Com. v. Williams, J. ( 2017 )

J-S23029-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JACK WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 2901 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order Dated August 9, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0503781-1997
BEFORE: OLSON, J., SOLANO, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY SOLANO, J.: FILED JULY 14, 2017
Appellant Jack Williams appeals from the order dismissing his petition
filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546,
as untimely. We affirm.
The facts leading to Appellant’s conviction are not relevant to our
disposition.1 Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder2 following a jury
1
In brief, on July 13, 1996, Appellant shot Paul Jones several times and
killed him as Jones was sitting in the driver seat of his car. Appellant, who
was standing outside of the car and arguing with Jones, was angry; Jones’
selling of a stolen car to Appellant had caused Appellant to be arrested for
auto theft two weeks earlier. See PCRA Ct. Op., 11/10/16, at 2-3.
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).
J-S23029-17
trial in May of 1998, and was thereafter sentenced to life imprisonment. 3
Appellant received no relief following his direct appeal or his first or second
PCRA petitions. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 1-2.
The instant petition, Appellant’s third, was filed pro se on August 20,
2012. The PCRA court issued a noticed of its intention to dismiss the petition
on June 1, 2016, and Appellant responded on June 17, 2016. The PCRA
court dismissed his petition on August 9, 2016. Appellant thereafter filed this
timely appeal. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 2.
Appellant presents a single issue for our review, which is, “Did
[Appellant file] his third PCRA petition timely under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii)[ & ](2) within sixty days?” Appellant’s Brief at 3.
“[I]n reviewing the propriety of an order granting or denying PCRA
relief, this Court is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the
determination of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal
error.” Commonwealth v. Andrews, ___ A.3d ___, 2017 WL 1290747 at *
3 (Pa. Super., Apr. 7, 2017) (citation omitted).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Leon W.
Tucker, we conclude that the PCRA court properly denied relief on the basis
3
Appellant was also convicted of possession of an instrument of crime, 18
Pa.C.S. § 907, and carrying a firearm on public streets in Philadelphia, 18
Pa.C.S. § 6108, for which he received lesser sentences.
-2-
J-S23029-17
of the petition’s untimeliness. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 3-5 (finding that the
timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional prerequisite; Appellant’s
petition was facially untimely as it was not filed within a year of when his
judgment of sentence became final, see 42. Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); Appellant
claimed an exception to the one-year time-bar under 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1)(iii), which allows for the filing of otherwise late petitions where
the petitioner asserts a constitutional right that has been newly recognized
by either the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania and has been held by that court to apply retroactively;
Appellant based his exception on Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455(2012)4; and the Miller decision does not apply to Appellant because he was
not under the age of eighteen when he committed the crime for which he
was sentenced to life imprisonment5).
Thus, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s opinion, and we
instruct the parties to attach a copy of the PCRA court’s opinion of
November 10, 2016, to any future filing that references this Court’s decision.
4
Miller held unconstitutional mandatory sentences of life without parole for
juveniles who were under the age of eighteen when they committed the
offense for which they were sentenced. Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2460.
Montgomery v. Lousiana, 136 S.Ct. 718, 736 (2016), held that the rule
announced in Miller has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review.
5
While the record does not appear to state Appellant’s date of birth,
Appellant has admitted that he was eighteen years of age at the time he
committed the murder. See Appellant’s Brief at 6. Information in the public
trial court docket shows that Appellant was almost 18 years 5 months old at
the time of the murder.
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J-S23029-17
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/14/2017
-4-
0011_Memorandum_Opinion
Circulated 06/26/2017 03:37 PM