Com. v. Waters, S. ( 2016 )


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  • J. S69025/16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                  :       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :            PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    SIDNEY LAMONT WATERS                          :
    :
    APPELLANT                 :       No. 152 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 23, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0001250-2015
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                               FILED OCTOBER 19, 2016
    Appellant, Sidney Lamont Waters, appeals from the December 23,
    2015 Judgment of Sentence of two concurrent terms of two to five years’
    incarceration imposed after the court found him guilty of one count each of
    Firearms not to be Carried without a License and Possession of a Firearm
    with Altered Manufacturer’s Number.1,     2
    Appellant alleges specifically that
    the trial court erred when it denied his pre-trial suppression motion. After
    careful review, we affirm.
    *
    Retired Senior Judge Assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6106 and 18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.2, respectively.
    2
    The Commonwealth also charged Appellant with Possession of Marijuana,
    35 Pa.C.S. § 780-113(a)(3), but did not present any evidence at trial in
    support of this charge. Accordingly, the trial court found Appellant not guilty
    of Possession of Marijuana.
    J. S69025/16
    The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion includes a thorough and
    complete narrative of the facts and procedural history in this case, which we
    adopt for purposes of our disposition. See Trial Ct. Op., 3/7/16, at 1-3, 5-9.
    Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
    Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion to
    suppress, where police did not have a reasonable suspicion
    to stop and frisk [Appellant] initially, and therefore, any
    observations of the police after that or any evidence taken
    from [Appellant] should have been suppressed as the fruit
    of the illegal stop and frisk?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    Our standard of review in an appeal from an order denying a Motion to
    Suppress is as follows:
    Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of
    a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the
    suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record
    and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
    correct.  Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
    suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
    Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
    remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record
    as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
    supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and
    may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous.
    Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    988 A.2d 649
    , 654 (Pa. 2010) (citation
    omitted).
    A police officer may conduct an investigative detention, otherwise
    known as a Terry3 stop, of an individual if he or she has reasonable
    3
    Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 24 (1968).
    -2-
    J. S69025/16
    suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.    Commonwealth v. Bryant, 
    866 A.2d 1143
    , 1146 (Pa. Super. 2005).           That suspicion must be based on
    “specific, articulable facts” known to the officer at the time and “reasonable
    inferences drawn from those facts in light of the officer’s experience.”
    Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
    698 A.2d 571
    , 573 (Pa. 1997).
    After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
    applicable law, and the well-reasoned Opinion of the trial court we conclude
    that the issue Appellant has raised on appeal lacks merit. The trial court
    Opinion properly disposes of the question presented. See Trial Ct. Op. at 3-
    5, 9-12 (concluding: (1) the officer reasonably suspected, based upon
    specific and articulable facts and the reasonable inferences drawn from those
    facts and their experience, that the three men he observed running in the
    street shortly before a dispatch for shots fired, and who were subsequently
    stopped by police were the same men involved in the shooting; (2) based on
    the temporal and spatial proximity to the area where shots were reportedly
    fired, the officer had reasonable suspicion to suspect that Appellant was
    armed; and (3) the search performed was limited to what was necessary to
    ensure officer safety, and the firearm was readily apparent).    Accordingly,
    we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s Opinion.
    The parties are instructed to attach a copy of the trial court’s March
    17, 2016 Opinion to all future filings.
    -3-
    J. S69025/16
    Judgment of Sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/19/2016
    -4-
    Circulated 09/23/2016 10:02 AM
    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
    CRIMINAL
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    SIDNEY LAMONT WATERS                                             0     :--.        n
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    BY TOTARO, J.
    On March 5, 2015, shortly after 9:50 p.m., officers of the Lancaster City Bureau of Police
    stopped Sidney Lamont Waters ("Appellant") and two other men in the vicinity of 644 Columbia
    A venue, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, after Lancaster County dispatch reported a call of shots fired
    and gave a description of three males wearing dark hoodies seen in the area. See Affidavit of
    Probable Cause. According to the Affidavit, Appellant and two other men were found matching
    the description. 
