Com. v. Oliver-Williams, G. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S68031-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    GORDON OLIVER-WILLIAMS
    Appellant                    No. 2941 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 5, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0006727-2012
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    GORDON OLIVER-WILLIAMS
    Appellant                    No. 2944 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 5, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0007931-2012
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DONOHUE, J., and MUNDY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.:                             FILED DECEMBER 28, 2015
    Appellant,    Gordon      Oliver-Williams,   appeals   pro   se1   from   the
    September 5, 2014 aggregate judgment of sentence of 11 to 25 years’
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Prior to trial, the trial court conducted an extensive on the record colloquy,
    pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 121, after which, the
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    J-S68031-15
    imprisonment, plus 5 years’ probation, imposed after he was found guilty of
    two counts of aggravated assault and one count each of possession of an
    instrument of a crime (PIC), possession of a weapon, terroristic threats, and
    escape.2 After careful review, we affirm.
    The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural
    background of this case as follows.
    On May 25, 2011, between 1:00 and 2:00 in
    the morning, the victim, Mr. Anthony Harmon (“Mr.
    Harmon”), was at his home located at 1105 Pine
    Street in Darby, PA.         For reasons that remain
    unknown [Appellant], left a message on Mr.
    Harmon’s phone requesting that Mr. Harmon fight
    him. [Appellant], who lived across the street was a
    close friend of Mr. Harmon prior to this incident and
    on numerous occasions spent time in Mr. Harmon’s
    household with Mr. Harmon and his family. As a
    result of the phone message left by [Appellant], a
    brief argument occurred between [Appellant] and Mr.
    Harmon on the front porch of Mr. Harmon’s house.
    The argument eventually was taken into the
    backyard where Mr. Harmon’s mother, Zina Harmon
    (“Ms. Harmon”), broke up the fight after noticing
    [Appellant] constantly reaching into his back pocket
    in an effort to possibly retrieve something.
    Subsequently to the first argument, Mr.
    Harmon along with cousin Colin Wesley (“Mr.
    Wesley”) left the property for about an hour. Upon
    returning, Mr. Harmon noticed [Appellant] walking
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    trial court permitted Appellant to proceed pro se, and appointed Thomas
    Dreyer, Esquire as Appellant’s standby counsel.     See generally N.T.,
    7/29/13, at 5-30.
    2
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2702(a)(4), 907(a), 907(b), 2706(a)(1), and
    5121(a), respectively.
    -2-
    J-S68031-15
    outside Mr. Harmon’s house shouting insults at Mr.
    Harmon’s family who were outside on the porch.
    [Appellant] again reiterated his demand to fight Mr.
    Harmon and suggested that the two walk down the
    street away from Mr. Harmon’s house to do so. Mr.
    Harmon and Mr. Wesley followed [Appellant] about
    two houses down from Mr. Harmon’s property, where
    [Appellant] proceeded to stab Mr. Harmon in the
    chest with a pocketknife. Mr. Harmon did not see
    the weapon on [Appellant] prior to being stabbed nor
    did Mr. Harmon or Mr. Wesley have any weapons on
    their persons.
    Following the stabbing, Mr. Wesley and Mr.
    Harmon’s sister, Ms. Brittany Robinson (“Ms.
    Robinson”), gave chase of [Appellant] who fled the
    scene.     Mr. Harmon proceeded to pull the
    pocketknife out of his chest and placed it in his
    pocket. Mr. Harmon then attempted to drive himself
    to the hospital. Shortly after getting behind the
    wheel of the car Mr. Harmon crashed the vehicle into
    a pole.
    Officer Brian Evans …, an [o]fficer of the Darby
    Borough Police Department, arrived at the scene of
    the accident and testified that when he arrived Mr.
    Harmon was lying face down outside the car. Officer
    Evans had an opportunity to speak with Mr. Harmon
    who informed Officer Evans that he had been
    stabbed prior to the car accident. Officer Evans
    noticed that Mr. Harmon’s shirt was covered with a
    large amount of blood.       Prior to the ambulance
    arriving, Officer Evans removed a knife from Mr.
