Goetz, L. v. Williams, M. & A. ( 2018 )

J-A07033-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
LINDA M. GOETZ : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
MICHAEL A. & ANN WILLIAMS : No. 1175 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment Entered July 26, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Civil Division at No(s):
2013-SU-0000610
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 25, 2018
Appellant Linda M. Goetz (hereinafter “Linda”) appeals from the
judgment entered on July 26, 2017, following a non-jury verdict in the Court
of Common Pleas of Adams County confirming the default judgment entered
on May 5, 2015, on her quiet title action in favor of Michael A. Williams
(hereinafter “Michael”).1 As Appellant has failed to submit an appropriate
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1 In accordance with a per curiam Order of this Court entered on April 29,
2015, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Michael and against Linda
as directed in its prior order of March 24, 2015. However, the Order was not
entered on the docket until March 25, 2015. Therein, the trial court denied
Linda’s motion for post-trial relief filed following its Order entered on
December 15, 2014. In its December 15, 2014, Order, the trial court found
Linda had failed to carry her burden of proof and entered judgment in favor
of Michael and against Linda on Linda’s action to quiet title and all other claims
set forth in her Amended Complaint wherein she had sought to nullify the
mortgage in question to clear title to the subject real estate. In addition,
Linda had entered a default judgment against Michael’s Mother, Ann Williams,
thereby extinguishing Ms. Williams’ mortgage against the subject property.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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concise statement of errors complained of on appeal as required by Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b), we find all her arguments are waived on appeal. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment.
This Court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history in our prior
memorandum decision as follows:
This dispute has its roots in the protracted divorce between
Linda and her ex-husband, Robert Goetz, who is Michael’s uncle.
The following summary of those divorce proceedings are taken
from a master in equitable distribution’s report.
The parties met in 1985; they began living together in
1987. They were married on April 26, 1991 in Frederick
County, Maryland. The marriage was the second for
Husband and the third for Wife. The parties separated
during the marriage several times, the longest of which
was December 1996 through December 2000. … The
parties separated for the final time in September 2004.
The instant Complaint in Divorce was filed by Wife on
March 21, 2005 ….
The central dispute in this matter has been the
determination of what constitutes marital assets.
Husband claims that all real property and assets are his
sole property; Wife claims that all real property and
assets are marital property. The issue arises from
documents entitled “Prenuptial Agreement” and
“Postnuptial Agreement” signed by the parties, and
equitable considerations raised by the parties’ [sic], and
particularly Husband’s actions and statements in prior
matters before various courts, including the first divorce
…; a property claim advanced by the parties … to avoid
a Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
lien; and a bankruptcy petition filed by Husband in 2005
after the parties’ final separation. … The Opinion and
Order of the [trial court] dated August 15, 2008, …
affirmed the validity of the Prenuptial Agreement and the
invalidity and unenforceability of the Postnuptial
Agreement. … Despite the above, Husband continues to
claim that by virtue of the Postnuptial Agreement, Wife
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has no interest in any real property or the proceeds of
the public auction of business related joint property and
at subsequent Master’s hearings spent considerable time
introducing evidence intended to show ownership of
assets pre-dated the marriage.
On October 15, 2008, Husband having failed to pay
alimony pendente lite arrearages and counsel fees under
Orders of Court … in the amount of $57,496.96, Wife
obtained a judgment and filed a Writ of Execution. A
Sheriff’s sale of construction equipment and salvage
materials to satisfy the judgment was scheduled for
February 26, 2009. Husband requested Wife’s
cooperation to obtain funds against marital property at
3380 Chambersburg Road to forestall the sale. Wife
cooperated in signing four mortgages. Husband obtained
$35,000.00 against three of those mortgages, but did
not obtain the remaining $25,000 against the fourth
mortgage. Husband did not pay any amount to Wife. [As
a result] Wife filed her Fourth Petition for Special Relief
asking for [a public auction instead of a sheriff’s sale,]
which was scheduled for Saturday, April 18, 2009.
Report and Recommendation of Master, 1/26/11, at 1-3.2 Of the
$35,000 borrowed by Robert against 3380 Chambersburg Road,
Michael provided $25,000.
Then-counsel for Robert, John A. Wolfe, Esq., deposited the
checks in an escrow account. At some point after that, Attorney
Wolfe withdrew from the case, and Husband retained a new
lawyer, Richard K. Konkel, Esq. On April 17, 2009, Attorney
Konkel disbursed the proceeds of the escrow account created by
Attorney Wolfe to Robert.
