Com. v. Ingram, R. ( 2015 )


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  • J-A25024-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    RONALD INGRAM
    Appellant                 No. 3433 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 27, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0004131-2013
    BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.:                          FILED DECEMBER 01, 2015
    Appellant, Ronald Ingram, appeals from the October 27, 2014
    aggregate judgment of sentence of 81 to 162 months’ incarceration,
    imposed following his conviction by a jury of possession of a controlled
    substance with intent to deliver (PWID) and tampering with evidence.1 After
    careful review, we affirm.
    The trial court summarized the factual background of this case as
    follows.
    Appellant was arrested on April 30, 2013 at
    approximately 1:00 a.m. as a result of a vehicle stop
    conducted by two Pennsylvania State Police Officers
    in a marked patrol vehicle.     The Troopers were
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4910(1), respectively.
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    driving northbound on I-95 in the vicinity of Upper
    Chichester, Delaware County, Pennsylvania at mile
    marker two.         Trooper Richardson observed a
    Chevrolet Cruze vehicle in the center lane with a
    right taillight that was cracked and the vehicle was
    clocked traveling approximately 65 mph in a 55 mph
    zone.      [] Appellant, the sole occupant of the
    speeding vehicle, stopped his vehicle at the exit
    ramp for Route 452. Trooper Richardson testified
    that he asked [] Appellant to step out of his vehicle
    and [Appellant] reached for a duffel bag on the front
    passenger-side seat and retrieved a vial.      As []
    Appellant exited the vehicle, he pulled out the vial
    and smashed it on the ground. The two Troopers
    could smell [phencyclidine,] PCP. [] Appellant was
    arrested and placed in handcuffs.
    Trial Court Opinion, 1/14/15, at 1-2.
    Following his arrest, Appellant was charged with numerous offenses
    including those mentioned above.2              Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial
    motion including a motion to suppress statements and physical evidence. A
    hearing on Appellant’s motion was held on January 10, 2014, at which
    Trooper Richardson was the only witness.            On January 27, 2014, the trial
    court issued an order, including its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
    which, inter alia, denied Appellant’s motion to suppress physical evidence.
    ____________________________________________
    2
    In addition to PWID and tampering with evidence, Appellant was charged
    with two counts each of aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3);
    simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1); recklessly endangering another
    person, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705; and one count each of intentional possession
    of a controlled substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16); and possession of drug
    paraphernalia, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32). Appellant was also cited with two
    summary traffic offenses for a defective taillight, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(b);
    and speeding, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3362(a). All these additional charges were
    either dismissed by the trial court or withdrawn by the Commonwealth prior
    to trial.
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    The matter proceeded to a jury trial, commencing on September 30,
    2014. On October 2, 2014, the jury returned a verdict of guilty for PWID
    and tampering with evidence.              On October 27, 2014, the trial court
    sentenced Appellant to a term of incarceration of six to 12 years on the
    PWID count and a consecutive term of incarceration of nine to 18 months on
    the tampering with evidence count.             Appellant did not file a post-sentence
    motion. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on November 23, 2014.3
    On appeal appellant raises a single question for our consideration.
    Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s
    pretrial motion to suppress, where an officer
    conducted an investigative detention, by ordering
    Appellant to exit his vehicle, when the officer did not
    have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was
    afoot?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    When reviewing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression
    motion, we observe the following principles.
    [An appellate court’s] standard of review in
    addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression
    motion is limited to determining whether the
    suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
    the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
    from those facts are correct.           Because the
    Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression
    court, we may consider only the evidence of the
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 1925. The trial court’s 1925(a) opinion incorporates by
    reference its January 27, 2014 order, findings and conclusions. Trial Court
    Opinion, 1/14/15, at 3.
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    Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the
    defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
    context of the record as a whole.          Where the
    suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
    the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]
    findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
    conclusions are erroneous. Where … the appeal of
    the determination of the suppression court turns on
    allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s
    legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate
    court, whose duty it is to determine if the
    suppression court properly applied the law to the
    facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts
    below are subject to [] plenary review.
    Commonwealth v. Garibay, 
    106 A.3d 136
    , 138-139 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en
    banc), appeal denied, --- A.3d ---, 
    2015 WL 5972499
     (Pa. 2015). Our scope
    of review is limited to the suppression hearing record. In re L.J., 
    79 A.3d 1073
    , 1080 (Pa. 2013).