    Id.
     Because they believed the men could be armed, officers performed a pat-
    down search of all three individuals, at which time Appellant was found to be carrying a firearm
    with obliterated manufacturers number and suspected marijuana. 
    Id.
     Appellant was taken into
    custody and charged with Firearms Not To be Carried without a License (F3), Possession of a
    Firearm with Altered Manufacturer's Number (F2), and Possession of Marijuana (M).1 
    Id.
    On July 8, 2015, Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, alleging the officers did
    not have a proper warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion to effectuate the stop, search,
    and seizure of Appellant. See Omnibus Pretrial Motion. As such, Appellant claimed the search
    and seizure of a firearm violated his rights as guaranteed by the 4th and 14th Amendments of the
    United States Constitution, as well as Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.               
    Id.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6110.2;   and 35 P.S. § 780-l l 3(a)(31 ), respectively.
    ,   .._
    .
    On September 28, 2015, a suppression hearing was held on Appellant's Motion to
    Suppress Evidence. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the Court found, based on
    specific and articulable facts, that there was reasonable suspicion for police to conduct a
    temporary stop of Appellant in relation to the dispatch of shots fired. (Notes of Transcript at 93-
    94) (hereinafter "N.T."). Moreover, police had reasonable suspicion to believe Appellant was
    potentially armed and dangerous, justifying a protective search of Appellant limited in nature to
    that which was necessary to discover any weapons. Id. Further, the nature of the object as a
    firearm was immediately apparent. Id at 94. Therefore, Appellant's motion was denied. Id.
    Following the suppression hearing, the parties proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. (N.T.
    at 100). At that time, both counsel agreed to incorporate the entire record from the suppression
    hearing. Id. Counsel also entered into a number of stipulations which established factual guilt
    on the firearms charges, and thus the Court found Appellant guilty on those counts.2 Id. at 100-
    104, 106. However, because no evidence was presented with respect to the charge of possession
    of marijuana, the Court found Appellant not guilty of that count. Id. at 104-06. A Presentence
    Investigation Report was ordered, and sentence was deferred pending its completion.3 Id. at 106.
    2
    Counsel stipulated that the firearm found on Appellant was a functional firearm capable of
    expelling a projectile under the action of an explosive; Appellant did not have a license to carry a
    concealed weapon on the date of the offense and because he was only 19 years old on that date he was
    not eligible for such a license; Appellant gave a voluntary statement to police detectives following his
    arrest admitting to possessing the firearm; the manufacture's number on the firearm had been obliterated;
    and Officer Sinnott charged Appellant with the three aforementioned counts. (N .T. at 100-04).
    3
    On December 23, 2015, the trial court imposed a standard range sentence of not less than two
    years nor more than five years in the State Correctional Institution on each count, concurrent to each
    other. (Notes of Transcript, Sentencing at 25) (hereinafter "N.T.S."); Sentencing Guideline Worksheet.
    Appellant was ordered to pay a fine of $100, submit a DNA sample and pay the $250 cost, he was not
    made eligible for the Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive (RRRI) Program, and he received credit for
    time served. (N.T.S. at 25-26). Appellant was also made eligible for boot camp, any programs dealing
    with drug and alcohol addiction, as well as any vocational or educational programs. Id. at 26.
    2
    _ .....
    On January 22, 2016, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Superior Court of
    Pennsylvania.   On February 16, 2016, Appellant timely filed a Statement of Errors Complained
    of on Appeal ("Statement"), claiming the suppression court erred in denying his Motion to
    Suppress Evidence because police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Appellant.
    See Statement. As such, any evidence taken from Appellant should have been suppressed "as the
    fruit of the illegal stop and frisk." Id
    LEGAL STANDARD
    When a motion to suppress has been filed, the burden is on the Commonwealth to
    establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged evidence is admissible.
