a fifteen-year reporting period under SORNA, the Court in
Lutz-Morrison stated that its resolution was controlled by its decision in
A.S. Lutz-Morrison, ___ A.3d at ___, 2016 WL 4273555 at *2. The Court
stated:
[W]e hold that [SORNA’s] Section 9799.14, considered in the
context of the statutory language as a whole, is susceptible to
two reasonable constructions, and the statute, which sets forth
a graduated (three-tier) scheme of registration, encompasses a
recidivist philosophy. As such, the statute requires an act,
a conviction, and a subsequent act to trigger lifetime
registration for multiple offenses otherwise subject to a fifteen-
or twenty-five-year period of registration.
Id. (emphases added). Our Supreme Court then reversed this Court’s order
affirming the decision of the trial court and remanded for the “imposition of
a fifteen-year reporting requirement under SORNA.” Id.Upon review of the certified record, we conclude that Appellant’s issue
is controlled by our Supreme Court’s decisions in A.S. and Lutz-Morrison.
As noted, Appellant pled guilty to two charges of indecent assault related to
a single incident in which he used scissors to cut the jeans and underwear
off of a sleeping woman. Specifically, Appellant pled guilty at count one to
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indecent assault under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(4), which involves the
complainant being “unconscious,” as the victim was sleeping at the time of
the offense. He also pled guilty to indecent assault at count two under 18
Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1), which involves an offense committed “without the
complainant’s consent.” Prior to Appellant’s sentencing, SORNA was
enacted. The conviction under count one is a Tier II offense pursuant to
SORNA and requires a twenty-five-year registration. The conviction under
count two is a Tier I offense under SORNA and requires a fifteen-year
registration. The trial court concluded that the two separate convictions
result in Appellant being classified as a Tier III offender under 42 Pa.C.S.
9799.14(d)(16), which requires lifetime registration.
However, in light of the recent precedential decisions of our Supreme
Court in A.S. and Lutz-Morrison, the statute requires an act, a conviction,
and a subsequent act in order to trigger the lifetime registration under 42
Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(d)(16). This was not the case herein because both of
Appellant’s convictions stem from the same act. Accordingly, we are
compelled to vacate the portion of the judgment of sentence relating to the
imposition of a lifetime registration under SORNA, and remand for imposition
of a twenty-five-year reporting period as required under SORNA.
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Judgment of sentence vacated in part. Case remanded for
proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/23/2016
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