    In evaluating the level of interaction [between a
    police officer and a defendant], courts conduct an
    objective examination of the totality of the
    surrounding circumstances. We are bound by the
    suppression court’s factual findings, if supported by
    the record; however, the question presented—
    whether a seizure occurred—is a pure question of
    law subject to plenary review.
    Commonwealth v. Lyles, 
    97 A.3d 298
    , 302 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).
    Based on the testimony received during the suppression motion
    hearing, the trial court summarized its findings of fact concerning the
    circumstances as they developed during the subject traffic stop.      After
    Appellant pulled over, as recited above, the following occurred.
    [Trooper Richardson] approached [Appellant’s]
    vehicle from the passenger side, as was his general
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    practice. He asked [Appellant], who was the sole
    occupant of the vehicle, for his driver’s license,
    registration and insurance information. [Appellant]
    produced a New York driver’s license, and a rental
    agreement for the vehicle. … The Trooper then
    explained to [Appellant] why he stopped him and
    told him he was going to give him a warning.
    As the Trooper approached the car he realized that
    the rear light was stuck in the “on” position and was
    not cracked as he had originally thought. Trooper
    Wiley was also outside the police vehicle. When
    Trooper Richardson initially approached the vehicle,
    he testified that he smelled some type of chemical
    odor but he was not sure what it was.
    Once Trooper Richardson received [Appellant’s]
    license, he used his patrol vehicle’s computer and
    ran a check of [Appellant] through NCIC.       The
    Trooper learned that [Appellant’s] name was on the
    rental car agreement.       The NCIC check also
    produced an extensive rap sheet for [Appellant].
    [Appellant] had been convicted of possession of a
    firearm and robbery and other crimes from New
    Jersey, Delaware, Texas and Maryland.
    Trooper Richardson determined that [Appellant’s]
    vehicle was rented in Philadelphia, however
    [Appellant] told the Officer that he had rented the
    vehicle in New Jersey and was headed to New Jersey
    to return the vehicle.
    Trooper Richardson had decided to give [Appellant] a
    warning for the two traffic violations but was unable
    to print the warning because the printer in his
    vehicle was not working. The Trooper exited the
    patrol vehicle and approached the passenger-side of
    [Appellant’s] vehicle and asked him to step out of
    the car.     Trooper Richardson wanted to show
    [Appellant] the broken tail light. When the Officer
    asked [Appellant] to step out, [Appellant] grabbed
    the gear shift knob and the ignition keys, then
    reached for a duffle bag on the front passenger-side
    seat and retrieved a vial.        Trooper Richardson
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    backed up to the rear of the vehicle and drew his
    firearm. [Appellant] put both of his hands in his
    pockets. As [Appellant] reached into the duffel bag,
    the Trooper was concerned that he had a weapon.
    As [Appellant] exited the vehicle, he pulled out the
    vial and smashed it on the ground.           Trooper
    Richardson could smell PCP.
    Trial Court Order and Findings, 1/27/14, at 2-3.
    From these findings, the trial court determined that the traffic stop
    was not completed at the time Trooper Richardson asked Appellant to step
    out of the vehicle. Trial Court Order and Findings, 1/27/14, at 6. The trial
    court found that Trooper Richardson merely asked Appellant to exit the
    vehicle in order to show him the defective taillight before issuing the warning
    and terminating the stop.4        
    Id.
       The trial court determined that the police
    officers did not need reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to request an
    occupant to exit a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop. Id. at 5.
    “As a matter of precaution, a police officer is entitled to ask occupants
    of a vehicle to step from the vehicle during a traffic stop.” Commonwealth
    v. Van Winkle, 
    880 A.2d 1280
    , 1285 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted),
    appeal denied, 
    898 A.2d 1071
     (Pa. 2006). “[F]ollowing a lawful traffic stop,
    an officer may order both the driver and passengers of a vehicle to exit the
    vehicle until the traffic stop is completed, even absent a reasonable
    ____________________________________________
    4
    The trial court also concluded that the police officers would have had
    reasonable belief that Appellant might be armed, but that the officer’s
    request was not specifically for safety reasons.    Trial Court Order and
    Findings, 1/27/14, at 7.
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    suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”   Commonwealth v. Pratt, 
    930 A.2d 561
    , 564, (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 
    946 A.2d 686
     (Pa. 2008).
    Once the primary traffic stop has concluded,
    however, the officer’s authority to order either driver
    or occupant from the car is extinguished. Thus, if
    subsequently the officer directs or requests the
    occupants to exit the vehicle, his show of authority
    may constitute an investigatory detention subject to
    a renewed showing of reasonable suspicion.