    Harmon’s pocket, which Officer Evans believes was
    the knife that was used to stab Mr. Harmon.
    An ambulance eventually arrived at the scene
    and took Mr. Harmon to University of Pennsylvania
    Hospital. Dr. Patrick Kim (“Dr. Kim”), attending
    surgeon at University of Pennsylvania Hospital,
    treated Mr. Harmon upon arrival. Dr. Kim testified
    that when Mr. Harmon was brought to him[,]Mr.
    Harmon was in [h]emorrhagic shock. Hemorrhagic
    shock is a condition of life-threatening bleeding,
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    which causes changes in vital signs.          Dr. Kim
    determined that the wound to the chest was the
    cause of Mr. Harmon’s hemorrhagic shock. Dr. Kim
    also testified that the wound to the chest of Mr.
    Harmon was in his expert opinion consistent with
    that of a stab wound. Dr. Kim further stated that
    [h]emorrhagic shock could be a life-threatening
    event without proper or immediate treatment. Dr.
    Kim placed a tube in Mr. Harmon’s chest in order to
    remove the blood that had built up as a result of the
    stab wound. After the tube failed to adequately
    drain out the necessary amount of blood, Dr. Kim
    determined that an emergency surgery known as a
    thoracotomy needed to be performed. The surgery
    was a success and Mr. Harmon proceeded to go
    through a full recovery. Dr. Kim indicated that an
    ethanol test was given to Mr. Harmon at 2:28 am on
    [May 25, 2011]. The results of the test found that
    Mr. Harmon had a blood alcohol content of .04,
    which although that reading various [sic] from
    person to person, is still well below the legal limit of
    intoxication while driving.
    Detective Brian Pitts …, a [d]etective [c]orporal
    for the Darby Borough Police Department, testified
    that he was assigned to investigate the incident that
    occurred between Mr. Harmon and [Appellant].
    Detective Pitts stated that on May 25, 2011 he met
    with witnesses Champella Harmon, Ms. Harmon, and
    Ms. Robinson at their place of residence. Detective
    Pitts took each witness separately into the kitchen of
    Mr. Harmon’s resident and presented each witness
    with a photo array of possible suspects in the
    stabbing.    Each witness identified the photo of
    [Appellant] in the photo array as being the individual
    who stabbed Mr. Harmon. All photos the witnesses
    pointed out as being the suspect were signed and
    dated by the witness. The following day, May 26,
    2011, Detective Pitts went to the University of
    Pennsylvania [H]ospital and presented Mr. Harmon
    with the same photo array. Mr. Harmon identified
    [Appellant] as being the individual that stabbed him.
    Mr. Harmon signed and dated the photo after
    identifying [Appellant] as the suspect.
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    On June 17, 2011, a call was placed to the
    Darby Police Department that [Appellant], who was
    in hiding, was currently at his place of residence.
    One of the responding officers, Officer Jeffrey
    Bevenour …, testified that a perimeter was set up
    around [Appellant’s] residence. After displaying the
    arrest warrant to [Appellant’s] mother, Leslie
    Williams (“Ms. Williams”), the officers checked inside
    [Appellant’s] house. It was eventually determined
    that [Appellant] was no longer there.
    On April 3, 2012, officers were again
    dispatched to [Appellant’s] resident in response to a
    domestic dispute. Officer Anthony Salvatore … of
    the Darby Borough Police Department responded to
    the dispute. Although Officer Salvatore was not the
    first officer on the scene, he was in full radio contact
    with those who were. Officer Salvatore testified that
    fellow Darby Police Officer Falkenstine radioed to
    other officers that upon arriving at the scene Officer
    Falkenstine was directed to the back door of
    [Appellant’s] residence by Ms. Williams.           After
    arriving at the back door, Officer Falkenstine noticed
    [Appellant] run out.       Officer Falkenstine further
    added that he saw [Appellant] jumping over
    numerous fences eventually disappearing onto the
    railroad tracks beyond one of the fences.
