Com. v. Engleman, J. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JARED D. ENGLEMAN
Appellant No. 1320 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of May 5, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-06-CR-0003668-2011
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 08, 2015
Jared Engleman challenges, inter alia, the sufficiency of the evidence
offered by the Commonwealth to support his conviction for criminal
conspiracy to commit persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control,
sell, or transfer firearms.1 For the reasons set forth herein, in my view, the
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain that conviction.
Because the learned Majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
The following represents a summary of the evidence offered by the
Commonwealth at Engleman’s March 6, 2014 jury trial.
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903; 6105.
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On June 29, 2011, Lieutenant Adam Kosheba of the Pennsylvania
State Police, along with other members of various law enforcement
agencies, arrested an individual by the name of Matthew Conner. When
Matthew Conner was arrested, Lt. Kosheba seized a fully loaded Norinco
MAK-90 Sporter 7.62 by 39 millimeter caliber semi-automatic rifle that was
located at Conner’s feet. This particular weapon is a derivative of the more
common AK-47 assault rifle, and is often referred to as an AK-47, which is
how the weapon was referred to at Engleman’s trial. Matthew Crouse, a
juvenile probation officer, confirmed that Matthew Conner had been
adjudicated delinquent of burglary as a juvenile, and, therefore, could not
legally possess a firearm.
On July 1, 2011, Trooper Robert Norton of the Pennsylvania State
Police went to Engleman’s Auto Body shop, where he spoke with Engleman.
During the discussion, Engleman told Trooper Norton that he had known
Matthew Conner since they were both thirteen years old. Engleman stated
that he and Conner were friends, but that they had not spoken much
because Conner had moved to Hawaii. Before Conner moved away,
Engleman frequently would go to a shooting range with Conner, sometimes
accompanied by Conner’s father, Maurice Conner. Matthew Conner would
shoot either his father’s firearms or firearms that belonged to his friends.
He never brought his own weapons to shoot.
Engleman described Matthew Conner as having mental instabilities.
Engleman also told Trooper Norton that Matthew Conner was heavily
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interested in firearms and in shooting firearms. According to Engleman,
Matthew Conner was into violent things and violent topics. Engleman told
Trooper Norton that he assumed that Matthew Conner was not permitted to
possess a firearm due to certain incidents in Conner’s past, including an
incident during which Conner fired a weapon at police officers. That incident
had led to Conner’s placement in a mental institution.
Trooper Norton asked Engleman whether he had ever purchased any
firearms. Engleman admitted that he had bought at least four different
weapons, including an AK-47. Engleman claimed that he had held onto the
AK-47 for approximately two years, and had then sold it to Maurice Conner,
Matthew Conner’s father. The transaction occurred in either 2005 or 2006.
Engleman stated that the transaction occurred face-to-face with Maurice
Conner outside of Maurice Conner’s home. Engleman could not recall
whether he had provided Maurice Conner with a receipt for the purchase, but
noted that it was his typical practice to issue a handwritten receipt when he
sold a gun.
On August 19, 2011, Trooper Norton returned to Engleman’s Auto
Body with fellow State Trooper Robert Hess, and arrested Engleman. The
troopers later advised Engleman of his constitutional rights pursuant to
Miranda v. Arizona,2 after which Engleman agreed to speak with the
____________________________________________
2
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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troopers. The troopers first discussed with Engleman a .17 caliber rifle that
Engleman also had sold to Maurice Conner. During the investigation of this
case, law enforcement found a handwritten receipt confirming the sale of
this particular weapon from Engleman to Maurice Conner at Maurice
Conner’s home. Engleman admitted during this interrogation that he had
written that receipt. With regard to the AK-47, Engleman rejected the
troopers’ suggestion that Engleman had sold the weapon to Matthew Conner
to give to his father, Maurice Conner. Engleman stated that he believed that
the transaction was between himself and Maurice Conner only. He insisted
that he never sold or loaned the AK-47 to Matthew Conner.
Trooper Robert Hess was present for the interview with Engleman
regarding the .17 caliber weapon. Trooper Hess testified that Engleman
admitted that Matthew Conner had asked him about the sale of that weapon,
and that Engleman insisted that he sold that particular weapon to Maurice
Conner. Notably, the .17 caliber rifle is not the AK-47 type weapon at issue
at Engleman’s trial. Engleman was not charged with any offenses related to
the .17 caliber rifle. Engleman was shown the handwritten receipt for that
weapon, and conceded that the receipt was for the .17 caliber weapon, and
that he had written the receipt. Engleman told Trooper Hess that he had
given the receipt to Matthew Conner to provide to his father, Maurice
Conner. Regarding the AK-47, Engleman told Trooper Hess that the
transaction was a face-to-face transaction with Maurice Conner. Trooper
Hess later executed a search warrant at Maurice Conner’s home, which
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produced the receipt for the .17 caliber weapon, as well as receipts for other
weapons, but no receipts for the AK-47.
