Com. v. Doty, C. ( 2017 )

J-S28036-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
CHRISTOPHER DOTY, :
:
Appellant : No. 1626 WDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order October 17, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0001370-2008
BEFORE: OLSON, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JULY 11, 2017
Christopher Doty (Appellant) appeals from the order entered on
October 17, 2016, which denied his petition filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
A prior panel of this Court offered the following relevant factual and
procedural history of this matter.
[Appellant] was charged in connection with the April 24,
2008 assault of Kyle Miles, which left Miles with chronic,
debilitating injuries. On January 20, 2009, a jury found
[Appellant] and two co-defendants guilty of conspiracy and
aggravated assault. Thereafter, on March 19, 2009, [Appellant]
failed to appear at a sentencing hearing. The trial court
sentenced [Appellant], in absentia, to an aggregate term of 115
months’ to 232 months’ incarceration. The trial court also
imposed fees and costs, and further ordered [Appellant] to pay
$1,500,000 in restitution. While [Appellant] remained at-large,
his direct appellate counsel filed a timely notice of appeal on
April 1, 2009, and, thereafter filed a timely statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Law
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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enforcement officials eventually apprehended [Appellant] outside
the Commonwealth.
On June 9, 2010, a panel of this Court quashed
[Appellant’s] direct appeal on the basis that he was a fugitive
during the thirty-day period in which he was permitted to file a
notice of appeal from his judgment of sentence. See
[Commonwealth v. Doty, 997 A.2d 1184 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(Doty I)].
On March 10, 2011, [Appellant] filed his first pro se PCRA
petition. Counsel was appointed, who then filed an amended
PCRA petition. On August 3, 2011, the trial court dismissed
[Appellant’s] first PCRA petition as untimely.[1] Upon reviewing
1
The PCRA sets forth the following time requirements for filing a PCRA
petition.
(b) Time for filing petition.--
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second
or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition
alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim
previously was the result of interference
by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of
the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or
laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is
predicated were unknown to the
petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional
right that was recognized by the
Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after
the time period provided in this section
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[Appellant’s] first PCRA petition, a panel of this Court concluded
that, although the PCRA court erred in deeming [Appellant’s]
first PCRA petition untimely, [Appellant] was still not eligible for
relief. See [Commonwealth v Doty, 48 A.3d 451 (Pa. Super.
2012) (Doty II)]. Accordingly, on July 2, 2012, this Court
affirmed the PCRA court’s dismissal of [Appellant’s] first PCRA
petition.
On August 6, 2012, [Appellant] filed [his second] PCRA
petition. Therein, [Appellant] alleged the discovery of new,
exculpatory facts in the form of an affidavit from a witness,
Shawn Williams. In relevant part, [Appellant] asserts that
Williams’ testimony impeaches the identity of one of the
Commonwealth’s witnesses at trial. [Appellant] also alleges that
the Commonwealth committed a Brady[v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963)] violation, because the Commonwealth was aware of
Williams’ testimony and should have turned it over to the
defense. [Appellant] also argues that he was never advised [of
or] aware of the disadvantages of knowingly or intelligently
waiving his [appellate rights].
On September 28, 2012, the PCRA court ordered the
Commonwealth to file a response to [Appellant’s] second PCRA
petition…. On May 30, 2013, the PCRA court dismissed
[Appellant’s] second PCRA petition.
Commonwealth v. Doty, 97 A.3d 814 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished
memorandum at 1-2) (Doty III) (some internal citations, quotation marks,
and footnotes omitted).
Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court, and on appeal we
concluded that his August 6, 2012 petition was untimely filed, and he failed
and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in
paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the date the
claim could have been presented.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545.
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to prove an exception to a timeliness requirement of the PCRA pursuant to
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Thus, we affirmed the dismissal of that petition.
See Doty III.
On September 9, 2016, Appellant filed the PCRA petition at issue in
this case. In that petition, Appellant acknowledged the facial untimeliness of
the petition, but asserted it was timely pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(1)(ii), which provides that “the facts upon which the claim is
predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” In his petition, Appellant also
asserted that he learned the information that formed the basis of the
petition on July 7, 2016.2
The PCRA court reviewed the petition, and concluded that Appellant
“failed to plead or prove application of this exception.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
Notice, 9/16/2016. Thus, the PCRA court issued a notice of its intent to
dismiss the petition without a hearing. Appellant responded, and on October
17, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition.
On October 24, 2016, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The
PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). Appellant filed a statement, where he averred for the first time
that “on July 7, 2016, [another inmate] advised [Appellant] how to regain
2
While the petition sets forth the PCRA statute and the fact that he has filed
his petition within 60 days from learning newly-discovered facts, he does not
actually assert what these newly-discovered facts are.
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his appellate rights and instructed him to file a PCRA petition for
reinstatement of the right to file a direct appeal nunc pro tunc.” Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) Statement, 11/15/2016, at ¶ 3. On November 16, 2016, the PCRA
court filed an opinion relying on the rationale set forth in its Pa.R.Crim.P.
907 notice.
Before we reach the arguments Appellant sets forth on appeal, we
bear in mind that our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA
petition is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s rulings are
supported by the evidence of record and free of legal error.
Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233 (Pa. Super. 2012). Under
the PCRA, all petitions must be filed within one year of the date that the
petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final, unless one of three statutory
exceptions applies. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Chester,
895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006). For purposes of the PCRA, a judgment
becomes final at the conclusion of direct review. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
“The PCRA’s time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature.” Chester,
895 A.2d at 522. “Thus, ‘[i]f a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court
nor the trial court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we
simply do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims.’”
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 851 (Pa. 2005)).
“The question of whether a petition is timely raises a question of law. Where
the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and
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our scope of review plenary.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491,
499 (Pa. Super. 2016).
Appellant acknowledges the facial untimeliness of his petition, but
argues that he has proven the newly-discovered facts exception pursuant to
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). However, Appellant’s newly-discovered facts
were pled for the first time in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, rather than
in his PCRA petition. The PCRA requires specifically that the “petition
allege[] … the facts upon which the claim is predicated.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(1)(ii) (emphasis added). Moreover, it is well-settled that
“inclusion of the issue in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will not save it
from being waived because Appellant failed to raise it in the court below, as
required by Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).”
Commonwealth v. Foster, 960 A.2d 160, 163 (Pa. Super. 2008). Based
on the foregoing, Appellant has neither pled properly nor preserved the basis
upon which he relies to satisfy the newly-discovered facts timeliness
exception.
Additionally, even if Appellant did not waive the issue, he would not be
entitled to relief.
The newly-discovered facts exception
has two components, which must be alleged and proved.
Namely, the petitioner must establish that: 1) the facts
upon which the claim was predicated were unknown and 2)
could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
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diligence. If the petitioner alleges and proves these two
components, then the PCRA court has jurisdiction over the
claim under this subsection.
Brown, 141 A.3d at 500 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d
1264, 1272 (Pa. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted;
emphasis removed)). Appellant’s purported newly-discovered fact is that he
received legal advice from another inmate. Such an assertion does not
satisfy the aforementioned requirements, as it is not evident that this
information “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence.” Id. Moreover, it is still not clear what type of legal advice
Appellant received, and “[o]ur Courts have expressly rejected the notion
that judicial decisions can be considered newly-discovered facts.”
Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 763 (Pa. Super. 2013). Thus,
even if it had been properly pled, Appellant would not be able to
demonstrate that legal advice he received from another inmate would have
entitled him to relief.
Thus, we conclude that the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA
petition was proper and, accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s October 17,
2016 order.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/11/2017
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