    Subsequent to the information being broadcasted
    over the police radio, Officer Salvatore along with
    other officers[,] set up a perimeter to locate
    [Appellant].      It was eventually determined that
    [Appellant] could not be found.
    [Appellant] was eventually arrested on June
    29, 2012, over a year after the initial stabbing
    incident with Mr. Harmon.
    Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/15, at 5-9.
    On October 25, 2012, the Commonwealth filed an information at
    docket number CP-23-CR-6727-2012, charging Appellant with three counts
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    of simple assault, two counts of aggravated assault and one count each of
    attempted murder, PIC, possession of a weapon, terroristic threats, and
    recklessly endangering another person (REAP).3       On January 2, 2013, the
    Commonwealth filed an information charging Appellant with one count of
    escape at docket number CP-23-CR-7931-2012.4 Appellant proceeded to a
    bench trial on June 17, 2014, at the conclusion of which, the trial court
    found Appellant guilty of two counts of aggravated assault and one count
    each of PIC, possession of a weapon, terroristic threats, and escape.       The
    trial court found Appellant not guilty of attempted murder and the simple
    assault and REAP charges were withdrawn. On September 5, 2014, the trial
    court imposed an aggregate sentence of 11 to 25 years’ imprisonment, plus
    5 years’ probation.5 On September 10, 2014, Appellant filed a timely post-
    ____________________________________________
    3
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1), 2701(a)(2), 2701(a)(3), 2702(a)(1),
    2702(a)(4), 901(a), 907(a), 907(b), 2706(a)(1), and 2705, respectively.
    4
    Although not directly at issue in this appeal, we note the factual allegations
    surrounding the escape charge were that Appellant “was able to get away
    from the constables who were escorting him to and from the [preliminary]
    hearing[]” scheduled for the remaining charges at issue in this appeal. N.T.,
    6/17/14, at 33.
    5
    Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 9 to 20 years’
    imprisonment for one count of aggravated assault, five years’ probation for
    the other aggravated assault charge, one and one-half to three years’
    imprisonment for PIC, one to two years’ imprisonment for terroristic threats,
    and two to five years’ imprisonment for escape. The trial court imposed no
    further penalty for possession of a weapon. The sentences of incarceration
    for aggravated assault, PIC and terroristic threats were to run concurrently
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -6-
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    sentence motion, which the trial court denied on September 22, 2014. On
    October 6, 2014, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.6
    On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review.
    [1.]      Did the trial court erroneously allow the
    Commonwealth to violate [Appellant’s] Sixth
    Amendment right to a speedy trial?
    [2.]      Did the trial court erroneously allow the
    Commonwealth    to    violate   [Appellant’s]
    Fourteenth Amendment [rights under the Equal
    Protection and Privileges and Immunities
    Clauses?]
    [3.]      Did the trial court erroneously allow the
    Commonwealth to [deny Appellant’s c]laim of
    self-defense where [Appellant] was acting only
    with force that was equal to the force of the
    attackers [sic] [?]
    [4.]      Did   the    trial court    erroneously    deny
    [Appellant’s] motion [in limine] with respect to
    the weapon seized … [w]here the weapon that
    was charged to [Appellant] was found in
    someone else [sic] possession[?]
    [5.]      Did the trial court erroneously allow the
    Commonwealth      to    violate   [Appellant’s]
    [m]otion to [s]uppress [p]hysical [e]vidence
    where [Appellant’s] fingerprints was [sic] not
    on the weapon would be in favor to the
    defense?
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    to each other. The sentence for escape and probationary sentence for
    aggravated assault were to run consecutively to the balance.
    6
    Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 1925.
    -7-
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    [6.]    Did the trial court erroneously allow the
    Commonwealth to violate [Appellant’s] request
    for a line-up where [Appellant] has a right to a
    line-up[?]
