Com. v. Flowers, N. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
NYEM FLOWERS,
Appellant No. 188 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 18, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012140-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, and SHOGAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 12, 2016
Appellant Nyem Flowers appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed after the trial court denied his Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 motion to dismiss
and convicted him of retail theft. After careful review, we reverse the trial
court’s order, vacate the judgment of sentence, and discharge Appellant.
The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute as Appellant
entered into a stipulated trial. If called to testify, Lymaris Rodriguez, the
manager of a Rite-Aid store in Philadelphia, would state that she observed
Appellant take video games from a stand in the store and place them in his
bag. When Ms. Rodriguez confronted Appellant, he returned some of the
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games. N.T. 12/18/14, at 7. Officer Lai,1 an off-duty Philadelphia police
officer, would recount that he confronted Appellant and asked for
identification. Id. at 7–8. Appellant left his wallet with the officer and ran
from the store with some games still in his bag. Id. The incident was
captured on video, and Appellant admitted that he took the games and put
them in his bag. Id. at 8.
The trial court summarized the procedural history, as follows:
The criminal act in question occurred on April 23, 2013.
The criminal complaint was filed on May 10, 2013. Appellant
was arrested on September 9, 2013 and his preliminary
arraignment was held on September 10, 2013. A preliminary
hearing was then scheduled on September 26, 2013. Appellant
was held for court at his preliminary hearing, and formal
arraignment was scheduled for October 17, 2013. After his
arraignment, court staff scheduled a pre-trial conference for
November 6, 2013. At the November 6 pre-trial conference, a
discovery request was put on the record and the case was
scheduled for a trial on December 30, 2013. Additionally, a writ
was prepared to secure Appellant’s presence from custody in
Delaware County. On December 20, [2013,] the case was
administratively re-listed for trial on February 11, 2014.
On February 11, [2014,] the Commonwealth was not
ready, as an officer failed to appear, and the Commonwealth
made its first request for a continuance. Additionally, Appellant
was not brought down from Delaware County. The case was
continued to April 7, 2014. On April 7, [2014,] the
Commonwealth was not ready, as a loss-prevention officer from
the victim store failed to appear. Appellant’s location had
changed from Delaware County custody to Montgomery County
custody in the interim. Appellant was not brought to court from
Montgomery County custody. The case was continued to
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1
Officer Lai’s first name is not identified in the record.
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May 22, 2014, and a writ was prepared to secure Appellant’s
presence from Montgomery County.
On May 22, [2014,] it was determined that Appellant had
been moved to state custody at SCI Camp Hill in the interim and
was therefore not brought down. Both parties were otherwise
ready for trial. The case was scheduled for July 14, 2014, the
next possible date consistent with this court’s calendar, and a
writ was prepared. On July 14, [2014,] the Commonwealth was
not ready, as a defective copy of the relevant surveillance video
had been passed in discovery, and the Commonwealth sought a
continuance to correct the issue. The case was then scheduled
for October 6, 2014, the earliest possible date consistent with
this court’s calendar, and a writ was prepared.
On October 6, [2014,] the Commonwealth was not ready,
as the loss-prevention officer from the victim store failed to
appear. The case was then scheduled for December 18, 2014,
and a writ was prepared for Appellant to be brought down from
state custody. On December 18, 2014 this court heard and
denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 600. The case
then proceeded by way of an open stipulated trial and Appellant
was found guilty of retail theft. This court sentenced Appellant
to a term of one to two years of incarceration, concurrent to any
other prison sentence he was then serving, followed by four
years non-reporting probation.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/15, at 2–3.
Appellant raises a single issue for our consideration on appeal:
Did not the lower court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion to
dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, because, including the
time attributable to the conventional progression of a criminal
case and the time attributable to the Commonwealth due to its
non-diligent delay, and excluding the time not counted due to
delay beyond the Commonwealth’s control, more than 365 days
had elapsed before [Appellant] was brought to trial?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
In evaluating a Rule 600 issue,
[O]ur standard of review of a trial court’s decision is
whether the trial court abused its discretion.
