Mittereder, T. v. Seven Springs ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
TIFFANY MITTEREDER IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
SEVEN SPRINGS MOUNTAIN RESORT,
INC.: SEVEN SPRINGS FARM, INC.,
SEVEN SPRINGS MOUNTAIN RESORT,
INC., T/D/B/A SEVEN SPRINGS; SEVEN
SPRINGS MOUNTAIN RESORT, INC.,
T/D/B/A SEVEN SPRINGS MOUNTAIN
RESORT; SEVEN SPRINGS FARM, INC.,
T/D/B/A SEVEN SPRINGS; SEVEN
SPRINGS MOUNTAIN RESORT,
Appellees No. 1790 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered September 30, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County
Civil Division at No: 571 CIVIL 2012
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 21, 2015
Appellant, Tiffany Mittereder, appeals from the September 30, 2014
order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County granting
summary judgment in favor of Appellees, Seven Springs Mountain Resort
and various affiliated entities. Appellant contends the trial court erred by
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees. We disagree and
therefore affirm.
The trial court provided the following factual background:
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On February 19, 2012, [Appellant] and her boyfriend,
Christopher Damron, were skiing at Seven Springs Resort. At
approximately 3:00 p.m. [Appellant] and Mr. Damron entered
the “Foggy Goggle” which is a bar and restaurant inside of the
ski lodge. [Appellant] had her ski boots on the duration of time
she was at the Foggy Goggle. [Appellant] consumed two to
three Captain Morgan and Diet Coke drinks throughout the three
hours she was there. At some point prior to the incident
[Appellant] used the restroom. About three hours after
[Appellant] arrived at the Foggy Goggle, around 6:00 or 6:15
p.m. [Appellant] began her second trip to the restroom. On her
way to the restroom, [Appellant] fell, severely injuring her arm,
which required extensive surgery. The area where [Appellant]
fell was the hallway to the restroom which had a concrete floor.
[Appellees’] employee took down an incident report following
[Appellant’s] fall which lists “injured[’s] description of incident”
(i.e. [Appellant’s] description) as “walking to the bathroom,
turned corner, was ice on floor, slipped and fell—was wearing ski
rental boots.” Although the report states this, during
[Appellant’s] deposition she said she did not have first hand
knowledge of the cause of her fall, as the Brief in Opposition
states she “cannot specifically identify precisely what caused her
to fall” due to the pain she was in after the fall.
[Appellant] does recall having a conversation with a woman who
assisted her right after she fell “who stated that she had noticed
ice or slush in the area where [Appellant] fell and knew someone
was going to fall.” Mr. Damron, who was walking behind
[Appellant] when she fell, is also unable to testify as [to] the
cause of [Appellant’s] fall, but does recall the woman assisting
them. The incident report does not list a witness to the incident
and the identity of the woman who made the statement remains
unknown.
[Appellant] filed suit for negligence on August 10, 2012 and
[Appellees] moved for summary judgment on June 27, 2014.
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Trial Court Memorandum (Memorandum), 10/1/14, at 1-3 (references to
Appellant’s Brief in Opposition to Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment
omitted).1
By order entered September 30, 2014, the trial court granted
Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, finding Appellees were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because there were no issues of material fact
and also concluding the motion was not premature. Memorandum at 11.
This timely appeal followed in which Appellant asks this Court to consider
two issues, which we have reordered for ease of discussion:
1. Whether [Appellant] has provided sufficient circumstantial
evidence and facts to establish a genuine issue of material
fact that should be submitted to a jury for determination?
2. Whether [Appellees’] motion for Summary Judgment was
premature as discovery had not yet been completed in the
instant case?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.2
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1
Although not mentioned by the trial court in its factual summary, Appellees
do not suggest that Appellant was intoxicated or that her alcohol
consumption played any role in causing Appellant’s fall. See, e.g., Notes of
Testimony, Argument, 9/11/14, at 2.
