Com. v. Knight, S. ( 2015 )

J-S68006-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SHAWN KNIGHT,
Appellant No. 2229 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 27, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-51-CR-0002728-2010
CP-51-CR-0002729-2010
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DONOHUE, J., and MUNDY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 15, 2015
Appellant, Shawn Knight, appeals from the judgment of sentence of an
aggregate term of 2½ to 5 years’ imprisonment, imposed after the court
revoked his term of probation based on a new conviction in an unrelated
case. Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After
careful review, we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand the case for
re-sentencing.
The procedural history of this case was summarized by the trial court
in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion as follows:
While on the Honorable Shreeves-Johns[’] probation for
the crimes of theft by deception (M1), theft by unlawful taking
(M1) and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (M2), [Appellant],
along with a co-conspirator, committed a gunpoint robbery of a
Best Buy retail location and held the manager at gunpoint while
tying up several employees using plastic zip-ties. On April 11,
J-S68006-15
2012, Judge Trent sentenced [A]ppellant to nine (9) to twenty
(20) years[’] imprisonment for the armed robbery.
This court conducted a violation of probation hearing on
June 27, 2013. The court found [A]ppellant in direct violation of
Judge Shreeves-Johns[’] probation. In view of the fact that
[Appellant] was on probation for serious charges when he
participated in this armed robbery of a Best Buy retail location,
this [c]ourt sentenced him to two and one-half (2½) to five (5)
years[’] incarceration consecutive to any other sentences being
served.
Appellant filed a timely Motion to Reconsider Sentence
which was denied. A Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania was timely filed on July [1]9, 2013. An Order was
issued pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and a timely statement
[of] errors complained [of] on appeal was filed on May 29, 2014.
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 1/16/15, 1-2.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following sole issue for our review:
Did not the lower court violate the tenets of the Sentencing
Code, which mandate individualized sentencing, where the court
utterly failed to consider [A]ppellant’s background, character[,]
or rehabilitative needs and imposed an excessive sentence of
two and a half to five years of consecutive confinement for two
misdemeanor theft cases, on a violation of probation?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Initially, we note that Appellant’s allegations relate to the discretionary
aspects of his sentence.
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant
challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must
invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
-2-
J-S68006-15
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are
generally waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing
or in a motion to modify the sentence imposed.
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 179 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations
and internal quotations omitted).
Here, the record clearly reflects that Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal, properly preserved his claim in his post-sentence motion, and
included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief in compliance with
the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus, we proceed to
determine whether Appellant has raised a substantial question to meet the
fourth requirement of the four-part test outlined above.
As we explained in Moury:
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A substantial
question exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable
argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1)
inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or
(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the
sentencing process.
Id. at 170 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant asserts that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to consider his rehabilitative needs, order a
pre-sentence report, inquire about his individual circumstances, or state any
reason on the record for the sentence imposed. Appellant’s Brief at 8. We
-3-
J-S68006-15
look to relevant case law to guide us in determining whether Appellant’s
assertions raise a substantial question.
In Commonwealth v. Lewis, 595 A.2d 593 (Pa. Super. 1991), rev’d
on other grounds, 636 A.2d 619 (Pa. 1994), the appellant similarly claimed
that the trial court failed to consider his background, character, or prior
record at the time of sentencing, failed to state a reason for the sentence
imposed, and failed to order a pre-sentence report. In support of our
conclusion that a substantial question existed in Lewis, we explained that:
42 Pa.C.S. § 9725 mandates that the sentencing court consider
not only the nature and circumstances of the crime, but also the
history, character, and condition of the defendant. Thus,
appellant’s argument that the court focused solely on the crime
advances a colorable claim that the sentencing court acted in a
manner contrary to the Sentencing Code. Therefore, it is clear
that it raises a substantial question that the sentence imposed is
inappropriate under the Sentencing Code as [a] whole and
supports an appeal from the discretionary aspects.
Lewis, 595 A.2d at 599-600. See also Commonwealth v. Flowers, 950
A.2d 330 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding that an allegation that the trial court
imposed a sentence without considering the requisite statutory factors or
stating adequate reasons for dispensing with a pre-sentence report raises a
substantial question); Commonwealth v. Cappellini, 690 A.2d 1220 (Pa.
