Com. v. Wilkinson, W. ( 2016 )

J-S57011-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WILLIAM WILKINSON
Appellant No. 2369 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 21, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010104-2007
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OTT, J., and STABILE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JANUARY 25, 2016
Appellant, William Wilkinson, appeals from the July 21, 2014 order
dismissing, without a hearing, his petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful
review, we affirm.
The PCRA court has fully and accurately recounted the factual history
of this case in its opinion filed pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(a). See PCRA Court Opinion, 11/24/14, at 2-6. Relevant to
this appeal, we note the following pertinent facts. Appellant and the
complainant were involved in a romantic relationship and lived together. Id.
at 2. In December 2006, Appellant advised complainant that he was in
financial difficulty and could not maintain the mortgage on his home and an
agreement was reached where Appellant sold his house to complainant. Id.
J-S57011-15
On February 2, 2007, complainant prepared a will leaving her entire estate
to her daughter. Id. at 2-3. “Appellant cautioned [c]omplainant that if she
were required to be admitted to a hospital or if she were committed to a
mental institution she would loose [sic] control of everything[,]” and he
persuaded her to transfer the $48,000.00 in her bank account to him for
safekeeping, which he immediately deposited in his account at Commerce
Bank. Id. at 3. On February 4, 2007, complainant attempted suicide,
leaving a note for Appellant to give everything to her daughter. Id.
Complainant was transferred to the hospital, then to a mental hospital for
treatment, and ultimately released. Id. Appellant then told complainant he
was no longer permitted to be around her. Id. Complainant never received
her money back from Appellant despite requesting it on multiple occasions.
Id.
The PCRA court set forth the subsequent procedural history in its Rule
1925(a) opinion, as follows.
On April 3, 2007[,] Appellant was arrested and
charged with Theft and Securing Execution of
Documents by Deception and on April 22, 2008,
following a jury trial … he was found guilty of those
crimes. On [] June 12, 2008[,] Appellant was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than
twenty-one (21) months nor more than four (4)
years plus three (3) years’ probation for Theft, and a
term of imprisonment of not less than one (1) year
nor more than two years (2) for Execution of
Documents by Deception. Post[-s]entence [m]otions
were filed and on July 31, 2008[,] they were denied.
Appellant filed a timely [n]otice of [a]ppeal to the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania on August 20, 2008.
-2-
J-S57011-15
On October 14, 2011[,] the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed the [j]udgment of
[s]entence[, Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, 37
A.3d 1231 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 49 A.3d
443 (Pa. 2012),] and on November 14, 2011[,]
Appellant filed a [p]etition for [a]llowance of [a]ppeal
in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. On August 8,
2012[,] the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied []
Appellant’s [p]etition for [a]llowance of [a]ppeal.
On March 8, 2013[,] Appellant filed a [timely
p]etition pursuant to the [PCRA] and on November
14, 2013[,] the Commonwealth filed a [m]otion to
[d]ismiss. [On May 2, 2014,] Appellant was given
[n]otice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of the [PCRA
c]ourt’s intention to dismiss the PCRA [p]etition
without a hearing and Appellant responded. On July
[21], 2014[,] the PCRA [petition] was dismissed.
Id. at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
On August 14, 2014, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. 1 On
appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review.
I. Was Appellant denied a legitimate opportunity to
develop and present his claims under the Post-
Conviction Collateral Relief Act when the [trial] court
denied his petition without an evidentiary [hearing]?
II. Was Appellant denied his Constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel
failed to obtain copies of the complainant’s
transcribed testimony from previous judicial
proceedings for impeach[ment] purposes at trial?
III. Was Appellant denied his Constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel
failed to object to testimony elicited from Commerce
____________________________________________
1
Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
-3-
J-S57011-15
Bank employees, Appellant’s former spouse, and his
former girlfriend regarding matters that were unduly
prejudicial and unrelated to the charges?
IV. Was trial counsel ineffective when he failed to file
a [m]otion to [d]ismiss under Rule 600 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure when the
Commonwealth failed to prosecute him within three
hundred and sixty-five (365) days of his arrest in
violation of his right to a speedy trial?
V. Was Appellant denied his Constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel when Appellant was
not informed of the use and importance of character
testimony and his right to secure character witnesses
for counsel to prepare and present during trial?
Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.
Our standard of review requires us to “examine whether the PCRA
court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “The scope of review is limited to the findings
of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level.” Commonwealth v.
Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). “It is well-settled
that a PCRA court’s credibility determinations are binding upon an appellate
court so long as they are supported by the record.” Commonwealth v.
Robinson, 82 A.3d 998, 1013 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). However, this
Court reviews the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Commonwealth
v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
-4-
J-S57011-15
Further, in order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead
and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or
sentence arose from one or more of the errors listed at Section 9543(a)(2)
of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). These errors include
ineffectiveness of counsel. Id. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). The issues raised in a PCRA
petition must be neither previously litigated nor waived. Id. § 9543(a)(3).
Instantly, Appellant presents five claims for our review. In his first
claim, Appellant argues the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition
without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant’s Brief at 19. Our review is
guided by the following.
[T]he right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-
conviction petition is not absolute. It is within the
PCRA court’s discretion to decline to hold a hearing if
the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has no
support either in the record or other evidence. It is
the responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to
examine each issue raised in the PCRA petition in
light of the record certified before it in order to
determine if the PCRA court erred in its
determination that there were no genuine issues of
material fact in controversy and in denying relief
without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 2012), quoting
Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 882 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(citations omitted), appeal denied, 940 A.2d 365 (Pa. 2007); see also
generally Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. “We stress that an evidentiary hearing is not
meant to function as a fishing expedition for any possible evidence that may
support some speculative claim ….” Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d
-5-
J-S57011-15
595, 604-605 (Pa. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied, Roney v. Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 56 (2014). We review a
PCRA court’s decision to dismiss without a hearing for abuse of discretion.
Id. at 604. Accordingly, we must examine Appellant’s four remaining issues
asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in light of the record
before us. Wah, supra. If Appellant has failed to raise a meritorious claim,
then the PCRA court will not have abused its discretion in dismissing
Appellant’s claim without a hearing. Likewise, if Appellant has raised a valid
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we would remand for an
evidentiary hearing. Therefore, we proceed to address Appellant’s four
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
When reviewing a claim of ineffectiveness, we apply the following test,
first articulated by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527
A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987).
[C]ourts presume that counsel was effective, and
place upon the appellant the burden of proving
otherwise. Counsel cannot be found ineffective for
failure to assert a baseless claim.
To succeed on a claim that counsel was
ineffective, Appellant must demonstrate that: (1) the
claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no
reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or
inaction; and (3) counsel’s ineffectiveness prejudiced
him.
…
[T]o demonstrate prejudice, appellant must
show there is a reasonable probability that, but for
-6-
J-S57011-15
counsel’s error, the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different.
Commonwealth v. Michaud, 70 A.3d 862, 867 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). “Failure to establish any prong of
the test will defeat an ineffectiveness claim.” Commonwealth v.
Birdsong, 24 A.3d 319, 329 (Pa. 2011).
We begin by addressing Appellant’s second and fifth issues. In his
second issue, Appellant asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to secure
transcripts from a protection from abuse (PFA) hearing in family court
involving Appellant and the complainant. Appellant’s Brief at 22-24.
Appellant baldly asserts that “[i]f the complainant’s prior testimony was
inconsistent with how she testified at trial, counsel could have used the
transcript for impeachment purposes.” Id. at 22-23. In his fifth issue,
Appellant argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “call character
witnesses to testify about his reputation in the community for possessing
specific traits.” Id. at 33. Appellant argues that “[h]ad trial counsel
discussed this important trial strategy with him, he would have elected to
call character witnesses, and he would have secured character witnesses to
testify on his behalf.” Id. at 33-34.
In both issues, Appellant fails to articulate his claims with any
specificity, or set forth how these purportedly ineffective decisions by trial
counsel would have changed the outcome of trial. In the second issue,
Appellant fails to specify what statements made by complainant he wished to
-7-
J-S57011-15
use, or how these statements would have been used for impeachment
purposes. Further, in his fifth claim, Appellant does not state what
witnesses he would have presented, or more importantly what character
traits they would have testified to, or how that would have changed the
jury’s verdict. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim is waived based on his failure
to prove his claim is of arguable merit, or how such omissions caused him
prejudice. See Fears, supra at 804 (concluding that the “failure to
meaningfully discuss each of the three ineffectiveness prongs” renders claim
“waived for lack of development[]”).
Next, in his third issue Appellant argues trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to the testimony of three different witnesses at trial.
