Bochkareva, A. v. Bochkarev, V. ( 2015 )


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  • J-A28040-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    ANASTASIA BOCHKAREVA A/K/A                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    BOCHKAREV,                                             PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    VIATCHESLAV BOCHKAREV,
    Appellee                  No. 2924 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order Entered August 28, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
    Civil Division at No(s): 2009-05232 PACSES #285110953
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, and SHOGAN, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                        FILED DECEMBER 01, 2015
    Appellant, Anastasia Bochkareva, also known as Anastasia Bochkarev1
    (“Mother”), appeals from the order entered on August 28, 2014, that
    disposed of her motion for modification of child support. We affirm.
    Mother and Viatcheslav Bochkarev (“Father”) were born in Russia,
    were married in Russia in 2003, and later moved to the United States. N.T.,
    5/2/14, at 165; Trial Court Memorandum, 8/28/14, at 2. Two children were
    born of the marriage.        Trial Court Memorandum, 8/28/14, at 2.    In 2008,
    Father lost his job at Morgan Stanley in the United States. Id. The parties
    planned to return to Russia with their two children.     Id.   Father obtained
    ____________________________________________
    1
    “Bochkareva” is the feminine form of the family name “Bochkarev.” N.T.,
    5/2/14, at 22-23.
    J-A28040-15
    employment at Penta Investments in Russia, and he returned to Russia in
    August of 2008. Id. While Mother had planned on returning to Russia with
    the children, Mother instead filed for divorce in Montgomery County in
    February of 2009. Id. Mother and Father are now divorced. Id. Father
    continues to reside in Russia, and Mother and the children continue to reside
    in the United States. Id. Father intends to remain in Russia, and Mother
    concedes this point. Id.
    On September 17, 2009, Mindy A. Harris, Esquire,
    conference officer in support, found [F]ather, a resident of
    Russia, considering his background, education and experience,
    with a net earning capacity of $2,176 per month and [M]other
    with a net income, after legal deductions, of $1,841 per month.
    Ms. Harris[’] recommendation was [Father] to pay child support
    for two children in the amount of $618 per month, plus $81 per
    month for medical insurance contribution, for a total of $699 per
    month. Unreimbursed medical expenses were to be paid 54% by
    [F]ather and 46% by [M]other. The recommendation became an
    order on September 21, 2009. Neither side filed exceptions from
    this order.
    On July 10, 2012, [M]other filed a petition to modify the
    September 21, 2009 order based on a change of circumstances.
    Mindy A. Harris, Esquire, addressed the matter again and found,
    on April 17, 2013, [F]ather with a net income of $1,383.70 per
    month and [M]other with a net income of $4,720.52 per month.
    Ms. Harris’ recommendation was an order against father of $485
    per month for two children, $35.23 per month for medical
    insurance contribution, and $223.60 per month for child care, for
    a total support of $743.83 per month. Unreimbursed medical
    expenses were to be paid 23% by [F]ather and 77% by
    [M]other. The recommendation became an order on April 22,
    2013. Mother filed exceptions from the support order on May 8,
    2013.
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    J-A28040-15
    Trial Court Memorandum, 8/28/14, at 1-2.          Following a hearing, the trial
    court entered an order on August 28, 2014, which provides, in relevant part,
    as follows:
    AND NOW, this 28th day of August, 2014, after hearing
    and briefs, the following is ORDERED:
    1. For the period of July 10, 2012 through December 31, 2012
    (1) Father’s net income is $1,214 net per month.
    (2) Mother’s net income is $3,716 net per month.
    (3) Father shall pay child support as follows:
    (i) $336.00 per month for 2 children;
    (ii) $49.20 per month for medical
    insurance contribution $385.20 per
    month TOTAL
    (4) Mother shall provide medical insurance for the
    children.
    (5) Mother shall pay the first $250 annually for
    unreimbursed medical expenses incurred for each
    child.
    (6) Unreimbursed medical expenses that exceed
    $250 annually for each child shall be paid 24.6% by
    father and 75.4% by mother.
    2. For the period of January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013
    (1) Father’s net income is $1,214 net per month.
    (2) Mother’s net income is $5,949 net per month.
