Com. v. Reid, W. ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM J. REID :
:
: No. 816 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 12, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0000471-2020
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED MAY 05, 2022
William Reid appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the
Berks County Court of Common Pleas on April 12, 2021, following his
conviction of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and related charges. On
appeal, Reid challenges both the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence
underlying his conviction for DUI. After careful review, we affirm.
Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
is to determine whether, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict
winner, the evidence at trial and all reasonable inferences therefrom are
sufficient for the trier of fact to find that each element of the crimes charged
is established beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Dale, 836
A.2d 150, 152 (Pa. Super. 2003). The Commonwealth may meet this burden
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of proving every element of the crime by utilizing only circumstantial evidence.
See Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa. Super. 2007).
“[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need
not preclude every possibility of innocence.” Id. (citation omitted). Any doubt
raised as to the accused’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact-finder, so long as
the evidence presented is utterly incapable of supporting the necessary
inferences. See id. This Court does not independently assess credibility or
otherwise assign weight to evidence on appeal. See Commonwealth v.
Kinney, 863 A.2d 581, 584 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Viewed favorably to the Commonwealth, the evidence upon which Reid
was convicted is as follows. On November 27, 2019, Reid went out to a bar
with his friend Megan. James Nonnemacher, a friend of Megan’s, later picked
them up from the bar and took them to Megan’s mother’s house, where Reid
had left his car. At that time, Reid was intoxicated and slurring his words.
Megan wanted to go back to the bar but did not want to leave Reid at her
mother’s house, so she asked Reid to leave. Reid agreed to leave, got into his
car, and backed out of the driveway.
After Reid drove away, Megan called the police. While they were waiting
for the police to arrive, Nonnemacher drove around to try to find Reid.
Nonnemacher eventually encountered Reid driving toward him on a narrow
street. Reid almost struck Nonnemacher, who was able to swerve away. Reid
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then returned to Megan’s mother’s house, parked his car, and tried to enter
the house.
Officer Focht of the Fleetwood Police Department arrived and saw a
black SUV, registered to Reid, parked in front of the house. Officer Focht spoke
with both Nonnemacher and Reid. Officer Focht then administered field
sobriety tests to Reid, which Reid failed. Officer Focht additionally observed
that Reid had red glassy eyes, slurred speech, poor balance and ‘roller coaster’
changes in attitude. Based on these observations, along with Reid’s failure of
the field sobriety tests, Reid was taken into custody. A breath test was
administered indicating a blood alcohol content of 0.149%. At the time of the
incident, Reid's driver's license was under suspension for a previous DUI.
On March 19, 2021, Reid proceeded to a bench trial on the charges
arising from this incident. The Commonwealth presented testimony from
Officer Focht and Nonnemacher. Reid did not testify on his own behalf. At the
conclusion of the trial, the court found Reid guilty of two counts of DUI, one
count of careless driving, and one count of driving while operating privilege is
suspended or revoked. On April 12, 2021, the trial court sentenced Reid to an
aggregate term of sixty days to six months’ imprisonment. Reid filed a timely
post-sentence motion, challenging the sufficiency and weight of the evidence.
After the motion was amended, the trial court denied the motion. This timely
appeal followed.
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To support a conviction under Section 3802(a)(1), the prosecution must
prove “the accused was driving, operating, or in actual physical control of the
movement of a vehicle during the time when he or she was rendered incapable
of safely doing so due to the consumption of alcohol.” Commonwealth v.
Teems, 74 A.3d 142, 145 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
Here, Reid concedes that the testimony at trial was technically sufficient,
if believed, to support his conviction for DUI. See Appellant’s Brief, at 17-18.