    Commonwealth v. Reppert, 
    814 A.2d 1196
    , 1202, (Pa. Super. 2002)
    (citations omitted).
    Appellant concedes the validity of the initial traffic stop for speeding
    and taillight infractions.   Appellant’s Brief at 11.    Appellant attempts to
    distinguish this precedent, noting, “Appellant was left in the vehicle for the
    entire investigation. Officer safety cannot be used to justify the decision to
    ask Appellant out of the vehicle in the present case.” Id. at 13. Additionally
    Appellant asserts “[t]he stated reason for asking Appellant to exit the
    vehicle, to show him the malfunctioning taillight is illogical given the fact
    that the vehicle was a rental car.” Id. at 13. Finally, Appellant argues that
    the purpose of the traffic stop was essentially complete at the time the
    police officer directed him to exit the vehicle, and that the police officers had
    excessively prolonged the traffic stop with the subjective intent to further
    investigate Appellant without any reasonable suspicion to do so. Id. at 13-
    14, citing Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct 1609, 1612 (2015)
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    (holding, “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for
    which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against
    unreasonable seizures”). We disagree with Appellant’s arguments.
    The fact that Appellant had not been asked to exit the vehicle earlier,
    does not negate any safety concern the officers acquired during the stop
    upon learning of Appellant’s extensive criminal record. As the cases make
    clear, no additional reasonable suspicion is required to justify a police
    officer’s request for an occupant to exit a vehicle during a valid traffic stop.
    See Van Winkle, 
    supra.
     The timing of that request is irrelevant.
    In any event, the trial court found that the purpose of Officer
    Richardson’s request was to show him the defective taillight.       Trial Court
    Order and Findings, 1/27/14, at 6.      Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, we
    conclude this stated purpose is not “illogical” because the car was a rental.
    It is prudent for any driver to be aware of defects with the vehicle he or she
    is driving so they can operate it more safely. Knowledge of a malfunctioning
    light will allow a driver to be aware of what surrounding traffic perceives that
    may affect how they react to his driving.        That the car is a rental is
    inapposite to these legitimate concerns.
    We further conclude that Appellant’s reliance on Rodriguez is
    misplaced. In Rodriguez, the police had stopped the defendant for a traffic
    violation, completed the attendant document and record checks, and issued
    a written warning. Rodriguez, supra at 1613. Thereafter, police continued
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    to detain Appellant while they walked a drug-sniffing dog around the vehicle.
    Id.   The United States Supreme Court held the prolongation of the traffic
    stop without reasonable suspicion beyond that required to effect the purpose
    of the stop was constitutionally infirm.   Id. at 1616. Instantly, the traffic
    stop had not been completed and the request to exit the vehicle was not an
    unrelated action that “prolonged” the purpose of the stop.      Rather it was
    integral to the purpose of the stop to show Appellant the defective light.
    Because this is not a case of improperly extending a traffic stop, Rodriguez
    does not apply.
    Appellant characterizes the police officers’ request as a supposed
    “pretext for an ulterior motive” to investigate for drugs and weapons.
    Appellant’s Brief at 12. That the police officers had multiple concerns, does
    not negate the legitimacy of their request as found by the trial court. We
    have noted that where a legitimate objective basis for police action exists,
    “an officer’s uncommunicated subjective intent to act illegally is irrelevant.”
    Commonwealth v. Bennett, 
    827 A.2d 469
    , 480 (Pa. Super. 2003)
    (citations omitted).
    Based on our review of the record, we conclude the trial court’s
    findings are supported by the testimony of Officer Richardson.            See
    Garibay, supra. We further conclude that the trial court’s legal conclusions
    that Officer Richardson acted within the purpose of the traffic stop when
    requesting Appellant to alight the vehicle and that additional reasonable
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    suspicion need not be shown to justify the request are correct.5 Therefore,
    the trial court correctly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress physical
    evidence in this case.          Accordingly, we affirm the October 27, 2014
    judgment of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judge Donohue joins the memorandum.
    Justice Fitzgerald concurs in the result.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/1/2015
    ____________________________________________
    5
    Given the legitimacy of the request to exit the vehicle, Appellant does not
    dispute that his subsequent actions in reaching for the duffle bag, retrieving
    a vial, and smashing the vial on the pavement provided probable cause to
    arrest.
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