2
In her statement of questions involved, Appellant lists the two issues
identified above. However, Appellant’s argument is broken into four
sections. We remind Appellant’s counsel that Rule of Appellate Procedure
2119 requires the argument section of an appellant’s brief to “be divided into
as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the
head of each part . . . the particular point treated therein, followed by such
discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P.
2119.
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Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 provides:
After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as
not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for
summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law
(1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact
as to a necessary element of the cause of action or
defense which could be established by additional discovery
or expert report, or
(2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the
motion, including the production of expert reports, an
adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has
failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of
action or defense which in a jury trial would require the
issues to be submitted to a jury.
Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035.2.
This Court reviews a decision granting summary judgment according
to the following standard:
A reviewing court may disturb the order of the trial court only
where it is established that the court committed an error of law
or abused its discretion. As with all questions of law, our review
is plenary.
In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter summary
judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the
summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment
may be entered. Where the non-moving party bears the burden
of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or
answers in order to survive summary judgment. Failure of a
nonmoving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue
essential to his case and on which it bears the burden of proof
establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a
matter of law. Lastly, we will view the record in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved
against the moving party.
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JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1261–62 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (quoting Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost,
777 A.2d. 418, 429 (Pa. 2001)).
In her first issue, Appellant contends she has provided sufficient
circumstantial evidence and facts to establish a genuine issue of material
fact that should be submitted to a jury for determination. The trial court
examined this contention under the test announced by our Supreme Court in
Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120 (Pa. 1983), which states:
Possessors of land owe a duty to protect invitees from
foreseeable harm. Restatement[ (Second) of Torts], §§ 341A,
343 & 343A. With respect to conditions on the land which are
known to or discoverable by the possessor, the possessor is
subject to liability only if he,
“(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would
discover the condition, and should realize that it involves
an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitee, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them
against the danger.”
Restatement, supra, § 343.
Id. at 123.
The trial court first considered Appellees’ assertion that Appellant
lacked sufficient evidence to present an issue of fact as to whether a
“dangerous condition” existed. Memorandum at 6. The trial court agreed
with Appellees, determining:
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[T]here is only a statement by an unidentified witness (that may
or may not be admissible) to imply that there was any water or
slush on the floor in the first place, as every other witness to the
incident as well as [Appellant] herself does not remember seeing
water or ice on the floor, and there is no evidence that
[Appellees] knew or should have known about the alleged
condition as required by the first prong of Carrender.
Id. The trial court suggested it would exclude as inadmissible hearsay the
statement supposedly made to Appellant by an unknown witness, but
indicated a finding of admissibility would not alter its ruling on the motion.
“Assuming hypothetically that the statement is admissible, it does not, nor
does any other evidence, create a question of fact as to whether [Appellees]
knew about the alleged slush or ice.” Id. at 7. Consequently, Appellant
could not satisfy the first prong of the Carrender test because there was
“no dispute of fact as to whether [Appellees] had actual notice.” Id.3
As to the second element of the Carrender test, the trial court
determined Appellant could not satisfy that prong, which requires that the
possessor of land should expect that invitees would fail to discover or realize
the danger of a condition or will fail to protect themselves against it.
Because Appellees did not have notice of the condition, they had “no basis to
expect that invitees, like [Appellant], may fail to protect themselves from
the unknown condition.” Id. at 9.
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3
The trial court similarly and appropriately dismissed any suggestion
Appellees had constructive notice.
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Finally, to meet the third prong of Carrender, Appellant must prove
that Appellees failed to exercise reasonable care to protect her against any
dangerous condition. “Where a fall is alleged because of water [on] the
floor, [Appellant] must prove that the proprietor failed to monitor and
maintain the area in order to establish a breach of duty.” Id. at 10 (citing
Estate of Swift v. Northeastern Hospital of Philadelphia, 690 A.2d 719,
723 (Pa. Super. 1997)). The trial court concluded Appellant failed to
produce evidence to show Appellees breached any duty to maintain or
monitor the Foggy Goggle on the day in question. “In fact, [Appellees]
presented evidence that six bartenders and seven waitresses were on staff
in the Foggy Goggle that day, who were trained to report any spill or other
such condition to housekeeping, and two housekeepers were assigned to the
building that day.” Id. (citing Appellees’ Memorandum in Support of Its
Motion for Summary Judgment, 6/25/14, at 16).
