Com. v. Parker, M. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S13019-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    MARIO COURTLIN PARKER
    Appellant                  No. 821 WDA 2015
    Appeal from the PCRA Order April 22, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0007624-2009
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
    DISSENTING STATEMENT BY FITZGERALD, J.:             FILED AUGUST 10, 2016
    I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to deny Appellant’s
    petition for remand for an evidentiary hearing.       See Majority Mem. at 5.
    The majority concludes that Appellant has not asserted or demonstrated
    “that Freeman’s recantation could not have been obtained prior to trial
    through reasonable diligence” and “he has not shown that it would compel a
    different result[.]” Id. at 5; see id. at 4 (“Appellant’s petition for remand
    does not aver that he could not have obtained Freeman’s recantation at or
    prior to the conclusion of trial through reasonable diligence”).      However,
    Appellant specifically contends Freeman’s recantation meets the criteria for
    an after-discovered evidence claim, including the requirement that the
    evidence “could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through the
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S13019-16
    exercise of reasonable diligence[.]” Appellant’s Pet. for Remand, 3/27/16, at
    6 (citation omitted). Moreover in his affidavit, Freeman avers, inter alia, the
    following:
    5.        When I was interviewed by the police, I did not
    feel that I was able to disagree with them. I had been
    held in a room for many hours, overnight, and felt
    pressured by the detectives to agree with them that
    [Appellant] was one of the shooters. I wanted to go home,
    so I told them what I felt they wanted to hear. Aside from
    the interview on May 1, 2009, I was never interviewed
    again by the police or the District Attorney’s Office.
    6.        Before I testified in court, I told the police that I
    didn’t think I had identified the right person. The police
    told me that I should just say what I had said to them
    before, that they had the right guy. I had never testified in
    court before. I did not have an attorney to advise me. I
    was scared and nervous.
    7.      [Appellant’s] trial attorney never contacted me
    before his trial. The first time I spoke to anyone other
    than the police about [Appellant’s] case was in April of
    2015, when an investigator for [Appellant] contacted me.
    I was not ready to talk to anyone at that time, so I
    told him that what I said at trial was the truth.
    8.        The first time I told anyone involved in
    [Appellant’s] case that I identified the wrong person was
    on February 11, 2016, when I met with [Appellant’s]
    attorney . . . at her office. Although I do not look forward
    to having to testify again, an experience that was
    extremely stressful to me, a man is serving two life
    sentence for crimes he did not commit, and the right thing
    to do is to come forward with the truth.
    Id. at Ex. A (Affidavit of D’Andre Freeman), at 1-2 (emphasis added).
    Accordingly, Appellant sufficiently contended in his petition that he
    could not have obtained Freeman’s recantation through the exercise of due
    -2-
    J-S13019-16
    diligence at or prior to trial, and Freeman reiterated he was unwilling to
    proffer his recantation as of April 2015. See id. at 6; id. at Ex. A at 1-2;
    see also Commonwealth v. Medina, 
    92 A.3d 1210
    , 1217-18 (Pa. Super.
    2014) (en banc) (discussing recantation evidence as “after-discovered
    evidence” and noting it was “highly unlikely” defense counsel could elicit
    recantation   testimony    on   cross-examination      at   the   time    of   trial).
    Furthermore, as the majority acknowledges, the other witness who identified
    Appellant prior to trial did not identify him as the shooter at the time of trial.
    Majority Mem. at 4-5.
    Based   on   the    foregoing,   I   conclude   Appellant   has    sufficiently
    established his right to an evidentiary hearing on his claim based on
    Freeman’s recantation, and I would remand to the PCRA court. Therefore, I
    respectfully dissent.
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 821 WDA 2015

Filed Date: 8/10/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024