Super. 1997) (finding that whether the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to state of record any reason for the sentence imposed constitutes a
substantial question for purposes of allowance of appeal).
-4-
J-S68006-15
Based on our review of relevant case law, we deem Appellant’s issues
as constituting substantial questions regarding the appropriateness of the
sentence imposed. Therefore, we grant Appellant’s petition for allowance of
appeal and address the merits of his claims.
When we consider an appeal from a sentence imposed following the
revocation of probation, our standard of review is well settled:
Sentencing is a matter vested within the discretion of the trial
court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. An abuse of discretion requires the trial court to have
acted with manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice,
bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly
erroneous. It is also now accepted that in an appeal following
the revocation of probation, it is within our scope of review to
consider challenges to both the legality of the final sentence and
the discretionary aspects of an appellant’s sentence.
Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citations omitted).
Appellant argues that the trial court “failed to engage in any
meaningful individualized sentencing,” as it failed to order a pre-sentence
investigative (PSI) report and did not inquire into his background, character,
or rehabilitative needs prior to imposing his sentence. Appellant’s Brief at
10. After careful review, we are constrained to agree.
The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure vest a sentencing judge
with the discretion to order a PSI report as an aid in imposing an
-5-
J-S68006-15
individualized sentence. Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz, 64 A.3d 722,
725 (Pa. Super. 2013). See Pa.R.Crim.P. 702(A)(1), (2)(a).1
The first responsibility of the sentencing judge is to be sure that
he has before him sufficient information to enable him to make a
determination of the circumstances of the offense and the
character of the defendant. Thus, a sentencing judge must
either order a PSI report or conduct sufficient presentence
inquiry such that, at a minimum, the court is apprised of the
particular circumstances of the offense, not limited to those of
record, as well as the defendant’s personal history and
background. … The court must exercise the utmost care in
sentence determination if the defendant is subject to a term of
incarceration of one year or more….
To assure that the trial court imposes sentence in consideration
of both the particular circumstances of the offense and the
character of the defendant, our Supreme Court has specified the
minimum content of a PSI report.
____________________________________________
1
Rule 702 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(A) Pre-sentence Investigation Report
(1) The sentencing judge may, in the judge’s discretion,
order a pre-sentence investigation report in any
case.
(2) The sentencing judge shall place on the record the
reasons for dispensing with the pre-sentence
investigation report if the judge fails to order a pre-
sentence report in any of the following instances:
(a) When incarceration for one year or more is a
possible disposition under the applicable
sentencing statutes[.]
Pa.R.Crim.P. 702(A)(1), (2)(a).
-6-
J-S68006-15
Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 728 (Pa. Super. 2000). In
sum, the “essential and adequate elements” of a PSI report include the
following: a complete description of the offense and the circumstances
surrounding it; a full description of any prior criminal record of the offender;
a description of the educational background of the offender; a description of
the employment background of the offender, including his present
employment status and capabilities; the social history of the offender; the
offender’s medical history; information about environments to which the
offender might return; supplementary reports from clinics, institutions and
other social agencies with which the offender has been involved; and
information about special resources which might be available to assist the
offender. Id. at 728, 729. While case law does not require that the
sentencing court order a PSI report under all circumstances, “the cases do
appear to restrict the court’s discretion to dispense with a PSI report to
circumstances where the necessary information is provided by another
source.” Carillo-Diaz, 64 A.3d at 726.
In the instant case, no PSI report was ordered, nor is there evidence
that the court utilized another source to provide it with the information
needed in order to properly issue an individualized sentence.2 It is clear that
____________________________________________
2
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court states that “the appellant’s
background and character were set forth in his Gagnon-II Summary
demonstrating a despicable robbery of a Best Buy retail location whereby a
firearm was held to another human being’s head while others were tied up
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-7-
J-S68006-15
in the absence of a PSI report, the trial court must conduct a detailed pre-
sentence inquiry which delves into the factors found within a proper PSI
report. Commonwealth v. Hill, 761 A.2d 1188, 1190, 1992 (Pa. Super.
