Com. v. Giuliano, P. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
PAUL E. GIULIANO
Appellant No. 2311 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 16, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0006604-2014
BEFORE: MOULTON, J., RANSOM, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED JUNE 20, 2017
Paul E. Giuliano appeals from the June 16, 2016 judgment of sentence
entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas after a jury
convicted him of burglary (overnight accommodation and person present)
and criminal trespass (enter structure).1 We affirm.
The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history:
On September 15, 2014, at 11:05 a.m.[,] Haverford
Township Police responded to . . . a burglary. The burglar
fled and [Giuliano] was later taken into custody and
positively identified by the homeowner. After a two-day
jury trial, [Giuliano] was found guilty on August 26, 2015.
On September 28, 2015, this Court sentenced [Giuliano]
on Count 1, Burglary, to a sentence of 10-20 years[’]
confinement plus 5 years[’] consecutive probation. On
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3502(a)(1) and 3503(a)(1)(i), respectively.
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October 2, 2015, [Giuliano]’s counsel filed a timely Notice
of Appeal.
The sentence was illegal since the aggregate total
exceeded the twenty-year statutory maximum by a period
of five years. The attorney for the Commonwealth and
[Giuliano]’s attorney were in agreement that the case
should be remanded to the Trial Court for re-sentencing.
The parties entered a Stipulation requesting that the
Judgment of Sentence be vacated, and the case remanded
for re-sentencing. The Court agreed with the parties. On
April 1, 2016, the Superior Court vacated the Judgment of
Sentence and remanded the matter.
On June 16, 2016, [Giuliano] was re-sentenced to an
aggregate total that did not exceed the twenty-year
statutory maximum. The Court sentenced [Giuliano]: on
Count 1, Burglary, to a sentence of 10-20 years SCI, and
on Count 2, Criminal Trespass, merges with Count 1. The
Court sentenced [Giuliano] pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714
and notice was properly served upon Defense Counsel, a
copy which [was] attached to [the] Sentencing Sheet . . . .
Trial Ct. Op., 8/23/16, at 1-2 (“1925(a) Op.”) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). On July 14, 2016, Giuliano filed a timely notice of
appeal.
Giuliano raises the following question on appeal:
Whether the mandatory sentence imposed pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S. § 9714 is illegal since that mandatory provision
and its triggering facts were not charged in the bill of
information, and because the government was not
required to prove that it applied, beyond a reasonable
doubt, to a jury?
Giuliano’s Br. at 5 (trial court answer omitted).
Giuliano claims that his mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to
section 9714 of the Sentencing Code is illegal. Our standard of review on
such matters is well settled:
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Generally, a challenge to the application of a mandatory
minimum sentence is a non-waivable challenge to the
legality of the sentence. Issues relating to the legality of a
sentence are questions of law, as are claims raising a
court’s interpretation of a statute. Our standard of review
over such questions is de novo and our scope of review is
plenary.
Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 45 A.3d 1123, 1130 (Pa.Super. 2012)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Brougher, 978 A.2d 373, 377 (Pa.Super.
2009)).
Section 9714 of the Sentencing Code provides, in part:
(a) Mandatory sentence.--
(1) Any person who is convicted in any court of this
Commonwealth of a crime of violence shall, if at the time
of the commission of the current offense the person had
previously been convicted of a crime of violence, be
sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least ten years of
total confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of
this title or other statute to the contrary. Upon a second
conviction for a crime of violence, the court shall give the
person oral and written notice of the penalties under this
section for a third conviction for a crime of violence.
Failure to provide such notice shall not render the offender
ineligible to be sentenced under paragraph (2).
(a.1) Mandatory maximum.--An offender sentenced to
a mandatory minimum sentence under this section shall be
sentenced to a maximum sentence equal to twice the
mandatory minimum sentence, notwithstanding 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 1103 (relating to sentence of imprisonment for felony) or
any other provision of this title or other statute to the
contrary.
...
