Romani-Ruby, C. v. Romani, D. ( 2016 )


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  • J-A32029-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    CHRISTINE ROMANI-RUBY, JESSICA                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    ROMANI, TRACY ROMANI                                    PENNSYLVANIA
    v.
    DOMENIC ROMANI
    Appellant                 No. 114 WDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered February 3, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County
    Civil Division at No(s): 10769 CD 2012
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and STABILE, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:                             FILED JANUARY 06, 2016
    Domenic Romani (Appellant) appeals from the order entered on
    December 17, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County,
    denying his post-trial motion for relief.1     In this appeal, Romani presents
    three claims, all of which essentially argue the $2,475,000.00 jury award
    against him was excessive and unsupported by the evidence.             After a
    thorough review of the submissions by the parties, relevant law, and the
    certified record, we affirm.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Technically, this appeal was premature, having been filed prior to entry of
    judgment. However, judgment was subsequently entered on February 3,
    2015, thereby allowing this panel to proceed. The appeal is properly taken
    from the judgment.
    J-A32029-15
    The underlying facts of this matter are well known to the parties and
    need not be recounted here. We simply note that over a period of years,
    Appellant engaged in inappropriate physical contact with the three plaintiffs,
    all of whom are related. After Appellant pled guilty to a single crime related
    to his actions, the plaintiffs filed suit, seeking damages based upon claims of
    negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional
    distress,     battery,   assault      and    false   imprisonment.     See    Complaint,
    8/14/2012 at ¶¶ 22, 54, 72; 23, 55, 73; 24, 56, and 74. Appellant failed to
    answer the complaint and a default judgment was entered against him.
    Subsequently, a jury trial for damages only was held on August 4-5, 2014.
    The    jury    awarded     Christine    Romani-Ruby       $475,000,    Jessica   Romani
    $1,000,000,       and    Tracy     Romani      $1,000,0002    (collectively   Appellees).
    Appellant filed a post-trial motion claiming the awards were unsupported by
    evidence and were excessive. In his brief in support of his motion, Appellant
    also    stated    the    plaintiffs    had    claimed    emotional   damages     without
    demonstrating physical impact or injury, and therefore, any award for such
    damages must fail pursuant to Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park,
    Inc., 
    527 A.2d 988
    (Pa. 1987).
    In this appeal, Appellant raises three claims, although all three claims
    appear to be included in the first. Specifically, his arguments are:
    ____________________________________________
    2
    The awards included compensatory and punitive damages.
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    I.     Where the jury returned a monetary damages verdict for
    intentional infliction of emotional distress in an aggregate
    amount of $2,475,000.00 in a case in which the plaintiffs’
    testimony demonstrates that the injuries complained of were not
    severe, that the injuries complained of were not permanent in
    nature, that the injuries complained of were unaccompanied by
    any physical impact or injury, that the injuries complained of
    were not manifested by objective physical evidence but were
    instead revealed only by the plaintiffs’ subjective testimony, that
    the injuries complained of do not prevent the plaintiffs from
    continuing with their employment, that the size of the plaintiffs’
    out of pocket expenses are minimal, that the amount of
    compensation demanded in the original complaint was minimal
    in relation to the eventual jury verdict, and that the plaintiffs
    failed to present any expert testimony with regard to their
    injuries, did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in denying Defendant’s Motion
    for Post-Trial Relief which argued that the jury verdict was
    excessive and unsupported by sufficient evidence and which
    sought relief in the form of a new trial on the issue of damages
    or, in the alternative, sought remittitur[?]
    II.   Does each Plaintiff[’s] failure to introduce any type of
    expert medical testimony to prove their claims of emotional
    distress cause their damages claims to fail as matter of law?
    III. Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying
    Appellant’s post-trial motion in the form of remittitur by failing to
    reduce the jury’s verdict due to its excessive nature in general
    and due [to] the fact that each plaintiff wholly failed to introduce
    any expert medical testimony to support their respective claims
    for damages arising out of Appellant’s conduct[?]
    See Appellant’s Brief, at 7.
    Our standard of review for the denial of a request for new trial based
    upon an excessive verdict is as follows:
    The grant or refusal of a new trial because of the excessiveness
    of the verdict is within the discretion of the trial court. This court
    will not find a verdict excessive unless it is so grossly excessive
    as to shock our sense of justice. We begin with the premise that
    large verdicts are not necessarily excessive verdicts. Each case is
    unique and dependent on its own special circumstances and a
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    J-A32029-15
    court should apply only those factors which it finds to be
    relevant in determining whether or not the verdict is excessive.
    Graham v. Compo, 
    990 A.2d 9
    , 17 (Pa. Super. 2010).
    Appellant bases certain aspects of his appeal on a claim that the
    award, based upon a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, was
    not supported by competent medical testimony.               This argument is
    unavailing.
    First, we note that the complaint did not solely allege intentional
    infliction of emotional distress; as noted above, the Appellees also claimed
    negligent infliction of emotional distress.3 The jury verdict, however, did not
    differentiate between damages awarded for negligent or intentional infliction
    of emotional distress.       Moreover, Appellant did not ask for a verdict form
    that differentiated between those two claims, nor did he object to the form
    that was submitted to the jury. To the extent that the jury verdict cannot be
    differentiated between the claims of negligent and intentional infliction of
    emotional distress and the fact Appellant failed to object, the claim must be
    considered waived for failure to raise a timely objection.       See Pa.R.A.P.
    302(a) (issue must be raised first in the trial court).
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Our resolution of this matter is not strictly dependent upon any distinctions
    between claims of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
    We note that the Complaint characterized Romani’s actions as “intentional,
    wanton, willful and reckless” and not negligent. See Complaint at ¶¶ 24,
    56, 74.
    -4-
    J-A32029-15
    Substantively, Appellant’s argument that the failure to causally link his
    actions to the emotional harm claimed is fatal to Appellees’ claims, is based
    largely upon Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park, Inc., 
    527 A.2d 988
    (Pa. 1987).   Kazatsky determined that a claim of intentional infliction of
    emotional distress, based solely upon allegations of outrageous conduct,
    required expert medical testimony to link the conduct to the harm claimed.
    It is important to note that outrageous conduct is characterized as extreme
    actions that may border upon malice, but which does not include any
    physical impact or injury between the plaintiff and defendant.            See
    