2000) (citing Goggins, 748 A.2d at 728-730). However, the record is also
completely lacking of any pre-sentence inquiry by the court. The hearing
transcript reveals the following, very limited, colloquy prior to the imposition
of sentence:
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Knight, anything you want to say to
me today?
[APPELLANT]: Yes. You know, I violated and I take full
responsibility for violating. Right now I’m sentenced to 9 to 20
years and I’m using this time to get my life together because I
was young and I made mistakes. And, I have two kids, and I
just want to do what I need to do to get back out there to my
kids and my family. I know what I did and I take full
responsibility. I was wrong. And, I like said, I apologize to the
Court, Your Honor.
[COMMONWEALTH]: If I may, Your Honor? [Appellant] went
with another male to a Best Buy and held the manager at
gunpoint and actually tied up several employees using plastic zip
ties, Your Honor, and demanded money and that someone open
the safe.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
and forced to reveal the location of the safe.” TCO at 2. We are unable to
locate the “Gagnon-II Summary” in the record and, therefore, are unable to
identify what information is contained in the summary. Moreover, from the
court’s opinion, it seems that the summary may have only detailed the facts
of Appellant’s new offense; nothing in the court’s opinion indicates what
character or background information about Appellant was provided. In the
event that the trial court may be referring to the transcript from the June
27, 2013 sentencing hearing, we note that the information contained therein
is very limited and is not sufficient to enable the court to issue a proper
individualized sentence.
-8-
J-S68006-15
THE COURT: Is there anything you’d like to say?
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I don’t disagree with the
Commonwealth, but Mr. Knight was sentenced to a very serious
amount of time for it. He’ll be doing the next 9 to 20 years in
custody allowing for another 7 years, at least, for supervision
after that. Which will take his supervision into his 50’s. I think
it’s a very serious sentence.
N.T. Sentencing, 6/27/13, at 3-4. The court did not ask any additional
questions of Appellant, nor did the court offer any explanation for its
decision not to order a PSI.3
The foregoing colloquy merely restates the facts of the crime
underlying Appellant’s probation violation and focuses on the seriousness of
that new crime for which Appellant had already been sentenced. It provides
very little information regarding Appellant’s background or character and is
insufficient to take the place of a PSI report. In Flowers, even though the
trial court had previous contact with the appellant at his original sentencing,
we found the court’s consideration on the record of only factors germane to
either his original offense or his current violation of probation insufficient to
replace the thoroughness of a properly crafted PSI report, and we vacated
the judgment of sentence and remanded for re-sentencing. Flowers, 950
A.2d at 334. Similarly, in Hill, we found the trial court’s colloquy
____________________________________________
3
We find it worthy to note that the judge presiding over Appellant’s
revocation/resentencing hearing inherited Appellant’s case from the
Honorable Shreeves-Johns, who had presided over the prior proceedings in
this case; thus, we cannot presume that the current judge was familiar with
Appellant’s background and character from prior dealings with him.
-9-
J-S68006-15
inadequate to replace a PSI report where the court did not examine the
social and family history of the appellant, beyond counsel’s statement that
the appellant had a grandson, and where the court failed to inquire about
the appellant’s employment background, education, mental status, medical
history, residence, participation in social programs, or his interests and
activities. Hill, 761 A.2d at 1192. We conclude that the trial court’s failure
to order a PSI report or to conduct an appropriate pre-sentence inquiry in
the present case is comparable to Flowers and Hill, and constituted an
abuse of discretion. See Flowers, 950 A.2d at 334 (finding an abuse of
discretion by the trial court for failure to order a PSI report).
Appellant further argues that his sentence should be vacated because
the trial court failed to state any reason on the record for the sentence it
imposed. Appellant’s Brief at 8, 10. We have stated, “in all cases where the
court resentences an offender following revocation of probation … the court
shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of
sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed
and failure to comply with these provisions shall be grounds for vacating the
sentence or resentence and resentencing the defendant.” Commonwealth
v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1040-41 (Pa. Super. 2013).
See also Commonwealth v. Aldinger, 436 A.2d 1196 (Pa. Super. 1981)
(stating that a trial court must state its reasons on the record when it
imposes sentence following revocation of probation).