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    At the outset, we elect to address Appellant’s second, fourth, and fifth
    issues together, as we dispose of all three on the same ground.           In his
    second issue, Appellant avers that the Commonwealth violated the Privileges
    and Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
    Federal Constitution. 
    Id. at 20.
    Appellant argues in his fourth issue that the
    trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude a weapon found in
    the victim’s possession. 
    Id. at 4.
    In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that
    the trial court erred in not suppressing said weapon. 
    Id. Generally, appellate
    briefs are required to conform to the Rules of
    Appellate Procedure. See generally Pa.R.A.P. 2101. While this Court will
    construe pro se materials liberally, “pro se status confers no special benefit
    on an appellant.”     In re Ullman, 
    995 A.2d 1207
    , 1211-1212 (Pa. Super.
    2010) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    20 A.3d 489
    (Pa. 2011).            Rule
    2119(a) requires that “[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as
    there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part--in
    distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed--the particular point treated
    therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are
    deemed pertinent.”        Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).   Additionally, this Court will not
    consider an argument where an appellant fails to cite to any legal authority
    -8-
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    or otherwise develop the issue.      Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    985 A.2d 915
    , 924 (Pa. 2009), cert. denied, Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 
    562 U.S. 906
    (2010); see also, e.g., In re Estate of Whitley, 
    50 A.3d 203
    , 209 (Pa.
    Super. 2012) (stating, “[f]ailure to cite relevant legal authority constitutes
    waiver of the claim on appeal[]”) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    69 A.3d 603
    (Pa. 2013).
    In this case, Appellant has failed to provide any cogent argument as to
    how the Commonwealth violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
    abused its discretion in denying his motion in limine, or in not suppressing
    the weapon found on the victim’s person.        Appellant has not explained or
    developed any argument as to how any of these issues entitles him to a new
    trial. Based on these considerations, we deem these three issues waived for
    want of development. See 
    id. Turning to
    his first issue, Appellant avers that the trial court erred in
    denying his motion to dismiss the charges with prejudice under Pennsylvania
    Rule   of   Criminal   Procedure   600.     Appellant’s   Brief   at   7-8.   The
    Commonwealth counters that the majority of any delays in proceeding to
    trial were caused by Appellant and that his speedy trial rights were not
    violated. Commonwealth’s Brief at 12.
    “When reviewing a trial court’s decision in a Rule 600 case, an
    appellate court will reverse only if the trial court abused its discretion.”
    Commonwealth v. Bradford, 
    46 A.3d 693
    , 700 (Pa. 2012).
    -9-
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    An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
    judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is
    overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised
    is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,
    prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence
    or the record, discretion is abused.
    The proper scope of review … is limited to the
    evidence on the record of the Rule 600 evidentiary
    hearing, and the findings of the trial court. An
    appellate court must view the facts in the light most
    favorable to the prevailing party.
    …
    So long as there has been no misconduct on
    the part of the Commonwealth in an effort to evade
    the fundamental speedy trial rights of an accused,
    Rule 600 must be construed in a manner consistent
    with society’s right to punish and deter crime. In
    considering these matters …, courts must carefully
    factor into the ultimate equation not only the
    prerogatives of the individual accused, but the
    collective right of the community to vigorous law
    enforcement as well.
    Commonwealth v. Peterson, 
    19 A.3d 1131
    , 1134 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en
    banc) (citations omitted), affirmed, 
    44 A.3d 655
    (Pa. 2012).
    Courts utilize an initial three-step analysis to determine whether Rule
    600 requires dismissal of the charges against a defendant.
    The first step in determining whether a
    technical violation of Rule 600 […] has occurred is to
    calculate the “mechanical run date.” The mechanical
    run date is the date by which trial must commence
    under the relevant procedural rule.             [T]he
    mechanical run date is ascertained by counting the
    number of days from the triggering event - e.g., the
    date on which … the criminal complaint was filed - to
    the date on which trial must commence under Rule
    [600].
