Com. of PA Ex Rel., Rodriguez, C. v. Kauffman, K. ( 2018 )


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  • J. S07045/18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    EX REL. CHIRAL RODRIGUEZ,                :          PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    Appellant        :
    :
    v.                    :         No. 2586 EDA 2017
    :
    KEVIN KAUFFMAN, WARDEN                   :
    Appeal from the Order Entered July 10, 2017,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
    Civil Division at No. 2017-C-1544
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:                  FILED APRIL 25, 2018
    Chiral Rodriguez appeals pro se from the July 10, 2017 order denying
    his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and motion to dismiss.           After
    careful review, we affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
    On May 16, 2017, appellant filed a pro se petition in the Civil Division of the
    Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County that is the subject of this appeal.
    Appellant styled this petition as a “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
    Ad Subjiciendum1 and a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Rights Secured
    under the United States Constitution 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendment
    1 A writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is defined as “[a] writ directed
    to someone detaining another person and commanding that the detainee be
    brought to court.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 778 (9th ed. 2009).)
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    Rights 316 and 3162,” and initiated this action against Kevin Kauffman in his
    capacity as the Superintendent of SCI Huntingdon, where appellant is
    incarcerated. This petition stems from appellant’s March 13, 2017 request
    to prison authorities at SCI Huntingdon that he “be processed for outside
    clearance to fill an opening in the barber shop.” (Habeas corpus petition,
    5/16/17 at 3, ¶ 3.) However, appellant was determined to be ineligible for
    this program due to a New Jersey detainer that was lodged against him in
    2012.     (Id. at 3-4, ¶¶ 3-8.)    In his petition, appellant asserted that his
    constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by the State of New Jersey
    and requested that the trial court dismiss the New Jersey detainer, with
    prejudice. (Id. at 4-5, ¶ 12; see also memorandum of law, 5/16/17 at 4,
    ¶ 15.)
    On July 10, 2017, the trial court denied appellant’s petition for a writ
    of habeas corpus and motion to dismiss. Appellant filed a timely notice of
    appeal on August 8, 2017. The trial court did not order appellant to file a
    concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).     The trial court filed its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on
    August 16, 2017, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to lift the New Jersey
    detainer and that appellant’s petition was properly denied. (See trial court
    opinion, 8/16/17 at 2.)
    On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing
    his petition for writ of habeas corpus because his constitutional right to a
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    speedy trial was violated by the State of New Jersey. (Appellant’s brief at
    3-4, 10; see also memorandum of law, 5/16/17 at 2, ¶ 8.)                 Appellant
    maintains that the trial court should have discharged the New Jersey
    detainer because it violated both the Interstate Agreement on Detainer Act
    (“IAD”)2 and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (“UCEA”).3           (Appellant’s
    brief at 3, 7-9).    In support of these contentions, appellant further avers
    that:
    [Appellant] has been “under arrest” for
    1,590 days and counting, and New Jersey has not
    exercised due diligence in securing [appellant] for
    trial in New Jersey.
    New Jersey should have at least initiated
    extradition proceedings within 365 days from the
    filing of [a] complaint for defendants who are
    imprisoned in another state in order to meet it’s [sic]
    duty as to due diligence.
    Memorandum of law, 5/16/17 at 2, ¶¶ 9-10 (capitalization, numeration, and
    citations omitted). For the following reasons, we disagree.
    The statutory writ of habeas corpus is codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    §§ 6501-6505.       The statutory writ lies only for commitments under the
    criminal process.      See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6501 et seq.           The statutory
    framework for the writ expressly provides that “the writ of habeas corpus
    shall not be available if a remedy may be had by post-conviction hearing
    2   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9101-9108.
    3   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9121-9148.