The trial court concluded there were no genuine issues of material fact.
Because Appellant failed to produce evidence to satisfy any of the
Carrender prongs, the trial court found Appellees were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
As reflected above, this Court may disturb the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment only if Appellant establishes that the trial court
committed an error of law or abused its discretion. JP Morgan Chase
Bank, 63 A.3d at 1261 (citation omitted). Again:
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In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter summary
judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the
summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment
may be entered. Where the non-moving party bears the burden
of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or
answers in order to survive summary judgment. Failure of a
non-moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an
issue essential to his case and on which it bears the
burden of proof establishes the entitlement of the moving
party to judgment as a matter of law. Lastly, we will view
the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact must be resolved against the moving party.
Id. at 1261-62 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Here, Appellant failed to adduce sufficient evidence of the existence of
any “dangerous condition,” any notice that can be imputed to Appellees, or
any failure of Appellees to exercise reasonable care, all of which are issues
essential to her case and on which she bore the burden of proof. Although
Appellant does not suggest she had—or could establish—evidence of direct
negligence on the part of Appellees, she asserts that circumstantial evidence
can serve as a basis for defeating summary judgment. Appellant points to
her deposition testimony in which she testified that her fall occurred “on the
concrete/tile surface leading to the restroom facilities” and to the testimony
both she and her boyfriend offered about the “independent witness”—an
unidentified individual neither Appellant nor her boyfriend could describe—
who said “she knew someone was going to fall on the snow/slush/water that
was present on the floor” where Appellant fell. Appellant’s Brief at 28
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(citations to deposition testimony omitted). She also suggests that the
incident report reveals she was “[w]alking to bathroom, turned corner, was
ice on the floor, slipped and fell, was wearing rental ski boots.” Id. at 29
(citations omitted). However, she admits she did not see anything on the
floor and acknowledges that the information in the incident report, including
the reference to “ice on the floor,” was not based on her observation but
rather on a statement by the phantom witness. Appellant’s Deposition,
8/2/13, at 25, 31. Nevertheless, Appellant suggests she “has established
sufficient circumstantial evidence of the existence of a dangerous, hazardous
and unsafe condition through deposition testimony, the incident report, and
common sense.” Appellant’s Brief, at 29.
In support of her position regarding sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence, Appellant cites several cases in which circumstantial evidence was
deemed sufficient to warrant a case going to a jury. Appellant’s Brief at 18-
21. Appellant’s reliance on each case is misplaced.
For instance, in First v. Zem Zem Temple, 686 A.2d 18 (Pa. Super.
1996), the trial court entered summary judgment against a woman who fell
on a temporary dance floor during a wedding reception. The appellant and a
witness established evidence of two potential defects on the dance floor, i.e.,
a discolored, slippery area and a raised metal rim, both of which were near
where she fell and either of which may have caused her to fall. This Court
determined the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because the
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appellant presented sufficient evidence to create a jury question on
causation.
In McMillan v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 367 A.2d 1106 (Pa.
Super. 1976), the trial court granted a compulsory nonsuit against a
racetrack patron who slipped and fell in a large room described as the
ground floor of the track’s grandstand. The room, measuring 250’ in length
and 80 to 125’ in width, contained more than 30 betting windows in the
center of the room and four refreshment stands, each 25’ long, on one side
of the room. The appellant fell near one of the refreshment stands where
significant debris had accumulated over the course of more than two hours
during the evening. Although she could not say precisely what caused her to
fall, she testified she believed her fall was caused “by the liquid, cups,
papers, or tickets on the floor.” Id. at 1108. On appeal, this Court reversed
the trial court’s grant of a nonsuit, concluding the appellant’s “proof
identified the cause of [appellant’s] fall with enough sufficiency to allow the
jury to determine questions of negligence.” Id. at 1111.
