In Re: Delgros, E., Appeal of: Delgros, E. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: EDWARD S. DELGROS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: EDWARD S. DELGROS, :
: No. 349 WDA 2013
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order, February 1, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County
Civil Division at No. 2012-3455
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., AND OLSON, J.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 03, 2014
Appellant appeals from the order denying his petition to expunge his
mental health records pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1(g)(2) and to
restore his right to possess a firearm under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(f)(1).
Finding no reversible error below, we affirm, but we will remand this matter
to the trial court to enter an order sealing the record in this case.
In May and June of 1997, two separate involuntary commitments
under Section 7302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”) were
sought against appellant. The May commitment was sought by appellant’s
father. (Notes of testimony, 2/1/13 at 58.) The allegations included that
appellant thought people “were out to get him,” that he was making threats
to people, and that he had lost his job because of this problem. (Id.) A
medical professional who evaluated appellant found that he had
hallucinations, psychosis, and depression, concluding that appellant required
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in-hospital evaluation and treatment, and further that appellant was severely
mentally disabled. (Id.) There was no averment that appellant had
demonstrated within the last 30 days that he was a danger to himself or
others.
The June commitment was sought by appellant’s ex-wife and her
husband. The allegations included that on June 17, 1997, appellant
threatened to kill his ex-wife and her husband and take custody of his
children. (Id. at 59.) Appellant menacingly drove his vehicle into the path
of the husband’s vehicle and then chased him for a mile. (Id.) A medical
professional examined appellant and noted well-documented recent episodes
of severe psychosis and violent behavior. (Id. at 60.) The professional
concluded that appellant was severely mentally disabled and in need of
involuntary commitment. (Id.)
On November 6, 2012, appellant filed his petition to expunge his
records and restore his right to possess a firearm. A hearing was held on
February 1, 2013. The only evidence presented by appellant was his own
testimony. An attorney for the Pennsylvania State Police entered certified
copies of appellant’s May and June 1997 petitions for commitment into
evidence and then read into the record the allegations contained therein.
Thereafter, the court found that the May commitment was not supported by
sufficient evidence and ordered that record expunged. However, the court
found that the June commitment was supported by sufficient evidence and
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denied expunction. The court further found that appellant had failed to show
that he could possess a firearm without risk to himself or others, specifically
noting that appellant failed to produce any mental health testimony. Finally,
the trial court denied appellant’s request to keep the record in this case
under seal. This timely appeal followed.
We may summarize appellant’s issues on appeal as follows:
1. Appellant was denied due process when he was
involuntarily committed on June 19, 1997.1
2. The trial court erred in finding the allegations
of the June 1997 commitment to be sufficient
and denying expunction.
3. The trial court erred in requiring appellant to
present expert medical testimony in order to
demonstrate that he was not a risk to himself
or others in order to have his right to possess
a firearm restored.
4. The trial court erred in relying on or taking
judicial notice of evidence in other cases
involving appellant.
5. The trial court erred in failing to seal the
record.
1
This is the due process claim that was raised in appellant’s Statement Of
Matters Complained Of, and is the claim that was analyzed by the trial court.
Appellant raises additional due process issues on appeal, contending that the
interplay of various statutes resulted in a due process violation and arguing
that 50 P.S. § 7302 and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1(g)(2) violate due process by
failing to provide a meaningful post-determination de novo review of the
decision to commit. These issues were not raised in appellant’s Statement
Of Matters Complained Of, nor were they addressed by the trial court, and
are being improperly raised for the first time on appeal. Matters raised for
the first time on appeal are waived. Pa.R.A.P., Rule 302(a), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
We also note that appellant raised no constitutional issues in his original
petition.
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We will address these issues seriatim.
Appellant first claims that during his involuntary commitment on
June 19, 1997, he was denied due process of law. Simply stated, this
issue has been previously decided. While this court has acknowledged
that procedure under 50 P.S. § 7302 provides minimal constitutional due
process protection, we have found “it is nevertheless constitutionally
sound in light of the therapeutic/non-punitive intent and short duration of
the Section 302 procedures.” In re F.C., III, 966 A.2d 1131, 1136-1137
(Pa.Super. 2009), affirmed, 2 A.3d 1201 (Pa. 2010). There is no error
here.
