Com. v. Brown, A. ( 2016 )


Menu:
  • J-S69011-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                        IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    ALEXIS A. BROWN
    Appellant                    No. 494 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 16, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004497-2013
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and OLSON, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:                          FILED JANUARY 27, 2016
    Appellant, Alexis A. Brown, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, following his
    bench trial convictions for two counts of theft by deception and one count
    each of tampering with public records or information, forgery, and false
    statements (to obtain food stamps).1 We affirm Appellant’s convictions but
    vacate and remand for resentencing.
    In its opinion, the trial court fully sets forth the relevant facts and
    procedural history of this case.         Therefore, we have no reason to restate
    them. We add only that the court sentenced Appellant on January 16, 2015,
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3922(a)(1); 4911(a)(2); 4101(a)(2); 62 P.S. § 481,
    respectively.
    J-S69011-15
    to an aggregate term of six (6) to twenty-three (23) months’ imprisonment,
    plus five (5) years’ probation. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on
    February 17, 2015. On February 20, 2015, the court ordered Appellant to
    file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), which Appellant timely filed on March 12, 2015.
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
    DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE
    EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW AS A MATTER OF
    LAW THAT APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF THEFT BY
    DECEPTION IN RELATION TO THE LOST EARNINGS WHEN
    THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE COMMONWEALTH
    FAILED TO SHOW BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
    APPELLANT MISREPRESENTED HIS EMPLOYMENT STATUS?
    DID THE COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE
    WAS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
    APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF THEFT BY DECEPTION IN
    RELATION TO THE MEDICAL EXPENSES WHEN ANY
    ALLEGED DECEPTION HAD NO BEARING UPON ANY
    PAYMENTS MADE BY THE VICTIMS COMPENSATION
    ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT?
    DID THE COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE
    WAS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
    APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF FRAUD OR FALSE
    STATEMENTS IN RECEIVING FOOD STAMPS/PUBLIC
    ASSISTANCE WHERE THE COURT CONCLUDED THAT THE
    ALLEGED EMPLOYMENT WAS DETERMINED TO BE
    NONEXISTENT.    THIS CREATED CONFLICTING FACT
    DETERMINATIONS THAT ARE IRRECONCILABLE[.]
    DID THE COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE
    WAS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
    APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF TAMPERING WITH PUBLIC
    RECORDS WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS BASED PURELY
    UPON OPINIONS OF LAY WITNESSES THAT THE RECORD
    WAS CHANGED?
    -2-
    J-S69011-15
    DID THE COURT ERR IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF
    BOTH TAMPERING WITH PUBLIC RECORDS AND FORGERY
    BECAUSE THE FINDING OF GUILT IN SPECIAL
    PROVISIONS   PRECLUDE    PROSECUTION    OF   THE
    CORRELATING GENERAL PROVISION OF THE PENAL CODE?
    DID THE COURT ERR IN GRADING THE CONVICTION FOR
    THEFT BY DECEPTION, RELATING TO THE MEDICAL
    EXPENSES, AS A THIRD DEGREE FELONY WHEN THE
    ALLEGED COST OF SERVICES DID NOT EXCEED $2,000.
    DID THE COURT ERR IN GRADING THE FRAUD OR FALSE
    STATEMENTS IN RECEIVING FOOD STAMPS/PUBLIC
    ASSISTANCE AS A THIRD DEGREE FELONY WHEN THE
    ALLEGED VALUE OF THE ASSISTANCE APPELLANT
    RECEIVED DID NOT EXCEED $3,000.
    (Appellant’s Brief at 6-7).
    After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
    applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable William R.
    Carpenter, we conclude Appellant’s first, second, third, and fourth issues
    merit no relief.   The trial court’s opinion comprehensively discusses and
    properly disposes of those questions. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed May 8,
    2015, at 10-18) (finding: (1) evidence at trial established Appellant lied
    about his employment status on Victims Compensation Assistance Program
    (“VCAP”) application, where Appellant submitted suspicious paystubs and
    suspicious employer verification information; paystubs raised “red flags”
    because they did not contain employer identification number, employee
    identification number, or Appellant’s social security number; purported letter
    from employer and employer verification form also raised red flags, where
    employer letter was not on letterhead, signature on employer letter merely
    -3-
    J-S69011-15
    stated: “Management,” and two phone numbers listed as belonging to
    employer were wrong numbers; additionally, paystubs, employer letter, and
    employer verification form were submitted from Appellant’s fax machine, not
    from   purported   employer;   VCAP    claims   specialist,   VCAP   compliance
    reviewer, and Special Agent for Attorney General’s Office were unable to
    verify existence of Appellant’s purported employer, “Muscle Therapy”;
    Appellant listed business address as 1616 Walnut Street, but parties
    stipulated no company called Muscle Therapy leased office space in that
    building during relevant timeframe; Appellant also submitted different
    employer information on VCAP application than he submitted on Philadelphia
    Hand Center patient intake form; court concluded Appellant lied about
    employment status on VCAP form and submitted fraudulent paperwork to
    support his claim for lost wages; Commonwealth produced sufficient
    evidence to sustain Appellant’s theft by deception conviction (related to lost
    earnings); (2) when Appellant submitted VCAP application, Appellant
    acknowledged that consequence of providing fraudulent information on
    application would be ineligibility to receive lost wages; additionally, once
    applicant commits fraud, he is ineligible to receive any compensation from
    VCAP; because Appellant provided fraudulent information to obtain alleged
    lost earnings, Appellant was also ineligible to receive compensation for
    medical expenses; Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to sustain
    Appellant’s theft by deception conviction (related to medical expenses); (3)
    -4-
    J-S69011-15
    contrary to Appellant’s assertions, court did not make express determination
    that Appellant’s employment was non-existent; rather, court decided
    Appellant lied about his employment on VCAP application to overstate his
    claim for lost wages; Appellant also failed to disclose to Public Welfare
    agency any VCAP payments he received,2 as he was required to do, which
    would have adversely affected his eligibility for public assistance and
    reduced     or   eliminated     amount         of   public     assistance    he    received;
    Commonwealth         produced      sufficient       evidence    to   sustain      Appellant’s
    conviction for false statements (to obtain food stamps);3 (4) Appellant
    submitted falsified documents in his VCAP application; specifically, Appellant
    presented fraudulent paystubs, fraudulent employer letter, and fraudulent
    employer verification form; evidence demonstrated Appellant knowingly
    produced false or altered documentation to receive compensation for lost
    wages; Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s
    tampering with public records or information conviction).                   Accordingly, we
    affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion as to issues one through four.