    Commonwealth v. Bowmaster, 
    101 A.3d 789
    , 792 (Pa. Super. 2014). When the Commonwealth
    prevails on a motion to suppress evidence before the trial court, an appellate court may consider
    only the Commonwealth's evidence and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
    uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
    62 A.3d 433
    , 438 (Pa. Super. 2012).
    Where the record supports the factual findings of the trial court, the appellate court is
    bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
    Commonwealth v. Angel, 
    946 A.2d 115
    , 117 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Russo,
    
    934 A.2d 1199
    , 1203 (Pa. 2007)). While the appellate court is not bound by the lower court's
    conclusions oflaw, "it is within the suppression court's sole province as factfinder to pass on the
    credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony." Angel, 
    946 A.2d at 117
    (quoting Russo, 934 A.2d at 1203); Commonwealth v. Dutrieville, 
    932 A.2d 240
    , 242 (Pa. Super.
    2007); Commonwealth v. Martin, 
    101 A.3d 706
    . 719 (Pa. 2014).
    3
    -                                      -.
    A police officer may conduct an investigative detention of an individual if he has
    reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 
    866 A.2d 1143
    ,
    1147 (Pa. Super. 2005)(citing Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 
    751 A.2d 1153
    , 1156 (Pa. 2000)). That
    suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts known to the officer at the time and
    reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of the officer's experience. Commonwealth
    v. Jackson, 
    698 A.2d 571
    , 573 (Pa. 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 24 (1968)). "The
    fundamental inquiry is an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to the officer at the
    moment of the intrusion warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken
    was appropriate." Zhahir, 751 A.2d at 1156 (quoting Terry, 
    392 U.S. at 21-22
    ) (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    "A police officer need not personally observe the suspicious conduct leading to the
    reasonable belief needed for a Terry stop and may rely upon information received over the police
    radio to justify the initial stop." Commonwealth v. Arch, 
    654 A.2d 1141
    , 1144 (Pa. Super. 1995).
    An officer may also rely on information provided by third parties under certain circumstances.
    Commonwealth v. Korenkiewicz, 743 A.2d at 958, 963 (Pa. Super. 1999).
    Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to stop an individual requires an evaluation
    of the totality of the circumstances, viewed though the eyes of a trained officer rather than an
    ordinary citizen. Zhahir, 751 A.2d at 1156; In re NL., 
    739 A.2d 564
    , 567 (Pa. Super. 1999).
    Factors to consider include "the specificity of the description of the suspect in conjunction with
    how well the suspect fits the given description, the proximity of the crime to the sighting of the
    suspect, the time and place of the confrontation, and the nature of the offense reported to have
    been committed."    Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
    678 A.2d 798
    , 801 (Pa. Super. 1996).
    4
    --
    Once an officer has lawfully detained an individual, the "officer may conduct a limited,
    pat-down search for weapons when the officer has reasonable suspicion that the individual is
    armed and dangerous." Jackson, 698 A.2d at 573. Because the justification of this search is for
    the protection of the officer or others nearby, "such a protective search must be strictly limited to
    that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or
    others nearby." Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 
    744 A.2d 1261
    , 1264-65 (Pa. 2000) (quoting
    Terry, 
    392 U.S. at 26
    ). The nature of the suspected criminal activity is a proper consideration in
    the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a search was appropriate. Zhahir, 751
    A.2d at 1157. It is appropriate for an officer to search an individual when the individual is
    stopped for the investigation of gunshots in the nearby area. Bryant, 
    866 A.2d at 1147
    .
    DISCUSSION
    On March 5, 2015, at approximately 9:51 p.m., Officer Ben Bradley ("Bradley") of the
    Lancaster City Police Department C'LCPD") was patrolling in the area of East Filbert Street
    approaching Lafayette Street when he observed three men running together north on East Filbert
    Street. (N.T. at 6, 8-11). Fresh snow was on the ground and the temperature was 18 degrees. Id.
    at 9. Although it was dark, there were street lights in the area and he could tell they were males.