(d) Proof at sentencing.--Provisions of this section shall
not be an element of the crime and notice thereof to the
defendant shall not be required prior to conviction, but
reasonable notice of the Commonwealth's intention to
proceed under this section shall be provided after
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conviction and before sentencing. The applicability of this
section shall be determined at sentencing. The sentencing
court, prior to imposing sentence on an offender under
subsection (a), shall have a complete record of the
previous convictions of the offender, copies of which shall
be furnished to the offender. If the offender or the
attorney for the Commonwealth contests the accuracy of
the record, the court shall schedule a hearing and direct
the offender and the attorney for the Commonwealth to
submit evidence regarding the previous convictions of the
offender. The court shall then determine, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the previous convictions of
the offender and, if this section is applicable, shall impose
sentence in accordance with this section. Should a
previous conviction be vacated and an acquittal or final
discharge entered subsequent to imposition of sentence
under this section, the offender shall have the right to
petition the sentencing court for reconsideration of
sentence if this section would not have been applicable
except for the conviction which was vacated.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a), (a.1), and (d). Robbery is a crime of violence under
section 9714. Id. § 9714(g).
First, Giuliano argues that his sentence is illegal because the
Commonwealth failed to include his prior conviction for robbery in the bill of
information and never amended the bill of information.
We conclude that Giuliano’s claim is meritless. Section 9714 clearly
states that notice to the defendant that the Commonwealth is seeking a
mandatory minimum under section 9714 “shall not be required prior to
conviction, but . . . shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing.”
42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(d). We agree with the trial court that “the
Commonwealth has no obligation to provide the defendant notice in the
charging document,” 1925(a) Op. at 4, and that the Commonwealth
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provided the notice required by law, id. at 4-5; see also N.T., 6/16/16, at
4, 8-9 (trial court and re-sentencing counsel agree that Giuliano received
notice that the Commonwealth sought a mandatory minimum sentence
before both his original sentencing and his re-sentencing).2
Second, Giuliano argues that section 9714 is unconstitutional pursuant
to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States,
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2
Giuliano did not challenge the reasonableness of the
Commonwealth’s notice. Even had Giuliano lodged such a claim, the trial
court correctly concluded that the Commonwealth’s notice was proper:
In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth notified
[Giuliano]’s counsel in writing four (4) days prior to
sentencing. The assistant district attorney informed
[Giuliano]’s counsel that the Commonwealth intended to
invoke the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence that
was applicable to [Giuliano] as a second strike offender
pursuant to [section 9714]. The letter included an
attachment with a Judgment of Sentence from April 6,
2004 evidencing [Giuliano]’s prior conviction for robbery.
The letter was dated September 24, 2015 and sentencing
was September 28, 2015.
...
The statute does require that the notice be reasonable
and the question becomes whether four days written
notice is reasonable. The Pennsylvania Superior Court in
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 831 A.2d 661 (Pa.Super.
2003), determined that the Commonwealth notified the
defendant 2-3 days before sentencing of the intention to
proceed to sentence the defendant under the mandatory
minimum sentence as a second-strike offender and the
Court held such short notice was reasonable.
1925(a) Op. at 4-5.
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133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), which he contends requires the Commonwealth to
prove section 9714’s “triggering facts beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Giuliano’s Br. at 17. Giuliano recognizes that this Court has “rejected an
Alleyne based challenge to [s]ection 9714. . . . [but] invites this court to
revisit the issue.” Id. at 18.
We conclude that Giuliano is not entitled to relief. As Giuliano admits,
this Court has rejected Alleyne-based challenges to section 9714. See
Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 785 (Pa.Super. 2015) (“Alleyne
did not overturn prior precedent that prior convictions are sentencing factors
and not elements of offenses. . . . [a]ccordingly, . . . section [9714] is not
unconstitutional under Alleyne”); see also Commonwealth v. Bragg, 133
A.3d 328, 333 (Pa.Super.), app. granted in part, 143 A.3d 890 (Pa. 2016)
(“In . . . Reid, . . . this Court specifically found that [s]ection 9714 is not
rendered unconstitutional under Alleyne as it provides for mandatory
minimum sentences based on prior convictions.”). This panel lacks authority
to revisit this issue.3 Accordingly, we conclude that Giuliano’s mandatory
minimum sentence, imposed pursuant to section 9714, is legal.
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3
We recognize that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted
allowance of appeal in Bragg and three other cases to examine the
constitutionality of section 9714. See Bragg, 143 A.3d at 890. However,
until our Supreme Court issues a decision in Bragg, we are bound by this
Court’s prior conclusion that section 9714 is constitutional. See
Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 278 n.9 (Pa.Super. 2014) (“This
Court is bound by existing precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis and
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/20/2017
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
continues to follow controlling precedent as long as the decision has not
been overturned by our Supreme Court.”).
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