Com. v. Caez, C. ( 2015 )


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  • J-A30015-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    CARLOS CAEZ
    Appellant                   No. 304 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 23, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010889-2010
    BEFORE: MUNDY, J., JENKINS, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.:                          FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2015
    Appellant, Carlos Caez, appeals from the January 23, 2014 judgment
    of sentence of 15 to 30 months of incarceration, imposed after the trial court
    convicted Appellant of theft and receiving stolen property.1         After careful
    review, we affirm.
    The trial court recounted the facts presented at trial as follows.
    On June 5, 2010, Ms. Dawn Stenslend-Mendte
    was living at 151 East Bells Mills Road in
    Philadelphia.   After leaving a charity event, Ms.
    Stenslend-Mendte, her husband, and their two boys
    arrived at their home at approximately 10:00 p.m.
    Ms. Stenslend-Mendte had travelled home in her
    husband’s leased Honda Odyssey minivan, and
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3921(a) and 3925(a), respectively.
    J-A30015-15
    parked it in the three car garage. Ms. Stenslend-
    Mendte testified she usually leaves the car unlocked,
    because it is inside a locked garage. Ms. Stenslend-
    Mendte and her husband went to bed around
    midnight and slept until 9 a.m., June 6, 2010. When
    Ms. Stenslend-Mendte woke up, she realized she had
    left her cellphone and purse in the minivan. Ms.
    Stenslend-Mendte entered the garage and observed
    the place had been ransacked, the large garage door
    was wide open, and the minivan was gone. The
    other vehicle in the garage, a Cadillac station wagon,
    had been ransacked but nothing was missing from it.
    Ms. Stenslend-Mendte testified several things were in
    the minivan when it was taken out of the garage,
    including: her iPhone, her purse, some sporting
    equipment for her kids, a George Foreman grill, and
    gym shoes for the kids.        Ms. Stenslend-Mendte
    immediately called the police and filled out a report.
    After the police left her property, Ms.
    Stenslend-Mendte realized there was a GPS on her
    cell phone she could use to track the phone’s
    location. Ms. Stenslend-Mendte and her husband
    tracked the phone to the Hunting Park section of
    Philadelphia.     Ms. Stenslend-Mendte and her
    husband drove approximately forty-five (45) minutes
    away to the Hunting Park location indicated on the
    GPS. Ms. Stenslend-Mendte observed the missing
    vehicle and immediately called the police again. The
    police arrived approximately twenty (20) to thirty
    (30) minutes later. Ms. Stenslend-Mendte and her
    husband waited for the police to arrive, making sure
    not to touch the vehicle, as to protect the crime
    scene per police orders. The minivan was located on
    a residential block, filled primarily with row-homes.
    Some items from the minivan were recovered, but
    not the iPhone or the children’s sneakers.        The
    vehicle was damaged internally and externally
    including: scrapes on the outside, scrapes on the
    inside dashboard, rips in the carpet, stains, and
    damage to a tire. Ms. Stenslend-Mendte testified the
    vehicle looked generally banged up and bumped and
    sustained approximately $5,000 worth of damage.
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    She testified the vehicle did not have any of the
    damage when she had seen it the night prior.
    There was no damage to the ignition of the
    minivan. Ms. Stenslend-Mendte testified she didn’t
    remember where she put her keys the night of June
    5, 2010. She testified she typically keeps her keys
    in her purse while out and then places them on a
    hook inside her house upon entering. Ms. Stenslend-
    Mendte looked for the keys after she discovered the
    vehicle was missing but was unable to find them,
    and they were never recovered.
    Ms. Stenslend-Mendte testified she did not
    know [Appellant], and she didn’t believe her husband
    or children knew [Appellant]. Ms. Stenslend-Mendte
    didn’t give [Appellant] permission to enter her house
    or enter her Honda Odyssey.
    There was a stipulation by and between
    counsel that Officer Gomes would testify he
    responded to the original police call for the burglary
    and took information from Ms. Stenslend-Mendte and
    her husband about the theft of the minivan. Officer
    Gomes put out flash information describing the
    missing van and held the entire garage as a crime
    scene.
    There was a stipulation by and between
    counsel that Officer Nace would testify he responded
    to the second call from Ms. Stenslend-Mendte and
    went to 3861 North Eighth Street, Philadelphia,
    where he observed the stolen vehicle. There was a
    stipulation by and between counsel that Detective
    Brian Sanders would testify he was assigned to the
    burglary of 151 Bells Mills Road and subsequent theft
    of the Honda Odyssey minivan. Detective Sanders
    would testify he dusted for fingerprints inside the
    garage, outside the garage, and inside the Cadillac,
    without success. Detective Sanders would further
    testify he attempted to lift eight latent prints from
    inside the 2007 Honda Odyssey and successfully
    matched two prints to [Appellant]. Search warrants
    were then issued for the last known address of
    [Appellant], which was 4022 North Eighth Street.