    Id at 18~ 19. Because hardly anyone was out that night and the ground was icy, Bradley took
    mental note of the three males. Id. at 22. Bradley observed the men were around five foot five
    inches tall, wearing dark clothing that included jackets or hooded sweatshirts. Id. at 10, 17, 18.
    Shortly thereafter, Bradley saw a fourth man look up the street in the direction where the
    first three males had just traveled. (N.T. at 12). When Bradley saw the fourth man throw a
    cardboard pizza box on the ground, Bradley stopped the man for littering. Id. at 12, 20, 22.
    5
    -.
    Approximately 15 seconds after stopping the fourth man, Lancaster County dispatch reported a
    call of shots fired at 25 New Dorwart Street, and gave the description of three individuals who
    were wearing hoodies. Id. at 12-13. According to Bradley, 25 New Dorwart is at the comer of
    Lafayette Street, and the dispatch for shots fired occurred approximately "a minute or less" after
    Bradley saw the three individuals running. Id. at 11-13. At that point, Bradley dispatched
    information about his observation of the three men he just saw running down the street. Id. at 13.
    After clearing the fourth man, Bradley joined the search and was called to assist officers
    who had stopped three men. (N.T. at 13). Upon arrival, Bradley stated the three males who were
    stopped looked like the same three individuals he saw running around the comer on Filbert
    Street, based on their clothing, similar height and build. Id. at 13-14, 23. Furthermore, only a
    few minutes had passed between the time he observed the three men running and the time the
    three individuals were stopped. Id. at 14. Because of the weather, pedestrian traffic was "pretty
    low that night," and from the time he saw the three individuals until he responded to where they
    had been detained Bradley did not see any other groups of individuals matching the description
    that was given out over the radio. Id. at 14-15.
    Bradley testified he has been employed as a police officer with LCPD since October
    2007. (N.T. at 6). He further testified that the area where he saw three men running and where
    the three men were later stopped is within his jurisdiction. Id. at 7. Bradley stated he is familiar
    with the area and officers are frequently dispatched there for criminal activity such as robberies,
    aggravated assaults, and weapons calls. Id. at 8. More specifically, during his career he has seen
    "at least two homicides, three shootings and countless shots fired calls" in the area. Id.
    6
    Officer Michael Fisher ("Fisher") of the LCPD was on duty on March 5, 2015, riding in a
    patrol vehicle with Officer Bogner ("Bogner").   (N.T. at 25-28). At approximately 9:50 p.m.,
    Fisher and Bogner were dispatched to respond to a call of shots fired in the first block of New
    Dorwart Street. Id. at 27-29. The dispatch gave an address and a description of three men in
    hooded sweatshirts. Id. at 29. Thereafter, Fisher and Bogner heard Bradley's radio transmission
    describing his observation of three men wearing darker clothing with hooded sweatshirts on
    Filbert Street. Id. at 29-30. The officers then heard Sergeant McCrady ("McCrady") call out on
    the radio that he located three men in hooded sweatshirts at 644 Columbia Avenue in Lancaster
    City. Id. at 31. Fisher and Bogner responded to McCrady' s location within seconds, and when
    they arrived Fisher saw three men wearing hoodies. Id at 31-34. At no time did Fisher recall
    seeing any other people, "let alone anybody in groups." Id. at 33-34.
    As officers approached the three men, Fisher asked them to "hold up" so officers could
    talk to them. (N.T. at 34). The men complied. Id. at 35. Within a period ofless than four
    minutes, when a sufficient number of officers arrived at the scene, a pat-down search was
    conducted of the three men. Id. at 35-37. According to Fisher, the search was appropriate
    "because of the call that was received and because of the investigation into the shots fired .... "
    Id. at 35. Fisher also testified the area where the shots were fired is a high crime area, based on
    continual problems such as fights, shootings, and weapons calls. Id. at 27, 42.