    - 10 -
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    Commonwealth v. Preston, 
    904 A.2d 1
    , 11 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal
    citations omitted), appeal denied, 
    916 A.2d 632
    (Pa. 2007). In the second
    step, we must “determine whether any excludable time exists pursuant to
    Rule 600(C).”    Commonwealth v. Ramos, 
    936 A.2d 1097
    , 1103 (Pa.
    Super. 2007), appeal denied, 
    948 A.2d 803
    (Pa. 2008). Then, in the third
    step, we add all excludable or excusable time to the mechanical run date,
    which provides the adjusted run date. 
    Id. Furthermore, delays
    not attributable to a defendant but where the
    Commonwealth is found to have acted with due diligence in attempting to
    commence a timely trial but was prevented by circumstances beyond its
    control, is considered excusable time and likewise added to the mechanical
    run date.   Commonwealth v. Hunt, 
    858 A.2d 1234
    , 1241 (Pa. Super.
    2004).
    “Due-diligence is a fact-specific concept that is
    determined on a case-by-case basis. Due diligence
    does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious
    care, but rather a showing by the Commonwealth
    that a reasonable effort has been put forth.”
    Commonwealth v. Booze, 
    953 A.2d 1263
    , 1273
    (Pa. Super. 2008) (quotations and quotation marks
    omitted). “Judicial delay may justify postponing trial
    beyond the adjusted run date if the Commonwealth
    was prepared to commence trial prior to the
    expiration of the mandatory period but the court was
    unavailable because of ‘scheduling difficulties and
    the like.’”     Preston, [supra] at 14 (citation
    omitted).
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    J-S68031-15
    Commonwealth v. Lynch, 
    57 A.3d 120
    , 124 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal
    denied, 
    63 A.3d 1245
    (Pa. 2013). Any time prior to trial, a defendant may
    move the trial court for dismissal of the charges if the Commonwealth has
    violated the Rule. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(G).7
    In this case, the Commonwealth filed its criminal complaint on May 25,
    2011, rendering the mechanical run date May 25, 2012. Between the dates
    of May 25, 2011 and June 29, 2012, Appellant was unable to be located by
    police. Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/15, at 12.
    Officers exercised continuous due diligence in an
    effort to locate [Appellant] by consistently patrolling
    the area around [Appellant]’s residence. There was
    no additional information given to the officers to aid
    in their search of [Appellant] except for [Appellant]’s
    home address. Eventually, [Appellant] was arrested
    on June 29, 2012, over a year after the criminal
    complaint was filed.
    
    Id. As Appellant
    does not challenge the Commonwealth’s due diligence in
    apprehending him, this totals an excludable delay of 405 days.           See
    Commonwealth v. Miskovitch, 
    64 A.3d 672
    , 678 (Pa. Super. 2013)
    (stating that Rule 600 excludes time where “the defendant could not be
    apprehended because his or her whereabouts were unknown and could not
    be determined by due diligence[]”), appeal denied, 
    78 A.3d 1090
    (Pa.
    ____________________________________________
    7
    On July 1, 2013, a new version of Rule 600 took effect. However, as the
    criminal complaint was filed in this case before July 1, 2013, we utilize the
    former version of Rule 600. See generally Commonwealth v. Roles, 
    116 A.3d 122
    , 124 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2015).
    - 12 -
    J-S68031-15
    2013); Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). We further note that Appellant waived his
    Rule 600 rights due to continuances he requested from January 7, 2013 until
    June 7, 2013, adding another 151 days of excludable time.               
    Id. at 600(C)(2).
    Appellant does not dispute this time period either in his brief.
    Instantly, Appellant filed his Rule 600 motion to dismiss on July 9,
    2013, which the trial court denied on July 29, 2013.8 As noted above, the
    mechanical run date for Rule 600 purposes was May 25, 2012.           From the
    two above-mentioned time periods, we have identified, at a minimum, 556
    days of excludable time, which results in an adjusted run date of October 18,
    2013.     As a result, Appellant’s Rule 600 rights were not violated when
    Appellant filed his motion to dismiss the charges and the trial court correctly
    denied Appellant’s July 9, 2013 motion. See 
    Bradford, supra
    .
