Com. v. Verbus, R. ( 2015 )

J-S66043-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
ROBERT LEE VERBUS, SR., :
:
Appellant : No. 976 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 4, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000170-2015
BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2015
Robert Lee Verbus, Sr. (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered following his convictions for indecent assault on a person
less than 13 years of age and corruption of minors. After review, we affirm.
On June 2, 2015, Appellant pled guilty to the aforementioned offenses
and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than one year and
six months nor more than three years. The trial court determined that
Appellant was not a sexually violent predator (SVP); however, as a result of
his convictions, Appellant was classified as a Tier III offender pursuant to the
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).1 Consequently,
Appellant was ordered to comply with the registration and reporting
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.
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requirements of SORNA. Appellant timely filed a motion to modify his
sentence, which was denied by the trial court. This timely appeal followed.
Both the trial court and Appellant complied with the requirements of
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises three issues on appeal.
1. Is it unconstitutional to require … Appellant to register for a
lifetime when said registration requirement exceeds the
statutory maximum penalty for Appellant’s offense?
2. Is [SORNA] unconstitutional in requiring … Appellant to
register for a lifetime?
3. Is [SORNA] unconstitutional in requiring … Appellant to
register for a lifetime when Appellant was assessed and deemed
not to be [an SVP]?
Appellant’s Brief at 7.
Appellant’s interrelated issues concern the constitutionality of SORNA.
Appellant’s Brief at 19-21. Because those issues implicate a pure question
of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is
plenary. Commonwealth v. Raban, 85 A.3d 467, 468 (Pa. 2014).
On multiple occasions, our Courts have considered, and rejected, the
first two issues raised by Appellant. These prior decisions reason that the
imposition of the registration and notification requirements does not
constitute punishment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d
962, 986 (Pa. 2003) (upholding as non-punitive the registration, notification,
and counseling provisions of Megan’s Law II); Commonwealth v. Rhoads,
836 A.2d 159 (Pa. Super. 2003) (same). More recently, this Court upheld
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the constitutionality of SORNA’s registration requirements in
Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747 (Pa. Super. 2014). Moreover,
specific to Appellant’s first argument, in Commonwealth v. McDonough,
96 A.3d 1067 (Pa. Super. 2014) this Court rejected the argument that
mandating compliance with SORNA by offenders who have served their
maximum term is unconstitutional. Appellant has failed to convince us that
another constitutional analysis of SORNA would produce a different result.
Although presented as a separate issue, Appellant’s third argument is
intertwined with his second: Appellant contends that his lack of an SVP
designation somehow renders unconstitutional his lifetime registration
requirement. Appellant cites no authority for this proposition, and his claim
is belied by the provisions of the statute. SORNA provides explicitly that a
Tier III classification requires lifetime registration, independent of any SVP
designation. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a)(3), (6). Moreover, a lifetime
registration period is applicable to both SVP designation (regardless of the
tier of one’s conviction) and conviction of a Tier III offense. Id. Thus,
contrary to Appellant’s claim, his lack of an SVP designation has no effect on
the applicable registration period. Additionally, as discussed above, the
registration requirement is constitutional. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim
fails.
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we determine that
Appellant is not entitled to relief.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/22/2015
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