Despite the fact that the handwritten receipt for the .17 caliber
weapon was found at his home, Maurice Conner asserted that, prior to June
29, 2011, he had never met or heard of Engleman. Maurice Conner stated
that he had never seen Engleman at his home before that date, and had
never had any conversations with him. Maurice Conner claimed that he had
seen Engleman’s vehicle on the property, but never Engleman himself.
Paul Foster knew both Engleman and Matthew Conner from high
school. After high school, Foster, who is a banker by trade, also became a
federally licensed firearms dealer. On one occasion, Foster was at a
shooting range when Matthew Conner entered the range carrying a Norinco
MAK-90 AK-47. Foster estimated that this incident occurred anywhere from
one to three years before Matthew Conner was arrested. Foster looked at
and handled the weapon. Foster noted that the stock of the weapon that
Matthew Conner brought to the range was different from the one that the
Commonwealth had introduced at trial. However, Foster informed the jury
that the stock could be changed with a screwdriver, and that it is easy to do
so.
Holly Young, an inmate at the state prison for women at Cambridge
Springs who is Matthew Conner’s former girlfriend, recounted an incident
that occurred at some point prior to 2007, which is when Young dropped out
of high school. Young, Engleman, and Matthew Conner were smoking
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marijuana in the back of a van that was parked beside Matthew Conner’s
house. While they were smoking the marijuana, Matthew Conner asked
Engleman for protection from bears that live in the Hawk Mountain,
Pennsylvania, area. Engleman merely replied that he would look into it.
Young never heard any other talk about the so-called protection, and never
witnessed any exchange of weapons between Engleman and Matthew
Conner.
Young noted that the incident had recently been refreshed in her
memory after she talked with a Pennsylvania State Trooper while she was
imprisoned after she reviewed her testimony with the assistant district
attorney. She conceded that she has trouble remembering events and dates
due to a prolonged drug addiction, a disease that ultimately led to her
incarceration, and that the details of her story often change due to the
memory lapses caused by her addiction. For example, although Young
initially stated that the discussion with Matthew Conner and Engleman had
occurred in 2007, she later claimed that it had occurred in 2009.
Steven Engle testified for the defense. Engle considers himself one of
Engleman’s close friends. At some point, Engleman moved in with Engle.
When Engleman moved in, he no longer had the AK-47. Engle, who is an
aficionado of weapons, had wanted to purchase that weapon from Engleman.
Engle asked Engleman about the AK-47, but Engleman explained to him that
he had already sold it to Maurice Conner. Engle denied that he had told the
police that Engleman was scrambling to find paperwork to prove that he had
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sold the AK-47 to Maurice Conner, and denied ever saying that Engleman
might have sold the weapon to Matthew Conner.
Engleman testified at trial in his own defense. Engleman recalled
purchasing the AK-47 in 2004. He testified that he sold that weapon at
some point in 2005, a year to a year-and-a-half after he bought it.
Engleman insisted that he sold the weapon to Maurice Conner, not Matthew
Conner. Engleman stated that he had not seen the weapon since selling it to
Maurice Conner. Engleman also claimed that he did not know that Matthew
Conner had been adjudicated delinquent of burglary until the police
questioned him in this case. Engleman testified that he did not know that
Matthew Conner was ineligible to own a firearm. Engleman also denied ever
being in a van with Matthew Conner and Holly Young, and, accordingly,
denied ever making the statement that he would look into helping Matthew
Conner with protection from bears.
Upon this record, Engleman was convicted of criminal conspiracy to
commit persons not to possess a firearm. Notably, Engleman was acquitted
of sale or transfer of firearms to an ineligible person. See 18 Pa.C.S. §
9111(g)(2). On May 5, 2014, the trial court sentenced Engleman to twenty-
four to forty-eight months’ incarceration, which fell within the aggravated
range of the sentencing guidelines, and determined that Engleman was
eligible for boot camp. Engleman filed timely post-sentence motions, which
were denied on July 16, 2014. Engleman filed a timely notice of appeal,
which prompted the trial court to direct Engleman to file a concise statement
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of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On August
21, 2014, Engleman timely filed a concise statement. On September 11,
2014, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Engleman raises the following five questions for our review:
1. Whether the lower court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion when it failed to grant [Engleman’s]
Post-Sentence Motion in the nature of a Motion for Judgment
of Acquittal and/or when it allowed the case to proceed to
verdict, where the Commonwealth’s evidence did not prove
scienter beyond a reasonable doubt?
