A.O. v. P.O. ( 2015 )

J-A08019-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
A.O. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
P.O.
Appellee No. 1733 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered September 10, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Orphans’ Court at No.: 06FC 40111
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED MARCH 30, 2015
A.O. (“Mother”) appeals the September 10, 2014 order that denied her
petition to remove the guardian ad litem (“G.A.L.”) of the minor children
who are the subject of custody litigation between Mother and P.O.
(“Father”). After review, we quash the appeal.
The trial court provided the following summary of the history of this
case:
On January 24, 2006, Mother filed a complaint in custody against
[Father] seeking custody of the minor children, K.O. and L.O.
On February 21, 2006, [the] Honorable Judge [Chester] Harhut
awarded primary physical custody to Mother and shared legal
custody between Mother and Father. Father had periods of
partial custody on weekends and Wednesdays. Because of the
acrimonious relationship between the parties, the order also
stated that “neither parent shall say or do anything in the
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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presence or hearing of the children that would in any way
diminish the children’s love or affection for the other parent, and
shall not allow others to do so.” On September 20, 2006, [the]
Honorable Judge Harhut appointed Michael Marrazzo, Esquire, as
G.A.L. of the minor children, who agreed to provide his services
pro bono. On June 19, 2007, [the] Honorable Judge Harhut
ordered that Danielle Ross, Esquire, would replace Attorney
Marrazzo as the G.A.L. for the minor children and Lackawanna
County would pay the services of the G.A.L. . . .
On June 3, 2013, Bonni Shelp, Esquire, replaced Danielle Ross,
Esquire, as G.A.L. of the minor children. On June 4, 2013,
Attorney Shelp filed a petition for emergency special relief in
custody seeking to prohibit Mother from relocating to Pottstown
with the minor children and to transfer custody of the minor
children to Father. The G.A.L. alleged in her petition that she
was advised that Mother had decided to relocate and had taken
substantial steps in furtherance of that goal without conferring
with Father or filing a petition to relocate with the court. On
June 14, 2014, following a hearing on the G.A.L.’s petition for
special relief, [the] Honorable Judge [Margaret] Moyle modified
custody to shared physical custody of the [children]. On June
20, 2013, Mother then filed a petition to modify [the] custody
order due to relocation, in which Mother sought to relocate the
minor children to Pottstown, PA. After an evidentiary hearing on
the matter in front of [the trial] court on August 12, 2013 on
Mother’s proposed relocation, [the trial] court granted the
G.A.L.’s request for a nonsuit, holding that Mother, the party
proposing relocation, failed to sustain her burden in establishing
that relocation would serve the best interest of the minor
children. On November 13, 2013, [the trial] court entered an
opinion setting forth its reasons for denying Mother’s relocation.
The Superior Court remanded Mother’s relocation to [the trial]
court,[1] and the hearing has not yet been held, due to several
requests for continuances by Mother. On April 30, 2014, Mother
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1
This Court vacated the trial court’s order, holding that the trial court
erred in precluding evidence pertaining to custody when both custody and
relocation were implicated in Mother’s petition. A.O. v. P.O., 1645 MDA
2013, at 8-9. (Pa. Super. March 17, 2014) (unpublished memorandum). We
also noted that the grant of a nonsuit was procedurally improper. Id. at 7
n.1. We remanded the case for a full evidentiary hearing. Id. at 10.
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filed a motion to remove [the Honorable Richard Saxton] from
this case, alleging “where upon advise [sic] of Ms. Shelp, the
Honorable Judge Saxton refused to hear pertinent evidence and
witnesses.”
On July 3, 2014, Mother filed a petition to remove [the] G.A.L.
from this case. Mother alleged in her petition that Attorney
Shelp lost impartiality and had an “overly adversarial
relationship to Mother.” A hearing was set before [the trial]
court on August 11, 2014 on Mother’s petition and later
continued to August 29, 2014 before [the trial] court.
On August 29, 2014, [the trial] court heard oral argument on
Mother’s petition to remove the G.A.L. At the conclusion of the
hearing, [the trial] court found that Mother did not present
sufficient evidence to support her petition and denied Mother’s
petition. [The trial] court entered an order on September 10,
2014 codifying [the trial] court’s decision to deny Mother’s
petition.
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 11/10/2014, at 1-4 (minor modifications to
capitalization and punctuation; footnote and citations to record omitted).