    In his next issue, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient
    to convict him of aggravated assault because the Commonwealth failed to
    disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.       Appellant’s Brief at 11.
    The Commonwealth counters that the evidence overwhelmingly showed that
    Appellant was the initial aggressor. Commonwealth’s Brief at 18. We begin
    by noting our well-settled standard of review. “In reviewing the sufficiency
    of the evidence, we consider whether the evidence presented at trial, and all
    ____________________________________________
    8
    The certified record reflects that Appellant filed multiple motions to dismiss
    the charges against him. The only Rule 600 motion that is referenced in
    Appellant’s brief to this Court is his July 9, 2013 motion. Appellant’s Brief at
    9. Therefore, we confine our review to this motion.
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    J-S68031-15
    reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to
    the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, support the [finder of fact] verdict
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 
    91 A.3d 55
    ,
    66 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Patterson v. Pennsylvania,
    
    135 S. Ct. 1400
    (2015). “The Commonwealth can meet its burden by wholly
    circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be
    resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
    that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the
    combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Watley, 
    81 A.3d 108
    , 113
    (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
    appeal denied, 
    95 A.3d 277
    (Pa. 2014).       As an appellate court, we must
    review “the entire record … and all evidence actually received[.]”        
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).    “[T]he trier of fact while
    passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence
    produced is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    “Because evidentiary sufficiency is a question of law, our standard
    of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth
    v. Diamond, 
    83 A.3d 119
    , 126 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied,
    Diamond v. Pennsylvania, 
    135 S. Ct. 145
    (2014).
    In this case, the offense at issue is aggravated assault, the statute
    governing said offense provides in relevant part, as follows.
    § 2702. Aggravated assault
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    (a) Offense defined.--A          person   is   guilty   of
    aggravated assault if he:
    (1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to
    another, or causes such injury intentionally,
    knowingly or recklessly under circumstances
    manifesting extreme indifference to the value
    of human life;
    …
    (4) attempts to cause or intentionally or
    knowingly causes bodily injury to another with
    a deadly weapon;
    …
    (b) Grading.--Aggravated assault under subsection
    (a)(1), (2) and (9) is a felony of the first degree.
    Aggravated assault under subsection (a)(3), (4), (5),
    (6), (7) and (8) is a felony of the second degree.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702.
    We note that if a defendant presents evidence raising an issue of self-
    defense, the Commonwealth has the burden to disprove it beyond a
    reasonable doubt.   Commonwealth v. Houser, 
    18 A.3d 1128
    , 1135 (Pa.
    2011), cert. denied, Houser v. Pennsylvania, 
    132 S. Ct. 1715
    (2012). The
    Commonwealth meets that burden if it proves any one of the following: (1)
    the defendant was not free from fault in provoking or continuing the conflict
    that resulted in the killing; (2) the defendant did not reasonably believe he
    was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, and it was not
    necessary to kill in order to avoid that danger; or (3) the defendant violated
    a duty to retreat or avoid the danger.       Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53
    - 15 -
    J-S68031-15
    A.3d 738, 741 (Pa. 2012).       Further, “[a]lthough the Commonwealth is
    required to disprove a claim of self-defense … a jury is not required to
    believe the testimony of the defendant who raises the claim.”          
    Houser, supra
       (quotation   marks   and   citation     omitted).   Nonetheless,   “the
    Commonwealth cannot sustain its burden of proof solely on the fact finder’s
    disbelief of the defendant’s testimony.”       Commonwealth v. Torres, 
    766 A.2d 342
    , 345 (Pa. 2001).      Accordingly, we must determine whether the
    affirmative evidence presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient to
    disprove Appellant’s claim of self-defense.
    The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Harmon, that on May
    25, 2011, Appellant left a message on his phone asking for Harmon to fight
    him.    N.T., 6/17/14, at 50-51.     Harmon did not know the reason why
    Appellant wished to fight.    
