Com. v. Hargrove, D. ( 2015 )

J. A29001/15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
DANIEL HARGROVE, : No. 1896 WDA 2013
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, July 2, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0002069-2012
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES AND MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2015
Daniel Hargrove appeals from the July 2, 2013 judgment of sentence
following his conviction of false reports to law enforcement authorities with
intent to falsely incriminate another person. We affirm.
The trial court has provided the following relevant facts:
In July of 2008, the victim, [Jill] Cueni-Cohen,
(hereinafter referred to as “Cohen”), had just
returned to the United States from Switzerland as a
result of the break-up of her marriage. Cohen
returned with her minor son, however she was
charged with international kidnapping by her
ex-husband and was looking for an attorney to
represent her in connection with this charge. She
met Hargrove in a bar and explained her situation to
him. The next day Hargrove called her and told her
that he could help her and they should meet. Their
attorney-client relationship almost immediately
developed into a romantic relationship, which lasted
for approximately three years. At one point Cohen
moved into Hargrove’s home and resided with him.
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After approximately three years, she became
frightened of Hargrove because of his threats to
harm her and her family. Hargrove would text
Cohen at all hours of the day and she became fearful
of his continued harassment. Cohen described him
as [a] Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde character and noted
that when he became drunk, he would text horrible
things to her. Cohen ended their relationship in
August of 2011.
During the early evening of October 3, 2011,
Cohen began receiving numerous text messages
from Hargrove while she was at work. Hargrove
wanted her to meet with him. He continued to text
message her asking her to come over and meet with
him. She responded to one of his text messages by
saying that he was drunk and he texted back that he
was not drunk and she should come over and make
this assessment. Cohen, who is an avid runner was
not too far from Hargrove’s house and decided to go
over to his house. When she arrived, she texted him
and told him that she was outside and he said for
her to come in and she responded that she would not
come in and he would have to come outside. He
started screaming and when he came out, she
realized that he said that she should shoot him.
These text messages began at approximately
8:47 p.m. The last text message that she received
from Hargrove was shortly before midnight. After
receiving the last text message from Hargrove,
Cohen left and started to jog back towards her
home.
Hargrove made three 911 calls, the first being
at 12:18 a.m. on October 4, 2011. In the first call
he told the 911 operator that his ex-fiancée was
“blowing up” his phone and wanted him to come
outside and he believed that she had a weapon. The
second 911 call occurred at 12:34 a.m. when
Hargrove was wondering whether the police were
going to respond to his earlier 911 call. The final
911 call was made at 1:11 a.m. when Hargrove said
that he was still receiving messages from a stalker
and [they] were getting more elevated.
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The police arrived at Hargrove’s house at
12:36 a.m., obtained a description of Cohen, and
received her phone number. When Officer Shawn
Frank left Hargrove’s house, he called Cohen on her
cell phone and asked her to meet him and they
agreed to meet at the Township Park, located on
Greenfield Road. Officer Frank met her at
approximately 12:56 a.m. and was with her until
1:43 a.m. At approximately 1:14 a.m., Officer Frank
received a radio call indicating that Hargrove had
made an additional call saying that he was receiving
more text messages from Cohen. Officer Frank
noted that in the eighteen minutes that he had been
with Cohen, she had not used her phone nor did she
attempt to send any text messages. Officer Frank
noted that the time their meeting ended at 1:43
a.m., she had not used her phone nor had she made
any text messages.
Hargrove testified on his own behalf and stated
that some time during the late night of October 3
and the early morning of October 4, his phone went
dead and he had placed it in the charger and that he
had received so many text messages that his phone
was refusing to accept any more. It was only after
his phone had recharged that the messages came
flooding onto his phone.
Trial court opinion, 6/4/15 at 3-5.
Appellant was charged with, inter alia,1 false alarm to agency of
public safety and false reports to law enforcement authorities with the intent
of incriminating another person.2 A non-jury trial was held beginning on
April 9, 2013. Appellant was convicted on April 11, 2013, of false reports
1
Appellant was facing several other charges through a separate criminal
information, which is not before us for the purposes of this review.
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4905(a) and 4906(a), respectively.