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Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with
law, upon facts and circumstances judicially before
the court, after hearing and due consideration. An
abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is
overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised
is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the
evidence or the record, discretion is abused.
The proper scope of review is limited to the
evidence on the record of the Rule [600] evidentiary
hearing, and the findings of the [trial] court. An
appellate court must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party. Additionally, when
considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court is not
permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule
[600]. Rule [600] serves two equally important
functions: (1) the protection of the accused’s
speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society.
In determining whether an accused’s right to a
speedy trial has been violated, consideration must
be given to society’s right to effective prosecution of
criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime
and to deter those contemplating it. However, the
administrative mandate of Rule [600] was not
designed to insulate the criminally accused from
good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of
the Commonwealth.
So long as there has been no misconduct on
the part of the Commonwealth in an effort to evade
the fundamental speedy trial rights of an accused,
Rule [600] must be construed in a manner
consistent with society’s right to punish and deter
crime. In considering [these] matters . . . courts
must carefully factor into the ultimate equation not
only the prerogatives of the individual accused, but
the collective right of the community to vigorous law
enforcement as well.
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Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 283–284 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa. Super.
2007) (en banc)).
In pertinent part, the version of Rule 6002 that was in effect when the
criminal complaint was filed against Appellant provided as follows:
Rule 600. Prompt Trial
(A)
* * *
(3) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is
filed against the defendant, when the defendant is at
liberty on bail, shall commence no later than 365 days
from the date on which the complaint is filed.
* * *
(C) In determining the period for commencement of trial
there shall be excluded therefrom:
(1) the period of time between the filing of the written
complaint and the defendant’s arrest, provided that the
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2
A new version of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 was adopted on October 1, 2012, and
took legal effect on July 1, 2013. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 comment. Both the
trial court and the parties refer to this version of the Rule in their respective
analyses of the speedy trial issue. Our jurisprudence, however, instructs
that we should review Appellant’s claim under the previous version of Rule
600 that was in effect at the time that the instant criminal complaint was
filed. See Commonwealth v. Roles, 116 A.3d 122, 124 n.4 (Pa. Super.
2015) (citing Commonwealth v. Brock, 61 A.3d 1015, 1016 n.2 (Pa.
2013) (noting that former Rule 600 applies because the criminal complaint
was filed prior to the effective date of the new version of the rule)).
Because the differences in the versions of the two Rules do not implicate the
discrete issue before us, the time excluded from the 365-day calculation,
this legal error does not hamper our review.
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defendant could not be apprehended because his or her
whereabouts were unknown and could not be determined
by due diligence;
(2) any period of time for which the defendant expressly
waives Rule 600;
(3) such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings
as results from:
(a) the unavailability of the defendant or the
defendant’s attorney;
(b) any continuance granted at the request of the
defendant or the defendant’s attorney.
* * *
(G)
* * *
If the court, upon hearing, shall determine that the
Commonwealth exercised due diligence and that the
circumstances occasioning the postponement were beyond the
control of the Commonwealth, the motion to dismiss shall be
denied and the case shall be listed for trial on a date
certain . . . . If, at any time, it is determined that the
Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence, the court shall
dismiss the charges and discharge the defendant.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.
This Court has outlined the requirements for the calculation of the
relevant Rule 600 time period in the following manner:
The first step in determining whether a technical violation of Rule
600 has occurred is to calculate the “mechanical run date.”
Commonwealth v. Aaron, 804 A.2d 39, 42 (Pa. Super. 2002).