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Appellant also failed to disclose his purported earnings to the Public
    Welfare agency.
    3
    On appeal, Appellant appears to have abandoned his challenge to the
    sufficiency of the evidence for his false statements conviction.         (See
    Appellant’s Brief at 17-18.) Instead, Appellant now challenges only the
    grading for the sentence he received for this conviction. We address
    Appellant’s grading complaint in the analysis of his seventh issue on appeal.
    -5-
    J-S69011-15
    In his fifth issue, Appellant invokes the “specific/general” principle of
    law that prohibits prosecutions under the general provisions of the penal
    code when there are special provisions available.        Appellant asserts the
    Commonwealth’s prosecution of Appellant for tampering with public records
    falls under the specific provisions of the Welfare Code, which prohibited the
    Commonwealth from also prosecuting him under the general theft by
    deception provisions of the Crimes Code for the same behavior. Appellant
    admits   that   in    his   Rule   1925(b)   statement   he   challenged   the
    Commonwealth’s prosecution of him for tampering with public records and
    forgery as barred under the “specific/general” principle. Appellant maintains
    he meant to challenge the Commonwealth’s prosecution of him for
    tampering with public records and theft by deception, as barred by this
    principle of law.    Appellant concludes his error was inadvertent, and this
    Court should remand to provide Appellant and the trial court an opportunity
    to address the issue he intended to raise on appeal. We cannot agree.
    As a general rule, “to preserve their claims for appellate review,
    appellants must comply whenever the trial court orders them to file a
    Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to [Rule] 1925.
    Any issues not raised in a [Rule] 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.”
    Commonwealth v. Castillo, 
    585 Pa. 395
    , 403, 
    888 A.2d 775
    , 780 (2005)
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Lord, 
    553 Pa. 415
    , 420, 
    719 A.2d 306
    , 309
    (1998)). See also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating issues not raised in trial court
    -6-
    J-S69011-15
    are waived and cannot be raised for first time on appeal).
    Instantly, Appellant presented his fifth issue on appeal in his Rule
    1925(b) statement as follows: “The court erred in finding Appellant guilty of
    both Tampering with Public Records and Forgery because the finding of guilt
    in special provisions preclude[s] prosecution of the correlating general
    provision of the penal code.”     (Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, filed
    3/12/15, at 2, ¶e).
    In response to Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement, the trial court
    addressed   Appellant’s   “specific/general”   argument   in   relation   to   his
    convictions for tampering with public records and forgery. Appellant did not
    seek permission to file an amended or supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement
    to correct his purported error.   See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2) (stating: “Upon
    application of the appellant and for good cause shown, the judge may
    enlarge the time period initially specified or permit an amended or
    supplemental Statement to be filed. … In extraordinary circumstances, the
    judge may allow for the filing of a Statement or amended or supplemental
    Statement nunc pro tunc”). Likewise, Appellant did not file a motion in this
    Court acknowledging his alleged error and requesting a remand to give the
    trial court an opportunity to address Appellant’s “intended” appellate issue.
    Instead, Appellant waited until he filed his appellate brief to explain his
    error, which denied the trial court a chance to address Appellant’s proposed
    issue in a timely manner. Appellant’s failure to preserve his claim before the
    -7-
    J-S69011-15
    trial court compels waiver of Appellant’s fifth issue on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P.
    302(a); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2); 
    Castillo, supra
    .
    Moreover, our legislature limited the “specific/general” rule with the
    enactment of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9303, which provides:
    § 9303.      Liability for violations of general and
    specific criminal statutes
    Notwithstanding the provisions of 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933
    (relating to particular controls general) or any other
    statute to the contrary, where the same conduct of a
    defendant violates more than one criminal statute, the
    defendant may be prosecuted under all available statutory
    criminal provisions without regard to the generality or
    specificity of the statutes.
    42   Pa.C.S.A.   §   9303   (effective   February   7,   2003).    See    also
    Commonwealth v. Nypaver, 
    69 A.3d 708
    (Pa.Super. 2013) (explaining
    enactment of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9303 halted operation of “specific/general” rule
    of statutory construction in context of criminal prosecution, and cases which
    applied that concept as basis for their holdings are no longer precedential;
    rejecting appellant’s argument that Commonwealth could prosecute him only
    under specific provision of Unemployment Compensation Law prohibiting
    wrongful receipt of unemployment benefits, but not under general theft by
    deception provisions of Crimes Code).
    Here, Section 9303 was in effect at the time the Commonwealth
    initiated prosecution in this matter. Consequently, the Commonwealth was
    free to charge Appellant for his criminal conduct under all available statutory
    criminal provisions. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9303; 
    Nypaver, supra
    . Therefore,
    -8-
    J-S69011-15
    even if Appellant had preserved his fifth issue before the trial court, it would
    merit no relief.
    For purposes of disposition, we combine Appellant’s sixth and seventh
    issues on appeal.   Appellant argues his convictions for theft by deception
    (related to medical expenses) and false statements were incorrectly graded
    as third-degree felonies for sentencing. Appellant asserts the financial loss
    associated with these convictions was not enough to support sentences as
    third-degree felonies. Rather, Appellant maintains his convictions for theft
    by deception (related to medical expenses) and false statements should
    have been graded as first-degree misdemeanors for sentencing.
    Regarding his false statements conviction, Appellant insists the court
    must have incorrectly calculated the amount of his welfare fraud by
    considering every month in which Appellant received food stamps, from
    August 2011 until June 2013.       Instead, Appellant claims the amount he
    received relative to his false statements conviction should have been
    calculated from the date he first received payment from VCAP and failed to
    report it to the Public Welfare agency.         Appellant concludes he was
    improperly sentenced on his theft by deception (related to medical
    expenses) and false statements convictions as third-degree felonies, and this
    Court must grant appropriate relief.    We agree in part that some relief is
    due.
    “A claim that the court improperly graded an offense for sentencing
    -9-
    J-S69011-15
    purposes implicates the legality of a sentence.”               Commonwealth v.
    Mendozajr,        
    71 A.3d 1023
    ,        1027   (Pa.Super.   2013)   (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Pantalion, 
    957 A.2d 1267
    , 1271 (Pa.Super. 2008)).
