Com. v. Wright, P. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S56009-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    PATRICK EUGENE WRIGHT,
    Appellant                 No. 338 MDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 27, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0000709-2014
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, JENKINS, and PLATT,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                       FILED NOVEMBER 06, 2015
    Appellant, Patrick Eugene Wright, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence entered following his convictions of driving under the influence of
    alcohol or controlled substance (“DUI”), and driving under suspension (DUI
    related). We affirm.
    The trial court has summarized the facts of this case as follows:
    At approximately 10:45 P.M. on July 25, 2013, Lieutenant
    Steven Helm1 (Helm) of the Williamsport Bureau of Police was
    operating an unmarked police car on Fourth Street in
    Williamsport, Pennsylvania. Helm approached the intersection of
    Fourth Street and Campbell Street.         As he approached the
    intersection, Helm noticed that the traffic light was red. He saw
    the vehicle ahead of him brake at the traffic light.         Helm
    described the brake as sudden, as if the driver of the vehicle did
    not realize that the light was red. The vehicle stopped in the left
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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    lane of Fourth Street, and Helm stopped in the right lane. Helm
    noticed that half of the vehicle was over the white stop line.
    Helm testified that the vehicle was not in the crosswalk.
    1
    Helm has been a police officer for over 20 years.
    When the light turned green, the vehicle began to turn left
    onto Campbell Street.        According to Helm, the vehicle
    accelerated rapidly. He heard a slight “chirp” from the vehicle’s
    tires as it turned onto Campbell Street. Helm described the turn
    as wide. He testified that the vehicle nearly struck cars parked
    on Campbell Street. Helm testified that the cars were parked
    legally on Campbell Street.
    After the vehicle turned, Helm began to follow it. The
    vehicle was not speeding, and it did not swerve. The driver used
    a turn signal and turned left onto Park Avenue. Helm described
    the turn as sudden. He testified that the vehicle did not slow
    down much before the turn. After the turn onto Park Avenue,
    Helm stopped the vehicle. Helm identified the driver of the
    vehicle as [Appellant]. Helm eventually arrested [Appellant] on
    suspicion of driving after imbibing enough alcohol so that he
    could not safely operate a vehicle.2
    2
    75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a).
    Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/14, at 1-2. In addition, we note that testimony
    from police officers indicated that Appellant failed two field sobriety tests.
    Also, after Appellant was transported to Williamsport Hospital, he refused to
    have his blood drawn for chemical testing.           On November 27, 2013,
    Appellant was charged with the crimes stated above.
    On July 23, 2014, Appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence and
    statements obtained as a result of the vehicle stop. The trial court held a
    hearing on Appellant’s motion on August 18, 2014. On October 23, 2014,
    the trial court entered an order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.
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    A nonjury trial was held on January 27, 2015. At the conclusion of the
    trial, Appellant was convicted of both crimes with which he was charged.
    The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a term of incarceration of three
    to six months for the DUI conviction and a consecutive term of incarceration
    of ninety days for the summary offense of driving under suspension (DUI
    related).   This timely appeal followed.   Both Appellant and the trial court
    have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
    1. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
    THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL TO
    SUSTAIN A CONVICTION FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE,
    AS THE COMMONWEALTH FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT
    THE APPELLANT WAS INCAPABLE OF SAFELY DRIVING AS A
    RESULT OF ALCOHOL.
    2. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
    APPELLANT’S PRETRIAL SUPPRESSION MOTION, WHEREIN THE
    ARRESTING OFFICER DID NOT HAVE THE REQUISITE
    REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE VEHICLE?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    Appellant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support
    his conviction of DUI.      Appellant’s Brief at 9-10. Basically, Appellant
    contends that the Commonwealth failed to establish that he was incapable of
    safely driving because he obeyed traffic signals, did not swerve, and used
    proper signaling while he was driving.
    When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
    evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
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    verdict winner, giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences
    to be drawn from the evidence.          Commonwealth v. Duncan, 
    932 A.2d 226
    , 231 (Pa. Super. 2007). “Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support
    the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged
    and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    
    Id. (quoting Commonwealth
    v. Brewer, 
    876 A.2d 1029
    , 1032 (Pa. Super.
    2005)).       However, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a
    mathematical certainty, and it may sustain its burden by means of wholly
    circumstantial evidence. 
    Id. In addition,
    this Court may not substitute its
    judgment for that of the factfinder, and where the record contains support
    for the convictions, they may not be disturbed. 
    Id. Lastly, we
    note that the
    finder of fact is free to believe some, all, or none of the evidence presented.
    Commonwealth v. Hartle, 
    894 A.2d 800
    , 804 (Pa. Super. 2006).
    The relevant DUI statute, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802, provides in pertinent part
    as follows:
    (a) General impairment –
    (1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical
    control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient
    amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable
    of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of
    the movement of the vehicle.
    75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).
