Com. v. Rosa-Diaz, G. ( 2019 )


Menu:
  • J-S43011-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    GABRIEL OMAR ROSA-DIAZ
    Appellant                 No. 1599 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence imposed August 18, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of the 37th Judicial District
    Forest County Branch
    Criminal Division at No: CP-27-CR-0000005-2017
    BEFORE: STABILE, DUBOW, and NICHOLS, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                      FILED JANUARY 25, 2019
    Appellant, Gabriel Omar Rosa Diaz, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of the 37th Judicial District,
    Forest County Branch, on August 18, 2017.      Counsel has filed a brief and
    petition to withdraw pursuant to Anders. v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967)
    and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
     (Pa. 2009).             We grant
    counsel’s petition to withdraw, and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
    The facts of the case are undisputed.      Briefly, on June 28, 2017,
    Appellant pled guilty to criminal mischief and dangerous burning. On August
    18, 2017, Appellant was sentenced to a period of incarceration of 6 months to
    1 year, to run concurrently to the sentence he was serving at that time.
    J-S43011-18
    Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied after
    argument on October 4, 2017. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, counsel filed an Anders brief challenging the discretionary
    aspects of Appellant’s sentence. Specifically, Appellant argues the sentence
    was unreasonable excessive, considering Appellant’s low prior record score
    and the circumstances surrounding the crimes.
    Before we address the merits of the challenge, we must consider the
    adequacy of counsel’s compliance with Anders and Santiago. Our Supreme
    Court requires counsel to do the following.
    Prior to withdrawing as counsel on a direct appeal under Anders,
    counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements established
    by our Supreme Court in Santiago. The brief must:
    (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
    with citations to the record;
    (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes
    arguably supports the appeal;
    (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
    frivolous; and
    (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
    frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
    controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
    conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    Counsel also must provide a copy of the Anders brief to his client.
    Attending the brief must be a letter that advises the client of his
    right to: (1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed
    pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems
    worthy of the court[’]s attention in addition to the points raised
    by counsel in the Anders brief.
    Commonwealth v. Orellana, 
    86 A.3d 877
    , 879–80 (Pa. Super. 2014).
    -2-
    J-S43011-18
    Upon review of the record, we conclude counsel has satisfied the
    requirements set forth in Anders and Santiago.1
    Having determined that the Anders and Santiago requirements are
    satisfied, it is incumbent upon this Court to “conduct an independent review
    of the record to discern if there are any additional, non-frivolous issues
    overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 
    113 A.3d 1246
    , 1250
    (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations and footnote omitted).
    The issue raised on appeal, namely, excessiveness of sentence,
    involves the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence.          See, e.g.,
    Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 
    961 A.2d 884
    , 886 (Pa. Super. 2008). As such,
    Appellant does not enjoy an absolute right to appeal but must present a
    substantial question to this Court that his sentence violates a particular
    provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental norms
    underlying the sentencing process.             Commonwealth v. Boyer, 
    856 A.2d 149
    , 152 (Pa. Super. 2004).
    ____________________________________________
    1 We previously denied counsel’s petition to withdraw and remanded to the
    trial court for counsel to file a proper Anders brief or an advocate brief
    because the record was not clear whether counsel had properly advised
    Appellant of his rights in connection with counsel’s petition to withdraw. See
    Commonwealth v. Rosa-Diaz, No, 1599 EDA 2017, unpublished
    memorandum at 3-4 (Pa. Super. filed October 22, 2018) Counsel filed an
    application for reconsideration of our memorandum, addressing our concerns
    pertaining to the apparently missing information. The application to withdraw
    is now complete, and ripe for our consideration.
    -3-
    J-S43011-18
    Here, Appellant merely alleges that the sentence was unreasonably
    excessive, without identifying how the sentence imposed violates the
    Sentencing Code or the sentencing process. Lacking any support in the facts
    or the law, we must conclude that Appellant failed to raise a substantial
    question. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bromley, 
    862 A.2d 598
    , 604 (Pa.
    Super. 2004) (explaining defendant did not raise a substantial question by
    merely asserting sentence was excessive when he failed to reference any
    section of Sentencing Code potentially violated by the sentence), appeal
    denied, 
    881 A.2d 818
     (Pa. 2005).
    We also note that the record reveals that the sentencing court was fully
    aware of Appellant’s prior record score and the circumstances surrounding the
    crimes.    N.T. Sentencing, 8/18/17, at 16.    It is clear, therefore, that the
    sentencing court considered all circumstances, including those mentioned by
    Appellant.    Appellant, however, seems to argue that the sentencing court
    should have weighed those mitigating circumstances in a more favorable light
    to Appellant. We disagree.
    It is well-settled that mere dissatisfaction with the sentencing court’s
    weighing of sentencing considerations is not sufficient to raise a substantial
    question for our review. Moury, 992 A.2d at 175; see also Commonwealth
    v. Cannon, 
    954 A.2d 1222
    , 1229 (Pa. Super. 2008) (a claim of inadequate
    consideration of mitigating circumstances does not raise a substantial question
    -4-
    J-S43011-18
    for review); Commonwealth v. Ladamus, 
    896 A.2d 592
    , 595 (Pa. Super.
    2006) (same).
    We have conducted an independent review of the record and addressed
    Appellant’s argument on appeal. Based on our conclusions above, we agree
    with counsel that the issue Appellant seeks to litigate in this appeal is wholly
    frivolous.   Additionally, we do not discern any non-frivolous issues that
    Appellant could have raised.    In light of the foregoing, we grant counsel’s
    petition to withdraw and affirm his judgment of sentence.
    Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/25/2019
    -5-