Epps L. v. Dunbar Community Counseling Services ( 2017 )


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  • J-A08002-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    LORETTA EPPS                                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    DUNBAR COMMUNITY COUNSELING
    SERVICES; DR. REGINALD BANKS PH.D;
    AND YOLANDA BANKS
    Appellees                 No. 1232 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No(s): 1406-03646
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, J.                           FILED JUNE 29, 2017
    Appellant, Loretta Epps, asks us to review the order denying her
    request to file an appeal nunc pro tunc. While we conclude that a breakdown
    in court operations occurred, we nevertheless affirm the order on the basis
    that the proposed appeal would be interlocutory.
    Epps filed a complaint against Appellees asserting that she had been
    wrongfully terminated from her employment after revealing their fraudulent
    conduct. Appellees, in turn, filed an answer denying Epps’s assertions, and
    asserted counterclaims against her premised in defamation and commercial
    disparagement.
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A08002-17
    On July 31, the trial court provided Epps with notice that it had
    granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on all of Epps’s claims.
    Appellees’ counterclaims were still intact, as neither party had filed for
    summary judgment on the counterclaims. The case was listed for trial in
    October.
    On August 21, Epps attempted to file a notice of appeal from the order
    granting summary judgment to the Appellees. It is undisputed that the trial
    court Prothonotary rejected the filing, allegedly over the failure to include a
    certificate of service that identified the trial court as a recipient. This the trial
    court Prothonotary was not permitted to do. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
    Willis, 
    29 A.3d 393
    , 396 (Pa. Super. 2011).
    Shortly after being notified that the affidavit of service was deficient,
    Epps filed a corrected affidavit of service. The corrected affidavit of service
    was accepted by the Prothonotary and is in the certified record, while the
    notice of appeal it references is not.
    The events that followed amply support the propriety of the rule
    followed in Willis. The trial court first entered an order directing Epps to file
    a statement of matters complained of on appeal, and then vacated the
    order, noting that the order was “without prejudice for petitioner to re-file.”
    Epps attempted to determine what had gone wrong, and eventually filed a
    second notice of appeal on October 5.
    -2-
    J-A08002-17
    The trial court again ordered Epps to file a statement of matters
    complained of on appeal, and Epps complied. We quashed the appeal as
    untimely on January 19, 2016.
    On February 16, 2016, Epps filed a petition for allowance of appeal
    nunc pro tunc. The trial court denied the petition, and this timely appeal
    followed.
    “Generally, in civil cases [nunc pro tunc relief] is granted only where
    there was fraud or a breakdown in the court’s operations through a default
    of its officers.” Union Electric Corp. v. Board of Property Assessment,
    Appeals & Review of Allegheny 
    Coutny, 746 A.2d at 584
    (Pa. 2000)
    (citation omitted). As noted previously, it is undisputed that the trial court
    Prothonotary acted without authority in rejecting Epps’s notice of appeal. As
    such, there clearly was a breakdown in the court’s operation that acted to
    nullify her attempt to appeal.
    However, it is equally apparent from the record that the order Epps
    desired to appeal was interlocutory. A party may only appeal from a final
    order unless otherwise permitted by rule or statute. See Stewart v.
    Foxworth, 
    65 A.3d 468
    , 471 (Pa. Super. 2013). A final order is any order
    that disposes of all claims and all parties. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). As noted
    above, Appellees’ counterclaims were still pending and were listed for trial
    when Epps attempted to file the notice of appeal. A review of the certified
    record before us reveals no indication that Appellees’ counterclaims have
    -3-
    J-A08002-17
    been resolved. As such, we conclude that Epps was not denied her right to
    appeal, as that right has not yet ripened.
    Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/29/2017
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Epps L. v. Dunbar Community Counseling Services No. 1232 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 6/29/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024