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    The prints were lifted from the inside passenger door
    handle and the navigation screen of the vehicle’s
    GPS. Nothing was recovered [from] the burglary at
    [Appellant’s] house.
    Trial Court Opinion, 1/28/15, at 2-4 (citations to notes of testimony
    omitted).
    Appellant was arrested and charged with the aforementioned crimes.
    A one-day bench trial convened on December 11, 2013, after which the trial
    court rendered its verdicts and sentenced Appellant to fifteen to thirty
    months of incarceration on each count to run concurrently, followed by two
    years of reporting probation.         Appellant filed a post-sentence motion and
    motion to reconsider sentence on December 19, 2013, and after a hearing
    on January 23, 2014, the trial court amended Appellant’s sentence such that
    the theft conviction merged with the receiving stolen property conviction for
    purposes of sentencing, although Appellant’s sentence of fifteen to thirty
    months of incarceration remained unchanged. Appellant filed this appeal the
    next day.2
    On appeal, Appellant presents a single issue for our review as follows.
    Was not the evidence insufficient as a matter
    of law to support convictions for theft and receiving
    stolen property where the only evidence implicating
    [A]ppellant in the theft was that his fingerprints were
    found on the interior, passenger side of a vehicle
    that had no visible indicators of having been stolen?
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 1925.
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    Appellant’s Brief at 3.
    Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
    convictions. We are bound by the following standard and scope of review.
    “A claim impugning the sufficiency of the evidence presents us with a
    question of law.”   Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 
    84 A.3d 736
    , 756 (Pa.
    Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    95 A.3d 275
     (Pa. 2014).
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
    the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence
    admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the
    verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable
    the fact-finder to find every element of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above
    test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
    our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we
    note that the facts and circumstances established by
    the Commonwealth need not preclude every
    possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
    defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
    unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
    as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
    drawn from the combined circumstances.            The
    Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
    every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
    Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
    record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
    received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of
    fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
    and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
    believe all, part or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Fabian, 
    60 A.3d 146
    , 150-151 (Pa. Super. 2013)
    (citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    69 A.3d 600
     (Pa. 2013). “This standard of
    deference is not altered in cases involving a bench trial, because the
    province of a trial judge sitting without a jury is to do what a jury is required
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    to do.” Commonwealth v. Lee, 
    956 A.2d 1024
    , 1027 (Pa. Super. 2008)
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    964 A.2d 894
     (Pa. 2009).
    However, the inferences must flow from facts and
    circumstances proven in the record, and must be of
    such volume and quality as to overcome the
    presumption of innocence and satisfy the [finder of
    fact] of an accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable
    doubt. The trier of fact cannot base a conviction on
    conjecture and speculation and a verdict which is
    premised on suspicion will fail even under the limited
    scrutiny of appellate review.
    Commonwealth v. Kearney, 
    92 A.3d 51
    , 64 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
    omitted), appeal denied, 
    101 A.3d 102
     (Pa. 2014).
    The essence of Appellant’s sufficiency argument is that the evidence
    established that he “was merely a passenger” and “never in possession or
    control of the van.” Appellant’s Brief at 7, 9-10. Appellant maintains that
    “mere presence in a stolen vehicle as a passenger is insufficient to sustain
    convictions for either theft or receiving stolen property.” Id. at 13. Upon
    review, we find Appellant’s argument to be unavailing.
    The theft statute provides as follows.
    § 3921. Theft by unlawful taking or disposition
    (a)    Movable property.--A person is guilty of theft
    if he unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful
    control over, movable property of another with
    intent to deprive him thereof.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).
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    The receiving stolen property statute provides as follows.
    § 3925. Receiving stolen property
    (a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of theft if
    he intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of
    movable property of another knowing that it has
    been stolen, or believing that it has probably been
    stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or
    disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.
    (b) Definition.--As used in this section the word
    “receiving” means acquiring possession, control or
    title, or lending on the security of the property.
    Id. § 3925.
    The trial court, sitting as the fact-finder in this case, explained its
    reasoning with regard to its theft verdict as follows.
    There is sufficient circumstantial evidence to
    prove [Appellant] unlawfully took the complaining
    witness’s vehicle.    Ms. Stenslend-Mendte testified
    that neither she, nor any other member of her
    family, knew [Appellant] or gave him permission to
    enter the vehicle. [Appellant’s] fingerprints were
    found inside the vehicle in two places. The vehicle
    was found less than eighteen hours after Ms.
    Stenslend-Mendte had last seen it. [Appellant] lived
    a short distance from the location where the stolen
    vehicle was found. The cell phone’s GPS led Ms.