The mechanical run date is the date by which the trial must
commence under Rule 600. Id. It is calculated by ascertaining
the number of days in which the Commonwealth must
commence trial under Rule 600 and counting from the date on
which the criminal complaint was filed. Id. The mechanical run
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date can be modified or extended by adding any periods of time
in which the defendant causes delay. Id. Once the mechanical
run date is modified accordingly, it then becomes an “adjusted
run date.” Id.Rule 600 takes into account both “excludable time” and
“excusable delay.” Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234,
1241 (Pa. Super. 2004). “Excludable time” is defined in Rule
600(C) as the period of time between the filing of the written
complaint and the defendant’s arrest, provided that the
defendant could not be apprehended because his whereabouts
[were] unknown and could not be determined by due diligence;
any period of time for which the defendant expressly waives Rule
600; and/or such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings
as results from: (a) the unavailability of the defendant or the
defendant’s attorney; and/or (b) any continuance granted at the
request of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney. Id. (citing
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)). The “due diligence” required under Rule
600(C)(1) pertains to the Commonwealth’s efforts to apprehend
the defendant. Id. at 1241 n.10. The other aspects of Rule
600(C) defining “excludable time” do not require a showing of
due diligence by the Commonwealth. Id. “Excusable delay” is
not expressly defined in Rule 600, but the legal construct takes
into account delays which occur as a result of circumstances
beyond the Commonwealth’s control and despite its due
diligence. See id. at 1241-42 (explaining manner in which
excludable time, excusable delay and due diligence are to be
determined); see also DeBlase, 665 A.2d at 431 (discussing
excludable time and excusable delay).
Commonwealth v. Murray, 879 A.2d 309, 313 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal
citations modified).
In addition,
“Judicial delay may justify postponing trial beyond the adjusted
run date if the Commonwealth was prepared to commence trial
prior to the expiration of the mandatory period but the court
was unavailable because of ‘scheduling difficulties and the like.’”
[Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 14 (Pa. Super.
2006)] (citation omitted).
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Commonwealth v. Lynch, 57 A.3d 120, 124 (Pa. Super. 2012). “In
considering [these] matters . . . , courts must carefully factor into the
ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual accused, but
the collective right of the community to vigorous law enforcement as well.”
Ramos, 936 A.2d at 1103 (citation omitted).
At the hearing on the Rule 600 motion, Appellant moved the Quarter
Sessions file into evidence. The Commonwealth presented no evidence.
After hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion. The case then
proceeded to trial where, as previously noted, Appellant was found guilty of
retail theft.
The trial court subsequently addressed Appellant’s Rule 600 claim in
its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, as follows:
Periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by
the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to
exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the
time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of
delay shall be excluded from the computation. Pa R.Crim.P. 600
(C)(l). If the Commonwealth attempts to bring a defendant to
trial beyond the 365 day-period prescribed by Rule 600, and the
defendant files a Rule 600 motion to dismiss, the court must
assess whether there is excludable time and/or excusable delay.
Hill, supra at 263, 736 A.2d at 591; Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C), (G).
“Even where a violation of Rule [600] has occurred, the motion
to dismiss the charges should be denied if the Commonwealth
exercised due diligence and . . . the circumstances occasioning
the postponement were beyond the control of the
Commonwealth.” Id. at 263, 736 A.2d at 591.
“Due diligence is a fact-specific concept that must be
determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 256, 736 A.2d at
588. “Due diligence does not require perfect vigilance and
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punctilious care, but rather a showing by the Commonwealth
that a reasonable effort has been put forth.” Id.
In the case sub judice, the criminal complaint was filed on
May 10, 2013, and Appellant’s Rule 600 motion was denied and
the case was brought to trial on December 18, 2014. A total of
587 days elapsed before the case was brought to trial. As the
case was brought to trial after the mechanical run date of
May 10, 2014, the court must determine whether anytime was
excludable or excusable.
Initially, the court notes that the time from filing of the
criminal complaint on May 10, 2013 until Appellant’s arrest on
September 10, 2013 is not excluded totaling 123 days for Rule
600 purposes.