2. Whether the lower court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion when it failed to grant [Engleman’s]
Post-Sentence Motion in the nature of a Motion for Judgement
of Acquittal and/or when it allowed the case to proceed to
verdict, by admitting certain prejudicial and irrelevant
evidence on the issue of [Engleman’s] scienter and/or by
providing improper and erroneous instructions to the jury on
said issue?
3. Whether the lower court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion when it failed to grant [Engleman’s]
Post-Sentence Motion in the nature of a Motion for Judgment
of Acquittal and/or when it allowed the case to proceed to
verdict, over [Engleman’s] timely objection, where the
Commonwealth offered no evidence showing the precise date
of the transfer of the subject firearm from [Engleman] to
Matthew Conner and/or Maurice Conner as such evidence was
critical to prove scienter, i.e., [Engleman’s] state of mind and
knowledge at the time of the transfer, and where such
evidence was necessary to satisfy the Commonwealth’s
burden of proving this is a timely prosecution under the
applicable statute of limitations?
4. Whether the lower court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion when it failed to grant [Engleman’s]
Post-Sentence Motion in the nature of a Motion for Judgment
of Acquittal and/or when it failed to grant [Engleman’s]
Motion for Arrest of Judgment and/or motion timely made at
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trial and/or [Engleman’s] Omnibus Pretrial Motion based on
the time-bar of the applicable statute of limitations?
5. Whether the lower court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion when it failed to grant [Engleman’s]
Motion to Modify Sentence, and to vacate [Engleman’s]
sentence when, at [Engleman’s] sentencing hearing, it
accepted into evidence testimony from various individuals
regarding the death of Deputy Sheriff Kyle Pagerly, in that
such evidence was an impermissible factor in imposing
sentence, in the admission of such evidence was inconsistent
with several prior pretrial rulings of the lower court, and in
that the admission of such evidence violated [Engleman’s]
due process guarantees?
Brief for Engleman at 14 (emphasis in original).
The crux of Engleman’s appeal to this Court is that the Commonwealth
failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove Engleman guilty of criminal
conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. In his brief, Engleman summarizes
his sufficiency of the evidence challenge as follows:
The Commonwealth introduced no evidence whatsoever showing
a direct transfer of the subject firearm from [Engleman] to
Matthew Conner. The Commonwealth did not even prove that
[Engleman] transferred the firearm to Maurice Conner as this
testimony was elicited on direct examination of [Engleman]
during [Engleman’s] case. The only evidence regarding the
transfer of the firearm came from [Engleman] himself, who
testified that he transferred the firearm to Maurice Conner in
2005. This was the only evidence offered at trial regarding the
actual transfer of the AK-47.
To support a finding of conspiracy herein, the Commonwealth
had to necessarily prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that –at
the time of the transfer of the firearm to Maurice Conner--
[Engleman] was aware that Maurice Conner intended to give the
firearm to Matthew Conner and that [Engleman] was aware that
Matthew Conner was ineligible to possess a firearm. The
ultimate provision of the firearm to Matthew Conner could be the
only illegal object of the conspiracy; otherwise, the transaction
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between [Engleman] and Maurice Conner would be nothing more
than a legal transfer as there would be no “criminal intent.”
Brief for Engleman at 21 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). For the
reasons that follow, I agree with Engleman that the Commonwealth did not
prove a criminal conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, even when viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question
of law. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). We
must determine “whether the evidence is sufficient to prove every element
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Hughes, 555
A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 1989). We “must view evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, and accept as true all
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom upon which, if believed,
the fact finder properly could have based its verdict.” Id.Our Supreme Court has instructed:
[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts
regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received
must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon
the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence
produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1236 n.2 (Pa. 2007).
A conviction for criminal conspiracy requires proof of:
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(1) an intent to commit or aid in an unlawful act, (2) an
agreement with a co-conspirator and (3) an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Because it is difficult to prove an
explicit or formal agreement to commit an unlawful act, such an
act may be proved inferentially by circumstantial evidence, i.e.,
the relations, conduct or circumstances of the parties or overt
acts on the part of the co-conspirators.
Commonwealth v. Galindes, 786 A.2d 1004, 1010 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Spotz, 756 A.2d 1139, 1162 (Pa. 2000)).
Circumstantial evidence can include, but is not limited to, the relationship
between the parties, the knowledge of and participation in the crime, and
the circumstances and conduct of the parties surrounding the criminal
episode. Commonwealth v. French, 578 A.2d 1292, 1294 (Pa. Super.