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and was acquitted of false alarms to agencies of public safety. On July 2,
2013, appellant was sentenced to one year of probation and was prohibited
from having any contact with Cohen. Appellant was further ordered to
attend batterer’s intervention. On July 11, 2013, appellant filed timely
post-sentence motions which were denied on October 29, 2013. Appellant
filed a timely notice of appeal to this court on December 2, 2013.3 The trial
court ordered appellant to submit a concise statement of matters complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and appellant complied with this
order on April 21, 2014. The trial court has filed an opinion.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Whether there was insufficient evidence to prove the
crime of false reports to law enforcement when the
Commonwealth failed to prove that Appellant gave
false information, namely that he was being
threatened and/or harassed by Jill Cueni-Cohen?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
When reviewing a claim of the sufficiency of the evidence, we are held
to the following standard:
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
we view all evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict
winner, to see whether there is sufficient evidence to
enable [the fact finder] to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard is
equally applicable to cases where the evidence is
3
November 29, 2013, was the day after Thanksgiving, which has been
designated as a court holiday. Therefore, appellant’s filing deadline was
extended to the next business day, which was December 2, 2013. See
1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.
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circumstantial rather than direct so long as the
combination of evidence links the accused to the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Although a
conviction must be based on “more than mere
suspicion or conjecture, the Commonwealth need not
establish guilt to a mathematical certainty.”
Moreover, when reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence, this Court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the fact finder; if the record
contains support for the convictions, they may not
be disturbed.
Commonwealth v. Stokes, 78 A.3d 644, 649 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations
omitted).
Moreover, in applying the above test, the
entire record must be evaluated and all evidence
actually received must be considered. Finally, the
finder of fact, while passing upon the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943-944 (Pa.Super. 2011)
(citations omitted).
The credibility and weight of the evidence are both matters that are in
the sole purview of the fact-finder. Specifically, when considering whether
the evidence was sufficient to prove each element of a charge beyond a
reasonable doubt, we cannot assume the task of weighing evidence and
making independent conclusions of fact. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 911
A.2d 558, 563 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citations omitted). “Any doubts regarding
[an appellant’s] guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence
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is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact
may be drawn from the combined circumstances.” Id.The statute at issue provides that a “person who knowingly gives false
information to any law enforcement officer with intent to implicate another
commits a misdemeanor of the second degree.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4906(a).
This court has established the four elements that the Commonwealth must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict a defendant of false
reports--implicating another: “(1) the defendant must have made the
statement to a law enforcement officer; (2) the defendant’s statement must
be false; (3) the defendant must know the statement is false; and (4) the
defendant must intend to implicate another.” Commonwealth v. Soto,
650 A.2d 108, 110 (Pa.Super. 1994).
Here, the first two elements are not in dispute. The Commonwealth
met the first prong under Soto by presenting evidence that appellant told
the first 911 operator and Sergeant Frank that he was afraid that Cohen
may have a weapon. (Notes of testimony, 4/9/13 at 12, 51.) The second
Soto prong was satisfied when the police determined that Cohen was
unarmed. (Id. at 53.) Whether the Commonwealth met its burden in
proving the third prong of Soto is strictly a matter of credibility, which is
within the exclusive purview of the trial court, as fact-finder. Here, the
Commonwealth presented Cohen’s testimony, which the trial court found
credible, that she is opposed to guns, and that she communicated her
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opposition to guns in the past to appellant. (Id. at 82-83.) Finally, the
Commonwealth met the fourth prong by establishing through its
case-in-chief that appellant intended to implicate Cohen. Appellant testified
that he felt threatened by the numerous text messages he received from
Cohen and that he believed that Cohen may have had a weapon. (Id. at
150.) The trial court noted multiple times that it found appellant’s testimony
to be lacking credibility. (See trial court opinion, 6/4/15 at 8.)
As noted above, we are bound by the trial court’s credibility
determinations, as determining credibility is within the sole purview of the
fact-finder. Credible testimony from the 911 operators who answered
appellant’s calls, Cohen, and Sergeant Frank provide ample factual support
within the record for the trial court’s determination, which cannot be
disturbed. See Stokes, supra at 649.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/23/2015
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