At the auction on April 18, 2009, Michael signed a bid
agreement with the auctioneer, Wolfe Industrial Auctions, Inc.3
Paragraph 1 of the agreement provided that “[a]ll prospective
buyers must register and receive a bidder’s card.” Paragraph 8 of
the document provided that in the event that the purchase price
was not paid, the auctioneer was entitled to recover any losses
from the buyer, including attorney’s fees and court costs. At the
bottom of the page, Michael’s signature is identified as the
signature of buyer. The number 60 is handwritten at the top of
the page.
Michael’s testimony regarding what happened at the auction
is dependent upon the circumstances under which his testimony
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was taken and contradictory in certain aspects. The consistent
aspects of his testimony are that he was bidder #60 at the
auction. Furthermore, Michael admitted that Robert performed the
bidding under bid card #60, and that Robert, and not he, had
provided the funds to pay for the purchase price of all items
purchased under bid card #60. Finally, it is undisputed that Robert
brought $35,000 to the auction and used it towards the purchase
price of the assets purchased under bid card #60.
The inconsistencies in Michael’s statements under oath
concern the reasons why Robert was the person making the bids
at auction. When he testified on July 8, 2010, during the divorce
case between Linda and Robert, Michael stated that Robert
performed the bidding because “[h]e knew the history of all his
equipment much more extensive[ly] than I did.” N.T., 7/8/10, at
1815.4 As far as the reason why the items were purchased,
Michael testified, “I was going to resell the equipment.” Id., at
1815; 1829-1830. After the conclusion of the auction, Michael
testified that Robert told him that he would pay for the purchases
because Robert “was going to get my $25,000 back.” Id., at 1835.
In contrast, during the non-jury trial in the present case on
October 28, 2014, Michael testified that he did not purchase
anything at the auction. See N.T., 10/24/14, at 59. Furthermore,
he testified that Robert purchased all of the items under bid card
#60 and did not give Williams any of the items purchased. See id.
Approximately eight months later, Michael recorded the
mortgage on 3380 Chambersburg Road. The property was later
sold pursuant to a sheriff’s sale to satisfy Linda’s claims against
Robert.
The central dispute in this current litigation is the ongoing
validity of the mortgage, executed by Robert and Linda, against
3380 Chambersburg Road and held by Michael. Of relevance to
the current appeal, Linda argues that Robert had in fact paid off
the $25,000 loan to Williams on the date of the auction by paying
for the purchases.5 The trial court found that there was no
evidence to support a finding that Robert had satisfied the loan.
We disagree, and conclude that pursuant to the stipulations
agreed to by Williams, there is an outstanding question regarding
the arrangements between Michael and Robert at and after the
auction.
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2 As Michael was not a party to the divorce proceeding, none of
the factual findings from that proceeding can be held against him.
Linda submitted the Masters’ Reports as exhibits in the non-jury
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trial. However, the trial court sustained Michael’s objections to
their admission. We utilize the reports merely to summarize the
factual and procedural history to provide context to Linda’s claims
in this matter in a manner consistent with the factual record
developed in the trial court.
3The record does not indicate any relationship between Attorney
Wolfe and the auctioneer.
4 Michael argues, on appeal, that this transcript was not admitted
at trial. However, when Linda was questioned regarding Michael’s
prior testimony, the trial court stated “The [c]ourt will read the
transcript.” N.T., 10/28/14, at 18. Michael did not object, and the
transcript was not one of the exhibits the trial court explicitly
excluded from admission at the close of Linda’s evidence.
5Linda propounded several theories for relief in her complaint. As
we conclude that a remand is necessary on this issue, we need
not catalogue the other theories.
Goetz v. Williams, No. 692 MDA 2015, unpublished memorandum at 1-6
(Pa.Super. filed March 7, 2016).
This Court went on to list numerous stipulated facts and indicated that
we were “concerned solely with the application of law” thereto. Id. at 6.
Specifically, we explained:
As noted previously, the Terms of Sale document provides that
Michael, as purchaser, was liable for the purchase price due for
any asset purchased under his bid number. Furthermore, the
attached transaction list referenced in stipulation 30 indicates that
Michael, as purchaser, was liable for a total purchase price at
auction of $61,240.
Under these stipulated facts, Michael was the purchaser at
auction, and liable for the purchase price to Wolfe Industrial
Auctions. See Graver v. O’Reilly, 55 Pa. Super. 505, at *3
(1913). Robert’s act in settling Michael’s account after the auction
was in fact income to Michael in the form of retirement of the debt
Michael owed Wolfe Industrial Auctions. See, e.g., United States
v. Centennial Savings Bank FSB, 111 S. Ct. 1512, 1518 (U.S.