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in finding the
allegations of the June 1997 commitment petition to be sufficient and
denying expunction. “Our well-settled standard of review in cases
involving a motion for expunction is whether the trial court abused its
discretion.” In re Keyes, 83 A.3d 1016, 1022 (Pa.Super. 2013).
Expunction of mental health records is provided for as follows:
(2) A person who is involuntarily committed
pursuant to section 302 of the Mental Health
Procedures Act may petition the court to
review the sufficiency of the evidence upon
which the commitment was based. If the court
determines that the evidence upon which the
involuntary commitment was based was
insufficient, the court shall order that the
record of the commitment submitted to the
Pennsylvania State Police be expunged. A
petition filed under this subsection shall toll the
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60-day period set forth under section
6105(a)(2).
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1(g)(2). Thus, unless there was sufficient evidence to
support a commitment, the record must be expunged.
In order to be involuntarily committed, the patient must be examined
by a physician and found to be severely mentally disabled and in need of
immediate treatment. 50 P.S. § 7302(b). Severe mental disability is
demonstrated where the patient exhibits a clear and present danger to
himself or others. 50 P.S. § 7301(a). A clear and present danger to others
is shown where the patient, within the last 30 days, has inflicted or
attempted to inflict serious bodily injury against another, and there is a
reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated. 50 P.S.
§ 7301(b)(1). A clear and present danger to self is shown where the patient
has acted in such manner as to evidence that he would be unable, without
care, supervision, and the continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need
for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and
safety, and that there is a reasonable probability that death, serious bodily
injury, or serious physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days unless
adequate treatment were afforded, or where suicide or substantial mutilation
have been attempted. 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2).
Instantly, the averments underlying appellant’s June 1997
commitment were read into the record. They indicated that on June 17,
1997, appellant threatened to kill his ex-wife and her husband and drove his
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vehicle into the path of the husband’s vehicle. This merited a finding that
within the last 30 days prior to the commitment, appellant attempted to
cause serious bodily injury both to himself and another. Moreover, the
allegations stated that there were well-documented recent episodes of
severe psychosis and violent behavior. This justified a finding that
appellant’s dangerous behavior had a reasonable probability to be repeated.
Coupled with the physician’s finding that he was severely mentally disabled
and in need of involuntary commitment, the evidence was clearly sufficient
to support the commitment.
Appellant argues that there should have been some sort of assessment
by the trial court as to the reliability of the accusation against him and an
evaluation of the reliability of the physician’s diagnosis. We disagree. Such
concerns go to the weight of the evidence and not its sufficiency. The
statute directs the court to assess the sufficiency of the evidence and not its
weight. As it stands, there was sufficient evidence to support the June 1997
commitment, and the court below properly did not expunge the record.2
In his third issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in
requiring appellant to present expert medical testimony in order to
demonstrate that he was not a risk to himself or others in order to have his
2
We also agree with the trial court’s expunction of the record of the May
1997 commitment. There was no allegation that within the last 30 days of
that commitment appellant attempted to inflict serious bodily injury on
himself or others.
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right to possess a firearm restored. Appellant argues that the statute does
not require expert medical testimony:
(1) Upon application to the court of common pleas
under this subsection by an applicant subject
to the prohibitions under subsection (c)(4), the
court may grant such relief as it deems
appropriate if the court determines that the
applicant may possess a firearm without risk to
the applicant or any other person.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(f)(1).