The Commonwealth successfully met its burden of
demonstrating a prima facie case at the first listing of the
preliminary hearing on September 26, 2013. In fact, no delay is
attributable to the Commonwealth from the entire period
between the filing of the complaint on September 10, 2013 and
the first trial date, February 11, 2014. Therefore, those 154
days of the case are excluded from Rule 600 calculation. See
Commonwealth v. Claffey, 80 A.3d 780, 788 (Pa. Super.
2013). (“At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate held the case
for court. Thus, the Commonwealth secured a magisterial ruling
that the Commonwealth had met its prima facie burden. The
Commonwealth moved the case forward. The Commonwealth
did not delay it. The case then proceeded past the preliminary
hearing, through arraignment and toward trial . . . .”)[.]
The court notes that the case did not proceed to trial on
July 14, 2014 because the video disc passed to defense in
discovery was technically defective. The issue was corrected in
time for the next listing. The court heard nothing to indicate
that the Commonwealth was not duly diligent in its effort to
provide a proper copy of the video to Appellant, but rather was a
simple issue of compatibility, where the disc did not function
correctly in one computer. Therefore the court found the time
from July 14, 2014 to October 6, 2014, totaling 84 days was
excludable.
Additionally, this court is compelled to note that it was,
during the calendar year of 2014, running a hybrid schedule.
Criminal trials and probation violations for judges no longer
sitting in the criminal division were heard on alternating weeks.
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In fairness to the Commonwealth, any continuances, excludable
or otherwise, requested after the initial trial listing on
February 11, 2014 were consequently, and beyond the
Commonwealth’s control, scheduled approximately twice as
distant as would normally have been the case for similarly
situated defendants.
Subtracting the 154 days of excludable pre-trial time and
the 84 days of excludable time for the Commonwealth’s request
from the total time of 587 days yields 349 days, an amount
below the 365 day limit of Rule 600. As such, Appellant was
tried consistent with Rule 600.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/15, at 6–8.
On appeal, Appellant specifically challenges the trial court’s exclusion
of the period between September 10, 2013, and February 11, 2014, in its
Rule 600 calculation.3 Appellant asserts that the time included in a
Rule 600 computation should be comprised of not only those days during
which the Commonwealth causes a delay, but also the time attributable to
the conventional progression of a case. Appellant supports his position by
reference to the dictionary definition of delay: “a situation in which
something happens later than it should; the amount of time that you must
wait for something that is late.” Appellant’s Brief at 14 (citing
http://wwww.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/delay). According to
Appellant, if delay is so defined, then the time attributable to the normal
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3
Appellant concedes that the period between July 14, 2014, and October 6,
2014, when the Commonwealth diligently pursued a discovery request for
the surveillance video, was excluded properly from the trial court’s Rule 600
calculation. Appellant’s Brief at 13–14.
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stages of a criminal proceeding—“filing of complaint, preliminary
arraignment, preliminary hearing, court arraignment, pre-trial hearing, and
trial–. . . must count towards the applicable Rule 600 period in which to
bring a defendant to trial.” Id. at 15.
Although we cannot endorse Appellant’s blanket theory that time
attributable to the normal progression of a criminal case is always includable
for purposes of a Rule 600 calculation, we do agree that Rule 600 creates a
presumption that 365 days is a reasonable amount of time by which to bring
a defendant to trial. However, when a defendant on bail is not tried within
such time, the excludable or excusable nature of any particular period
depends on the specific facts of the case. With regards to the duty of the
Commonwealth, a straightforward reading of our case law requires the
Commonwealth to act diligently to bring a case to trial and to present
evidence supporting its diligence at the Rule 600 hearing. As we stated in
Commonwealth v. Claffey, 80 A.3d 780 (Pa. Super. 2013):
[A] Rule 600 motion shall be denied if the Commonwealth acted
with due diligence in attempting to try the defendant timely and
the circumstances occasioning the delay were beyond the
Commonwealth’s control. Commonwealth v. Riley, 19 A.3d
1146, 1148–1149 (Pa. Super. 2011); Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(G).