1991) (“if the taxpayer is thereafter released from his obligation
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to repay [a debt,] the taxpayer enjoys a net increase in assets
equal to the forgiven portion of the debt”); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302
(providing that in support issues, discharge of indebtedness is
included as income for the debtor). Furthermore, as the party
signing the Terms of Sale and identified as the buyer under bid
card #60, the assets purchased at the auction were transferred to
Michael’s ownership as a matter of law as soon as the bid was
paid. What happened next is to be the issue on remand.
There is conflicting evidence, from Michael himself,
regarding what happened to the assets. If Michael’s prior
testimony is credited, he retained the assets for later resale for
his own benefit. Furthermore, in his earlier testimony, Michael
suggested that this discharge of his debt was related to his
$25,000 loan to Robert. If this testimony is credited, the
mortgage has been discharged.
On the other hand, if Michael’s recent testimony is credited,
Robert used Michael’s name, and not his own, at the auction to
purchase items for himself. However, this clandestine
arrangement did not change the legal reality that Michael gained
title to the assets purchased under his name. If somehow this
testimony is credited, it is necessary for the trial court to
determine the purpose of Michael’s transfer of the assets to
Robert. Was it a gift to Robert? Was it pursuant to an oral
contract? If pursuant to an oral contract, what was the
consideration to Michael for assuming the liability in the first
instance? And ultimately, what effect would any of these findings
have on Robert’s liability to Michael pursuant to the note and
mortgage?
We cannot address these issues in the absence of credibility
determinations. We therefore vacate the judgment, and remand
for the trial court to hold such further proceedings, if any, it deems
necessary to address these issues.
Id. at 7-9 (emphasis added). Michael filed his Petition for Rehearing En Banc
with this Court on March 18, 2016, and we denied the same by per curiam
order on May 12, 2016.
In accordance with our Memorandum decision, upon remand the trial
court conducted a hearing the purpose of which was to enable it to make
findings pertaining to the details of the arrangements between Michael and
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Robert Goetz (hereinafter “Robert”) in connection with the public auction held
on April 18, 2009. At the outset of the hearing, Linda chose not to supplement
the record with additional evidence and rested. N.T., 1/11/17, at 3-4.
Thereafter, Michael called Robert on direct examination. Id. at 6. Robert
explained that while Michael received the ticket to bid, Robert did the actual
bidding. Robert stated he did not want his identity to be revealed as a bidder,
because his name appeared on a number of the items to be auctioned. Id. at
7. Robert estimated that he had bid $61,000 by the end of the auction. Id.
Robert further testified that while Michael paid nothing for the auctioned
items, Robert paid thirty-five thousand dollars with funds he had borrowed,
and the trial court awarded Linda twenty-eight thousand dollars to cover the
difference in the divorce proceeding. Id. Robert stated he did not give any
of the items purchased or cash proceeds from the liquidation thereof to
Michael, nor did he pay Michael any portion of the twenty-five thousand dollars
Michael had lent to him. Id. at 8.
On cross-examination, counsel for Linda questioned Robert about
numerous statements Michael had made while testifying at the divorce
proceeding on July 8, 2012. Id. at 10-15. Robert clarified that the trial court
had determined Robert was buyer number sixty at the auction. Id. at 16-17.
Robert consistently testified he did not remember or know the answers to
numerous additional questions counsel posed which harkened back to the
divorce proceeding. Id. at 18-23. Argument ensued at which time Robert’s
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counsel indicated that the matters about which Linda’s counsel was asking
questions had been resolved pursuant to the divorce proceeding. Id. at 27.
Specifically counsel explained:
[Robert] paid for the items. Judge Bigham entered an order
solidifying that situation. Master Phillips laid out in detail where
the $61,000 came from, 35 from [Robert] and an allocation
against [Robert’s] property division in favor of [Linda]. [Linda’s
counsel] is acting like this is an issue that is still unresolved. He
was the winner in this case and he has all of these documents.
Id. at 27. Following this statement, the trial court admitted Linda’s exhibits
9 and 10 solely for the purpose of impeaching Robert.2 After additional
questioning regarding the manner in which the property obtained at the
auction had been disposed, Robert’s counsel objected. The trial court
indicated that the line of questioning exceeded the scope of cross-examination
and was essentially an attempt to re-litigate the divorce proceeding and
explore a collateral bankruptcy proceeding that was initiated on April 26,
2013, which it deemed to be impermissible. Id. at 30-34, 41-43.