    When examining a challenge to the legality of a sentence, our scope and
    standard of review is as follows:
    A claim that implicates the fundamental legal authority of
    the court to impose a particular sentence constitutes a
    challenge to the legality of the sentence. If no statutory
    authorization exists for a particular sentence, that
    sentence is illegal and subject to correction. An illegal
    sentence must be vacated.         When the legality of a
    sentence is at issue on appeal, our standard of review is de
    novo and our scope of review is plenary.
    
    Mendozajr, supra
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Catt, 
    994 A.2d 1158
    , 1160
    (Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc)) (internal citations and quotation marks
    omitted).    See also Commonwealth v. Berry, 
    877 A.2d 479
    (Pa.Super.
    2005) (en banc), appeal denied, 
    591 Pa. 688
    , 
    917 A.2d 844
    (2007)
    (explaining challenges to legality of sentence are non-waiveable, assuming
    jurisdiction is proper).4
    ____________________________________________
    4
    The trial court interprets Appellant’s claims as challenging the underlying
    convictions rather than the legality of the sentences for those convictions.
    In Commonwealth v. Spruill, 
    622 Pa. 299
    , 
    80 A.3d 453
    (2013), the issue
    before the appellate Court was whether the trial court erred by convicting
    the appellee of aggravated assault graded as a second-degree felony where
    the Commonwealth charged her with aggravated assault as a first-degree
    felony. In Commonwealth v. Shamsud-Dim, 
    995 A.2d 1224
    (Pa.Super.
    2010), the issue was whether the trial court erred by convicting the
    appellant of simple assault as a third-degree misdemeanor where: the
    Commonwealth had not charged the appellant with that offense as a third-
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    - 10 -
    J-S69011-15
    The Crimes Code provides the following grading of theft offenses, in
    relevant part:
    § 3903. Grading of theft offenses
    (a)      Felony     of     the   second      degree.—Theft
    constitutes a felony of the second degree if:
    (1) The offense is committed during a manmade
    disaster, a natural disaster or a war-caused disaster and
    constitutes a violation of section 3921 (relating to theft by
    unlawful taking or disposition), 3925 (relating to receiving
    stolen property), 3928 (relating to unauthorized use of
    automobiles and other vehicles) or 3929 (relating to retail
    theft).
    (2)       The property stolen is a firearm.
    (3) In the case of theft by receiving stolen property,
    the property received, retained or disposed of is a firearm.
    (4) The property stolen is any amount of anhydrous
    ammonia.
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    degree misdemeanor and simple assault as a third-degree misdemeanor was
    not a lesser included offense to any of the charges before the trial court. In
    each case, the reviewing Courts considered the issues as challenges to the
    respective convictions, which required specific and timely objections to avoid
    waiver.    In both Spruill and Shamsud-Dim, the remedy for each
    appellant’s complaint would have been an arrest of judgment for the
    challenged conviction.
    Here, Appellant claims the sentences on his convictions for false statements
    and for theft (medical expenses) were improper because the
    Commonwealth’s evidence supported only first-degree misdemeanor
    sentences. As well, Appellant does not seek an arrest of judgment for these
    convictions. Therefore, Spruill and Shamsud-Dim are inapposite, and the
    trial court erred in relying on those cases to define and decide Appellant had
    waived his issues.
    - 11 -
    J-S69011-15
    (5) The amount involved is $100,000 or more but less
    than $500,000.
    (a.1)     Felony of the third degree.—Except as
    provided in subsection (a) or (a.2), theft constitutes a
    felony of the third degree if the amount involved exceeds
    $2,000, or if the property stolen is an automobile,
    airplane, motorcycle, motorboat or other motor-propelled
    vehicle, or in the case of theft by receiving stolen property,
    if the receiver is in the business of buying or selling stolen
    property.
    (a.2)     Felony of the first degree.—Except as provided
    in subsections (a) and (a.1), theft constitutes a felony of
    the first degree if:
    (1) in the case of theft by receiving stolen property,
    the property received, retained or disposed of is a firearm
    and the receiver is in the business of buying or selling
    stolen property; or
    (2)   the amount involved is $500,000 or more.
    (b)     Other grades.—Theft not within subsection (a),
    (a.1) or (a.2), constitutes a misdemeanor of the first
    degree, except that if the property was not taken from the
    person or by threat, or in breach of fiduciary obligation,
    and:
    (1) the amount involved was $50 or more but less
    than $200 the offense constitutes a misdemeanor of the
    second degree; or
    (2) the amount involved was less than $50 the
    offense constitutes a misdemeanor of the third degree.
    *     *      *
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3903.     Additionally, the Public Welfare Code provides the
    following grading for a false statements conviction:
    § 481. False statements; investigations; penalty
    - 12 -
    J-S69011-15
    (a) Any person who, either prior to, or at the time of,
    or subsequent to the application for assistance, by means
    of a willfully false statement or misrepresentation, or by
    impersonation or by willfully failing to disclose a material
    fact regarding eligibility or other fraudulent means,
    secures, or attempts to secure, or aids or abets or
    attempts to aid or abet any person in securing assistance,
    or Federal food stamps, commits a crime which shall be
    graded as provided in subsection (b).
    (b) Any person violating subsection (a) commits the
    grade of crime determined from the following schedule:
    Amount of Assistance             Degree of Crime
    or Food Stamps
    $3,000 or more                   Felony of the third degree
    $1,500 to $2,999                 Misdemeanor of the first
    degree
    $1,000 to $1,499                 Misdemeanor      of    the
    second degree
    $999 and under, or an            Misdemeanor of the third
    attempt to commit any            degree
    act prohibited in
    subsection (a)
    *   *       *
    62 P.S. § 481.
    Instantly, the court convicted Appellant of theft by deception (related
    to lost earnings, at count one), theft by deception (related to medical
    expenses, at count two), tampering with public records or information (count
    three), false statements (count four), and forgery (count six).          (The
    Commonwealth withdrew the charge of identity theft (count five) at trial.)
    At sentencing, the following exchange occurred between the court and
    - 13 -
    J-S69011-15
    counsel regarding the grading of Appellant’s offenses for sentencing
    purposes:
    [THE COURT]:                    All   right,   we   are   here   for
    sentencing.
    The [c]ourt has conferred with counsel. Counsel agree the
    guidelines are properly calculated.      We have theft by
    deception, 3 to 14, a felony three, level three offenses;
    tampering with public records, felony three, R.S. to 12,
    level two; welfare fraud,[5] 3 to 14 in the standard range,
    level three, felony three; forgery M-1, R.S. to 9, level
    two.[6]
    Were there any additions or corrections to the presentence
    investigation and report?
