Com. v. Diaz, U. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S71031-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    ULYSSES S. DIAZ
    Appellant               No. 705 WDA 2015
    Appeal from the PCRA Order April 13, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000652-2010
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:                         FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2015
    Ulysses S. Diaz appeals pro se from the order entered on April 13,
    2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, that dismissed as
    untimely his petition filed pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction
    Relief Act.1    Diaz contends the petition is timely and raises meritorious
    issues. Based upon the following, we vacate and remand for appointment of
    counsel.
    On September 16, 2010, Diaz was convicted by a jury of two counts of
    attempted robbery, one count each of recklessly endangering another
    person, terroristic threats, firearms not to be carried without a license, and
    ____________________________________________
    1
    42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.
    J-S71031-15
    loitering and prowling at nighttime.2 On November 12, 2010, the trial court
    sentenced Diaz to an aggregate term of seven to 14 years’ imprisonment.
    On appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth
    v. Diaz, 
    37 A.3d 1233
     [1864 WDA 2010] (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished
    memorandum).
    On July 16, 2012, and September 21, 2012, Diaz filed pro se PCRA
    petitions, which the PCRA court consolidated on September 26, 2012.
    Counsel was appointed, and a supplemental PCRA petition was filed on
    behalf of Diaz.      On April 24, 2013, following a hearing, the PCRA court
    granted Diaz the right to file a petition for allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc
    and dismissed all other claims. On May 23, 2013, Diaz filed a petition for
    allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied
    on September 17, 2013.            Commonwealth v. Diaz, 
    74 A.3d 1029
     (Pa.
    2013).
    On January 6, 2015, the present PCRA petition was entered on the
    docket.3 On March 3, 2015, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice
    ____________________________________________
    2
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii) and 901(a), 2705, 2706(a)(1), 6106(a)(1),
    and 5506, respectively.
    3
    The petition is time-stamped January 6, 2015. The PCRA court, in its Rule
    907 notice, states that the envelope in which the petition was mailed bears a
    postmark of January 2, 2015, and under the “prisoner mailbox rule,”
    January 2, 2015, is considered the filing date of the petition. See PCRA
    Court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, 3/3/2015,
    at 5, citing Commonwealth v. Plummer, 
    798 A.2d 777
    , 778 (Pa. Super.
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -2-
    J-S71031-15
    of intent to dismiss, explaining the PCRA petition was untimely. Diaz filed
    objections to the Rule 907 notice on March 24, 2015. Thereafter, on April
    13, 2015, the court dismissed the PCRA petition. This pro se appeal timely
    followed.
    As a prefatory matter, we consider whether Diaz was entitled to the
    appointment of counsel.
    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that if a defendant has
    been denied the right to file a petition for allowance of appeal, on direct
    appeal, the PCRA provides for the reinstatement of that right under
    appropriate circumstances. Commonwealth v. Leibel, 
    825 A.2d 630
    , 635–
    636 (Pa. 2003). “‘It is now well[-]established that a PCRA petition brought
    after an appeal nunc pro tunc is considered [an] appellant’s first PCRA
    petition[.]’     Thus,       [the    a]ppellant   was   entitled   to   counsel   ….”
    Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 
    29 A.3d 1177
    , 1180–1181 (Pa. Super.
    2011).      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 904(C) provides, in
    pertinent part, that “when an unrepresented defendant satisfies the judge
    that the defendant is unable to afford or otherwise procure counsel, the
    judge shall appoint counsel to represent the defendant on the defendant’s
    first petition for post-conviction collateral relief.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C)
    (emphasis added). Even if a PCRA petition appears untimely, a petitioner is
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    2002); Commonwealth v. Jerman, 
    762 A.2d 366
    , 368 (Pa. Super. 2000).
    We note the envelope does not appear in the certified record.
    -3-
    J-S71031-15
    entitled to assistance of counsel on a first PCRA petition in order to
    determine whether any of the exceptions to the one-year time limitation
    apply. Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    818 A.2d 494
    , 500–501 (Pa. 2003).
    Here, the PCRA court considered the present petition as Diaz’s second
    petition. However, because the prior petition resulted in the reinstatement
    of Diaz’s right to pursue a petition for allowance of appeal, the present
    petition is deemed to be Diaz’s first PCRA petition. See Figueroa, 
    supra.
    Therefore, we conclude Diaz is entitled to the appointment of counsel even
    though the petition appears untimely on its face. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(c);
    Smith, supra.
    Accordingly, we vacate the PCRA court’s order and remand for the
    appointment of counsel pursuant to Rule 904(C).
    Order   vacated.       Case   remanded   for   appointment   of   counsel.
    Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/23/2015
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 705 WDA 2015

Filed Date: 11/23/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024