Robert could not explain why a mortgage to Michael had not been
recorded until nearly a year after Robert received the twenty-five thousand
dollars from Michael, nor could he recall why the mortgage had not been
recorded “until more than eight months after [Robert] used the $25,000 to
pay on account of items purchased on bid number 60 at the public auction[.]”
____________________________________________
2Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9 is Linda’s sixth petition for special relief in the divorce
matter and Exhibit 10 is Robert’s reply thereto.
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Id. at 46. Robert also did not recall recording a $25,000 mortgage from Linda
and him to Robert’s sister, Ann Williams. Id. at 46-48.
Following Robert’s testimony, Linda briefly testified.3 She indicated she
never received payment on the judgment in her favor in the divorce case
which exceeded fifty-seven thousand dollars for counsel fees, expenses and
alimony pendente lite. Id. at 51. She also identified Plaintiff’s Exhibit 24 as
a receipt from the Register and Recorders Office as the recording of the “Ann
Williams mortgage.” Id. She further explained that Plaintiff’s Exhibit 25 was
a copy of a mortgage to Michael in the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars.
Id. She acknowledged the mortgage “says Ann Williams about five lines
down” and that her signature appeared on the fourth page. Id.
Following the January 11, 2017, hearing, the trial court issued an Order
on June 30, 2017, which reads as follows:
AND NOW, this 30th day of June, 2017, after hearing held
in this matter and after consideration of the proposed findings of
fact submitted by each party, pursuant to the direction of the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, the [c]ourt makes the following
factual findings:
1. The Findings of Fact entered on December 15, 2014[,] are
Reaffirmed and incorporated herein by reference.
2. The Court finds the testimony of Michael Williams credible
when he indicates that he has never received any payment
on the $25,000 mortgage executed to him by Robert K.
Goetz, Jr. and Linda M. Goetz. Transcript of non-jury trial,
October 28, 2014, pg. 59-60.
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3Her testimony on direct examination spans just one page, and counsel for
Michael asked no questions on cross-examination.
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3. The mortgage referred to in paragraph 2 above secured a
loan to the parties from Michael Williams in the amount of
$25,000 as evidenced by Check No. 510. Plaintiffs Exhibit
No. 4.
4. Michael Williams registered as Bidder No. 60 at a public
auction of marital assets in the Goetz divorce which was held
on April 18, 2009. Stipulation of Fact No. 23.
5. Michael Williams registered as Bidder No. 60 to facilitate
bidding on the auctioned items by Robert Goetz, Jr. Tr., pg.
59.
6. Michael Williams did not pay for any item bid under Bid No.
60 nor received proceeds or income from any item
purchased under Bid No. 60. Tr., pg. 59.
7. The total purchase price for items purchased under Bid No.
60 was $61,240. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 7.
8. Robert Goetz, Jr. paid $35,000 on account of the items
purchased against Bid No. 60. Stipulation of Fact No. 8.
9. $26,240 of the $61,240 due under Bid No. 60 was never
paid to the auctioneer. Plaintiffs No. 17; Finding of Fact No.
64; Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 9, paragraph 76.
10. Vehicles purchased at auction under Bid No. 60 could
not be transferred due to clouds on the title to the vehicles.
Plaintiffs No. 9, paragraphs 23-52.
11. The $26,240 not paid to the auctioneer under Bid No.
60 was assessed to Robert Goetz, Jr. as part of the property
distribution in the divorce proceeding between Robert
Goetz, Jr. and Linda Goetz. Plaintiffs No. 17,
Recommendation 4H, pg. 25.
12. Possession of the $61,240 worth of equipment
purchased under Bid No. 60 was awarded to Robert Goetz,
Jr. as part of the master's recommendations in the divorce
between Robert Goetz, Jr. and Linda Goetz. Plaintiffs No. 17,
Recommendation 4H, pg. 25.
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13. The property purchased under Bid No. 60 was retained
fully by Robert Goetz, Jr. with Michael Williams receiving no
consideration or profit in permitting the property to pass
through his bid number from the auctioneer to Robert
Goetz, Jr.
14. Michael Williams' action in permitting Robert Goetz,
Jr. to purchase items under Bid No. 60 was a courtesy
granted between family members.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. In an action to quiet title, plaintiff has the burden of proof to
establish [his or her] right by a fair preponderance of the
evidence. Poffenberger v. Goldstein, 776 A.2d 1037 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2001).