However, he argues that this is a case where the “evidence offered to support
a verdict of guilt is so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict
based thereon pure conjecture[.]” See id. at 15 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Farquharson, 354 A.2d 545, 547 (Pa. 1976). Reid concedes he had
consumed alcohol to a point that made him intoxicated. However, Reid
contends the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was driving,
operating, or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle:
The only testimony really purporting to show that [Reid] ever
drove a car on November 27, 2019[,] came from [Nonnemacher,]
whose credibility or at least reliability … is gravely to be doubted.
… In this case, one cannot fail to infer something darker and
weightier beneath the surface of what was allowed into evidence
with regard to Nonnemacher’s relationship with [Reid.]
[Nonnemacher] pursued [Reid] with such a weird, grim tenacity
that night; acted as almost no one else would ever have acted in
this situation – no one, that is, without some ulterior, peculiarly
vindictive motive.
Id. at 17-18.
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We recognize that the only evidence that Reid had driven a vehicle is
found in Nonnemacher’s testimony. It is clear from the record that Officer
Focht did not witness Reid driving a vehicle. Nor was there any direct evidence
upon Officer Focht’s arrival that Reid had driven a vehicle. Specifically, the
vehicle was properly parked on the side of the road in front of a residential
home, Reid was coming out of the house at the time and did not have
possession of the keys to a vehicle, and Officer Focht did not check if the
vehicle was warm to the touch from having been driven.
However, we note that Reid has failed to establish that Nonnemacher’s
testimony was inherently contradictory. Rather, his argument on appeal
focuses on questioning whether Nonnemacher had an ulterior motive for his
testimony. While this could possibly be an appropriate argument to the fact-
finder before a verdict is rendered, it falls far short of establishing that
Nonnemacher’s testimony was so unreliable as to render it insufficient to
support the verdict.
The trial court, sitting as fact-finder, was entitled to find Nonnemacher’s
testimony credible that Reid was drunk when they returned to Megan’s
mother’s home, that Reid got in his car and drove away, and that when
Nonnemacher encountered Reid on the road, Reid almost hit Nonnemacher’s
car coming from the opposite direction. Based on the record before us, we
cannot conclude Nonnemacher’s testimony was so unreliable as a matter of
law that it could not support the DUI conviction.
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Given our standard of review and deference to the court’s factual
findings and credibility determinations, Reid’s sufficiency challenge fails.
Nonnemacher’s testimony is sufficient to support a finding that Reid had
driven a car while intoxicated. And combined with Officer Focht’s testimony,
it was sufficient to support a finding that Reid was not capable of safely
driving. Based on the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that the evidence
was sufficient to establish Reid’s guilt for DUI.
Reid additionally contends his conviction should be vacated because the
trial court failed to properly weigh the evidence presented by the
Commonwealth. We do not review challenges to the weight of the evidence
de novo on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1225
(Pa. 2009). Rather, we only review the trial court’s exercise of its discretionary
judgment regarding the weight of the evidence presented at trial. See id.“[W]e may only reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so contrary to
the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Commonwealth v.
Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003) (citations omitted). A verdict is
said to be contrary to the evidence such that it shocks one’s sense of justice
when “the figure of Justice totters on her pedestal,” or when “the jury’s
verdict, at the time of its rendition, causes the trial judge to lose his breath,
temporarily, and causes him to almost fall from the bench, then it is truly
shocking to the judicial conscience.” Commonwealth v. Davidson, 860 A.2d
575, 581 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
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In advancing his weight challenge, Reid claims the evidence offered that
he was driving was based on circumstantial evidence from a lay person. As
such, Reid contends the Commonwealth failed to present any credible
evidence proving Reid had driven a car. Reid therefore contends the verdict
was against the weight of the evidence.
In its opinion, the trial court states that its decision was a credibility
determination and that it believed Nonnemacher’s testimony. See Trial Court
Opinion, 10/15/2021, at 6. We agree with the trial court that this credibility
determination is not shocking and was thoroughly within the court’s discretion
and function as fact-finder. Thus, Reid’s final issue merits no relief.
As Reid has not established any right to relief on appeal, we affirm the
judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/5/2022
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