    This Court has instructed that to establish a defendant is not capable
    of   safely    driving   a   vehicle   due   to   consumption   of   alcohol,   “the
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    Commonwealth must prove that alcohol has substantially impaired the
    normal mental and physical faculties required to operate the vehicle safely;
    ‘substantial impairment’ means a diminution or enfeeblement in the ability to
    exercise judgment, to deliberate or to react prudently to changing
    circumstances and conditions.” Commonwealth v. Kerry, 
    906 A.2d 1237
    ,
    1241 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gruff, 
    822 A.2d 773
    781 (Pa. Super. 2003)).     “Section 3802(a)(1), like its predecessor, ‘is a
    general provision and provides no specific restraint upon the Commonwealth
    in the manner in which it may prove that an accused operated a vehicle
    under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of
    safe driving.’”   
    Id. (quoting Commonwealth
    v. Loeper, 
    663 A.2d 669
    ,
    673-674 (Pa. 1995)).     As noted by this Court, a police officer who has
    perceived a defendant’s appearance and acts is competent to express an
    opinion as to the defendant’s state of intoxication and ability to safely drive
    a vehicle.   Commonwealth v. Palmer, 
    751 A.2d 223
    , 228 (Pa. Super.
    2000).
    The trial court made the following relevant observations regarding
    Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:
    Here, the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a
    reasonable doubt that [Appellant] drove a vehicle when he was
    rendered incapable of safely doing so due to alcohol
    consumption. Helm testified that [Appellant] stopped suddenly
    at a traffic light and almost hit a legally parked car. Helm
    noticed that [Appellant] had glassy eyes; he also noticed an odor
    of alcohol. [Appellant] argued with Helm and would not listen to
    the instructions on the field sobriety tests. During the one-leg
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    stand, [Appellant] lifted his foot only an inch, swayed, and raised
    his arms. On the walk and turn, [Appellant] wanted to start the
    test early and thrice missed heel to toe contact. Additionally,
    [Appellant] did not finish the walk and turn. After observing the
    sobriety tests, both Helm and [Sergeant Kristopher] Moore
    believed that [Appellant] was incapable of safely driving as a
    result of alcohol consumption. [Appellant] testified that there
    were “too many things going on” to finish the tests. He “talked
    over” Helm when Helm was trying to explain the chemical testing
    law, and he refused the blood draw. Such evidence is sufficient
    to establish DUI (incapable of safely driving) beyond a
    reasonable doubt.
    Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/15, at 5.
    Likewise, our review of the record supports the conclusion made by
    the trial court.   Lieutenant Helm offered detailed testimony regarding his
    personal experiences as a police officer, Appellant’s erratic driving that led to
    the vehicle stop, Appellant’s physical appearance during the stop that
    included glassy eyes, slow speech, and odor of alcohol, Appellant’s
    argumentative behavior, and Appellant’s inability to properly complete two
    field sobriety tests.   N.T., 1/27/15, at 4-12.    Based upon the foregoing,
    Lieutenant Helm opined that Appellant was impaired as a result of alcohol
    and was not capable of safe driving.     
    Id. at 12-13.
    In addition, Sergeant
    Moore testified regarding his extensive experience as a police officer, and
    what transpired upon arriving at the scene as back-up for Lieutenant Helm.
    
    Id. at 30-34.
         Sergeant Moore stated that “from the second I got there
    [Appellant] appeared to be under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs,
    [was] belligerent, failing to obey commands and directions.”         
    Id. at 32.
    Sergeant Moore opined that, based upon his interactions with and
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    observations of Appellant, Appellant was under the influence of alcohol and
    was not capable of safely driving.       
    Id. at 33-34.
    Viewing the facts in the
    light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we
    conclude that the Commonwealth demonstrated, beyond a reasonable
    doubt, that Appellant was driving while under the influence of alcohol to a
    degree that rendered him incapable of safe driving. Therefore, Appellant’s
    contrary claim lacks merit.
    In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
    failing to grant his motion to suppress.           Appellant’s Brief at 10-12.
    Specifically, Appellant contends that the arresting officer lacked reasonable
    suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle.
    With respect to an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, our
    Supreme Court has stated the following:
    Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
    court’s denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual
    findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
    conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. When reviewing
    the ruling of a suppression court, we must consider only the
    evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence of the
    defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of
    the record. . . . Where the record supports the findings of the
    suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse
    only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
    Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 
    915 A.2d 1122
    , 1134 (Pa. 2007) (citations
    omitted). “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to
    pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their
    testimony.” Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 
    896 A.2d 583
    , 585 (Pa. Super.
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    2006).    Moreover, we note that our scope of review from a suppression
    ruling is limited to the evidentiary record that was created at the
    suppression hearing. In re L.J., 
    79 A.3d 1073
    , 1087 (Pa. 2013).1
    Further, we are aware that Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure
    581, which addresses the suppression of evidence, provides in relevant part
    as follows:
    (H) The Commonwealth shall have the burden . . . of
    establishing that the challenged evidence was not obtained in
    violation of the defendant’s rights.
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H).