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:              No, Your Honor.
    [COMMONWEALTH]:           The only amendment I would
    make is I believe the felony three theft was properly
    indicated as a standard range of 3 to 14 months. The
    misdemeanor one theft I believe would be R.S. to 9,
    and the felony tampering would be R.S. to 12.
    [THE COURT]:                    Very well.
    (N.T. Sentencing, 1/16/15, at 3; R.R. at Exhibit E) (emphasis added). The
    Commonwealth also offered the following sentencing recommendation:
    So the Commonwealth’s recommendation in this matter is
    for a standard range sentence, but it is a sentence that will
    involve some total confinement in this case.
    ____________________________________________
    5
    The court referred to Appellant’s false statements conviction as welfare
    fraud.
    6
    Appellant’s theft and false statements were actually level two offenses of
    varying degrees from third-degree felony to first-degree misdemeanor.
    - 14 -
    J-S69011-15
    On count one, theft by deception, we’re asking for a
    standard range sentence of 9 to 23 months, with
    restitution in the amount of $5,390 payable to the
    Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency
    Victims’ Compensation Assistance Program.
    On count two, theft by deception, a misdemeanor, we
    are asking for 9 to 23 months concurrent with count one,
    and $1,462 in restitution payable to the same victim.
    On count three, tampering with public records, we are
    asking for a sentence of five years’ probation concurrent
    with count three but consecutive to counts one and two.
    On count four, the false statements charge, five years’
    probation concurrent with count three but consecutive to
    counts one and two.
    And count six, forgery, the same sentence, five years’
    probation concurrent with counts three and four,
    consecutive to counts one and two, for a total sentence
    recommendation of 9 to 23 months, followed by five years’
    probation, and total of $6,852 restitution.
    (Id. at 16; R.R. at Exhibit E) (emphasis added).
    The court sentenced Appellant for the theft by deception conviction
    (related to medical expenses) to six (6) to twenty-three (23) months’
    imprisonment, plus three (3) years’ probation, with restitution in the amount
    of $1,462.00. Given the court’s on-the-record exchange with counsel, the
    court was aware the theft offense (related to medical expenses) was a first-
    degree misdemeanor.          See 
    id. See also
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3903(b).          The
    court’s   sentence   falls   within    the   standard   range   for   a   first-degree
    misdemeanor theft offense.             Additionally, the certified docket entries
    expressly state: “Count 2 is amended to (M1) grading at sentencing.” (See
    - 15 -
    J-S69011-15
    Docket Entries at 3; R.R. at Exhibit A). Thus, we see no error with respect
    to the sentence imposed for Appellant’s theft by deception conviction
    (related to medical expenses).
    Regarding Appellant’s false statements conviction (count four), the
    court imposed a concurrent term of six (6) to twenty-three (23) months’
    imprisonment, plus three (3) years’ probation, with this offense also graded
    as a third-degree felony. Nevertheless, the parties agree the court should
    have graded this offense as a first-degree misdemeanor at sentencing.7
    (See Appellant’s Brief at 18; 20; Commonwealth’s Brief at 27.) See also 62
    P.S. § 481(b). In its opinion, the court likewise concedes the evidence at
    trial   showed    the   false   statements/welfare   fraud   was   a   first-degree
    misdemeanor, i.e., between $1,500.00 and $2,999.00.            (See Trial Court
    Opinion at 19.) Given the court’s error in waiving the sentencing issue, we
    conclude the best resolution of this case is to vacate the judgment of
    sentence and remand for resentencing with the proper grading (amend false
    statements/welfare fraud to a first-degree misdemeanor for sentencing).
    ____________________________________________
    7
    The Commonwealth suggests the court’s grading error is harmless because
    the court imposed a standard range sentence within the statutory limits,
    even if Appellant’s false statements conviction had been graded properly as
    a first-degree misdemeanor. While this statement might seem appealing in
    some respects, we cannot ignore other ramifications associated with the
    improper grading of the offense for sentencing. See, e.g., 204 Pa.Code §
    303.15 (dictating offense gravity score and prior record points associated
    with offenses; misdemeanor offenses carry different offense gravity score
    and prior record point value than felony offenses). Therefore, we reject the
    Commonwealth’s position.
    - 16 -
    J-S69011-15
    See generally Commonwealth v. Bartrug, 
    732 A.2d 1287
    (Pa.Super.
    1999), appeal denied, 
    561 Pa. 651
    , 
    747 A.2d 896
    (1999) (holding
    sentencing error in multi-count case normally requires appellate court to
    vacate entire judgment of sentence so trial court can restructure its
    sentencing scheme on remand).        Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s
    convictions, but we vacate the judgment of sentence in its totality and
    remand for resentencing.
    Judgment of sentence vacated; case remanded for resentencing.
    Jurisdiction is relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/27/2016
    - 17 -
    Circulated 01/06/2016 09:05 AM
    IN 1HE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUN1Y
    PENNSYLVANIA
    CRIMINAL DMSION
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                           CP-46-CR-0004497-2013
    v.
    ALEXIS BROWN                                           494 EDA 2015
    OPINION
    CARPENTER         J.                                   MAY 8, 2015
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Appellant, Alexis Brown. appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed on January 16, 2015, following his conviction at a non-jury trial of two
    . counts of theft by deception 1. tampering with public records or information2,
    false statements' and forgery'.
    On June 30, 2014, this Court presided over a non-jury trial. At trial,
    Tracy Clouser, a claims specialist for the Victim's Compensation Assistance
    Program, testified. (Trial by Judge 6/30/14 pp. 9 - 10). The Victim's
    Compensation Assistance Program ("VCAP") is a program designed to
    financially help victims of crime with the financial burden they experience
    because of the crime. 
    Id. at 9.
    The kind of things a victim may be compensated
    for may be medical expenses, loss of earnings, funeral expenses or stolen cash
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §3922(a)(l);
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §491 l(a)(2);
    62 Pa.C.S.A. §481 (a);
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §410l{a)(2).
    claims. 
    Id. at 9
    - 10. As a claim specialist, Ms. Clouser is assigned a claim, she
    reviews the claim to make sure that all mandatory documents are received and
    then process the claim for payment. 
    Id. at 10.
    In October of 2012, Ms. Clouser was assigned to review Appellant's
    claim. 
    Id. at 11.
    She reviewed Appellant's claims summary which is a summary
    that contains victim information, what was reported, what happened, what the
    injuries were. 
    Id. at 13.