    Kazatsky, 527 A.2d at 991-91
    , discussing Restatement (Second) of Torts
    46 comment(d) and Knaub v. Gotwalt, 
    220 A.2d 464
    (Pa. 1960).
    Specifically, in Kazatsky, the plaintiffs, parents of prematurely born twins
    who died shortly after birth, filed suit against the cemetery, which failed
    both to install the grave marker or to maintain the gravesite. The facts of
    Kazatsky bear no resemblance to the instant claim for damages based upon
    decades of inappropriate touching of the plaintiffs.
    Additionally, Appellant misstates the record when he claims there was
    no evidence of physical impact or injury.     See Appellate Brief at 20. The
    evidence from all three plaintiffs described a prolonged course of conduct of
    inappropriate physical contact between Romani and the victims. Kazatsky
    specifically distinguished claims based solely on outrageous conduct from
    those arising from physical contact.
    -5-
    J-A32029-15
    The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by
    outrageous conduct differs from traditional intentional torts in an
    important respect: it provides no clear definition of the
    prohibited conduct.
    Battery, assault, and false imprisonment describe specific
    forms of behavior; while we can quibble about whether a
    kick in the playground should be attended with the same
    legal consequences as a kick in the classroom, everyone
    can agree that you cannot have a battery without physical
    contact (or an assault without at least the appearance of
    attempted physical contact, or a false imprisonment
    without restraint of the freedom of movement). The
    relative ease with which injury may be established is
    counter balanced by the specificity of the prohibited
    behavior.
    The term “outrageous” is neither value-free nor exacting.
    It does not objectively describe an act or series of acts;
    rather, it represents an evaluation of behavior. The
    concept thus fails to provide clear guidance either to those
    whose conduct it purports to regulate, or to those who
    must evaluate that conduct.
    
    Kazatsky, supra
    , 527 A.2d at 994, quoting Givelber, The Right to Minimum
    Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of
    Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 Col.L.Rev. 42, 52-53 (1982).
    As we noted above, the complaint in this matter alleged assault,
    battery and false imprisonment.    The Appellees characterized Appellant’s
    actions throughout the years as assaults, batteries and false imprisonment.
    See 
    Complaint, supra
    . Appellant did not answer the complaint and did not
    deny those allegations. Pursuant to Kazatsky, such allegations provide the
    foundation of physical impact required to distinguish the instant claim from
    the outrageous conduct requirements described in Kazatsky.
    -6-
    J-A32029-15
    Finally, Appellant’s argument that the failure to provide expert medical
    testimony dooms the Appellees’ claims for damages, may also have been
    waived.    Romani did not object during trial to any of the Appellees’
    testimony regarding the harm they suffered.         Although Appellant cited
    Kazatsky in his brief in support of his post-trial motion, he only made
    reference to the requirement of physical contact, and made no argument
    regarding expert testimony.       Accordingly, any argument that Appellees’
    claims fail due to a lack of medical testimony has been waived for failure to
    raise the issue before the trial court.
    Even if we read Appellant’s Kazatsky based argument most broadly to
    include the lack of expert medical testimony, we have already noted that
    requirement was based upon a factual situation of outrageous conduct only,
    and not a claim based upon years of sexual improprieties.          Appellant’s
    attempt to characterize his actions and Appellees’ allegations as lacking
    physical impact is demonstrably false. Accordingly, this aspect of Appellant’s
    argument also fails.
    Finally, Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for
    remittitur. We reject Appellant’s assertion he is entitled to this relief based
    upon the lack of expert medical testimony for the same reasons discussed
    above.
    Appellant has also argued the awards are generally excessive in that it
    “shocks the sense of justice as to suggest that the jury was influenced by
    partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption,” and the amount bears no
    -7-
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    relationship to the “nature of their alleged injuries.” See Concise Statement
    of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 2/3/2015, at ¶¶ 7, 8. We disagree, and
    rely upon the analysis provided by the trial court in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
    opinion.     Therein, the trial court noted how Appellant manipulated the
    Appellees, abusing his position of familial trust;4 how the abuse of two of the
    victims began when they were 14 and 10 years old;5 how the abuse of one
    of the victims took place over a period of almost twenty-five years.6        The
    trial court noted how each victim related Appellant’s actions and how that
    abuse adversely impacted her everyday life, from the extensive period of
    abuse into the foreseeable future.7            Based upon the detailed testimony
    provided by the Plaintiffs, the trial court determined the awards were
    supported by the evidence and were not excessive.8              Our review of the
    certified record supports the trial court’s determination and we discern no
    abuse of discretion therein. See Graham v. 
    Compo, supra
    .
    In light of the foregoing, Romani is not entitled to relief.
    Judgment affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    4
    Trial Court Opinion, 12/17/2014, at 13-14.
    5
    
    Id. 6 Id.
    at 12.
    7
    
    Id. at 14.
    8
    
    Id. at 14.
    -8-
    J-A32029-15
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/6/2016
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 114 WDA 2015

Filed Date: 1/6/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/6/2016