    (3) Father shall pay child support as follows:
    (i) $279 per month for 2 children
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    (ii) $33.88 per month for medical
    insurance contribution $312.88 per
    month TOTAL
    (4) Mother shall provide medical insurance for the
    children.
    (5) Mother shall pay the first $250.00 annually for
    unreimbursed medical expenses incurred for each
    child.
    (6) Unreimbursed medical expenses that exceed
    $250.00 annually for each child shall be paid 16.94%
    by [F]ather and 83.06% by [M]other.
    3. For the period January 1, 2014 forward:
    (1) Father’s net income is $1,214 net per month.
    (2) Mother’s net income is $5,298 net per month.
    (3) Father shall pay child support as follows:
    (i) $291.00 per month for 2 children
    (ii) $37.28 per month for medical
    insurance contribution $328.28 per
    month TOTAL
    (4) Mother shall provide medical insurance for the
    children.
    (5) Mother shall pay the first $250.00 annually for
    unreimbursed medical expenses incurred for each
    child.
    (6) Unreimbursed medical expenses that exceed
    $250.00 annually for each child shall be paid 18.64%
    by [F]ather and 81.36% by [M]other.
    (7) Any and all arrears are due and payable
    immediately and obligor shall pay $31.00 per month
    on arrears with each periodic payment. All terms of
    this order are subject to collection and/or
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    J-A28040-15
    enforcement by contempt proceedings, credit bureau
    reporting, tax refund offset certification, driver’s
    license revocation, and the freeze and seize of
    financial   assets.    These     enforcement/collection
    mechanisms will not be initiated as long as the
    obligor does not owe overdue support. Failure to
    make each payment on time and in full will cause all
    arrears to become subject to immediate collection by
    all of the means listed above. On and after the date
    it is due, by operation of law, each unpaid support
    payment shall constitute a judgment against you,
    [as] well as a lien against real property.
    [(]8[)] This order is effective July 10, 2012. Arrears
    adjustments resulting from this effective date will be
    calculated by the DRO and set as of the entry date of
    this order.
    Order, 8/28/14. This timely appeal followed.2
    On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for this Court’s
    consideration:
    1. Whether the trial court erred by not applying an earning
    capacity pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(4)?
    2. Whether the trial court erred by not considering Father’s
    present employment a voluntary reduction of income pursuant to
    Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(1)?
    3. Whether the trial court erred by not considering the standard
    of living of the parties and children, as well as their unusual
    needs pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5?
    ____________________________________________
    2
    It does not appear as though the trial court directed Mother to file a
    concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b), and the filing of a statement of errors complained of was not
    mandatory in this matter as it is not a Children’s Fast Track appeal as
    defined in Pa.R.A.P. 102. However, the trial court, on October 20, 2014,
    filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion incorporating the aforementioned August
    28, 2014 Trial Court Memorandum.
    -5-
    J-A28040-15
    Mother’s Brief at 7.
    We review an appeal from an order of child support under the
    following standard:
    When evaluating a support order, this Court may only reverse
    the trial court’s determination where the order cannot be
    sustained on any valid ground. We will not interfere with the
    broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the
    discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support order.
    An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in
    reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law,
    or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either
    manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice,
    bias or ill will, discretion has been abused. In addition, we note
    that the duty to support one’s child is absolute, and the purpose
    of child support is to promote the child’s best interests.
    Morgan v. Morgan, 
    99 A.3d 554
    , 556-557 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation and
    quotation marks omitted). The reviewing court does not weigh the evidence
    or determine credibility as these are functions of the trial court. Doherty v.
    Doherty, 
    859 A.2d 811
    , 812 (Pa. Super. 2004).
    In Mother’s first issue on appeal, she claims that the trial court erred
    by not imputing an earning capacity to Father pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
    1910.16-2(d)(4). Section 1910.16-2(d)(4) provides as follows:
    (d) Reduced or Fluctuating Income.
    ***
    (4) Earning Capacity. If the trier of fact determines that a party
    to a support action has willfully failed to obtain or maintain
    appropriate employment, the trier of fact may impute to that
    party an income equal to the party’s earning capacity. Age,
    education, training, health, work experience, earnings history
    and child care responsibilities are factors which shall be
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    J-A28040-15
    considered in determining earning capacity. In order for an
    earning capacity to be assessed, the trier of fact must state the
    reasons for the assessment in writing or on the record.