    It also contains the employer at the time of the crime,
    date of the crime, when it was reported, what the police department the
    incident was reported to and insurance questions. 
    Id. Based upon
    Appellant's
    claim form, Appellant provided as his address, 2437 West Allegheny Street,
    Philadelphia, PA 19132 and his phone number as 347-482-9611. 
    Id. at 14.
    Appellant also provided bis employer as Muscle Therapy at 1616 Walnut Street,
    Philadelphia, PA 19103 and a phone number of 267-253-3956. 
    Id. The date
    of
    the crime was reported as September 5, 2012. 
    Id. at 15.
    As part of the process, Ms. Clouser explained that she reviews the
    police report which will usually have the injuries listed. She verifies the medical
    bills to see if they correlate to the injuries listed by the police department. 
    Id. In Appellant's
    case several medical expenses were listed. 
    Id. In a
    request for lost
    earnings, she sends out a verification form to the employer and a request for a
    certifying doctor's name and address who can certify that the injuries the
    victim suffered from the crime disabled the employee from working. 
    Id. In this
    case, Ms. Clouser testified as to the documentation and
    verification received from Appellant on October 19, 2012, sent from Appellant's
    2
    fax. 
    Id. at 16,
    17 - 18. Specifically, she received statement from Pennsylvania
    Hospital stating that Appellant owed $2,027.00. 
    Id. at 16.
    Since an itemized bill
    was never forwarded no payment was made on that bill. 
    Id. at 17.
    The next
    document that was submitted was a statement from Albert Einstein Medical
    Center reflecting that Appellant owed $200.00. 
    Id. at 17.
    An itemized statement
    was not provided and no payment was made on that bill. 
    Id. There were
    other
    medical expenses that included appropriate verification and were in fact paid
    out to Appellant. 
    Id. at 30.
    These include medical bills from Philadelphia Hand
    Center. 
    Id. Ms. Clouser
    did receive an itemized medical bill. 
    Id. at 31.
    Next, Appellant provided two paystubs and an employer letter. The
    first paystub has a pay date of September 7, 2012. 
    Id. at 19.
    It showed that
    Appellant's gross pay was for $1,295.00 for 37 hours of work. 
    Id. at 19
    - 20.
    That equals $35.00 an hour. 
    Id. at 20.
    The second paystub reflects a pay date of
    August 24, 2012 and a gross pay of $1400.00 for 40 hours of work. 
    Id. Finally, a
    employer letter was submitted. 
    Id. at 22.
    It read To whom it may concern,
    11
    Alexis Brown is a valued employee at the Muscle Therapy Company. If you have
    any questions or concerns, please don't hesitate to call or fax or any other
    required information for employee verification. Management." 
    Id. at 23.
    It listed
    a phone number and a fax number. 
    Id. The letter
    was not on letterhead and it
    was not signed by an individual other than "Management." It provided no
    further identifying information. 
    Id. Ms. Clouser
    needed additional information from the employer, and
    submitted a victim employment questionnaire directly to the employer. 
    Id. at 3
     24 - 25. Ms. Clouser received this form back which reflected that the date of
    employment was May 8, 2012, job title was massage therapist, it listed that
    Appellant worked an eight hour day and was paid $35 per hour. 
    Id. at 25.
    The
    questionnaire also stated that Appellant had lost time from September 6, 2012,
    the date after the crime, through November 14, 2012. 
    Id. The questionnaire
    was
    signed by Daniel Jacob on November 14, 2012. A phone number was provided.
    Ms. Clouser tried to verify Appellant's employment information by
    first calling the phone number listed on the victim employment questionnaire
    form filled out by Daniel Jacobs, 215-460-7591. 
    Id. at 26.
    Ms. Clouser was
    informed that she had a wrong number. 
    Id. at 27.
    She went back to the original
    letter submitted by Appellant with his claim. 
    Id. She was
    also advised that she
    had a wrong number. 
    Id. At the
    time of filing his claim, Appellant signed a signature page
    acknowledging the consequences for providing inaccurate information and
    more specifically, that if he provided fraudulent employment information that
    would preclude that his from recovering loss wages. 
    Id. at 27
    - 28. In addition,
    once fraud is committed, a claimant becomes ineligible for any compensation.
    
    Id. at 29.
    At trial, Ms. Clouser testified as to three forms called a review and
    determination.   See, Exhibit "C-6", "C-7" and "C-8". Exhibit C-6 reflected that the
    total amount paid by the Victim's Compensation Assistance Program to
    Appellant for loss of earnings was $5,390.00. 
    Id. at 3
    2 - 33. This amount was
    4
    paid directly to Appellant. 
    Id. at 3
    7. Exhibit C-7 reflected that a payment was
    made to Philadelphia Hand Center for two visits for a total amount of
    $1,248.00. 
    Id. at 3
    5. Finally, C-8 reflected that another payment was made to
    Philadelphia Hand Center for $214.50. 
    Id. at 3
    6. These payments were sent
    directly to Philadelphia Hand Center. 
    Id. at 3
    7. All checks were cashed. 
    Id. at 3
    8.
    Subsequent to these payments, Appellant filed for additional loss
    of earnings and medical expenses but they were not paid out because red flags
    on Appellant's claims were starting to pop up. 
    Id. at 3
    6 - 37. Appellant's claim
    was then sent to a secondary reviewer, who put a halt on Appellant's claim. 
    Id. at 3
    7.
    Next to testify at trial was William Anspach, who works for the
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in the Victims Compensation Program. 
    Id. at 49.
    He is a financial recovery specialist and he also serves as a compliance
    reviewer for the program. 
    Id. In this
    capacity he reviews all work done by any of
    his peers for compliance assurance. 
    Id. at 49
    - 50. In particular, Mr. Anspach
    came to review Appellant's claim in January of 2013. 
    Id. at 50.
    Appellant's claim
    came to his attention as a matter of a second review by a second review
    request, after monies were already paid out and Appellant was looking to be
    paid again on additional expenses submitted by him. 
    Id. at 51,
    52. According to
    Mr. Anspach there were red flags that drew his attention to Appellant's claim.
    
    Id. at 52.
    For example, Mr. Anspach testified that the initial employer
    verification documentation was not in the standard format that the policies and
    procedures of his agency require. 
    Id. at 52.
    He also noticed that there had been
    5
    an item that seemed to have been whited out and information written on top of
    that as it related to the earning that Appellant earned for the last full pay
    period before the date of the crime. 