On October 8, 2014, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and her
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On November 10, 2014, the trial court filed its Rule
1925(a) opinion.
Before we reach the issues that Mother raises in her appeal, we first
must ensure that the September 10, 2014 order is appealable. “Ordinarily,
this Court has jurisdiction only of appeals from final orders.” D.L.H. v.
R.W.L., 777 A.2d 1158, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2001). “[A] custody order will be
considered final and appealable only if it is both: 1) entered after the court
has completed its hearings on the merits; and 2) intended by the court to
constitute a complete resolution of the custody claims pending between the
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parties.” G.B. v. M.M.B., 670 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. Super. 1996); see also
Pa.R.A.P. 341(b) (defining a final order as one that: (1) disposes of all
claims and all parties; (2) is defined as a final order by statute; or (3) is
entered as an express final order by the trial court). At the time of the
hearing on Mother’s petition to remove the G.A.L., there was a pending
remand from this Court for a full evidentiary hearing on Mother’s petition for
relocation. As that has yet to occur and has been continued pending the
instant appeal, the trial court could not have intended its September 10,
2014 order to “constitute a complete resolution of the custody claims
pending between the parties.” G.B., supra. Therefore, the order was not a
final order.
However, this does not end our inquiry. Even it is not a final order, an
order is appealable if it is an interlocutory appeal as of right, see Pa.R.A.P.
311; an interlocutory appeal by permission, see Pa.R.A.P. 312; or a
collateral order, see Pa.R.A.P. 313. Mother did not file a petition for
permission to appeal so the order is not appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
312 and 1311. Denial of a petition to remove a G.A.L. is not listed as an
interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311.
Therefore, we must consider whether Mother’s appeal is from a
collateral order. “A collateral order is an order separable from and collateral
to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be
denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed
until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P.
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313(b). Therefore, the three elements of a collateral order are “separability,
importance and irreparable loss.” Rehrer v. Youst, 91 A.3d 183, 188 (Pa.
Super. 2014).
Rehrer, while not directly on point, is instructive. In Rehrer, upon a
motion by the defendants, a trial court appointed a G.A.L. for an
incapacitated minor who was the plaintiff, along with her mother, in a
negligence suit. Id. at 186-87. The mother appealed the appointment.
This Court determined that the appointment was a collateral order. First, it
held that the issue concerning the G.A.L. (whether the trial court abused its
discretion in determining that a G.A.L. was needed to effectuate the minor’s
best interests) was separable from the underlying issue of the case (whether
the defendants were negligent). Next, this Court found that the issue was
too important to be denied review because the mother was losing her
fundamental right as a parent to make decisions regarding her child:
namely, the protection of the child’s legal interests. Finally, because the
G.A.L. had the authority to settle the law suit, if settlement were reached,
the mother would have no avenue to contest the appointment, and the claim
would be irreparably lost. Id. at 188.
The facts of this case lead to a different result. Unlike the negligence
action in Rehrer, appointment of a G.A.L. is entwined with the underlying
action and is not separable. A G.A.L. represents a child’s best interest and is
only appointed when necessary to assist with the determination of the child’s
best interest. See Pa.R.A.P. 1915.11-2(a). Similarly, the purpose of the
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underlying relocation and custody action is also to determine the children’s
best interest. S.J.S. v. M.J.S., 76 A.3d 541, 554 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“Our
concern in any custody or relocation matter is the best interest of the
child.”). Also, this case does not present that same type of important issue
that cannot be denied review. Mother is not losing any fundamental
parental rights. Whether or not the G.A.L. is involved, the trial court will
determine what custody rights Mother will have. Finally, Mother will be able
to present her current claims regarding the G.A.L. if she decides to appeal
the final custody order after the pending hearing, so her claim will not be
irreparably lost. As it satisfies none of the prongs of Rule 313, the order
appealed is not a collateral order. Therefore, it is not an appealable order
and accordingly, this appeal is quashed.
As guidance for the pending hearing on Mother’s relocation, we note
that, at the prior relocation hearing, the G.A.L. acted as counsel, including
cross-examining witnesses. See, e.g., Notes of Testimony, 8/12/2013, at
40. As of September 3, 2013, a G.A.L. no longer has the right to present
witnesses or evidence or examine or cross-examine witnesses. Pa.R.A.P.
1915.11-2, Note; 1915.25. Therefore, in future proceedings, the G.A.L.
shall not be permitted to cross-examine witnesses.
Appeal quashed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/30/2015
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