    Officer Timothy Sinnott ("Sinnott") of the LCPD testified he was working on the evening
    of March 5, 2015, when he heard county dispatchers relay information about a shooting that was
    reported by Maria Montes. (N.T. at 45-46, 61·62). Thereafter, Sinnott responded to the scene
    where three men were being held, arriving within three to five minutes after the call came out for
    7
    shots fired. Id. at 45-50. Prior to arriving at that location, while driving around looking for the
    suspects, Sinnott did not see anyone else out that evening. Id. at 48. According to Sinnott, the
    distance from where the shots were reportedly fired to where Appellant and the other two men
    were stopped was within two to three blocks of each other. Id. at 65-66.
    Upon arrival, Sinnott approached Appellant. (N.T. at 49). While Fisher and Bogner
    conducted pat-down searches of their respective suspects, Sinnott conducted a pat-down search
    of Appellant. Id. at 51. According to Sinnott, he did so due to the nature of the call that had
    been given out and for officer safety. Id. at 52.
    Sinnott conducted the pat-down by "running over the outside of [Appellant's] clothing,
    feeling for anything that [he could] recognize." (N.T. at 52-53). While placing his hand over
    Appellant's right pant leg, Sinnott immediately recognized a hard object in the shape of a firearm
    inside Appellant's right pant pocket. Id. at 53. Sinnott alerted other officers of his finding, at
    which time Appellant was put on the ground and placed in custody. Id. Officer Steven
    Alexander ("Alexander")then retrieved a firearm from underneath Appellant's outer pants, in the
    pocket of his gym shorts. Id. at 55-56.
    At the suppression hearing. Alexander stated he responded to the area where three men
    were being held after hearing a dispatch for shots fired and transmissions from Bradley and
    McCrady detailing their observations. (N.T. at 68-71). Prior to his arrival, while looking for the
    suspects himself, Alexander did not see any other groups of people who matched the description
    put out over the radio. Id at 71. Upon arrival, within approximately five minutes of the initial
    call for shots fired, Alexander observed three males wearing dark clothing. Id. at 71-72.
    Because Appellant was very loud and belligerent, Alexander assisted Sinnott in detaining him.
    8
    Id. at 73. After Sinnott informed Alexander that he felt a firearm on Appellant's person,
    Alexander retrieved a black semiautomatic handgun from the pocket of Appellant's shorts that
    Appellant was wearing underneath his jeans. Id. at 73- 75.
    Appellate court cases support the finding of reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk
    Appellant in the present case. In Commonwealth v. Bryant, 
    supra,
     an officer heard the firing of
    gunshots and saw the appellant and his companions running around the corner from where the
    officer heard the shots originate, while no other persons were seen running at the time. 
    866 A.2d at 1147
    . On appeal, the Superior Court, noting the encounter happened in a high crime area,
    stated as follows:
    Viewing the totality of the circumstances through the lense of [the officer's]
    experience, the combination of the aforementioned facts indicates that [the appellee]
    was engaged in 'unusual and suspicious conduct.' Given the facts before him at the
    time he heard the gunshots and saw [the appellee], [the officer] could have concluded
    reasonably that [the appellee] was a perpetrator, victim, or eyewitness of a possible
    shooting.
    
    Id.
     Therefore, the court concluded the officer possessed sufficient reasonable suspicion to
    conduct a Terry stop. Id The court also found the officer was justified in conducting a pat-down
    frisk for his safety due to recent gunfire in the area. 
    Id.
    In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
    supra,
     there was a radio report of an armed robbery, and
    the only description of the suspect was a male wearing a black baseball hat and black jacket. 
    678 A.2d at 799
    . Five minutes after receiving the report a police officer saw an individual matching
    that description two and one half blocks from the scene of the robbery. 
    Id. at 800
    . Although the
    Superior Court noted there was a meager physical description of an alleged perpetrator wearing
    two common articles of clothing, the Court found the stop and frisk were justified when
    9
    ~-
    considering the totality of circumstances, including the fact that the appellant fit the given
    description, appellant was spatially and temporally proximate to the crime scene when stopped,
    the crime was a serious felony, and it occurred late in the evening in a dangerous area. 
