Com. v. Cuadro, J. ( 2016 )


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  • J. S38009/16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :            PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                     :
    :
    JAIME CUADRO,                               :         No. 2452 EDA 2015
    :
    Appellant         :
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, July 21, 2015,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0010826-2014
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON AND JENKINS, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:                   FILED AUGUST 12, 2016
    Jaime Cuadro appeals the judgment of sentence entered in the Court
    of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County following his conviction in a waiver
    trial of one count of aggravated assault and two counts each of simple
    assault and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”).1           The trial
    court sentenced appellant to serve 11½-23 months’ imprisonment on the
    aggravated assault count. The trial court imposed no further penalty on the
    remaining counts. We affirm.
    The trial court set forth the following:
    On May 17, 2014, at approximately 9:40 a.m.
    on the 3900 block of L Street, [complainant] testified
    that he backed up his Ford Explorer from an
    alleyway partially onto the street when [appellant]
    blocked his car by driving behind [c]omplainant’s
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a), 2701(a), 2705, respectively.
    J. S38009/16
    Ford Explorer. Complainant exited his car and made
    a waving hand motion for [appellant] to back up his
    car. [Appellant] screamed at [c]omplainant, exited
    his car, and angrily approached him. Complainant
    grabbed a tire iron from a tool box in his car as
    [appellant] was approaching and placed it down
    when [appellant] stopped.        Complainant did not
    move or act aggressively while he held onto the tire
    iron. Complainant told [appellant] to calm down as
    [appellant] screamed and angrily approached.
    [Appellant] proceeded to punch [c]omplainant on the
    nose and [c]omplainant fell to the ground.
    [Appellant] got on top of him and punched him five
    to six more times, causing him to lose consciousness
    for five to ten seconds. Complainant never punched
    [appellant] back and was only trying to block off
    [appellant]’s punches. When [c]omplainant opened
    his eyes, he saw his mother [] come in between
    them, pushing [appellant] off of him. [Appellant]
    turned around and choked [complainant’s mother]
    who is a fragile 58 years old [sic] woman whom had
    undergone multiple prior surgeries. At the same
    time, [c]omplainant’s sister, who was a passenger of
    the Ford Explorer, exited the car to help but
    [appellant] shoved her aside.               Complainant
    eventually regained his footing and pulled out his
    licensed firearm from his hip, warding [appellant] off
    his mother.        The police later arrived and
    [c]omplainant went to the hospital for six hours to
    treat a broken nose, fractured jaw, a hole inside his
    mouth, and an injury which required three stitches.
    As a result of this incident, [c]omplainant sustained
    permanent injuries, including a scar on his face, a
    bent nose, and breathing difficulties. Complainant
    testified that [complainant’s mother] suffered neck
    pain after this incident.      Throughout the entire
    encounter, [c]omplainant did not strike [appellant]
    or [appellant]’s son with the tire iron or gun.
    [Appellant]’s son then testified.  [The son]
    stated that on the day in question, [appellant] was
    driving to their cousin’s house when they
    encountered [c]omplainant’s car blocking the
    alleyway on L Street.         After they waved
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    [c]omplainant to move his car, the [c]omplainant
    quickly backed up very close to their car.
    [Appellant] backed up his car in response, but
    [c]omplainant walked over to exchange words with
    [appellant]. Complainant walked back to his own car
    afterwards, reached for a tire iron, and then placed it
    on the ground before coming back to [appellant]’s
    car again. He saw [appellant] get out of the car and
    [c]omplainant threw a punch.         [Appellant’s son]
    testified that a young lady jumped on [appellant],
    while an older couple came out and hit [appellant].
    He then saw [c]omplainant leave the scene and
    return with a gun.         He further stated that
    [c]omplainant punched him on the right cheek since
    he was in the way between [c]omplainant and
    [appellant].
    [Appellant] testified that [] he backed up his
    car 30-40 feet to allow room for the [c]omplainant to
    back up his car on that day in question. He testified
    that [c]omplainant came out of the car, exchanged
    words, and returned to his car to retrieve a tire iron.
    After [c]omplainant threw the tire iron on the
    ground, [c]omplainant walked over to [appellant]’s
    car and exchanged words again. [Appellant] got out
    of the car and punched [c]omplainant, causing
    [c]omplainant to fall backwards.       At that time,
    [appellant] testified that a young lady grabbed onto
    his back, while an older couple grabbed onto him.