In First and McMillan, as well as in the remaining cases cited by
Appellant,4 the plaintiffs and/or witnesses observed and were able to
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4
Appellant also looks to cases from our Supreme Court, our Commonwealth
Court, and the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. Appellant’s Brief at 18-21. While we are bound only by the
Supreme Court’s decisions, we discuss all four briefly to illustrate they are
readily distinguishable from the instant case.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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describe a dangerous condition that existed in the area of the plaintiff’s fall.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
In Schwartz v. Warwick-Philadelphia Corp., 226 A.2d 484 (Pa. 1967),
the plaintiff was injured in a fall at a wedding reception where waiters
carrying trays of food crossed the dance floor on their way to the tables
where the guests dined. Plaintiff established the presence of asparagus and
sauce on the dance floor where she and her dance partner fell. Our
Supreme Court determined the trial court abused its discretion by granting a
nonsuit and reversed its ruling, finding “it is reasonable, proper, and fair to
conclude that this concatenation of circumstances made out a prima facie
case of negligence against the establishment running the wedding feast.”
Id. at 486.
In Marks v. Tasman, 589 A.2d 205 (Pa. 1991), an 89-year old legally blind
man tripped and fell on a sidewalk outside his ophthalmologist’s office. The
friend who accompanied him to the office did not see the man fall but did
see a depression in the sidewalk near the plaintiff’s feet immediately after
the man fall. Our Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment,
finding the evidence was sufficient to support an inference that the man fell
because of the defect in the sidewalk and, as such, created a genuine issue
of material fact. (To further distinguish Marks, we note that—unlike the
other cases upon which Appellant relies—Marks does not involve a
transitory condition.)
In Hyatt v. County of Allegheny, 547 A.2d 1304 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988), an
airline employee presented evidence that the upturned edge of a floor mat
caused her to fall. Because the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, established the condition responsible for her fall
and because the county and its maintenance company were in control of the
mats and had adopted a policy of taping all four edges to avoid falls, the
Commonwealth Court reversed a directed verdict entered by the trial court
and remanded for a new trial.
In Evans v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66675 (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 10, 2007), a witness observed grapes on the floor of the area where
the plaintiff fell in the grocery area of a Hazelton Wal-Mart. The district
court denied summary judgment, finding there were questions of fact for a
jury concerning whether Wal-Mart created a dangerous condition that was
known or should have been known by the store.
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In the cited cases, it was determined that there was at least circumstantial
evidence of a dangerous condition that existed in the vicinity of the fall at
the time of the fall. By contrast, Appellant could only say that she “turned
the corner and fell.” Appellant’s Deposition, 8/2/13, at 27. She did not see
or observe anything that might have cause her to fall. Id. at 27-28.
Neither she nor any identified witness could testify as to a dangerous
condition because no condition, dangerous or otherwise, was observed or
reported. It is axiomatic that if no dangerous condition was observed or
reported, notice of a dangerous condition cannot be imputed to Appellees.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellant as non-
moving party and resolving all doubts in her favor, it is clear Appellant is
unable to establish the existence of any genuine issue of material fact to
evade the grant of summary judgment. Because Appellant cannot
demonstrate that the trial court committed error of law or abused its
discretion by granting summary judgment against her, Appellant’s first issue
fails for lack of merit.
In her second issue, Appellant contends Appellees’ summary judgment
motion was premature because discovery had not been completed. A fair
reading of the argument section of her brief reveals it is not the motion itself
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Appellant claims was premature but rather the trial court’s grant of that
motion.5 We will conduct our review accordingly.
Appellant contends the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
foreclosed her from deposing various individuals currently or formerly
employed by Appellees and from conducting an expert examination of the
area where Appellant fell. Appellant’s Brief at 22-23. She does not suggest
she was impeded from conducting discovery by any conduct on the part of
Appellees but simply claims she “should have been afforded additional time
by the trial court to complete all aspects of discovery prior to the trial court
ruling” on the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 26. However,
Appellant has failed to demonstrate how any additional discovery could help
develop her case or save it from the grant of summary judgment.
