Com. v. Caez, C. ( 2015 )

J-A30015-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CARLOS CAEZ
Appellant No. 304 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 23, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010889-2010
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., JENKINS, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2015
Appellant, Carlos Caez, appeals from the January 23, 2014 judgment
of sentence of 15 to 30 months of incarceration, imposed after the trial court
convicted Appellant of theft and receiving stolen property.1 After careful
review, we affirm.
The trial court recounted the facts presented at trial as follows.
On June 5, 2010, Ms. Dawn Stenslend-Mendte
was living at 151 East Bells Mills Road in
Philadelphia. After leaving a charity event, Ms.
Stenslend-Mendte, her husband, and their two boys
arrived at their home at approximately 10:00 p.m.
Ms. Stenslend-Mendte had travelled home in her
husband’s leased Honda Odyssey minivan, and
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3921(a) and 3925(a), respectively.
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parked it in the three car garage. Ms. Stenslend-
Mendte testified she usually leaves the car unlocked,
because it is inside a locked garage. Ms. Stenslend-
Mendte and her husband went to bed around
midnight and slept until 9 a.m., June 6, 2010. When
Ms. Stenslend-Mendte woke up, she realized she had
left her cellphone and purse in the minivan. Ms.
Stenslend-Mendte entered the garage and observed
the place had been ransacked, the large garage door
was wide open, and the minivan was gone. The
other vehicle in the garage, a Cadillac station wagon,
had been ransacked but nothing was missing from it.
Ms. Stenslend-Mendte testified several things were in
the minivan when it was taken out of the garage,
including: her iPhone, her purse, some sporting
equipment for her kids, a George Foreman grill, and
gym shoes for the kids. Ms. Stenslend-Mendte
immediately called the police and filled out a report.
After the police left her property, Ms.
Stenslend-Mendte realized there was a GPS on her
cell phone she could use to track the phone’s
location. Ms. Stenslend-Mendte and her husband
tracked the phone to the Hunting Park section of
Philadelphia. Ms. Stenslend-Mendte and her
husband drove approximately forty-five (45) minutes
away to the Hunting Park location indicated on the
GPS. Ms. Stenslend-Mendte observed the missing
vehicle and immediately called the police again. The
police arrived approximately twenty (20) to thirty
(30) minutes later. Ms. Stenslend-Mendte and her
husband waited for the police to arrive, making sure
not to touch the vehicle, as to protect the crime
scene per police orders. The minivan was located on
a residential block, filled primarily with row-homes.
Some items from the minivan were recovered, but
not the iPhone or the children’s sneakers. The
vehicle was damaged internally and externally
including: scrapes on the outside, scrapes on the
inside dashboard, rips in the carpet, stains, and
damage to a tire. Ms. Stenslend-Mendte testified the
vehicle looked generally banged up and bumped and
sustained approximately $5,000 worth of damage.
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She testified the vehicle did not have any of the
damage when she had seen it the night prior.
There was no damage to the ignition of the
minivan. Ms. Stenslend-Mendte testified she didn’t
remember where she put her keys the night of June
5, 2010. She testified she typically keeps her keys
in her purse while out and then places them on a
hook inside her house upon entering. Ms. Stenslend-
Mendte looked for the keys after she discovered the
vehicle was missing but was unable to find them,
and they were never recovered.
Ms. Stenslend-Mendte testified she did not
know [Appellant], and she didn’t believe her husband
or children knew [Appellant]. Ms. Stenslend-Mendte
didn’t give [Appellant] permission to enter her house
or enter her Honda Odyssey.
There was a stipulation by and between
counsel that Officer Gomes would testify he
responded to the original police call for the burglary
and took information from Ms. Stenslend-Mendte and
her husband about the theft of the minivan. Officer
Gomes put out flash information describing the
missing van and held the entire garage as a crime
scene.