    [Appellant] then saw [c]omplainant walk towards
    [appellant]’s car, grab the keys to the car and put
    them in his pockets. [Appellant] also saw the police
    hug [c]omplainant before being arrested.
    Trial court opinion, 10/20/15 at 2-4 (citations to the notes of testimony
    omitted).
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
    I.    WAS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
    APPELLANT’S      CONVICTIONS       FOR
    AGGRAVATED    ASSAULT    AND   RELATED
    OFFENSES WHERE THE COMMONWEALTH
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    FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE
    DOUBT     THAT  APPELLANT   DID  NOT
    JUSTIFIABLY ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE WHEN
    THE COMPLAINANT ADVANCED UPON HIM
    WHILE SCREAMING AND WIELDING A TIRE
    IRON?
    II.    WAS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
    APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS FOR SIMPLE
    ASSAULT AND RECKLESSLY ENANGERING
    [SIC] ANOTHER PERSON WITH RESPECT TO
    HIS    SUPPOSED    ATTACK    ON   [THE
    COMPLAINANT’S MOTHER] WHRE [SIC] [THE
    MOTHER] DID NOT TESTIFY AND NO
    EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO ESTABLISH
    THAT SHE WAS INJURED IN ANY WAY DURING
    THE CONFRONTATION?
    III.   WERE APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS AGAINST
    THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
    WHERE: (1) THE TRIAL TESTIMONY OF THE
    COMPLAINANT WAS INCONSISTENT WITH
    STATEMENTS HE HAD MADE TO A POLICE
    OFFICER FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT ABOUT
    WHETHER HE WAS CARRYING HIS GUN AT
    THE TIME OF THE CONFRONTATION; AND
    (2) THE COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY THAT HE
    DID    NOT    INJURE   APPELLANT   WAS
    CONTRADICTED BY THE TESTIMONY OF A
    POLICE OFFICER, DEFENSE WITNESS, AND
    PHOTOGRAPHS?
    Appellant’s brief at 4.
    Appellant first complains that the evidence was insufficient to convict
    him of aggravated assault, simple assault, and REAP with respect to
    complainant because he acted in self-defense.
    We are subject to the following standard of review on sufficiency
    claims:
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    In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view
    all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner,
    to see whether there is sufficient evidence to enable
    [the factfinder] to find every element of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard is equally
    applicable to cases where the evidence is
    circumstantial rather than direct so long as the
    combination of the evidence links the accused to the
    crime beyond a reasonable doubt.           Although a
    conviction must be based on “more than mere
    suspicion or conjecture, the Commonwealth need not
    establish guilt to a mathematical certainty.”
    Moreover, when reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence, this Court may not substitute its judgment
    for that of the fact-finder; if the record contains
    support for the convictions they may not be
    disturbed.
    Commonwealth v. Stokes, 
    78 A.3d 644
    , 649 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations
    omitted).    Under the Crimes Code, a person commits aggravated assault
    when he or she “attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or
    causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances
    manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 2702(a).    A person commits simple assault if he ”attempts to cause or
    intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another;” or
    “attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious
    bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1), 2701(a)(3). The Crimes Code
    defines recklessly endangering another person as “conduct which places or
    may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.”
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.
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    The defendant has no burden to prove self-defense. Commonwealth
    v. Smith, 
    97 A.3d 782
    , 787 (Pa.Super. 2014).       If the defendant properly
    raises self-defense under Section 505 of the Crimes Code, the burden is on
    the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s
    act was not justifiable self-defense. 
    Id.
     With respect to self-defense, the
    Crimes Code states, “[t]he use of force upon or toward another person is
    justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary
    for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by
    such other person on the present occasion.”     18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a).   The
    use of force is not justifiable when:
    the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of
    using such force with complete safety by retreating,
    except the actor is not obliged to retreat from his
    dwelling or place of work, unless he was the initial
    aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by
    another person whose place of work the actor knows
    it to be.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(b)(2)(ii).