2. Any transfer of assets, or title to those assets, to Michael
Williams as a result of Bid No. 60 being in his name was
immediately transferred from Michael Williams to Robert Goetz
at equal value and did not involve any profit to Michael Williams
in any form including the forgiveness of debt.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 30th day of June, 2017, the judgment
entered May 5, 2015 is confirmed and the Adams County
Prothonotary's Office is directed to enter judgment as set forth
therein.
Trial Court Order, entered June 30, 2017, at 1-3 (unnumbered).
Linda filed a timely notice of appeal on July 26, 2017. On July 28, 2017,
the trial court ordered Linda to file a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal within twenty-one (21) days. On August 14, 2017, Linda
submitted a multi-page, multi-paragraph statement wherein she raised
twenty-one claims of error. The issues set forth therein read, verbatim, as
follows:
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1. In calling Robert Goetz to testify on his behalf, Michael
Williams called a witness who is in flagrant, obstinate, defiant,
and contumacious violation, of various Orders of this court in
the Goetz divorce case that are directly related to the
controversy in this case and that deprives Robert Goetz of all
credibility and requires that all contested issues of fact be
resolved against Michael Williams.
2. The Finding of Fact that the testimony of Michael Williams
is credible is contrary to the clear and convincing evidence of
record which establishes a pattern of years of fraudulent
collusion between Robert Goetz and Michael Williams, including
the knowing and fraudulent diversion of the proceeds of the
mortgage in question from the expressly represented purpose
of payment on account of the judgment of Linda Goetz against
Robert Goetz to the payment on account of items that Michael
Williams admitted under oath that he purchased for resale.
3. The Finding of Fact that there is no credible evidence that
Michael Williams personally received any equipment from the
property purchased at the April 19, 2009, public auction is
contrary to the testimony of Michael Williams under oath under
direct examination and, again, on cross-examination in the
Goetz divorce in which Michael Williams admitted that he was
purchasing the items at the public auction to resell them.
4. The evidence offered by Michael Williams on remand does
not answer the inquiries of the Superior Court as to the purpose
for Michael's transfer to Robert Goetz of the assets that he
purchased at the public auction other than to achieve the
fraudulent diversion of the mortgage proceeds from their
expressly represented application on account of the judgment
of Linda Goetz against Robert Goetz.
5. The evidence offered by Michael Williams on remand does
not answer the inquiries of the Superior Court as to the
consideration that Michael Williams received for his assumption
of the legal liability to pay for the items that were purchased at
the public auction.
6. Characterization, of the undisputable evidence of active
fraudulent collusion between Robert Goetz and Michael
Williams to divert the proceeds of the mortgage in question as
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a "courtesy granted between family members" is contrary to
the undisputable, clear, and convincing evidence of record and
an abuse of discretion.
7. The Finding of Fact that there is no credible evidence that
Michael Williams personally received any equipment from the
property purchased at the April 19, 2009, public auction is
contrary to stipulations 23 through 27 and 30 that Michael
Williams successfully bid on $61,240 worth of items at the
public auction of marital assets in the Goetz divorce case on
April 18, 2009.
8. The Finding of Fact that there is no credible evidence that
Robert Goetz paid any amounts to Michael Williams as
reimbursement for check number 510 is contrary to
stipulations 23 through 30 that Michael Williams purchased
$61,240 worth of items at the public auction of marital assets
in the Goetz divorce case on April 18, 2009, and that Robert
Goetz paid for $35,000 worth of those items.
9. The Finding of Fact that there is no credible evidence that
Robert Goetz paid any amounts to Michael Williams as
reimbursement for check number 510 is contrary to the
undenied testimony of Linda M. Goetz that $25,000 of the
$35,000 that Robert Goetz paid on account of the bids of
Michael Williams at the public auction of marital assets in the
Goetz divorce case on April 18, 2009, were the same $25,000
that Michael Williams had transferred to Robert Goetz in check
number 510 on January 27, 2009.
10. The Finding of Fact that there is no credible evidence that
Robert Goetz paid any amounts to Michael Williams as
reimbursement for check number 510 is contrary to stipulation
28 that Michael Williams knew that Robert Goetz paid $35,000
on account of the items that were purchased against bid # 60
at the public auction of marital assets in the Goetz divorce case
on April 18, 2009.
11. The Finding of Fact that there is no credible evidence that
Robert Goetz paid any amounts to Michael Williams as
reimbursement for check number 510 is contrary to stipulation
29 that Michael Williams paid nothing on account of the items
that were bid on bid # 60 at the public auction of marital assets
in the Goetz divorce case on April 18, 2009.