Although not addressed in her brief, Appellant’s counsel asserted at
oral argument on the summary judgment motion that his client had not been
afforded an opportunity to depose the employee who completed the incident
report or the medic who tended to Appellant. Notes of Testimony,
Argument, 9/11/14 at 13.6 However, Appellant did not—nor can she—argue
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5
The pleadings were closed on September 13, 2012, more than twenty-one
months before Appellees filed their motion for summary judgment.
Therefore, the prerequisite to the filing of a summary judgment motion was
satisfied. See Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2.
6
Counsel for Appellees noted in his argument that all persons on duty on the
day of the incident had been identified in written discovery and the fact
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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that testimony from either witness would shed any light on the issue
essential to her case, i.e., that Appellees had notice of the existence of any
dangerous condition. As previously stated, neither Appellant nor her
boyfriend could identify or describe the “phantom witness” who, they
contend, said there was slush on the floor. Further, the individual who
completed the incident report recorded “N/A” in the section designated for
identifying witnesses. Counsel’s suggestion that the unidentified witness
could potentially be identified through receipts from the Foggy Goggle is
implausible at best and would entail what can only be described as a “fishing
expedition.” Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court for not ordering additional time for discovery.
Appellant takes issue with the trial court’s reliance on Porro v.
Century III Associates, 846 A.2d 1282 (Pa. Super. 2004), in rejecting her
prematurity claim. In Porro, the appellant claimed he fell on March 26,
1998, on a soapy liquid substance that was on the floor of a mall stairwell.
Porro filed an amended complaint on March 24, 2000 and was deposed on
April 16, 2001. On March 18, 2002, the appellees filed a motion for
summary judgment arguing Porro failed to produce evidence or testimony to
establish that the allegedly dangerous condition resulted from the appellees’
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
Appellant had not deposed any of those individuals was beyond Appellees’
control. Id. at 17.
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negligence, to establish the property owner had actual notice of the
condition, or to establish the condition existed for such a length of time that
the owner should have known of it.
At oral argument, Porro requested additional time to conduct discovery
on the notice issue. In response, the trial court initially denied summary
judgment without prejudice, giving Porro time to conduct additional
discovery. Nothing further transpired until October 24, 2002, when the
appellees placed the case at issue. On January 17, 2003, Porro directed
written discovery to the appellees, to which they responded. On March 3,
2003, the appellees refiled their motion for summary judgment. Porro
claimed the appellees filed only incomplete and evasive responses to the
discovery requests but acknowledged he did not file additional requests,
notices of depositions, or any motion to compel additional responses. The
trial court granted the summary judgment motion.
On appeal, this Court affirmed, quoting from the trial court:
Summary judgment was originally denied because plaintiff
wanted more time for discovery. Inexplicably, however, plaintiff
waited over seven months from the denial of summary judgment
(and almost three years from the filing of his amended
complaint) to begin discovery. Even though plaintiff alleges that
defendants are improperly withholding discovery, he has not
sought court intervention since defendants responded to his
discovery requests on March 28, 2003. Plaintiff explains neither
how defendants have specifically evaded their duty to provide
discovery, nor how this information sought would help him. No
request to extend discovery has been made. In short, plaintiff
has shown neither materiality nor due diligence with respect to
such information, as required by Kerns v. Methodist Hospital,
393 Pa. Super. 533, 574 A.2d 1068 (1990).
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Id. at 1284-85 (quoting Trial Court Opinion, 8/13/03, at 6).
We acknowledge that the facts and timeline in Porro differ from those
in the case before us—most notably in that the trial court originally denied
the motion for summary judgment without prejudice and granted Porro’s
request for additional time to undertake discovery. However, we find no
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court for entering summary
judgment instead of granting additional time for discovery, not because
Appellant did not request additional discovery time, but rather because
Appellant has failed to explain how any additional discovery could help
develop her case or save it from the grant of summary judgment.
Therefore, we reject Appellant’s assertion that the grant of summary
judgment was premature. Appellant’s second claim fails for lack of merit.
We find no error of law or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of Appellees and against Appellant.
Therefore, we shall not disturb the trial court’s order.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
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Date: 12/21/2015
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