There was a stipulation by and between
counsel that Officer Nace would testify he responded
to the second call from Ms. Stenslend-Mendte and
went to 3861 North Eighth Street, Philadelphia,
where he observed the stolen vehicle. There was a
stipulation by and between counsel that Detective
Brian Sanders would testify he was assigned to the
burglary of 151 Bells Mills Road and subsequent theft
of the Honda Odyssey minivan. Detective Sanders
would testify he dusted for fingerprints inside the
garage, outside the garage, and inside the Cadillac,
without success. Detective Sanders would further
testify he attempted to lift eight latent prints from
inside the 2007 Honda Odyssey and successfully
matched two prints to [Appellant]. Search warrants
were then issued for the last known address of
[Appellant], which was 4022 North Eighth Street.
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The prints were lifted from the inside passenger door
handle and the navigation screen of the vehicle’s
GPS. Nothing was recovered [from] the burglary at
[Appellant’s] house.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/28/15, at 2-4 (citations to notes of testimony
omitted).
Appellant was arrested and charged with the aforementioned crimes.
A one-day bench trial convened on December 11, 2013, after which the trial
court rendered its verdicts and sentenced Appellant to fifteen to thirty
months of incarceration on each count to run concurrently, followed by two
years of reporting probation. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion and
motion to reconsider sentence on December 19, 2013, and after a hearing
on January 23, 2014, the trial court amended Appellant’s sentence such that
the theft conviction merged with the receiving stolen property conviction for
purposes of sentencing, although Appellant’s sentence of fifteen to thirty
months of incarceration remained unchanged. Appellant filed this appeal the
next day.2
On appeal, Appellant presents a single issue for our review as follows.
Was not the evidence insufficient as a matter
of law to support convictions for theft and receiving
stolen property where the only evidence implicating
[A]ppellant in the theft was that his fingerprints were
found on the interior, passenger side of a vehicle
that had no visible indicators of having been stolen?
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2
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
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Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
convictions. We are bound by the following standard and scope of review.
“A claim impugning the sufficiency of the evidence presents us with a
question of law.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014).
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence
admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable
the fact-finder to find every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above
test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we
note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of
fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Fabian, 60 A.3d 146, 150-151 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citation omitted), appeal denied, 69 A.3d 600 (Pa. 2013). “This standard of
deference is not altered in cases involving a bench trial, because the
province of a trial judge sitting without a jury is to do what a jury is required
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to do.” Commonwealth v. Lee, 956 A.2d 1024, 1027 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), appeal denied, 964 A.2d
894 (Pa. 2009).
However, the inferences must flow from facts and
circumstances proven in the record, and must be of
such volume and quality as to overcome the
presumption of innocence and satisfy the [finder of
fact] of an accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The trier of fact cannot base a conviction on
conjecture and speculation and a verdict which is
premised on suspicion will fail even under the limited
scrutiny of appellate review.
Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 64 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014).
The essence of Appellant’s sufficiency argument is that the evidence
established that he “was merely a passenger” and “never in possession or
control of the van.” Appellant’s Brief at 7, 9-10. Appellant maintains that
“mere presence in a stolen vehicle as a passenger is insufficient to sustain
convictions for either theft or receiving stolen property.” Id. at 13. Upon
review, we find Appellant’s argument to be unavailing.
The theft statute provides as follows.
§ 3921. Theft by unlawful taking or disposition
(a) Movable property.--A person is guilty of theft
if he unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful
control over, movable property of another with
intent to deprive him thereof.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).
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The receiving stolen property statute provides as follows.
§ 3925. Receiving stolen property
(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of theft if
he intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of
movable property of another knowing that it has
been stolen, or believing that it has probably been
stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or
disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.
(b) Definition.--As used in this section the word
“receiving” means acquiring possession, control or
title, or lending on the security of the property.
Id. § 3925.
The trial court, sitting as the fact-finder in this case, explained its
reasoning with regard to its theft verdict as follows.
There is sufficient circumstantial evidence to
prove [Appellant] unlawfully took the complaining
witness’s vehicle. Ms. Stenslend-Mendte testified
that neither she, nor any other member of her
family, knew [Appellant] or gave him permission to
enter the vehicle. [Appellant’s] fingerprints were
found inside the vehicle in two places. The vehicle
was found less than eighteen hours after Ms.
Stenslend-Mendte had last seen it. [Appellant] lived
a short distance from the location where the stolen
vehicle was found. The cell phone’s GPS led Ms.