While the statute does not require expert medical testimony, it plainly
leaves the decision whether to restore the right to possess a firearm to the
discretion of the trial court. Here, all appellant presented at the hearing on
this matter was his own self-serving testimony. We find no abuse of
discretion with the trial court finding that appellant failed to establish that he
could possess a firearm without risk to himself or others based upon his
testimony alone. Further, we also find no abuse of discretion in the court
requiring medical evidence, even expert medical testimony, in order for
appellant to prove that he could possess a firearm without risk to himself or
others. This seems a prudent step before restoring the right to possess
firearms to persons who have previously been diagnosed with such severe
mental disability that they had to be involuntarily committed. There is no
error here.
In his fourth issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in
relying on or taking judicial notice of evidence in other cases involving
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appellant. Specifically, in denying appellant’s petition, the trial court made
reference to a case involving an injunction sought by appellant’s former
employer which the court had also presided over. (Notes of testimony,
2/1/13 at 69; see also Order, 2/1/13 at 2.) In its ensuing opinion, the trial
court took judicial notice of the hearing on the injunction, as well as a
criminal trial for appellant in 1999, which the trial court also presided over.
(Trial court opinion, 4/8/13 at 5.) The court was referring to evidence
adduced at that time that appellant had “human targets” in his basement
that he used for target practice. (Notes of testimony, 2/1/13 at 67.)
We agree with appellant that it was error for the trial court to consider
or take judicial notice of evidence adduced in other cases, including previous
cases presided over by the court itself.
A court is bound to decide the case before it
based upon the evidence presented to it by the
parties; it has no authority to seek out additional
testimony in the records of unrelated cases on the
matters at issue before it. This Court, in a case
involving a claim of res judicata, noted that “a court
may not ordinarily take judicial notice in one case of
the records in another case even though the case
arose in the same court and the contents of those
records are known to the court.” Callery v.
Municipal Authority of Township of Blythe, 432
Pa. 307, 309, 243 A.2d 385, 386 (1968). A fortiori,
a court may not base a decision upon evidence of
record in another unrelated case.
Commonwealth v. DePasquale, 501 A.2d 626, 630, n.4 (Pa. 1985).
Nonetheless, we perceive no reversible error as there was no prejudice
to appellant. To achieve expunction of his mental health records, appellant
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had to show that the evidence was insufficient to justify commitment. The
human target evidence considered by the court had no relevance
whatsoever to whether the evidence justifying commitment was sufficient.
The evidence supporting the commitment was shown to be sufficient by
wholly independent evidence. To achieve restoration of his right to possess
firearms, appellant had to show that his possession of firearms did not
present a risk to himself or others. Again, the human target evidence had
no relevance to the weight of evidence appellant put forward at his hearing.
The trial court denied restoration because appellant failed to present medical
evidence that he no longer presented a risk. The human target evidence
was not used to negate medical evidence that appellant no longer presented
a risk to himself or others. We see no prejudice to appellant in this regard
and no reversible error.
In his final issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to
seal the record in this matter. Appellant indicates that one of the statutes
under which he brought his original petition compels a closed hearing:
(3) All hearings conducted under this subsection
shall be closed unless otherwise requested to
be open by the applicant.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6501(f)(3).
In response, the trial court merely indicates that the other section
under which appellant brought his original petition, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1,
contains no obligation to conduct a closed hearing. The court then cites to
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In re M.B., 819 A.2d 59 (Pa.Super. 2003), for the proposition that there is a
constitutional presumption of open courts. However, In re M.B. also held
that:
[o]nce an interested party, such as the press, seeks
access to such proceedings, the party seeking to
keep the proceedings closed may rebut the
presumption of openness by demonstrating that:
(1) the denial of public access serves an important
governmental interest, and (2) no less restrictive
means to serve that interest exists.
Id., at 63. We find an important government interest in keeping highly
stigmatizing mental health records private, and we find no less restrictive
means than closing the hearing and sealing the record. Moreover, it is of no
moment that Section 6111.1 does not require this as Section 6105 does.
Consequently, although we are affirming in all other respects, we will
remand this matter for the court below to enter an order sealing the record
in this case.
Order affirmed. Case remanded for the entry of an order sealing the
record.
Gantman, P.J. joins the Memorandum.
Olson, J. concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/03/2014
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