1990). “These factors may coalesce to establish a conspiratorial agreement
beyond a reasonable doubt where one factor alone might fail.” Id.Thus, a conviction for conspiracy requires only an intent to commit a
crime, an agreement with a co-conspirator, and an overt act in furtherance
of the conspiracy. Galindes, 786 A.2d at 1010. “Conspiracy to commit a
crime and the underlying crime itself are two entirely separate offenses with
separate elements required for each.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719
A.2d 778, 791 (Pa. Super. 1998). Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether
anyone, be he Matthew Conner or anyone else, actually committed the crime
of persons not to possess a firearm. The inquiry is only whether the
Commonwealth proved that Engleman conspired with someone to commit
that crime. I would hold that the Commonwealth did not do so.
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Two facts in this case are indisputable. First, Engleman purchased the
AK-47 in 2004. Second, when Matthew Conner was arrested in 2011, that
firearm was located at his feet. What was not proven beyond a reasonable
doubt is how that firearm matriculated from Engleman to Matthew Conner in
those seven years. There is no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise,
proving that Engleman provided the firearm to Matthew Conner. The record
is devoid of any evidence to prove when or how the weapon came into
Matthew Conner’s possession. Engleman claimed that he sold the weapon to
Maurice Conner in 2005. Maurice Conner insisted that he had never even
met Engleman, although receipts created in Engleman’s own handwriting
were found in Maurice Conner’s home for weapons that Maurice Conner
possessed. One of these two men lied at trial. Regardless of who provided
the more accurate version of events, there is nothing in the record to
establish how and when Matthew Conner took possession of the AK-47.
Regardless of this gap in the factual history of this case, the necessary
inquiry is whether Engleman entered into an illicit agreement either with
Maurice or Matthew Conner with the intent of Matthew Conner ending up in
possession of the weapon. That Engleman and Matthew Conner were at one
time friends, that they were seen at a firing range together, or that
Engleman once owned the weapon, do not prove the existence of a
conspiratorial agreement for Matthew Conner to possess the weapon in
question. Similarly, Paul Foster’s testimony that he saw Matthew Conner
with a similar weapon with a different stock does not prove that Engleman at
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some point agreed to provide his AK-47 to Matthew Conner. It proves only
that Matthew Conner was shooting an AK-47 with a different stock.
Moreover, that the stock of those weapons can easily be changed, does not
mean that the stock was changed in this case. It does not prove that this is
what occurred in this case, or that Engleman provided Matthew Conner with
the AK-47 and that Conner changed the stock to hide the transaction. Such
a conclusion is not a reasonable inference flowing from the facts. It is pure
guesswork.
The only testimony that comes close to evidence that at some point
Engleman agreed with either Maurice or Matthew Conner with a criminal
objective of Matthew Conner ending up in possession of the AK-47 came
from Holly Young, a state prison inmate with significant memory lapses due
to her drug addiction. Despite Young’s obvious credibility challenges, only
the substance of her testimony is relevant, because this is a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, not the weight of the evidence. The jury was
free to believe Young’s testimony. Nonetheless, Young’s testimony does not
amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Young testified that, in either 2007 or in 2009, she was smoking
marijuana in a van with Engleman and Matthew Conner. She stated that,
due to his fear of bears in the area, Matthew Conner asked Engleman for
protection. In response, she claimed, Engleman uttered that he would look
into it. This vague statement, recalled by a drug-addicted prison inmate
with memory problems, hardly constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt
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of a conspiratorial agreement. In fact, Engleman agreed to nothing more
than exploring the possibility of helping to protect Matthew Conner. He did
not explicitly agree to provide Matthew Conner with a weapon. This
conversation occurred two to four years before the crime was committed,
and contained no details or commitments that would enable a fact-finder to
conclude, from that vague statement, that Engleman and Conner shared a
criminal intent to achieve a certain objective. At best, the statement serves
as some indicia that some agreement might come to fruition in the future.
By itself, it is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an agreement was
conceived then, or ever did occur.
Engleman once owned the AK-47. Seven years later, Matthew Conner
had that weapon. The Commonwealth failed to adduce sufficient evidence of
what occurred between those events. Engleman’s vague statement made
sometime within that time frame does not establish a conspiracy between
him and Matthew Conner. Nor is there anything in the record to suggest
that Engleman conspired with Maurice Conner to provide the AK-47 to
Matthew Conner. In fact, Maurice Conner, the Commonwealth’s own
witness, alleged that he never even met Engleman. The evidence was
insufficient to establish a conspiracy.
I would vacate Engleman’s judgment of sentence, and order Engleman
to be discharged. In light of that disposition, I would not review any other of
Engleman’s arguments. I respectfully dissent.
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