Chromack, N. v. Williams, T. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S71029-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    NICOLE SEVILLE CHROMACK,                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    TOMMY WILLIAMS,
    Appellant                     No. 733 WDA 2015
    Appeal from the Order March 18, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Family Court at No(s): FD09005135
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and OTT, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                       FILED JANUARY 29, 2016
    Appellant, Tommy Williams, appeals from the order denying him
    permission to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on a custody complaint.
    After careful consideration, we reverse and remand.
    Appellant is the noncustodial parent of two children, ages six and
    seven. On March 13, 2015, Appellant petitioned to file a custody complaint
    IFP, and on March 18, 2015, a hearing on that request was conducted. On
    March 27, 2015, the trial court entered an order denying Appellant’s petition
    on the grounds that “petitioner makes over the guideline amount.” Order,
    J-S71029-15
    3/27/15.1 Appellant filed an appeal on April 22, 2015. Both Appellant and
    the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
    Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] petition to
    proceed in forma pauperis to seek partial custody of his children
    and modification of a support order, despite [Appellant’s]
    monthly income of only $600 and substantial child support and
    student loan obligations?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    We first note that this issue is properly before us as our Supreme
    Court has held that “an order denying in forma pauperis status is a final,
    appealable order.”       Amrhein v. Amrhein, 
    903 A.2d 17
    , 19 (Pa. Super.
    2006) (quoting Grant v. Blaine, 
    868 A.2d 400
    , 402 (Pa. 2005)).
    Furthermore, “[i]n reviewing a trial court’s resolution of an application to
    proceed in forma pauperis, we reverse only if the court abused its discretion
    or committed an error of law.”          
    Id. at 19.
      An abuse of discretion is not
    merely an error in judgment but requires a finding of bias, partiality,
    prejudice, ill will, manifest unreasonableness, or misapplication of law.
    Commonwealth v. Tickel, 
    2 A.3d 1229
    , 1234 (Pa. Super. 2010).
    It is well-established that “[a] party who is without financial resources
    to pay the costs of litigation is entitled to proceed in forma pauperis.”
    ____________________________________________
    1
    At the end of the March 18, 2015 hearing, Appellant was also advised that
    the trial court was denying the petition because Appellant made “well over
    the guideline amount.” N.T., 3/18/15, at 5.
    -2-
    J-S71029-15
    Pa.R.C.P. 240(b).   That party is required to file a petition and an affidavit
    describing in detail the inability to pay the costs of litigation.   Pa.R.C.P.
    240(c). The rule expressly prescribes that the affidavit requires, inter alia,
    the following information from the applicant:    present or past salary and
    wages, other types of income within the preceding year, other contributions
    for household support, property owned, available assets, debts, and
    obligations, and persons dependent for support. Pa.R.C.P. 240(h).
    This Court has explained the following regarding IFP petitions:
    The mere filing of a praecipe for IFP status will not
    automatically establish the petitioner’s right to proceed in that
    status. The court must satisfy itself of the truth of the averment
    of inability to pay. If it believes the petitioner’s averments,
    there is no requirement that the court conduct an evidentiary
    hearing.     The trial court has considerable discretion in
    determining whether a person is indigent for purposes of an
    application to proceed in forma pauperis. However, in making
    that determination, it must focus on whether the person can
    afford to pay and cannot reject allegations contained in an
    application without conducting a hearing.
    
    Amrhein, 903 A.2d at 19-20
    .
    In this case, Appellant filed a petition to proceed IFP.          Petition,
    3/13/15, at 1-6.    With that petition, Appellant filed a “verified financial
    statement” in which he provided information on his income, assets,
    dependents, debts, and obligations. 
    Id. at 3-6.
    As such, Appellant made a
    prima facie showing that he could not afford legal counsel. Thus, the trial
    court could not reject these allegations without conducting a hearing.
    
    Amrhein, 903 A.2d at 20
    .
    -3-
    J-S71029-15
    The record reflects that on March 18, 2015, a proceeding was
    conducted on Appellant’s request to proceed IFP. While the trial court refers
    to the proceeding as an evidentiary hearing, we cannot agree that it was
    sufficient for purposes of Pa.R.C.P. 240. A review of the hearing transcript
    reveals2 that the only questions the trial court directed to Appellant were
    related to his income and the number of minors living with him.             N.T.,
    3/18/15, at 3-5.      After obtaining information regarding Appellant’s income
    and household dependents, the trial court referenced “current guidelines” 3 it
    was reviewing.      
    Id. at 5.
       Following consideration of those guidelines, the
    trial court advised Appellant: “I am going to have to deny. You make well
    over the guideline amount. Sorry.” 
    Id. Thus, the
    trial court considered only Appellant’s income and household
    dependents measured against income guidelines in determining Appellant’s
    eligibility for IFP status.        Such limited assessment is improper under
    Pa.R.C.P. 240. Additionally, we addressed this issue in Amrhein and held
    that a trial court’s consideration of only income measured against guidelines
    without consideration of other obligations and monthly expenditures for
    ____________________________________________
    2
    In its opinion, the trial court indicates that Appellant failed to obtain and
    make part of the record the March 18, 2015 hearing transcript. Appellant
    acknowledges this delay. Appellant’s Brief at 6. The March 18, 2015,
    transcript is currently part of the record before us.
    3
    The transcript does not reflect the specific guidelines the trial court relied
    upon.
    -4-
    J-S71029-15
    purposes of an IFP request constituted error of law. 
    Amrhein, 903 A.2d at 22
    . Accordingly, we are constrained to conclude that in this case the trial
    court erred in considering only Appellant’s monthly income and dependents
    measured against guidelines in denying Appellant’s IFP request.
    As a result, we remand this matter for a hearing consistent with
    Pa.R.C.P. 240. During that hearing, the trial court should consider evidence
    of   Appellant’s   income,   assets,   dependents,   obligations,   and   monthly
    expenditures pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 240 in evaluating Appellant’s IFP
    petition.   We decline Appellant’s invitation to grant IFP status herein.
    Although Appellant has made a prima facie showing of his inability to pay for
    counsel, we remind Appellant of his obligation to present evidence
    supporting this claim at the hearing.
    Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/29/2016
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 733 WDA 2015

Filed Date: 1/29/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021