Thus, if the Commonwealth acted with due diligence and the
delay in question was beyond the Commonwealth’s control, the
delay is excusable. Riley, 19 A.3d at 1148–1149.
Id. at 786. See also Ramos, 936 A.2d at 1102 (if defendant’s trial takes
place outside of the adjusted run date, pursuant to Rule 600(G), it must
then be determined whether the delay occurred despite the Commonwealth’s
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due diligence); Commonwealth v. Goldman, 70 A.3d 874, 879 (Pa. Super.
2013) (Rule 600 provides for dismissal of charges in cases in where the
defendant has not been brought to trial within the term of the adjusted run
date, after subtracting all excludable time and excusable delay that occurs
as a result of circumstances beyond the Commonwealth’s control and
despite its due diligence). Conversely, if the Commonwealth was not
attentive to the progression of the case, any ensuing delay will not be
excluded. Cf. Commonwealth v. Colon, 87 A.3d 352, 361 (Pa. Super.
2014) (Rule 600 violation occurred when Commonwealth failed to exercise
due diligence to try the appellant within 365 days of filing of the criminal
complaint).
Even the cases cited by Appellant to support his argument concerning
includable time factor in the Commonwealth’s diligence in assessing delay
questions. In Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 2006),
this Court considered whether failure to provide mandatory discovery is a
basis for “excusable delay” of trial. Id. at 12. After the Preston Court
determined that there was no excludable time attributed to the defense, it
shifted its analysis to “whether any excusable delay is attributable to factors
beyond the Commonwealth’s control.” Id. Markedly, the Court did not
specifically reference any period it considered includable because it
represented the normal progression of the case. Similarly, in
Commonwealth v. Horne, the time during which the matter was on appeal
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was excluded from the Rule 600 calculation because “the Commonwealth did
not take the appeal in bad faith and it was diligent in pursuing the appeal.”
Horne, 89 A.3d at 284. While Appellant is correct that the Horne Court
declared that the clock began to run again after remand, it offered no basis
for this determination. Id. Finally, in Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93
A.3d 478 (Pa. Super. 2014), this Court stated that the Commonwealth has
the burden at a Rule 600 hearing to demonstrate that it “exercised due
diligence and the delay was beyond the Commonwealth’s control.” Id. at
488 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46 A.3d 693, 701 (Pa. 2012)).
The Thompson Court then observed that although the trial court concluded
that the delays in question were caused by administrative error, “there were
no findings regarding the Commonwealth’s efforts, or lack thereof, in
securing Appellant’s presence in court.” Id. at 488. The Court thus decided
it was prudent to remand the matter for a hearing on the Commonwealth’s
diligence in this regard. Id. at 489. We are hard-pressed to understand
how this decision bolsters Appellant’s position that time attributed to the
conventional progress of a case is separate from an evaluation of the
Commonwealth’s diligence in bringing a defendant to trial.4
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4
Despite the fact that the criminal charges against the appellants in
Thompson and Horne were apparently filed when the earlier version of
Rule 600 was in effect, their Rule 600 issues were analyzed under the
current version of the Rule. See Thompson, 93 A.3d at 483 (the appellant
was arrested on December 3, 2009, and tried on October 25, 2011); Horne,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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For its part, the Commonwealth asserts that the period between
September 10, 2013, and February 11, 2014, was excluded correctly
because that 154-day delay was occasioned by the trial court’s scheduling of
the first trial date. However, in each of the cases cited by the
Commonwealth as authority for its argument, the trial court record included
a definitive statement regarding the demands of the trial court’s schedule.
In Commonwealth v. Jones, 886 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. 2005), the eighty-
day period between September 13, 2002, and December 2, 2002, was
excusable delay because the trial court determined that December 2, 2002
was the earliest possible trial date. Id. at 701–702. In Commonwealth v.