    Id. at 801
    .
    Additionally, in the case of In re Ii.M; 
    727 A.2d 556
     (Pa. 1999), the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court found the stop and frisk of four black males was justified where an identified
    victim reported an armed robbery involving four or five black males, the officer observed four
    black males walking very quickly one-half block from the crime scene about one minute after the
    call, they were the only males the officer observed in the vicinity of the crime, and the group
    abruptly began walking in the opposite direction upon seeing the police. Id. at 558. In justifying
    the stop, the Court recognized that an officer who lacks probable cause to arrest "need not
    'simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.:" Id. at 557. The
    Court further stated the officer "would have been derelict in his duties had he not detained the
    group which was very possibly armed and retreating after having committed a violent armed
    felony mere moments earlier." Id. at 558.
    In the case sub Judice, Officer Bradley was patrolling in the area of East Filbert Street
    approaching Lafayette Street in Lancaster City when he observed three men running together
    north on East Filbert Street. This was in a high crime area, where there are continual problems
    such as fights, shootings, and weapons calls. Because hardly anyone was out that night and the
    ground was icy, Bradley took mental note of the three males and what they were wearing.
    Within one minute of seeing these individuals, Lancaster County dispatch reported a call of shots
    fired occurring at 25 New Dorwart Street, and gave the description of three individuals who were
    wearing hoodies. The call and information were provided by an identified individual.
    10
    According to Bradley, the three men were observed by him running in close proximity to
    the area where the shots were reportedly fired, less than five minutes afer the report of gunshots.
    The men were also wearing clothing that matched the description given by the caller. Based on
    the totality of these circumstances, Bradley believed the three individuals he saw were involved
    in the shooting. Therefore, Bradley dispatched information about his observations of the three
    men to other officers.
    A few minutes later, Bradley was called to assist officers who had stopped three men that
    were wearing dark clothing. The officers made the stop based on information contained in the
    police dispatch and information provided by Bradley. The distance from where the shots were
    reportedly fired to where Appellant and the other two men were stopped was within two to three
    blocks of each other. Upon arrival, Bradley stated the three males who were stopped looked like
    the same three individuals he saw running, based on their clothing, similar height and build.
    Moreover, officers did not see any other groups of individuals matching the description given
    over the radio between the time of dispatch and the stop of Appellant and his two colleagues.
    Based on this information, the trial court properly found that Bradley had specific and
    articulable facts, and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of his experience, to
    suspect that the three individuals he had observed running in the street shortly before a dispatch
    for shots fired and who were subsequently stopped by police were the same individuals involved
    in the shooting. Additionally, based on the suspected criminal activity and close proximity to the
    area where the shots were reportedly fired, the officers had reasonable suspicion to suspect that
    Appellant and his two colleagues were armed and dangerous. As such, the pat-down frisk
    conducted of Appellant was appropriate for officer safety. Moreover, the manner in which the
    11
    search was performed was limited to what was necessary for the discovery of weapons that might
    be used to harm the officers, and the discovery of a firearm was readily apparent. Thus, the
    search itself was reasonable.
    CONCLUSION
    Based on the foregoing, the Court did not err when it found the officers had reasonable
    suspicion to stop and search Appellant. Therefore, this appeal should be denied.
    BY THE COURT:
    Date: -=M~ar=-c=h~l 7'-'-,. .e: 2=0..e. cl 6"'---                       DONALD R. TOT ARO, JUDGE
    ATTEST:
    Copies:                  Travis S. Anderson, Esquire, Assistant District Attorney
    Diana C. Kelleher, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender
    •. ,
    I certify this document to be filed
    in the Lancaster County Office of
    the Clerk of the Courts.
    Jacquelyn E. Pfursich
    Clerk of Courts
    12