    The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
    and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect
    individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby
    ensuring the “right of each individual to be let alone.”
    Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
    412 U.S. 218
    , 236, 
    36 L. Ed. 2d 854
    , 
    93 S. Ct. 2041
    (1973); Commonwealth v. Blair, 394 Pa.
    Super. 207, 
    575 A.2d 593
    , 596 (Pa. Super. 1990).
    Commonwealth v. By, 
    812 A.2d 1250
    , 1254 (Pa. Super. 2002).
    ____________________________________________
    1
    On October 30, 2013, our Supreme Court decided In re L.J. In L.J., our
    Supreme Court held that our scope of review from a suppression ruling is
    limited to the evidentiary record that was created at the suppression
    hearing. In re 
    L.J., 79 A.3d at 1087
    . Prior to L.J., this Court routinely held
    that, when reviewing a suppression court’s ruling, our scope of review
    included “the evidence presented both at the suppression hearing and at
    trial.” Commonwealth v. Charleston, 
    16 A.3d 505
    , 516 (Pa. Super. 2011)
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Chacko, 
    459 A.2d 311
    (Pa. 1983)). L.J. thus
    narrowed our scope of review of suppression court rulings to the evidence
    presented at the suppression hearing. In this case, Appellant’s case was
    initiated after L.J. was decided. Therefore, the procedural rule announced in
    L.J. applies to the case at bar.
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    To secure the right of citizens to be free from intrusions by police,
    courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to demonstrate
    ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens as
    those interactions become more intrusive.              Commonwealth v. Beasley,
    
    761 A.2d 621
    , 624 (Pa. Super. 2000).
    It is undisputed that:
    [s]tate case law recognizes three categories of interaction
    between police officers and citizens, which include: (1) a mere
    encounter, or request for information, which need not be
    supported by any level of suspicion, but which carries no official
    compulsion to stop or to respond; (2) an investigative detention,
    which must be supported by reasonable suspicion as it subjects
    a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not
    involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional
    equivalent of an arrest; and (3) arrest or custodial detention,
    which must be supported by probable cause.
    Commonwealth v. Acosta, 
    815 A.2d 1078
    , 1082 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en
    banc).
    “[T]he standards concerning the quantum of cause necessary for an
    officer   to    stop    a    vehicle    in     this   Commonwealth   are   settled.”
    Commonwealth v. Feczko, 
    10 A.3d 1285
    , 1290-1291 (Pa. Super. 2010).
    Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a
    violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the authority of section 6308(b), 2
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    2
    Section 6308(b) of the Motor Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part, as
    follows:
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    must serve a stated investigatory purpose.          
    Id. at 1291.
      Reasonable
    suspicion exists when there are specific and articulable facts that create a
    reasonable suspicion, based on the officer’s experience, that there is criminal
    activity afoot.   Commonwealth v. Sands, 
    887 A.2d 261
    , 271-272 (Pa.
    Super. 2005). Officers may initiate a stop based upon reasonable suspicion
    to gather further information to support the enforcement of the Motor
    Vehicle Code. 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b); 
    Feczko, 10 A.3d at 1288
    . DUI is a
    violation for which there is a need for further investigation.     
    Sands, 887 A.2d at 270
    .
    In its opinion drafted pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court
    addressed this issue as follows:
    As discussed in the Court’s opinion filed on October 23,
    2014, [which addressed Appellant’s motion to suppress,] Helm
    articulated specific facts, which were sufficient to provide him
    with reasonable suspicion to believe that [Appellant] was
    committing DUI. Helm saw [Appellant’s] vehicle stop suddenly
    at a red light even though the light was red as the vehicle
    approached the intersection. When the vehicle came to a stop,
    half of it was over the stop line. When the light turned green,
    the vehicle accelerated rapidly and Helm heard a slight “chirp” of
    the tires. The vehicle made a wide turn and almost hit legally
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    Whenever a police officer . . . has reasonable suspicion that a
    violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a
    vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the
    vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle
    identification number or engine number or the driver’s license, or
    to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably
    believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
    75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b).
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    parked vehicles. Although not mentioned in the October 23,
    2014 opinion, during the suppression hearing, Helm testified that
    a driver could make the turn without coming close to the parked
    vehicles. Helm observed [Appellant] make another turn without
    slowing down much. He testified that sudden behavior is a
    major indicator of impaired driving. Although [Appellant] was
    not speeding and used his turn signal, the totality of the
    circumstances shows that Helm had reasonable suspicion that
    [Appellant] was committing DUI.
    Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/15, at 6-7.
    Likewise, our review of the record reflects that the facts, in the
    knowledge of the officer at the time, were sufficient to establish reasonable
    suspicion necessary to stop Appellant’s vehicle.   Thus, because the police
    officer articulated facts at the suppression hearing that amounted to
    reasonable suspicion, we conclude that the stop of Appellant’s vehicle was
    lawful. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion
    to suppress evidence obtained following the stop of the vehicle and
    Appellant’s second issue lacks merit.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/6/2015
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