Appellant’s Brief at 25. Specifically, Appellant argues counsel should have
objected to the testimony of Jennifer Erni regarding dating Appellant for four
months and subsequently filing a suit against him for $1,200,000.00 in
damages; Colleen Moran, Appellant’s former spouse who testified that
Appellant owed her $5,000.00 in child support arrears, that a lien had been
placed on Appellant’s property, and that the property had been sold in March
2007; and finally Henry Byrd, Senior Fraud Investigator for Commerce Bank,
who testified that complainant closed her bank account in May 2007, and
testified to the balances of, and transaction on Appellant’s account as of
trial. Id. at 25-28.
-8-
J-S57011-15
The Commonwealth, however, argues that Appellant has failed to
“present his claim with the Pierce framework.” Commonwealth’s Brief at
11. Preliminarily, we agree. In reference to each of the three witnesses
Appellant fails to develop his claim based on the arguable merit prong, or to
address the possibility of choosing not to object as a reasonable trial
strategy. On this basis alone, we could find waiver. See Fears, supra. To
the extent Appellant purports to argue the prejudice prong of the Pierce
test to the witnesses, Appellant has failed to explain how, in light of the
overwhelming evidence against him; the testimony of these three witnesses
would have changed the outcome at trial, and rather makes bald assertions
of prejudice.2
It is axiomatic that to be entitled to PCRA relief, a petitioner must be
able to show how he or she was prejudiced from trial counsel’s alleged
ineffectiveness.
Relating to the prejudice prong of the
ineffectiveness test, the PCRA petitioner must
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s error or omission, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.
Particularly relevant herein, it is well-settled that a
court is not required to analyze the elements of an
ineffectiveness claim in any particular order of
priority; instead, if a claim fails under any necessary
element of the Strickland test, the court may
proceed to that element first.
____________________________________________
2
Also noteworthy is Appellant’s failure to provide any citations to the notes
of testimony.
-9-
J-S57011-15
Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2012).
In this case, Appellant does not explain how objecting to the
aforementioned testimony would have created “a reasonable probability that
… the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. Based on
these considerations, we conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief on this
issue. See Spotz, supra at 319 (stating, “remanding for the PCRA court to
make factual findings and credibility determinations as to the ‘reasonable
basis’ prong will be unnecessary if we determine there is no reasonable
probability that an objection to the challenged jury instruction at trial would
have led to a more favorable outcome for [the defendant]”);
Commonwealth v. Steele, 961 A.2d 786, 797 (Pa. 2008) (stating, “a
petitioner must set forth and individually discuss substantively each prong of
the Pierce test[]”).
Finally, in his fourth issue, Appellant argues trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss the charges pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600. Appellant’s Brief at 31.
Appellant asserts the charges against him were filed on April 3, 2007, and a
jury was empaneled on April 16, 2008, 379 days after the criminal charges
were filed. Id. at 31. Therefore, Appellant concludes that his claim that
“trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking to have his case dismissed has
legal merit when the Commonwealth failed to bring the case to trial within
three hundred and sixty-five days.” Id. The Commonwealth counters that
- 10 -
J-S57011-15
Appellant’s issue lacks arguable merit as Appellant’s counsel litigated a Rule
600 motion in his companion case. Commonwealth’s Brief at 14.
We recognize that the courts of this Commonwealth employ a three-
step analysis to determine whether Rule 600 requires dismissal of the
charges against a defendant.
The first step in determining whether a
technical violation of Rule 600 […] has occurred is to
calculate the “mechanical run date.” The mechanical
run date is the date by which trial must commence
under the relevant procedural rule. [T]he
mechanical run date is ascertained by counting the
number of days from the triggering event - e.g., the
date on which … the criminal complaint was filed - to
the date on which trial must commence under Rule
[600]. Pa.R.Crim.P. [600(A)(3)].
Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 11 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal
citations omitted), appeal denied, 916 A.2d 632 (Pa. 2007). In the second
step, we must “determine whether any excludable time exists pursuant to
Rule 600(C).” Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1103 (Pa.
Super. 2007), appeal denied, 948 A.2d 803 (Pa. 2008). Then, in the third
step, “[w]e add the amount of excludable time, if any, to the mechanical run
date to arrive at an adjusted run date.” Id.
It is well settled that any delay occasioned by a defendant is
excludable time in the calculation of the adjusted run date. Pa.R.Crim.P.
600(C)(2)-(3); Preston, supra. Furthermore, delays not attributable to a
defendant but where the Commonwealth is found to have acted with due
diligence in attempting to commence a timely trial but was prevented by
- 11 -
J-S57011-15
circumstances beyond its control, is also considered excusable time.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(G); accord Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 989 A.2d 883,
899 (Pa. 2010), cert. denied, Wholaver v. Pennsylvania, 131 S. Ct. 332
(2010).