- 10 -
J-S68006-15
In Commonwealth v. Riggins, 377 A.2d 140 (Pa. Super. 1977), we
set forth in depth the reasons for this requirement. We reiterate, in part, as
follows:
The benefits of requiring the trial court to state its reasons for
the imposition of its sentence are manifold: First, requiring the
trial court to articulate its reasons for selecting a sentence will
promote more thoughtful consideration of relevant facts and will
help rationalize the sentencing process. It will safeguard against
arbitrary decisions and prevent consideration of improper and
irrelevant factors. It will minimize the risk of reliance upon
inaccurate information contained in the presentence report. …
Finally, a statement of reasons will be invaluable in aiding
appellate courts to ascertain whether the sentence imposed was
based upon accurate, sufficient and proper information.
Id., at 147-148.
Additionally, we have noted that the reasons stated for a sentence
imposed should reflect the court’s consideration of the criteria of the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9701 et seq., the circumstances of the
offense, and the character of the offender. Commonwealth v. DeLuca,
418 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa. Super. 1980). Although the sentencing court need
not undertake a lengthy disclosure of its reasons for imposing a sentence, or
specifically reference the statute in question, the record as a whole must
reflect the court’s consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the
offender. Colon, 102 A.3d at 1044.
In the case at bar, the trial court failed to state any reason whatsoever
on the record for the sentence imposed on Appellant. After hearing very
- 11 -
J-S68006-15
limited statements at the sentencing hearing from Appellant, his probation
officer, and the Commonwealth, the transcript merely reflects the following:
THE COURT: All right.
(A discussion is held off the record.)
THE COURT: The sentence of this [c]ourt is two and a half to
five years, then, to run consecutive.
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Mr. Knight, the [c]ourt did give you
two and a half to five years on your probation cases, it run[s]
consecutive[] to the 9 years you’re now serving. If you would
like the [c]ourt to reconsider, you will have to file it in 30 days
with the Public Defender’s Office. If you would [ ] like me to file
the reconsideration or appeal, Mr. Knight –
[APPELLANT]: Yes, I’d like a reconsideration, because I feel as
though that the sentence –
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Mr. Knight, it’s your right to have me
file for reconsideration for you.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
(Matter concluded.)
N.T. Sentencing at 4-5. We have no way of knowing what was discussed off
the record. Regardless, the trial court is required to state its reason for the
judgment of sentence imposed on the record, which it clearly did not do.4
____________________________________________
4
We note that the only reason stated by the trial court for the sentence
imposed was given after-the-fact in its Rule 1925(a) opinion:
Appellant was arrested for an egregious crime as
aforementioned, while on probation for various theft charges.
He pled guilty to Robbery and Conspiracy charges and this court
used its discretion in deciding that confinement was necessary
for the protection of the general public. [Appellant’s] conduct
demonstrated to the [c]ourt that he is a danger to the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
- 12 -
J-S68006-15
In Commonwealth v. Mathews, 486 A.2d 495 (Pa. Super. 1984),
the reasons given by the trial court for the sentence imposed indicated that
the court sufficiently considered the sentencing criteria. However, because
the reasons for the sentence gave no indication that the court had also
considered the character of the defendant, or the circumstances of the
offense for which he was sentenced, we reversed the trial court’s decision
and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 498. In the case at bar, the trial
court did not give any reason for its sentence. See Commonwealth v.
Riggins, 377 A.2d 140, 474 Pa. 115 (1977) (vacating the judgment of
sentence and remanding the case for resentencing because no reasons
appeared on the record supporting the imposition of the sentence imposed).
Accordingly, we are constrained to vacate the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Donohue joins this memorandum.
Judge Mundy files a dissenting statement.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
community and would pose a significant threat to society if not
incarcerated for a substantial period of time.
TCO at 3. The trial court seems to focus solely on the new crime committed
by Appellant, for which he had already been sentenced 9 to 20 years’
imprisonment, rather than on the seriousness of the original crimes for
which his probation was imposed, or any of the other appropriate sentencing
factors.
- 13 -
J-S68006-15
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/15/2015
- 14 -