    Stenslend-Mendte and her husband to the area
    where the vehicle was abandoned, but the cell phone
    was never recovered, thus the cell phone must have
    been in the immediate area of the vehicle. It is clear
    from this combination of evidence that [Appellant]
    took the vehicle from Ms. Stenslend-Mendte’s
    garage. The logical conclusion is [Appellant] was
    involved in the theft of the vehicle.
    Trial Court Opinion, 1/28/15, at 5-6.
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    Relative to the receiving stolen property verdict, the trial court further
    explained as follows.
    There is sufficient evidence to sustain a
    conviction of receiving stolen property. The evidence
    clearly indicates the property was stolen.        Ms.
    Stenslend-Mendte testified credibly that she woke up
    to discover a ransacked garage with a vehicle and
    several other items missing, without her giving
    permission to anyone to use or remove said items.
    The evidence further indicated [Appellant]
    possessed the property. If the contraband is not
    found on the appellant’s person, the Commonwealth
    must prove that the appellant had constructive
    possession … which has been defined as the “ability
    and intent to exercise control over the substance.”
    Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 
    947 A.2d 800
    , 806
    (Pa. Super. 2008).        The Commonwealth may
    establish constructive possession through the totality
    of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Muniz, 
    5 A.3d 345
    , 349 (Pa. Super. 2010).          Though the
    vehicle was not found directly with [Appellant,] the
    totality of the circumstances indicates [Appellant]
    had recently entered the vehicle, drove the vehicle
    with stolen keys, and never returned the keys.
    [Appellant’s] intention was clearly to exercise control
    over the vehicle.
    The evidence sufficiently proves [Appellant]
    not only had reason to believe the vehicle was stolen
    but specific knowledge it was stolen. The evidence
    indicates, beyond a reasonable doubt, [Appellant]
    entered the garage of Ms. Stenslend-Mendte, and
    used her keys to drive the car away to a block near
    his home. As Ms. Stenslend-Mendte testified she
    didn’t know [Appellant], it is clear [Appellant] would
    have no reason to believe he had permission to use
    the minivan he took from someone’s attached
    garage.
    Trial Court Opinion, 1/28/15, at 7-8.
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    We have reviewed the notes of testimony from the trial, mindful that
    we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-
    finder, and the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
    need not preclude every possibility of innocence. See Commonwealth v.
    Marrero, 
    914 A.2d 870
    , 872 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding where the
    appellant’s fingerprints were located on the interior hood of a stolen car and
    engine was removed, the location of the prints was not susceptible to a
    reasonable    inference   of   innocent   contact,   and   affirming   appellant’s
    conviction of receiving stolen property). To reiterate, any doubts regarding
    a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is
    so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
    be drawn from the combined circumstances. 
    Id.
    Instantly, the evidence adduced at trial, as recited by the trial court,
    supports the trial court’s determination that Appellant was guilty of theft and
    receiving stolen property. Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Henry, 
    875 A.2d 302
    , 303-304 (Pa. Super. 2005) for the proposition that the evidence is
    insufficient to sustain a conviction for theft and receiving stolen property
    where “the only evidence implicating the defendant was a fingerprint found
    on a window placard inside the car.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. However, in
    the instant case, the record supports the trial court’s observation that
    Appellant’s fingerprints “were lifted from inside the passenger door handle
    and the navigation screen of the vehicle’s GPS.” Trial Court Opinion,
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    1/28/15, at 4 (emphasis added), citing N.T., 12/11/13, at 39 (parties
    stipulating that “one of the prints that came back to [Appellant] was
    recovered on the navigation screen located inside the Honda and the second
    print   was   located   on   the   interior   passenger-side   door”);   see   also
    Commonwealth Exhibit C-7 (copies of Appellant’s fingerprints recovered from
    the minivan).      Contrary to Henry, where a fingerprint was found on a
    window placard, the record in the instant matter supports the trial court’s
    conclusion that “fingerprints were found inside the vehicle in two places.”
    Trial Court Opinion, 1/28/15, at 5.       The parties stipulated that Appellant’s
    fingerprints were found in two locations, the passenger side door as well as
    the minivan’s GPS. N.T., 12/11/13, at 37-40. The victim, Ms. Stenslend-
    Mendte, testified that the minivan’s GPS had a “built-in GPS screen” that
    “came with the car” and was “built into the console.” Id. at 31. As such,
    the evidence was sufficient to find Appellant guilty of theft and receiving
    stolen property.
    Given the foregoing, and with careful consideration of both the facts of
    record and prevailing case law, we conclude that Appellant’s issue
    challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions is
    without merit.     We therefore affirm the January 23, 2014 judgment of
    sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judge Jenkins joins the memorandum.
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    J-A30015-15
    Justice Fitzgerald concurs in the result.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/23/2015
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