Brown, 875 A.2d 1128 (Pa. Super. 2005), eighty-one days between
January 17, 2002, and April 8, 2002, were excusable because the trial court
stated that April 8, 2002 was the earliest possible trial date. Id. at 1139.
Similarly, the eighty-two–day period between May 22, 2003 and August 12,
2003 at issue in Commonwealth v. Ramos was deemed excusable
because the trial court decided to list this case as a protracted matter and
was unable to schedule an extended proceeding any earlier than August 12,
2003. Ramos, 936 A.2d at 1104.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
89 A.3d at 279–280 (a warrant for the appellant’s arrest was issued on
May 21, 2009, and the last of his cases was called for trial on May 14,
2012).
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In the case sub judice, the trial court made no such findings for the
time period prior to the February 11, 2014 trial listing. Also, the trial court
did not find any excludable delay attributable to Appellant prior to the
adjusted run date, either. To the contrary, the trial court found that the
Commonwealth was not ready on February 11, 2014, when the
Commonwealth made its first request for a continuance. The trial court also
found that the Commonwealth was not ready on April 7, 2014, and the case
was again continued. By the next trial listing of May 22, 2014, the adjusted
run date had expired. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the
Commonwealth failed to prove that it acted diligently in meeting the 365-
day mandate of Rule 600 in this relatively uncomplicated case. Accordingly,
the trial court erred in not granting the Rule 600 motion to dismiss and
discharging Appellant. 5
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5
We note that the trial court’s Pa.R.A.P 1925(a) opinion is, at times,
inconsistent and obfuscates, rather than clarifies, the issue before us. When
the trial court detailed the mechanics of its Rule 600 calculation, the 123
days from filing of the criminal complaint on May 10, 2013, until Appellant’s
arrest on September 10, 2013, were included for Rule 600 purposes. Trial
Court Opinion, 3/10/15, at 6. The court next found that because the
Commonwealth successfully met its burden of demonstrating a prima facie
case at the first listing of the preliminary hearing on September 26, 2013,
“no delay is attributable to the Commonwealth from the entire period
between the filing of the complaint on September 10, 2013 and the first
trial date, February 11, 2014. Therefore, those 154 days of the case are
excluded from Rule 600 calculation.” Id. at 7 (emphasis added). In this
writing, the trial court, for the first time, declared that the period between
“the filing of the complaint [erroneously stated to be on September 10,
2013] and the first trial date, February 11, 2014” should not be counted
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In summary, the lack of a record demonstrating the Commonwealth’s
diligence between September 10, 2013, and February 11, 2014, compel the
conclusion that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s Rule 600 motion
when it excluded those 154 days from its Rule 600 calculation. When that
time is included, Appellant was tried more than 365 days after the criminal
complaint was filed, and a Rule 600 violation occurred.6 Accordingly, we
reverse the denial of Appellant’s motion to dismiss and vacate the judgment
of sentence.
Order reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Appellant discharged.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
against the Commonwealth because it represented excusable delay. Indeed,
record evidence of the Commonwealth’s diligence is non-existent for the
entire period between September 10, 2013, and February 11, 2014. In Rule
600 proceedings, “[t]he Commonwealth must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that it acted with due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Kearse,
890 A.2d 388, 392 (Pa. Super. 2005); See also Ramos, 936 A.2d at 1102(Commonwealth due diligence is a fact-specific concept that must be
evaluated on an individual basis).
6
Having concluded that a Rule 600 violation occurred when the 154 days
between September 10, 2013, and February 11, 2014 were improperly
excluded from the trial court’s calculation, we need not discuss in detail the
days between May 22, 2014, and July 14, 2014—a period occurring after the
expiration of the run date of May 10, 2014. At the Rule 600 hearing, the
Commonwealth argued that these fifty-three days should be excluded when
Appellant was not transported to the courthouse because he had been
transferred to a facility other than that named in the bring-down writ.
Without explanation, the trial court agreed to exclude this time.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/12/2016
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