    Generally, the trier of fact should not impute an earning capacity
    that is greater than the amount the party would earn from one
    full-time position. Determination of what constitutes a
    reasonable    work regimen depends upon all relevant
    circumstances including the choice of jobs available within a
    particular occupation, working hours, working conditions and
    whether a party has exerted substantial good faith efforts to find
    employment.
    Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(4).
    Clearly, before the trial court may impute an income equal to Father’s
    earning capacity, the trial court must first conclude that Father “has willfully
    failed to obtain or maintain appropriate employment[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-
    2(d)(4).   Here, the trial court, after considering the record and the
    testimony, explained its decision as follows:
    After review of the record, the court [found] that [F]ather,
    who has lived for the last six years in Russia, and intends to
    reside in Russia, has the best employment he could obtain in
    Russia with TSFP (Center for Financial Support), obtaining that
    employment on April 1, 2013. Father’s salary there is 50,000
    rubles per month, with a tax rate of 13% (6,500 rubles per
    month), for a net of 43,500 rubles per month, which is
    $1,214.28 net per month U.S. currency. This $1,214.28 is not a
    change of circumstances from the September 21, 2009 order
    where [F]ather’s earning capacity was $2,176 net per month,
    unemployment compensation (U.S. Dollars). Indeed, it is less
    than the prior order.
    Prior to [F]ather obtaining employment on April 1, 2013 at
    TSFP, [F]ather was laid off in August-September 2009 at a
    Russian job at Penta, when Penta closed its Moscow office.
    Thereafter,     [F]ather   obtained    Russian   unemployment
    compensation      throughout     2010.  During   the     Russian
    unemployment compensation, [F]ather was offered a job as a
    cook for a company and a job as an industrial worker, both
    -7-
    J-A28040-15
    positions at lower salaries than at his present job. From the time
    Penta closed its doors, until obtaining the April 1, 2013
    employment with TSFP, [F]ather was aggressive and diligent in
    attempting to obtain employment in Russia. Father spoke to
    clubs and organizations at schools where his resume was
    submitted, he looked for vacancies on the Internet, he was
    registered for online conferences on career search, he
    interviewed with various companies, and was proactive in
    networking and speaking to people.1
    1
    The reality is that [F]ather has been unemployed
    for years, has obtained a job in Russia after good
    faith efforts for the most money as has been offered,
    has resided in Russia for 6 years, and there has been
    no change in financial circumstances for [Father]
    since the September 2009 order to warrant an
    increase in said order. Arguments to the contrary by
    [M]other are rejected by the court.
    The court found [F]ather to be credible.2
    2
    The court also finds [F]ather’s excerpts from his
    brief to be accurate, as follows:
    “After his loss of employment from
    Penta, Father’s living was financed by a
    combination of factors, including the fact
    that he lives rent free with his mother,
    he has borrowed money from his family,
    lived on credit cards, and liquidated
    assets. With respect to the credit cards,
    he did cash advances and then balance
    transfers from one credit card to pay
    back another credit card, which he did
    several times.” ([Father’s Post-Trial]
    Brief, [8/15/14] p. 4).
    [* * *]
    “Further, Mother’s argument that the
    Court should give Father an earning
    capacity has no basis in law or fact.
    Mother    provided    no     evidence   to
    contradict that Father’s income in Russia,
    -8-
    J-A28040-15
    where he has lived for six (6) years, is
    the highest income of any job he could
    find or was offered, and his testimony
    that this was the best income he could
    get   was,     to   the    contrary,    not
    contradicted.” ([Father’s Post-Trial] Brief,
    [8/15/14] p. 5).
    [* * *]
    “Father is employed. He lives in Russia.
    His income is known, his ability to live in
    Russia at that level of income (which as
    noted is higher than the other job offers
    he received) was explained as he is able
    to live with his mother (he doesn’t even
    own a car, he occasionally used his
    mother’s but that no longer exists as it
    was stolen as noted in the testimony).”
    ([Father’s Post-Trial] Brief, [8/15/14] pp.
    5-6).