    Here, the record reflects that complainant was backing out of the
    street in his car when appellant blocked his path.      (Notes of testimony,
    3/19/15 at 8.) Complainant asked appellant to move his car so complainant
    could continue backing out. (Id. at 10.) Appellant then got out of his car
    and began moving toward complainant.           (Id. at 11.)    At this point,
    complainant took a tire iron out of his car in an attempt to ward off
    appellant.   (Id.)   As soon as appellant halted his gait, complainant placed
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    the tire iron on the ground. (Id.) Once the tire iron was on the ground,
    appellant started towards complainant again and hit him in the nose with his
    fist.   (Id. at 12.)   Complainant then fell to the ground, and appellant
    continued hitting him five or six more times with his fists. (Id. at 13-14.)
    Complainant testified that he lost consciousness during the incident. (Id. at
    35.)     Complainant also stated that he feared for his life during the
    confrontation. (Id. at 17.) Appellant caused serious and permanent injuries
    to complainant, including a broken nose, a fractured jaw, and a hole in his
    mouth. (Id. at 18.) Complainant currently suffers from breathing problems
    due to the assault. (Id. at 17.)
    After careful review of the record, we find that, when viewed in the
    light   most   favorable   to   the   Commonwealth   as   verdict   winner,   the
    Commonwealth produced evidence sufficient to prove that appellant did not
    act in self-defense and that he had every opportunity to avoid the necessity
    of using force and safely retreat. After complainant placed the tire iron on
    the ground, appellant resorted to violence instead of leaving the scene
    peacefully. After complainant fell to the ground, appellant continued hitting
    complainant with his fists.     Appellant was not a victim in this incident; he
    was the source of danger. Therefore, appellant’s first claim lacks merit.
    Appellant next contends that because complainant’s mother did not
    testify, the Commonwealth was unable to produce sufficient evidence to
    sustain his convictions of simple assault and REAP with respect to
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    complainant’s       mother.      Alternatively,      appellant   claims      he    acted     in
    self-defense.
    Here, the record reflects that complainant testified that his mother is
    58 years old with limited physical mobility due to prior surgeries on her leg.
    (Id.   at    15.)     Complainant    further      testified   that   after    he    regained
    consciousness, he saw appellant choking his mother, causing her to scream
    and attempt to pull his hands off of her. (Id. at 19.) Appellant continued to
    choke complainant’s mother, only stopping when complainant drew his
    firearm. (Id. at 16.) As a result of appellant choking complainant’s mother,
    complainant testified that his mother experienced neck pain. (Id. at 35.)
    Here, the trial court rejected appellant’s version of events and
    accepted     the    eyewitness    testimony     of    complainant      with       respect    to
    appellant’s assault on his mother. The trial court, sitting as fact-finder, was
    free to determine witness credibility and believe all, part, or none of the
    testimony. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 
    956 A.2d 1024
    , 1029 (Pa.Super.
    2008).       Viewing    the   evidence   in    the    light   most    favorable       to    the
    Commonwealth as verdict winner, we find that the Commonwealth produced
    sufficient evidence to sustain appellant’s convictions of simple assault and
    REAP with respect to complainant’s mother.                    Therefore, this claim is
    meritless.
    Finally, appellant contends that the verdicts rendered by the trial court
    were against the weight of the evidence.
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    Our standard of review for determining whether a verdict is compatible
    with the weight of the evidence is well settled:
    Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
    exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
    of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
    evidence.    Because the trial judge has had the
    opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented,
    an appellate court will give the gravest consideration
    to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
    judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination
    that the verdict is against the weight of the
    evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for
    granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
    conviction that the verdict was or was not against
    the weight of the evidence and that a new trial
    should be granted in the interest of justice.
    Commonwealth v. Clay, 
    64 A.3d 1049
    , 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations
    omitted) (emphasis omitted).
    The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the
    finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none
    of the evidence and to determine the credibility of
    the witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute
    its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we
    may only reverse the . . . verdict if it is so contrary
    to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.
    Commonwealth v. Devine, 
    26 A.3d 1139
    , 1146 (Pa.Super. 2011).
    Here, appellant contends “that the testimony of the complainant []
    was wholly unreliable and unworthy of belief.”       (Appellant’s brief at 19.)
    Appellant   asks   us   to   re-weigh   the   evidence   and   make    credibility
    determinations. We decline to do so, as that is not our role. After a careful
    review of the record, we conclude that the verdicts by the trial court were
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    not so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to shock one’s sense of
    justice. Therefore, this claim lacks merit.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/12/2016
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Document Info

Docket Number: 2452 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 8/12/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/13/2016