    Id. at 51.
        Harmon called Appellant back and
    Appellant reiterated his desire to fight Harmon and informed him that he was
    coming over to Harmon’s residence.         
    Id. Harmon testified
    that after he
    hung up, he went downstairs, looked out the window and saw Appellant
    coming up to his front porch.       
    Id. Harmon came
    outside and again
    Appellant asked to fight. 
    Id. After leaving
    his residence for an hour to cool
    off, Harmon came back and Appellant was still outside requesting Harmon to
    fight him, and was “calling [Harmon’s] mom [and sisters] all sorts of
    names[.]” 
    Id. at 54,
    55. Harmon acquiesced and Appellant told him to walk
    down the street. 
    Id. at 55.
    Appellant and Harmon walked two houses down
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    and according to Harmon, “[w]e squared up and [Appellant] just stabbed
    me.” 
    Id. The trial
    court concluded the Commonwealth disproved Appellant’s
    claim of self-defense based on the following.
    In the instant case, [Appellant] initiated the
    confrontation between himself and Mr. Harmon.
    [Appellant] called Mr. Harmon’s phone saying that he
    wanted to fight him. In addition, [Appellant] walked
    across the street from his residence to the residence
    of Mr. Harmon[,] shouting for Mr. Harmon to come
    outside and fight him. Further, [Appellant] shouted
    insults at Mr. Harmon’s family in an effort to give Mr.
    Harmon an incentive to fight. Therefore, [Appellant]
    was the sole aggressor and the plea of self-defense
    cannot be established were [sic] [Appellant was] the
    aggressor.
    Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/15, at 10.
    After careful review of the certified record, we conclude the record
    supports the trial court’s legal conclusion. Our Supreme Court has held that
    for sufficiency purposes the testimony of one eyewitness alone is sufficient
    evidence to sustain a conviction.        Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    52 A.3d 1139
    , 1165 (Pa. 2012); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 
    373 A.2d 1051
    , 1054
    (Pa. 1977). Harmon testified that Appellant made several requests to fight
    him, Appellant left his own home and came to Harmon’s residence, remained
    there and shouted insults towards Harmon’s family, all in an effort to get
    Harmon to agree to fight him.     N.T., 6/17/14, at 50-55.    Based on these
    considerations,   we   conclude   the    Commonwealth    presented    sufficient
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    J-S68031-15
    affirmative evidence in order to disprove Appellant’s claim of self-defense, as
    the evidence was sufficient to show that Appellant was the initial aggressor.
    In his next issue, Appellant avers that he was entitled to a line-up
    procedure.   Appellant’s Brief at 15.   Appellant requested a line up on the
    record during a hearing on April 7, 2014.      N.T., 4/7/14, at 13.    The trial
    court denied the motion during the same. 
    Id. at 14.
    The Commonwealth
    counters that identity was not an issue in this case; therefore, the trial court
    was not required to order a line-up. Commonwealth’s Brief at 22.
    The grant or denial of a request for a lineup is within
    the sound discretion of the trial court, and such a
    decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an
    abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Rush, 
    562 A.2d 285
    (Pa. Super. 1989). A criminal defendant
    has    no    constitutional   right   to   a    lineup.
    Commonwealth v. Lark, 
    462 A.2d 1329
    (Pa.
    Super. 1983), aff'd, 
    477 A.2d 857
    (Pa. 1984).
    “[O]nly in those cases where an identification lacking
    a strong indicia of reliability is the sole evidence
    against the defendant should a defendant’s timely
    request for a lineup be granted.” Commonwealth
    v. Beverly, 
    547 A.2d 766
    , 767 (Pa. Super. 1988),
    appeal denied, 
    564 A.2d 1259
    (Pa. 1989) citing
    Commonwealth v. Sexton, 
    400 A.2d 1289
    (Pa.
    1979).
    Commonwealth v. Blassingale, 
    581 A.2d 183
    , 190 (Pa. Super. 1990)
    (parallel citations omitted).