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12. It was error to fail to conclude that, when Michael Williams
consented to the payment of $35,000 by Robert Goetz on
account of the bids of Michael Williams at the public auction on
April 18, 2009, that the mortgage to Michael Williams was paid
in full.
13. The failure to conclude that the fraud and collusion between
Robert Goetz and Michael Williams to divert the $25,000 from
the expressly represented application of the funds for the direct
benefit of Linda M. Goetz to the direct benefit of Michael
Williams constituted a fraud upon Linda M. Goetz is contrary to
the undisputable, clear, and convincing evidence of record.
14. The failure to conclude that the mortgage and note to
Michael Williams are void and unenforceable due to the
fraudulent misconduct of Robert Goetz and Michael Williams is
contrary to the undisputable, clear, and convincing evidence of
record.
15. The failure to conclude that the mortgage to Michael
Williams was divested by the equitable distribution Order of
May 5, 2011, in the Goetz divorce confirming the express
language of the mortgage and the recommendation of Master
Phillips that Robert Goetz was responsible for repayment of the
loan to Michael Williams is an error of law and an abuse of
discretion.
16. Where Michael Williams admitted the averment in paragraph
20 of the initial Complaint that he had actual knowledge of the
pendency of the Goetz divorce proceedings prior to the
execution of the mortgage in question, it was an error of law
and an abuse of discretion to fail to conclude that Michael
Williams was on notice that, at the time that Linda M. Goetz
signed the mortgage in question, the collateral for the
mortgage was in custodia legis in the Goetz divorce case so
that the lien of the mortgage could only attach to the collateral
in rem after the entry of the order of equitable distribution in
the Goetz divorce case.
17. Where Michael Williams admitted the averment in paragraph
20 of the initial Complaint that he had actual knowledge of the
pendency of the Goetz divorce proceedings prior to the
execution of the mortgage in question, it was an error of law
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and an abuse of discretion to fail to conclude that Michael
Williams was on notice that the collateral for the mortgage was
subject to orders of court in the divorce case under the doctrine
of custodia legis.
18. Where Michael Williams admitted the averment in paragraph
20 of the initial Complaint that he had actual knowledge of the
pendency of the Goetz divorce proceedings prior to the
execution of the mortgage in question, it was an error of law
and an abuse of discretion to fail to conclude that, because the
collateral for the mortgage was in custodia legis in the Goetz
divorce case, the cash award to Linda M. Goetz in the Goetz
divorce case had priority over the lien of the mortgage to
Michael Williams.
19. Where Michael Williams admitted the averment in paragraph
20 of the initial Complaint that he had actual knowledge of the
pendency of the Goetz divorce proceedings prior to the
execution of the mortgage in question, it was an error of law
and an abuse of discretion to fail to conclude that the mortgage
to Michael Williams was divested by the Order of May 5, 2011,
in the Goetz divorce case that confirmed the express language
of the mortgage and the recommendation of Master Phillips
that only Robert Goetz was responsible for repayment of the
loan to Michael Williams.
20. Where Michael Williams admitted the averment in paragraph
20 of the initial Complaint that he had actual knowledge of the
pendency of the Goetz divorce proceedings prior to the
execution of the mortgage in question, it was an error of law
and an abuse of discretion to fail to conclude that the mortgage
to Michael Williams was divested by the Sheriff's sale on March
16, 2012, which sale was upon the unsatisfied lien against
Robert Goetz in the Goetz divorce case, which lien had priority
over the lien of the mortgage to Michael Williams under the
doctrine of in custodia legis.
21. Where Robert Goetz was ordered to pay the mortgage in
question in the Goetz divorce case, it was an error of law and
an abuse of discretion to fail to conclude that Linda M. Goetz is
not required to pay the mortgage under the doctrine of custodia
legis.
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22. Linda M. Goetz requests leave to supplement this statement
upon the filing of the transcript of the testimony of January 11,
2017, herein. [4]
Plaintiff’s Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, filed August
14, 2017, at 1-6. On September 7, 2017, the trial court filed its Opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
In her brief, Linda presents the following Statement of Questions
Involved:
I. Are the findings in the decisions of December 15, 2014, and
June 30, 2017, of the court below manifestly unreasonable in light
of the sustainable evidence of record?
II. Did Robert offer any credible evidence on remand that would
answer the questions of your honorable court[] that were raised
in the opinion that reversed the original decision of the court
below?