    Id. at 54
    - 5 5. In addition, the paystubs
    attached to Appellant's record seemed out of the ordinary. 
    Id. at 55.
    They did
    not seem consistent with what he normally sees, namely there was no company
    leger and there was only an employer's name and no federal employer
    identification number. 
    Id. at 56.
    Mr. Anspach tried to locate the employer and
    contact number for Muscle Therapy by doing an internet search. 
    Id. at 57,
    59.
    He did not turn up anything and it seemed to be a suspicious claim. 
    Id. at 59.
    After his findings. Mr. Anspach alerted the claims specialist supervisor. 
    Id. at 59
    - 60. After that meeting, if the supervisor agreed with Mr. Anspach's
    determination the claim would then be forwarded to the legal department for
    review. 
    Id. at 60.
    The Commonwealth next called Denise White to testify at trial. Ms.
    White works in the Attorney General's Office investigating welfare fraud. 
    Id. at 62.
    Ms. White testified that Appellant received public assistance, namely food
    stamps. 
    Id. at 64,
    65. Records indicated that food stamps were issued to
    Appellant going back August of 2011 at his address at 2437 West Allegheny
    Avenue, Philadelphia, PA. 
    Id. at 65,
    66. He received $200.00 a month in benefits
    from August of 2011 until his file was closed in June of 2013. 
    Id. at 67.
    In
    applying for food stamps, an applicant must report their income since the.
    benefit is income based. 
    Id. at 68
    - 69. In addition, as part of the application
    process, an applicant is informed that if there are any changes during the
    6
    course of receiving the food stamp benefit that applicant must report that
    income change. 
    Id. at 69.
    None of the records reflect that Appellant ever
    reported any income as a massage therapist at any time between August 2011
    and June of 2013, whether at Muscle Therapy or at Brown Muscle Therapy. 
    Id. at 70,
    71. In fact, Appellant never reported any income at all. 
    Id. at 70.
    Ms.
    White also told this Court that if Appellant received money from the Victim's
    Compensation Assistance Program, he would have been required to report that
    as well as it would have to be accounted for in determining benefits. 
    Id. at 71
    -
    72. Appellant never reported the income he received from the Victim's
    Compensation Assistance Program. 
    Id. at 72.
    The third witness to testify on behalf of the Commonwealth was
    Jennifer Kuruc, director of operations at the Philadelphia Hand Center. 
    Id. at 76
    - 77. As part of Ms. Kuruc's responsibilities, she confirmed benefits for patients
    of the practice. 
    Id. at 78.
    Appellants' first appointment with the medical
    practice was on September 27, 2012. 
    Id. at 78.
    Ms. Kuruc identified Exhibit "C-
    12" as a portion of Appellant's registration information from the medical
    practice's computerized system. 
    Id. at 79.
    On the registration form Appellant
    provided his address as 2437 West Allegheny Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19132.
    
    Id. at 80.
    He also indicated that he was self-employed and his company was
    Brown's Muscle Therapy. 
    Id. Appellant listed
    his home address as his business
    address, not 1616 Walnut Street. 
    Id. Appellant also
    listed his cell phone number
    as his business phone number. 
    Id. at 81.
    Although the Victim's Compensation
    Assistance Program paid for some of the medical services provided by
    7
    Philadelphia Hand Center, there remained an outstanding balance of $675.00.
    
    Id. at 85.
    Special Agent Daniel Block was the next to testify at the non-jury
    trial. Agent Block stated that he worked for the Pennsylvania Office of the
    Attorney General and that he has done so since October 1, 2012. 
    Id. at 9
    2.
    Agent Block was assigned to Appellant's case after it was referred to him by the
    Pennsylvania Office of General Counsel. 
    Id. It was
    due to suspicions over his
    application to the Victim's Compensation Assistance Program that it was
    referred to the agent. 
    Id. at 9
    3. Agent Block testified that Appellant had
    purported himself to be the victim of an assault which took place on September
    5, 2012. 
    Id. at 9
    3. Agent Block had the application with the employer
    verification and the pay stubs, et cetera. 
    Id. Agent Block
    attempted to locate
    Appellant's employer as listed on the application. 
    Id. at 9
    3 - 94. First the agent
    looked online for any record or reference to the company, which he found
    nothing. 
    Id. at 9
    4. Next, Agent Block did a labor industry check of the company
    and taxes paid to the state referenced to the company, which he found none. 
    Id. Then he
    drove to 1616 Walnut Street in Philadelphia and looked in the
    building's directory and found nothing there referencing Muscle Therapy or
    Brown's Muscle Therapy. 
    Id. Agent Block
    did speak to Appellant and made a consensual
    recording the conversation. 
    Id. at 9
    6. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced a
    copy of the recording as Exhibit "C-14" and played it in it's entirely. 
    Id. at 9
    9.
    8
    Agent Block was able to secure an arrest warrant for Appellant. 
    Id. at 100.
    He went to the 2437 West Allegheny address to arrest Appellant, and
    when the agent got there Appellant attempted to flee outside his bedroom
    window. 
    Id. at 101
    - 102.
    Finally, the Commonwealth and defense counsel stipulated that if
    u1   Alex Breitmayer, the leasing agent for 1616 Walnut Street, was called to testify
    he would confirm and testify that between April 2012 and January I, 2013,
    there were no tenants at his property under the name of Muscle Therapy or
    Brown Muscle Therapy. 
    Id. at 109.
    The defense presented no witnesses.
    At the -conclusion of the trial, this Court found Appellant guilty of
    the aforementioned charges. On January 16, 2015, Appellant was sentenced.
    ISSUES
    I.     Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant's conviction of
    theft by deception in regard to loss earnings.
    II.    Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant's conviction of
    theft by deception in regard to medical expenses.
    III.   Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant's conviction of
    false statements.
    IV.   Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of tampering
    with public records.
    V.     Whether Appellant's convictions for tampering with public records and
    forgery do not violate the "specific/general rule".
    VI.    Whether Appellant's theft by deception. relating to medical expenses
    conviction and his false statements conviction were improperly graded.
    9
    DISCUSSION
    I.    The evidence was sufficient to support Appellant's conviction of theft by
    deception in regard to loss earnings.
    First in Appellant's Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on
    Appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to show as a matter of
    law that he was guilty of theft by deception in relation to lost earnings, because
    the evidence presented by the Commonwealth failed to show beyond a
    reasonable doubt that Appellant misrepresented his employment status.
