Com. v. Brown, G. ( 2016 )


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  • J-A31001-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    GARRETT STEVEN BROWN
    Appellant                 No. 443 MDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 24, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0005821-2014
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.                         FILED JANUARY 29, 2016
    Appellant, Garrett Steven Brown, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence entered after he was convicted of driving under the influence of
    alcohol (“DUI”) and resisting arrest. Brown argues that the arresting officer
    violated his right against unreasonable searches.     After careful review, we
    affirm.
    The Commonwealth charged Brown with five counts of DUI, one count
    of resisting arrest, and one count of driving a vehicle at an unsafe speed.
    Brown filed a pre-trial suppression motion, challenging the basis for the
    traffic stop. At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth presented the
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A31001-15
    testimony of Officer Michael Jordan, Patrol Officer for the West Manchester
    Township Police Department.
    Officer Jordan’s testimony can be summarized as follows. In the early
    morning of August 18, 2014, Officer Jordan observed a vehicle travelling “a
    lot faster than normal.” N.T., Suppression Hearing, 12/17/14, at 5. As he
    continued to observe the vehicle, it approached a red stop light aggressively,
    and proceeded to spin its tires when making a left turn after the light turned
    green. Officer Jordan proceeded to follow the vehicle.
    As he was following the vehicle, it sped up and continued to pull away
    from him. There were no other vehicles on the street, parked or in motion,
    no pedestrians, and no unusual driving conditions. The vehicle proceeded
    down the residential street until it made a left turn into a driveway. Officer
    Jordan turned on his emergency lighting and pulled into the driveway.
    Brown had already exited his vehicle and was heading to the door of his
    residence when Officer Jordan detained him.
    The trial court found Officer Jordan’s testimony credible, and denied
    Brown’s motion to suppress. Thereafter, Brown stipulated to the contents of
    the affidavit of probable cause and the transcript of the suppression hearing.
    Furthermore, Brown stipulated that Officer Jordan “had cause to file the
    resisting arrest charge and that charge is valid.” N.T., Trial, 2/24/15, at 2.
    The trial court proceeded to convict Brown of DUI and resisting arrest, and
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    imposed an aggregate sentence of two years’ probation. This timely appeal
    followed.
    On appeal, Brown argues that Officer Jordan lacked sufficient probable
    cause to stop him.     The Commonwealth counters that Officer Jordan had
    reasonable suspicion to stop Brown to investigate whether Brown was
    intoxicated.    We review a challenge to a trial court’s refusal to suppress
    evidence pursuant to the following well established standard of review.
    [W]e are limited to determining whether the factual findings are
    supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
    drawn from those facts are correct. We may consider the
    evidence of the witnesses offered by the prosecution, as verdict
    winner, and only so much of the defense evidence that remains
    uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
    whole.
    Commonwealth v. McAliley, 
    919 A.2d 272
    , 275-276 (Pa. Super. 2007)
    (citation omitted). “Moreover, if the evidence supports the factual findings
    of the suppression court, this Court will reverse only if there is an error in
    the legal conclusions drawn from those findings.” Commonwealth v.
    Powell, 
    994 A.2d 1096
    , 1101 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).
    The quantum of proof necessary to make a vehicle stop on suspicion of
    a violation of the motor vehicle code is governed by 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b),
    which states:
    (b) Authority of police officer.—Whenever a police officer is
    engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers
    or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is
    occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request
    or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration,
    proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or
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    engine number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other
    information as the officer may reasonably believe to be
    necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
    75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (emphasis supplied).
    Traffic stops based upon suspicion of a violation of the motor vehicle
    code under section 6308(b) “must serve a stated investigatory purpose.”
    Commonwealth v. Feczko, 
    10 A.3d 1285
    , 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010).
    Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the
    driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant
    to the suspected violation. In such an instance, ‘it is encumbent
    [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by
    him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide
    probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in
    violation of some provision of the Code.’
    
    Id. (emphasis omitted)
    (citation omitted).
    Brown is correct that a vehicular stop based solely upon suspicion of
    violating section 3361 requires probable cause:
    [A] vehicle stop based solely on offenses not ‘investigatable’
    cannot be justified by a mere reasonable suspicion, because the
    purposes of a Terry [v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 
    88 S. Ct. 1868
    , 
    20 L. Ed. 2d 889
    (1968)] stop do not exist—maintaining the status
    quo while investigating is inapplicable where there is nothing
    further to investigate. An officer must have probable cause to
    make a constitutional vehicle stop for such offenses.
    Commonwealth v. Busser, 
    56 A.3d 419
    , 423 (Pa. Super. 2012) (footnote
    and citation omitted). Here, however, the trial court concluded that Officer
    Jordan had sufficient reasonable suspicion to investigate whether Brown was
    intoxicated.
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    When this Court evaluates whether an investigative detention is
    constitutional, the following principles guide our decision.
    A police officer may detain an individual in order to
    conduct an investigation if that officer reasonably suspects
    that the individual is engaging in criminal conduct. This
    standard, less stringent than probable cause, is commonly
    known as reasonable suspicion. In order to determine
    whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion, the
    totality of the circumstances must be considered. In
    making this determination, we must give due weight to the
    specific reasonable inferences the police officer is entitled
    to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Also, the
    totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry
    to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate
    criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of innocent
    facts, when taken together, may warrant further
    investigation by the police officer.
    Commonwealth v. Ranson, 
    103 A.3d 73
    , 76 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing
    Commonwealth v. Foglia, 
    979 A.2d 357
    , 360 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en
    banc)).
    As noted previously, Officer Jordan testified that he witnessed Brown
    drive at extreme rates of speed through a residential neighborhood, even
    though he was unable to verify the exact speed.         See N.T., Suppression
    Hearing, 12/17/14, at 9-10.      At the speed Brown was travelling, Officer
    Jordan feared that Brown would be unable to stop at a stop sign in the
    neighborhood.     See 
    id., at 10.
       These circumstances certainly provided
    Officer Jordan with sufficient reasonable suspicion to investigate whether
    Brown was intoxicated while driving.      We therefore conclude that Brown’s
    issue on appeal merits no relief and affirm.
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    Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/29/2016
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Document Info

Docket Number: 443 MDA 2015

Filed Date: 1/29/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/29/2016