III. Where Michael knew when he tendered the $25,000 to
Robert, that Robert was in the middle of divorce proceedings and
that Robert had committed to apply the mortgage proceeds to
Linda’s lien in the divorce case, did Linda’s lien in the divorce case
have lien priority over Michael’s mortgage under the doctrine of in
custodia legis.
Brief for Appellant at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Before we consider the merits of these claims, we first must determine
whether Linda has preserved them for appellate review. Commonwealth v.
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4 We remind appellate counsel that requesting leave to supplement a Rule
1925(b) statement upon receiving notes of testimony is not in accordance with
the prescribed procedure to supplement the statement set forth in Rule
1925(b)(2). Merely requesting leave to supplement the statement is not the
equivalent of applying to the trial court and having a request granted by the
court “for good cause shown.” See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2).
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Wholaver, 588 Pa. 218, 903 A.2d 1178 (2006) (holding appellate courts may
determine sua sponte whether an appellant has properly preserved issues for
appeal). The fact that an appellant timely filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
“does not automatically equate with issue preservation.” Jiricko v. Geico
Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 775,
958 A.2d 1048 (2008). To the contrary, our law makes it clear that Rule
1925(b) is not satisfied when one simply files any statement. Tucker v. R.M.
Tours, 939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa.Super. 2007), reargument denied, Jan. 30,
2008, affirmed, 602 Pa. 147, 977 A.2d 1170 (2009). Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)
requires that the statement “concisely identify each ruling or error that the
appellant intends to challenge” and shall “not be redundant or provide lengthy
explanations as to any error.”
Rule 1925 is a “crucial component of the appellate process, because it
allows the trial court to identify and focus on those issues the parties plan to
raise on appeal.” Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 400 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(citation omitted), appeal denied, 584 Pa. 678, 880 A.2d 1239 (2005), cert.
denied, Spector Gadon & Rosen, P.C. v. Kanter, 546 U.S. 1092, 126 S. Ct.
1048, 163 L. Ed. 2d 858 (2006). For this reason, Pennsylvania courts
repeatedly have held that an appellant waives all matters for review where he
or she identifies an excessive number of issues in the concise statement. See
Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141 (Pa.Super. 2006); see also Jones v.
Jones, 878 A.2d 86 (Pa.Super. 2005) (holding issues waived for appellate
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review where the purpose of filing seven page, twenty-nine issue statement
was to place undue burden on trial court and delay a resolution of the
proceeding); Kanter supra (finding fifteen page, fifty-five issue statement
resulted in waiver).
This Court has explained Rule 1925 waiver by stating that “when an
appellant fails adequately to identify in a concise manner the issues sought to
be pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded in its preparation of a legal
analysis which is pertinent to those issues.” Lineberger, supra at 148
(internal citations omitted). Accordingly, we have concluded that the
submission of a Rule 1925(b) statement which is so redundant, vague,
incoherent, or confusing as to prevent the lower court from engaging in a
meaningful analysis results in waiver of all claims presented. Commonwealth
v. Ray, 134 A.3d 1109 (Pa.Super 2016) (finding waiver of all claims where
the appellant failed to identify his claims in an adequate and concise manner);
See also Jones, supra.
In Tucker, supra, this Court further stated:
[T]his Court has held that when appellants raise an outrageous
number of issues in their 1925(b) statement, the appellants have
deliberately circumvented the meaning and purpose of Rule
1925(b) and ha[ve] thereby effectively precluded appellate review
of the issues [they] now seek to raise. We have further noted that
such voluminous statements do not identify the issues that
appellants actually intend to raise on appeal because the briefing
limitations contained in Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) make[ ] the raising of
so many issues impossible. Further, this type of extravagant
1925(b) statement makes it all but impossible for the trial court
to provide a comprehensive analysis of the issues.
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Id. at 346 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in
original). More recently, we also held:
Rule 1925 is intended to aid trial judges in identifying and focusing
upon those issues which the parties plan to raise on appeal. Rule
1925 is thus a crucial component of the appellate process. When
a court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is
not enough for meaningful review. When an appellant fails
adequately to identify in a concise manner the issues sought to be
pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded in its preparation of
a legal analysis which is pertinent to those issues. In other words,
a [c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the court to
identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of
no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all.
Commonwealth v. Ray, 134 A.3d 1109, 1114 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation
omitted).
However, “the number of issues raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement does
not, without more, provide a basis upon which to deny appellate review where
an appeal otherwise complies with the mandates of appellate practice.”