“Due-diligence is a fact-specific concept that is
determined on a case-by-case basis. Due diligence
does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious
care, but rather a showing by the Commonwealth
that a reasonable effort has been put forth.”
Commonwealth v. Booze, 953 A.2d 1263, 1273
(Pa. Super. 2008) (quotations and quotation marks
omitted). “Judicial delay may justify postponing trial
beyond the adjusted run date if the Commonwealth
was prepared to commence trial prior to the
expiration of the mandatory period but the court was
unavailable because of ‘scheduling difficulties and
the like.’” Preston, 904 A.2d at 14 (citation
omitted).
Commonwealth v. Lynch, 57 A.3d 120, 124 (Pa. Super.
2012), appeal denied, 63 A.3d 1245 (Pa. 2013).
Because the Commonwealth cannot control the
calendar of a trial court, delay occasioned by the
court’s unavailability is usually excusable. However,
the Commonwealth may, under some circumstances
(e.g. a prolonged judicial absence), have a duty to
seek other courtrooms to try the case. The extent of
this duty depends on the specifics of each case. The
guiding principle is, again, that the Commonwealth
must exercise due diligence by putting forth a
reasonable effort in light of the particular case facts.
Along similar lines, delays caused by administrative
decisions of the court, decisions over which the
Commonwealth has no control, are generally
excused.
- 12 -
J-S57011-15
Commonwealth v. Riley, 19 A.3d 1146, 1149 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted).
Preliminarily, we note that Appellant concedes a Rule 600 motion was
litigated. He asserts that “[t]he [d]ocket on Appellant’s companion case
reflects that a [m]otion to [d]ismiss was filed on February 29, 2008, but
there is no similar entry on the [d]ocket of the instant case.” Appellant’s
Brief at 32. Attached to the Commonwealth’s brief is a copy of the Rule 600
motion filed in Appellant’s companion case at docket number CR-0010072-
2007.3 Commonwealth’s Brief at Appendix. Said motion states “[t]rial is
scheduled to commence on April 7, 2008, having been consolidated for trial
with charges at CP-51-CR-0010104-2007[, the instant case].” Id. at ¶3.
The motion only requests dismissal pursuant to Rule 600 at the earlier
docket number, and not the one in the instant matter. Notably, at the time
said motion was filed, Rule 600 would not have been violated in the instant
matter, and therefore, it would have been premature for counsel to file a
Rule 600 motion.
____________________________________________
3
We note said motion is not included in the docket that was transmitted to
this Court. Nevertheless, as it is not critical to our review, we can address
Appellant’s claim. Further, the PCRA court opinion states that “[a] cursory
review of the Record reflects that a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 was heard and on April 14, 2008 it was denied.” PCRA
Court Opinion, 11/24/14, at 10. The certified record does not contain any
notation of a denial of a Rule 600 motion on this date, but we can assume it
was the date on which the February 29, 2008 motion was denied.
- 13 -
J-S57011-15
Herein, Appellant was charged on April 3, 2007. Assuming arguendo
there were no excludable or excusable periods of time, the Commonwealth
had 365 days, or until April 2, 2008 to bring Appellant to trial. However, the
docket reveals that at the November 14, 2007 scheduling conference
“Discovery complete. List for 4 day jury trial on 4/7/08[,]” noting that
March 10, 2008 was “no good for [defense counsel], next earliest date 3/24
was no good for Commonwealth[,]” thus, the trial court listed the case for
April 7, 2008. Additionally, the docket indicates on April 7, 2008 “Court on
trial. Continued until 4/8/08[.]” April 8, April 10, April 14, and April 15,
2008 all contain notations of hearings without further notation. Trial
commenced on April 15, 2008. At a minimum, the period of time from
March 24, 2008 through April 8, 2008 would be excludable time. See Riley,
supra. Therefore, this is a total of 15 days of excludable time, making the
mechanical run date April 17, 2008 date. As a result, the Commonwealth
did not violate Rule 600. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to file a Rule 600 motion has no arguable merit.
See Michaud, supra.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court did not abuse its
discretion by dismissing Appellant’s petition without a hearing, as all of
Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are either waived or
lack arguable merit. See Roney, supra; see also Birdsong, supra.
Therefore, we affirm the PCRA court’s July 21, 2014 order.
- 14 -
J-S57011-15
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/25/2016
- 15 -