    In the case sub judice, Harmon testified that he had known Appellant
    for years leading up to the incident on May 25, 2011. N.T., 6/17/14, at 50.
    Harmon testified that he and Appellant were good friends, and Appellant was
    on friendly terms with Harmon’s family.        
    Id. Harmon’s sister,
    Brittany
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    J-S68031-15
    Robinson, also testified as having a “close friendship” with Appellant. 
    Id. at 89.
    Harmon’s mother, Zina Harmon, testified that she knew Appellant well,
    and he would even have meals at their home.               
    Id. at 122.
          Ms. Harmon
    testified that her son and Appellant were in her house “all the time.” 
    Id. The trial
    court concluded that identity was not an issue in this case as
    “[t]he record reflect[ed] that both the victim, Mr. Harmon, and his family
    were extremely familiar with [Appellant] prior to this incident.” Trial Court
    Opinion, 3/31/15, at 14.         Our review of the record reflects that the trial
    court’s conclusion is amply supported by the trial testimony. Therefore, this
    did not taint the in-court identifications of Appellant, and the trial court did
    not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s request for a line-up.             See
    
    Blassingale, supra
    .
    Finally, we address Appellant’s claim that the trial court abused its
    discretion in sentencing by failing to consider the sentencing guidelines and
    factors enumerated in Section 9721 of the Sentencing Code.9 At the outset,
    we note that this issue pertains to the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
    It is axiomatic that in this Commonwealth, “[t]here is no absolute right to
    appeal    when     challenging     the    discretionary   aspect   of   a    sentence.”
    Commonwealth v. Tobin, 
    89 A.3d 663
    , 666 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
    ____________________________________________
    9
    We recognize that Appellant did not include this issue in his statement of
    questions presented as required by Rule 2116. See generally Pa.R.A.P.
    2116(b). However, we decline to find waiver on this basis.
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    J-S68031-15
    omitted).       When an appellant forwards an argument pertaining to the
    discretionary aspects of the sentence, this Court considers such an argument
    to be a petition for permission to appeal. Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh,
    
    91 A.3d 1247
    , 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citation omitted), appeal
    denied, 
    104 A.3d 1
    (Pa. 2014). “[A]n [a]ppeal is permitted only after this
    Court determines that there is a substantial question that the sentence was
    not appropriate under the sentencing code.” Commonwealth v. Cartrette,
    
    83 A.3d 1030
    , 1042 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks
    and citation omitted).
    Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary aspects of sentencing
    issue, this Court is required to conduct a four-part analysis to determine
    whether     a     petition   for   permission     to   appeal   should   be   granted.
    Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 
    96 A.3d 1031
    , 1039 (Pa. Super. 2014)
    (citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    99 A.3d 925
    (Pa. 2014). Specifically, we
    must determine the following.
    (1) [W]hether appellant has filed a timely notice of
    appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 902, 903; (2) whether the issue
    was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion
    to reconsider and modify sentence, Pa.R.Crim.P.
    [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
    defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
    substantial question that the sentence appealed from
    is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
    [Pa.C.S.A.] § 9781(b).
    
    Id. - 20
    -
    J-S68031-15
    In the case sub judice, we note that Appellant has failed to include a
    Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief, and the Commonwealth has noted its
    objection. Commonwealth’s Brief at 24-25. “If a defendant fails to include
    an issue in his Rule 2119(f) statement, and the Commonwealth objects, then
    … this Court may not review the claim.”    Commonwealth v. Karns, 
    50 A.3d 158
    , 166 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 
    65 A.3d 413
    (Pa. 2013).
    As the Commonwealth has lodged its objection, we deny Appellant’s petition
    for permission to appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence.     See
    
    Trinidad, supra
    .
    Based on the foregoing, we conclude all of Appellant’s issues on appeal
    are either waived or devoid of merit.        Accordingly, the trial court’s
    September 5, 2014 judgment of sentence is affirmed.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/28/2015
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