Stenslend-Mendte and her husband to the area
where the vehicle was abandoned, but the cell phone
was never recovered, thus the cell phone must have
been in the immediate area of the vehicle. It is clear
from this combination of evidence that [Appellant]
took the vehicle from Ms. Stenslend-Mendte’s
garage. The logical conclusion is [Appellant] was
involved in the theft of the vehicle.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/28/15, at 5-6.
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Relative to the receiving stolen property verdict, the trial court further
explained as follows.
There is sufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction of receiving stolen property. The evidence
clearly indicates the property was stolen. Ms.
Stenslend-Mendte testified credibly that she woke up
to discover a ransacked garage with a vehicle and
several other items missing, without her giving
permission to anyone to use or remove said items.
The evidence further indicated [Appellant]
possessed the property. If the contraband is not
found on the appellant’s person, the Commonwealth
must prove that the appellant had constructive
possession … which has been defined as the “ability
and intent to exercise control over the substance.”
Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 947 A.2d 800, 806
(Pa. Super. 2008). The Commonwealth may
establish constructive possession through the totality
of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Muniz, 5
A.3d 345, 349 (Pa. Super. 2010). Though the
vehicle was not found directly with [Appellant,] the
totality of the circumstances indicates [Appellant]
had recently entered the vehicle, drove the vehicle
with stolen keys, and never returned the keys.
[Appellant’s] intention was clearly to exercise control
over the vehicle.
The evidence sufficiently proves [Appellant]
not only had reason to believe the vehicle was stolen
but specific knowledge it was stolen. The evidence
indicates, beyond a reasonable doubt, [Appellant]
entered the garage of Ms. Stenslend-Mendte, and
used her keys to drive the car away to a block near
his home. As Ms. Stenslend-Mendte testified she
didn’t know [Appellant], it is clear [Appellant] would
have no reason to believe he had permission to use
the minivan he took from someone’s attached
garage.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/28/15, at 7-8.
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We have reviewed the notes of testimony from the trial, mindful that
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-
finder, and the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
need not preclude every possibility of innocence. See Commonwealth v.
Marrero, 914 A.2d 870, 872 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding where the
appellant’s fingerprints were located on the interior hood of a stolen car and
engine was removed, the location of the prints was not susceptible to a
reasonable inference of innocent contact, and affirming appellant’s
conviction of receiving stolen property). To reiterate, any doubts regarding
a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is
so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
be drawn from the combined circumstances. Id.Instantly, the evidence adduced at trial, as recited by the trial court,
supports the trial court’s determination that Appellant was guilty of theft and
receiving stolen property. Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Henry, 875
A.2d 302, 303-304 (Pa. Super. 2005) for the proposition that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a conviction for theft and receiving stolen property
where “the only evidence implicating the defendant was a fingerprint found
on a window placard inside the car.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. However, in
the instant case, the record supports the trial court’s observation that
Appellant’s fingerprints “were lifted from inside the passenger door handle
and the navigation screen of the vehicle’s GPS.” Trial Court Opinion,
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1/28/15, at 4 (emphasis added), citing N.T., 12/11/13, at 39 (parties
stipulating that “one of the prints that came back to [Appellant] was
recovered on the navigation screen located inside the Honda and the second
print was located on the interior passenger-side door”); see also
Commonwealth Exhibit C-7 (copies of Appellant’s fingerprints recovered from
the minivan). Contrary to Henry, where a fingerprint was found on a
window placard, the record in the instant matter supports the trial court’s
conclusion that “fingerprints were found inside the vehicle in two places.”
Trial Court Opinion, 1/28/15, at 5. The parties stipulated that Appellant’s
fingerprints were found in two locations, the passenger side door as well as
the minivan’s GPS. N.T., 12/11/13, at 37-40. The victim, Ms. Stenslend-
Mendte, testified that the minivan’s GPS had a “built-in GPS screen” that
“came with the car” and was “built into the console.” Id. at 31. As such,
the evidence was sufficient to find Appellant guilty of theft and receiving
stolen property.
Given the foregoing, and with careful consideration of both the facts of
record and prevailing case law, we conclude that Appellant’s issue
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions is
without merit. We therefore affirm the January 23, 2014 judgment of
sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Jenkins joins the memorandum.
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Justice Fitzgerald concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/23/2015
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