    Our Superior Court has set forth the following standard of review
    when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
    the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence
    admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the
    verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable
    the fact-finder to find every element of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test,
    we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our
    judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that
    the facts and circumstances established by the
    Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
    innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt
    may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence
    is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
    probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
    circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its
    burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
    evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the
    entire record must be evaluated and all evidence
    actually received must be considered. Finally,the
    finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of
    witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is
    free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Nypaver, 
    69 A.3d 708
    , 714 - 715 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting
    10
    Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    886 A.2d 689
    , 704 (Pa.Super. 2005)).
    Section 3922(a)(l) of the Crimes Code is defined as follows:
    § 3922. Theft by deception
    (a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of theft if he
    intentionally obtains or withholds property of another
    by deception. A person deceives if he intentionally:
    (1)creates or reinforces a false impression, including
    false impressions as to law, value, intention or other
    state of mind; but deception as to a person's intention
    to perform a promise shall not be inferred from the
    fact alone that he did not subsequently perform the
    promise
    18 Pa.CS.A. § 3922.
    In this case, the evidence at trial established that Appellant lied
    about his employment status on his VCAP application, submitting suspicious
    paystubs and an employer verification that also seemed suspicious. It was
    testified to that the paystubs sent up red flags because there was no employer
    ID number, no employee identification number and no social security number.
    In addition, the employer letter as well as the employer verification form also
    sent up red flags. The employer letter was not on letterhead, it was signed by
    "Management" and the two phone numbers listed on the letter as belonging to
    the purported employer were wrong numbers. Additionally, it is noteworthy
    that the pay stubs, the employer letter and employer verification form came
    from Appellant's fax and not from the purported employer. Further, all
    attempts to verify the existence of Muscle Therapy could not be verified by Ms.
    Clouser, Mr. Anspach or Agent Block despite attempts to call the phone
    11
    numbers listed on the employer letter and the employer verification form,
    going to the listed address for the employer at 1616 Walnut Street, a stipulation
    by the leasing agent of 1616 Walnut Street that there was never a company
    called Muscle Therapy in that building during the relevant time periods and
    internet searches of various kinds by both Mr. Anspach and Agent Block.
    U1   Moreover, the employment information he submitted on his VCAP application
    was different than the information he submitted on bis Philadelphia Hand
    Company patient intake form. Based upon this circumstantial evidence, this
    Court as the fact-finder concluded that Appellant lied about his employment
    status on the VCAP forms and submitted fraudulent paperwork to support his
    claim for lost wages. Therefore, the amount that VCAP paid out to Appellant for
    these loss wages of $5,395 was the result of his deceptive conduct and was
    properly found guilty.
    II.   The evidence was sufficient to support Appellant's conviction of theft by
    deception in regard to medical expenses.
    Next, Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient as a
    matter of law to find him guilty of theft by deception in relation to medical
    expenses because any alleged deception had no bearing upon any payments
    made by VCAP for medical expenses.
    Here, Appellant was properly convicted of theft by deception as it
    relates to the money paid out to Philadelphia Hand Company. At trial Ms.
    Clouser testified that at the time Appellant filed his claim with VCAP, he was
    required to acknowledge the consequence of providing fraudulent information
    12
    during the application process (Trial by Judge 6/30/14 27 - 28). Appellant
    signed a signature page acknowledging that if fraudulent employer information
    was provided, he would not be eligible to receive loss wages. 
    Id. at 28.
    In
    addition, once fraud is committed, Appellant would be ineligible to receive any
    compensation. 
    Id. at 29.
    Because Appellant provided the fraudulent employer
    information, he was not eligible to receive the medical expenses paid to
    Philadelphia Hand Company. His compensation for medical expenses were a
    result of his fraudulent conduct.
    III.   The evidence was sufficient to support Appellant's conviction of false
    statements.
    Appellant's third issue on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the
    evidence to convict him of false statements in receiving food stamps where this
    Court concluded that the alleged employment was determined to be non-
    existent. This created conflicting fact determinations that are irreconcilable.
    To establish a conviction for false statements, the following must
    be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
    § 481. False statements; investigations; penalty
    (a) Any person who, either prior to, or at the time of, or
    subsequent to the application for assistance, by means
    of a wilfully false statement or misrepresentation, or
    by impersonation or by wilfully failing to disclose a
    material fact regarding eligibility or other fraudulent
    means, secures, or attempts to secure, or aids or abets
    or attempts to aid or abet any person in securing
    assistance, or Federal food stamps, commits a crime
    which shall be graded as provided in subsection (b).
    62 P.S. § 481(a).
    13
    VJ
    n
    P)
    ~                 In this case, there was no determination that Appellant's
    Ql
    employment was non-existent as counsel asserts. Rather, it was determined
    that Appellant lied in the VCAP application. Whether he did this to either   (1)
    overstate his employment status in order to receive a larger lost wages
    compensation pay out, or (2) he might have been unemployed. Either way, this
    Court did not have to make that determination in order to determine that what
    Appellant did submit to VCAP in support of his lost wages claim was
    fraudulent as detailed in Issue I, set forth above.
    Additionally, from Ms. White's testimony, this Court determined
    that Appellant failed to disclose the VCAP payments he did receive. Such
    disclosure would have been used to determine his eligibility for public
    assistance and would have reduced his $200.00 monthly payment. Appellant
    failed to disclose this material fact that would have impacted his eligibility in
    the program ..
    IV.   The evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of tampering with public
    records.
    Fourth, Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient as a
    matter of law to convict him tampering with public records because the
    evidence was based purely upon opinions of lay witnesses that the record was
    changed.
    To find a defendant guilty of tampering with public records under
    18 Pa.CS.A. 491l(a)(2), the following must be proven:
    14
    (a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if
    he:                                     ·
    (1) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration
    of, any record, document or thing belonging to, or
    received or kept by, the government for information or
    record, or required by law to be kept by others for
    information of the government;
    (2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or
    thing knowing it to be false, and with intent that it be
    taken as a genuine part of information or records
    referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection; or
    In this case, Appellant presented falsified documents in his VCAP
    application. Appellant presented fraudulent pay stubs, a fraudulent employer
    letter and a fraudulent employer verification form as discussed thoroughly in
    Issue I set forth earlier in this Opinion. The evidence demonstrated that he
    knowingly did so in order to receive compensation for lost wages that he was
    not otherwise entitled to.
    V.    Appellant's convictions for tampering with public records and forgery do
    not violate the "specific/general rule".