Mahonski v. Engel, 145 A.3d 175, 181 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal denied, ___
Pa. ____, 1168 A.3d 1277 (2017) (quotation marks and quotation omitted),
appeal denied, ___ Pa. ____, 168 A.3d 1277 (2017). This Court has
recognized that the complexity of the matter under review is a consideration
for courts to make prior to finding waiver based on the sheer volume of the
concise statement. Id. (citing Eiser v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
595 Pa. 366, 938 A.2d 417 (2007) (plurality) wherein the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court stressed the appellants had a reasonable basis to include a
large number of issues in their Rule 1925(b) statement because they had filed
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a complicated lawsuit with numerous defendants that contained multiple
counts and had resulted in a large number of trial court rulings).
The case sub judice does not involve a complicated matter but, instead,
pertains to a conventional quiet title action which initially required a single-
day non-jury trial and was supplemented with an additional hearing, as per
this Court’s directive, at which Linda chose not to present additional evidence.
More importantly, the extravagance of Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement
has impeded the appellate process in that it precluded the trial court from
providing a comprehensive analysis of the issues. This is evident in the fact
that the trial court did not engage in a legal analysis of each specific issue
asserted in the 1925(b) statement, and, instead, attempted to rephrase the
allegations generally as follows:5
1. Appellant takes exception to this [c]ourt’s credibility
determinations alleging factual findings that are not
supported by the record; and
2. Appellant claims the [c]ourt erred in failing to find that the
mortgage at issue is defeated under the legal theory of
custodia legis.
Opinion Pursuant To Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), filed 9/7/11, at 1. However, even if
the court correctly guesses the issues raised on appeal and writes a 1925(a)
____________________________________________
5 While the trial court did not specifically do so in its latest Opinion filed on
September 7, 2017, in its prior Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) which pertained to
Appellant’s appeal from its Order dated December 15, 2014, the trial court
cited to Kanter, supra upon noting Appellant had raised nineteen separate
issues and attempted to address those issues in the context of three general
claims. See Opinion Pursuant To Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), filed 7/1/15, at 1.
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Opinion, the issues may still be waived. See Kanter, supra 866 A.2d at 400.
Based upon our review of the Statement, we likewise have difficulty
discerning what exact issues Linda is raising. For instance, her first issue is
simply a sweeping statement challenging Robert’s credibility in all respects,
while numerous others refer to findings of fact without citation to the record.
See Plaintiff’s Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, filed
August 14, 2017, Issues 2-3, 7-11. In addition, Issues 4-5 refer generally to
how Michaels’s evidence presented on remand failed to satisfy “inquiries of
this Court.” Finally, numerous other claims harken back to determinations
made in the divorce proceeding. See Issues 15-21.
Moreover, as described above, this Court remanded the instant matter
to enable the trial court to determine the ongoing validity of the mortgage,
executed by Robert and Linda and held by Michael, against 3380
Chambersburg Road. Thus, the purpose of remand was limited in scope. “[I]n
remanding a case for rehearing, [the appellate court] may limit the scope
thereof to certain defined issues. This limitation restricts the power of the
court below to a determination of those issues.” Quaker State Oil Ref. Co.
v. Talbot, 322 Pa. 155, 159-60, 185 A. 586, 588 (1936). Where a case is
remanded for a specific and limited purpose, the trial court must strictly
comply with the appellate court’s mandate. Agostinelli v. Edwards, 98 A.3d
695, 706 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 631 Pa. 734, 113 A.3d 278 (2015)
(requiring strict compliance with the mandate of the appellate court on
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remand). Many of the issues Linda attempts to assert in her Rule 1925
statement pertain to the parties’ divorce proceeding in 2009.6 Linda cannot
now attempt to re-litigate those claims, and a holding to the contrary would
give her an impermissible second bite at the apple.
As Appellant does not clearly state her challenges, we affirm on the basis
that she has waived all issues on appeal due to her improper concise
statement. See Tucker, 939 A.2d at 346.7
Order affirmed.
Judge Panella joins the memorandum.
Judge Olson concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 04/25/18
____________________________________________
6 A Decree in Divorce was entered on July 14, 2011. Therein, it was indicated
that all claims had been resolved pursuant to a Master’s Report and
Recommendation filed on January 26, 2011, which was adopted in full as the
Opinion of the trial court. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2.
7 This Court may affirm the trial court on any valid basis. Plasticert, Inc. v.
Westfield Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 489, 492 (Pa.Super. 2007).
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