    On the other hand, there has been a substantial change of
    circumstance concerning [M]other’s income. Mother’s net income
    in the September, 2009 order was $1,841 net per month.
    Mother’s W-2 income for 2012 is $52,981 gross per year.
    Father’s attempt to impute $1,000 per month additional rental
    income is rejected by the court based on the record. The issue of
    [M]other’s income from January 1, 2014 going forward,
    according to [F]ather, would be to extend [M]other’s 2013
    $94,246 gross income into 2014. The court rejects this approach
    as [M]other’s base salary is $77,000 gross per year. Her bonuses
    are discretionary. However, the record shows that [M]other has
    received $3,750 bonus thus far in 2014, so that sum will be
    added to [M]other’s $77,000 salary for gross income going
    forward for [M]other of $80,750 gross per year. As to [M]other’s
    receiving further bonuses, [F]ather can always address that
    issue when and if it occurs.
    Lastly, [M]other admits there is no child care after June 1,
    2013. However, the issue remains if [M]other has proved a child
    care expense from July 10, 2012 to June 1, 2013. The court
    finds she has not. Mother presented no testimony on this issue.
    -9-
    J-A28040-15
    The court is left to speculate and guess about child care,
    concerning the amount and frequency and the very child care
    itself. Mother’s exhibit M-A-5 shows a copy of one check for 60
    and a 3 page “account detail” that does not reflect any specific
    child care payment whatsoever and is of no probative value
    regarding child care.
    Trial Court Memorandum, 8/28/14, at 2-4.
    The trial court found that Father’s testimony was credible and that
    Father was employed in the best job he could obtain. Nothing in Mother’s
    argument causes this Court to conclude there was any error or abuse of
    discretion in the trial court’s conclusion. Therefore, because the trial court
    did not find that Father willfully reduced his income, there was no error in
    refusing to impute a greater income to Father pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
    1910.16-2(d)(4). Accordingly, Mother is entitled to no relief.
    Next, mother claims that the trial court erred by not considering
    Father’s present employment a voluntary reduction of income.              The
    applicable Rule of Civil Procedure concerning a voluntary reduction of income
    is Rule 1910.16-2(d)(1), which reads as follows:
    (d) Reduced or Fluctuating Income.
    (1) Voluntary Reduction of Income. When either party voluntarily
    assumes a lower paying job, quits a job, leaves employment,
    changes occupations or changes employment status to pursue
    an education, or is fired for cause, there generally will be no
    effect on the support obligation.
    Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(1).
    Again, we point out that the trial court found that Father’s testimony
    was credible.   Trial Court Memorandum, 8/28/14, at 2.       Father’s reduced
    - 10 -
    J-A28040-15
    income was not voluntary. As the trial court noted, the parties decided to
    move to Russia, but Mother ultimately chose to remain in the United States
    with the children and file for divorce. 
    Id.
     The trial court was satisfied that,
    while living in Russia, Father made good faith efforts to obtain suitable
    employment for the greatest income he could find, and there was no change
    in Father’s financial circumstances since the September 2009 order that
    warrant an increase in Father’s support obligation. 
    Id.
     at 3 n.1. Similar to
    our analysis of Mother’s first issue, we discern no error of law or abuse of
    discretion.   The trial court’s conclusion is supported by the record, and
    because we will not disturb the trial court’s credibility determinations, we
    conclude that Mother is entitled to no relief.
    Finally, Mother argues that the trial court erred by not considering the
    parties’ standard of living and their unusual needs pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
    1910.16-5 in determining Father’s support obligation.            However, after
    reviewing Mother’s argument on this issue, it is apparent that Mother is, in
    fact, challenging only the trial court’s credibility determinations. Specifically,
    Mother asserts that Father’s ability to travel belies his alleged financial
    status. Mother’s Brief at 26-27.
    Mother is baldly asking this Court to substitute its credibility
    determinations for that of the trial court. However, Mother has provided no
    authority for her argument, and this Court will not reweigh the trial court’s
    credibility determinations. Doherty, 
    859 A.2d at 812
    .
    - 11 -
    J-A28040-15
    For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Mother is entitled to
    no relief. Accordingly, we affirm the August 28, 2014 support order.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/1/2015
    - 12 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2924 EDA 2014

Filed Date: 12/1/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024