    Fifth, Appellant contends that this Court erred in finding him
    guilty of both tampering with public records and forgery because the finding of
    guilt in special provisions precludes prosecution of the correlating general
    provision of the penal code.
    The "specific/general rule" prohibits prosecution under the general
    provisions of the penal code when there are applicable special provisions
    available. Commonwealth v. Tisdale, 
    100 A.3d 216
    , 218 (Pa.Super. 2014). (citing
    15
    Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    29 A.2d 793
    , 796-97 (Pa. 1943)). "This same policy
    remains in force nearly sixty years later and continues to prevent the
    Commonwealth for pursuing general criminal charges against an individual
    whose conduct was intended to be punished by a 'specific penal provision' that
    constitutes the exclusive legal authority for prosecution of the acts charged."
    Commonwealth v. Leber, 
    802 A.2d 648
    , 650 (Pa.Super. 2002).
    In this case, the crime of tampering with public records or
    information and the crime of forgery are intended to punish different behavior,
    and this is not a case where one crime is general and the other one is specific to
    which the prohibition the specific/general rule prohibition precludes the
    Commonwealth from pursuing both charges!
    In this case, Appellant was found guilty of tampering with public
    records under 18 Pa.CS.A. §491 l(a)(2) and of forgery under 18 Pa.CS.A.
    §4101(a)(2).Both provisions are set forth below.
    § 4911. Tampering with public records or
    information
    (a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if
    he:
    (1) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration
    of, any record, document or thing belonging to, or
    received or kept by, the government for information or
    record, or required by law to be kept by others for
    information of the government;
    (2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or
    thing knowing it to be false, and with intent that it be
    taken as a genuine part of information or records
    referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection; or
    16
    18 Pa.CS.A. §4911.
    § 4101. Forgery
    (a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of forgery if,
    with intent to defraud or injure anyone, or with
    knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud or injury to be
    perpetrated by anyone, the actor:
    (1) alters any writing of another without his authority;
    (2) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues or
    transfers any Wliting so that it purports to be the act
    of another who did not authorize that act, or to have
    been executed at a time or place or in a numbered
    sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a
    copy of an original when no such original existed; or
    18 Pa.CS.A.§ 4101.
    The plain language of the tampering with public records as defined
    by subsection (a)(2) punishes the making, presenting or using a falsified record,
    meant to be taken as true; whereas forgery under subsection (a)(2) punishes the
    making, completing, executing, authenticating, issuing or transferring a writing
    with the intent to defraud or injure anyone. This plain language shows that each
    crime is meant to punish distinct behavior. Under tamping with public records
    there is no requirement that the criminal behavior was intended to injure
    anyone; rather, just the act of knowingly falsifying public records is a crime.
    The element of intent to injury is not necessary.
    In the alternative, this Court notes that Section 9303, 42 Pa.CS.A.,
    allows for, "[n]Notwithstanding the provisions of 1 Pa.CS. § 1933 (relating to
    particular controls general) or any other statute to the contrary, where the same
    17
    conduct of a defendant violates more than one criminal statute, the defendant
    may be prosecuted under all available statutory criminal provisions without
    regard to the generality or specificity of the statutes." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9303; see
    also, In re N.W. 
    6 A.3d 1020
    , 1026 (Pa.Super. 2010).
    VI.   Appellant's theft by deception. relating to medical expenses conviction
    and his false statements conviction were improperly graded.
    In Appellant's sixth and seventh issues on appeal, he asserts that
    his conviction for theft by deception, relating to medical expenses was
    improperly graded as a third degree felony when the alleged cost of services
    did not exceed $2,000.00 and that this Court erred in grading the fraud or false
    statements in receiving food stamps/public assistance as a first degree felony
    when the alleged value of the assistance did not exceed $3,000.
    Although this Court notes that Appellant was not sentenced for his
    welfare fraud conviction as a first degree felony, but rather as a felony of the
    third degree. See, Sentencing Guidelines Sheet and (Sentencing 1/16/15 pp. 3,
    21); grading is admittedly improper on both of these convictions.
    In regard to Appellant's theft by deception, relating to medical
    expenses conviction, he was found guilty of theft in the amount of $1,462.00.
    The theft charge, Count II, was graded as a third degree felony in the bill of
    information, despite that the amount of the theft was listed as $1,462.00. In
    addition, this theft conviction was graded in the sentencing guidelines sheet as
    a third degree felony. Appellant was ultimately sentenced to a term of 6 to 23
    months' imprisonment, followed by a three year term of probation. (Sentencing
    18
    1/16/15 p. 20). This conviction should have been graded as a first degree
    misdemeanor. See, 204 Pa. Code §303.15.
    In regard to Appellant's conviction for welfare fraud, it was graded
    as a third degree felony in Count IV of the bills of information and it was also
    set forth as a third degree felony in the sentencing guidelines sheet. There was
    Yt   no finding as to the dollar amount regarding the fraud. However, the evidence
    adduced at trial showed that the amount was not equal to or more than
    $3,000.00 so as to make this a third degree felony. Rather the evidence adduced
    at trial :•howeJ. the fraud was a first degree misdemeanor, i.e., between
    $1,500.00 to $2,999.00.
    Our Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Spruill, 
    80 A.3d 453
    (Pa. 2013)~ held that an error in grading an offense concerns the
    underlying conviction rather than the legality of the sentence, and is therefore
    subject to waiver. In our case, the admitted errors in grading go to the
    conviction and not to the legality of sentence. Therefore, Appellant should have
    objected to this Court's consideration of that offense or to the conviction
    immediately following this Court's guilty verdict. Commonwealth v. Shamsud-
    Din, 
    995 A.2d 1224
    (holding that an appellant failed to preserve for appellate
    review a claim that the trial court erred by convicting her of third-degree
    misdemeanor assault where appellant did not timely object to the trial court's
    consideration of that offense or to conviction immediately following the court's
    guilty verdict.); see also, Commonwealth v. Spruill, 
    105 A.3d 802
    (Pa.Super.,July
    28, 2014) (memorandum opinion).
    19
    CONCLUSION
    Based on the forgoing analysis, the judgment of sentence entered
    on January 16, 2015, should be affirmed.
    BY THE COURT:
    WIWAM R. CARPEN        J.
    COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    MONTGOMERY COUNTY
    PENNSYLVANIA
    3STH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    Copies sent on May 8, 2015
    By Interoffice Mail to:
    Court Administration
    By First Class Mail to:
    Michael Doyle, Esquire
    20