Com. v. Castro, L. ( 2016 )

J-S67029-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LUIS ALBERTO CASTRO
Appellant No. 153 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 26, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0001058-2014
BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JANUARY 26, 2016
Appellant, Luis Alberto Castro, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered November 26, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster
County. We affirm.
The factual history of this matter is well known to the parties, so we
will rely upon the trial court’s recitation of the facts as set forth on pages 1-4
of the March 6, 2015 Rule 1925(a) opinion. Briefly, Castro was charged with
criminal attempt (kidnapping), persons not to possess a firearm, two counts
of terroristic threats, one count of simple assault (domestic violence), and
one count of recklessly endangering another person.1 The charges arose
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 6105(a)(1), 2706(a)(1), 2701(a)(3) and 2705,
respectively.
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from an incident in which Castro sent threatening text messages to his wife
in order to persuade her to leave her place of employment and then
attempted to force her into a car at gunpoint. Police responded to the scene
and were able to diffuse the situation and arrest Castro. At the police
station, the victim gave two written statements memorializing the incident,
and showed officers the threating text messages she received from Castro
on the day of the assault.
On September 11, 2014, Castro entered an open guilty plea to persons
not to possess a firearm. On November 10, 2014, a jury trial commenced
on the remaining charges, and Castro was convicted of one count of
terroristic threats and simple assault. After reviewing a pre-sentence
investigation report, the trial court sentenced Castro to 5-10 years’
imprisonment for persons not to possess a firearm, 2½ to five years’
imprisonment for terroristic threats, and 1-2 years’ imprisonment for simple
assault. The convictions were ordered to be served consecutively for an
aggregate sentence of 8½ to 17 years in prison. Carson filed a timely
motion seeking modification of his sentence, which the trial court denied.
This appeal followed.
Castro raises the following issues for our review.
I. Did the trial court err in denying the Appellant’s post
sentence motion requesting relief upon review of sentence
with respect to available mitigating factors, thus
misapplying the sentencing guidelines, thereby abusing its
discretion in sentencing the Appellant to an aggregate
sentence of 8 1/2 to 17 years in a state correctional
institution?
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II. Did the trial court err in denying the Appellant’s Motion in
Limine seeking to exclude testimony privileged
communication between the Appellant and his wife which
is protected as confidential communication between
spouses.
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
Castro first argues that the trial court erred when it allegedly failed to
consider certain mitigating factors of record in fashioning his sentence. This
argument challenges the discretionary aspects of Castro’s sentence. “A
challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be considered a
petition for permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a claim is not
absolute.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super.
2004) (citation omitted).
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his
sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a
four-part test:
[We] conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence,
see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate
under the Sentencing Code, 42. Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(quotation marks and some citations omitted).
Here, Castro filed a timely appeal and challenged his sentence in a
post-sentence motion. Castro’s appellate brief also contains the requisite
Rule 2119(f) concise statement, in which he contends that “the [s]entencing
[c]ourt failed to properly take into consideration mitigating factors presented
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by counsel at sentencing.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. We must now determine
whether Castro’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence
raises a substantial question.
“A substantial question will be found where an appellant advances a
colorable argument that the sentence imposed is either inconsistent with a
specific provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental
norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Zirkle,
107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 117 A.3d 297 (Pa.
2015) (citation omitted). “[W]e cannot look beyond the statement of
questions presented and the prefatory 2119(f) statement to determine
whether a substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Christine, 78
A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
Castro’s claim that his sentence was excessive because the trial court
failed to consider mitigating factors which were of record does not raise a
substantial question for our review. “[A]rguments that the sentencing court
failed to consider the factors proffered in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721 does present a
substantial question whereas a statement that the court failed to consider
facts of record, though necessarily encompassing the factors of § 9721, has
been rejected.” Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1266 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263,
1272 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2013)). Here, the trial court had the benefit of
reviewing a pre-sentence investigation report, and thus “we can assume the
sentencing court was aware of relevant information regarding the
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defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with
mitigating statutory factors.” Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (internal citations
omitted).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Castro has not raised a
substantial question that the sentence imposed was inappropriate or
contrary to a fundamental norm underlying the sentencing code. We are
thus compelled to deny allowance of appeal as to the discretionary aspects
of sentencing. See McAfee.
Castro also claims that the trial court erred in admitting the
threatening text messages he sent to the victim, his wife, in violation of the
spousal confidential communication privilege. See Appellant’s Brief at 14.
The “[a]dmission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court
and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused
its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 357 (Pa. Super.
2015) (citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the
exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,
prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.”
Commonwealth v. Ali, 112 A.3d 1210, 1217 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation
omitted), appeal granted in part by, --- A.3d ----, 2015 WL 7763727 (Pa.
Dec. 2, 2015).
The spousal communications privilege states as follows. “Except as
otherwise provided in this subchapter, in a criminal proceeding neither
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husband nor wife shall be competent or permitted to testify to confidential
communications made by one to the other, unless this privilege is waived
upon the trial.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5914.
Communications between spouses are presumed to be
confidential, and the party opposing application of the rule
disqualifying such testimony bears the burden of overcoming this
presumption. In order for a confidential communication between
spouses to be protected, knowledge must be gained through the
marital relationship and in the confidence which that relationship
inspires. In order to be protected under § 5914, it is essential
that the communication be made in confidence and with the
intention it not be divulged. Therefore, whether a particular
communication is privileged depends upon its nature and
character of the circumstances under which it was said.
Accordingly, if the nature of the communication is not imbued
with an aura of a sharing disclosure precipitated largely due to
the closeness spouses share, then arguably it is not privileged.
Commonwealth v. McBurrows, 779 A.2d 509, 514 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(internal quotes and citations omitted).
As this Court noted in McBurrows, the spousal communications
privilege is not absolute. “[T]here are instances where the circumstances
surrounding marital communications indicate that the communications are
intended to create or further disharmony in the marital relationship; in those
instances, the privilege yields.” Commonwealth v. Spetzer, 813 A.2d 707,
719 (Pa. 2002). Thus, statements concerning a husband’s actual and
contemplated crimes against his wife are removed from the penumbra of the
privilege. See id. at 721. “It would be perverse, indeed, to indulge a fiction
of marital harmony to shield statements which prove the declarant spouse’s
utter contempt for, and abuse of, the marital union.” Id.
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Here, the text messages Castro sent to his wife included threats such
as “you wanted psycho, you got it,” “I’m going in shooting,” and “last
chance, come out.” N.T., Jury Trial, 11/10/14 at 132, 139. Threats of
physical violence “cannot rationally be excluded on the pretext that
‘considerations of domestic peace and harmony of the marital relation forbid
their disclosure.’” Spetzer, 813 A.2d at 721 (citation omitted).2 As such,
the statements were admissible.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Bowes joins the memorandum.
Judge Platt concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/26/2016
____________________________________________
2
We are unpersuaded by Castro’s assertion that the threats were made in
the spirit of reconciliation.
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