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    proceedings authorized by law.”     42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6503(b).     Moreover, we
    note that the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)4 explicitly states that an
    action under the PCRA is the “sole means of obtaining collateral relief and
    encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies . . . including
    habeas corpus.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. Plainly stated, “[u]nless the PCRA
    could not provide for a potential remedy, the PCRA statute subsumes the
    writ of habeas corpus.”      Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
    65 A.3d 462
    , 465
    (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
    Notwithstanding the admonition that claims be “channeled” into the
    PCRA, “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended.”
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6501. In Taylor, we explained:
    The common law writ of habeas corpus has not
    been eliminated. In both Commonwealth v. West,
    [
    938 A.2d 1034
    (Pa. 2007)] and Commonwealth v.
    Judge, [
    916 A.2d 511
    (Pa. 2007)], our Supreme
    Court held that claims that fall outside the sphere of
    the PCRA can be advanced via a writ of habeas
    corpus.
    
    Taylor, 65 A.2d at 466
    n.3 (citation formatting amended). Here, the claims
    raised in appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus are not cognizable
    under the PCRA; accordingly, we elect to address them under the purview of
    habeas corpus.
    “[H]abeas corpus is a civil remedy which lies solely for commitments
    under criminal process.” Commonwealth v. McNeil, 
    665 A.2d 1247
    , 1249
    4   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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    (Pa.Super. 1995) (citation omitted). “Habeas corpus is an extraordinary
    remedy and may only be invoked when other remedies in the ordinary
    course have been exhausted or are not available.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    Our standard of review of a trial court’s order
    denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus is
    limited to abuse of discretion. Thus, we may reverse
    the court’s order where the court has misapplied the
    law or exercised its discretion in a manner lacking
    reason.     As in all matters on appeal, the
    appellant bears the burden of persuasion to
    demonstrate his entitlement to the relief he
    requests.
    Rivera v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr., 
    837 A.2d 525
    , 528 (Pa.Super.
    2003) (citations omitted; emphasis added), appeal denied, 
    857 A.2d 680
    (Pa. 2004). “In cases of this nature, our review of the denial of the habeas
    corpus petition is limited to determining whether the trial court had subject
    matter jurisdiction and whether the proceedings were regular and in
    conformity with the law.”   Commonwealth v. Livengood, 
    901 A.2d 556
    ,
    558 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citations omitted).
    Upon review, we agree that neither the trial court nor this court
    possess the jurisdiction to grant appellant the relief he seeks in this case;
    namely, the dismissal of an out-of-state detainer lodged against him in
    New Jersey.    Appellant filed the instant action in the Civil Division in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, Pennsylvania.           Pennsylvania
    courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over criminal cases in which all
    relevant acts occur in a different state. Commonwealth v. Kloss, 385 A.2d
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    480, 482 (Pa.Super. 1978) (stating, “[j]urisdiction to try a person on a
    criminal charge lies only in the courts of the state or county where the crime
    was committed.”).     Thus, we lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider
    whether New Jersey is time-barred under the IAD from proceeding in its
    prosecution of appellant, in purported violation of his right to a speedy trial.
    “The IAD is an agreement between 48 states, the District of Columbia,
    Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands that establishes procedures for the
    transfer of prisoners incarcerated in one jurisdiction to the temporary
    custody of another jurisdiction which has lodged a detainer against them.”
    Commonwealth v. Booze, 
    953 A.2d 1263
    , 1266 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2008)
    (citations omitted), appeal denied, 
    13 A.3d 474
    (Pa. 2010).
    Unlike a request for extradition, which is a request
    that the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated
    transfer custody to the requesting state, a detainer
    is merely a means of informing the custodial
    jurisdiction that there are outstanding charges
    pending in another jurisdiction and a request to hold
    the prisoner for the requesting state or notify the
    requesting state of the prisoner's imminent release.
    Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    896 A.2d 523
    , 536 n.5 (Pa. 2006) (citation
    omitted), cert. denied, 
    549 U.S. 1213
    (2007).
    A State seeking to bring charges against a prisoner
    in another State’s custody begins the process by
    filing a detainer . . . . After a detainer has been
    lodged against him, a prisoner may file a “request
    for a final disposition to be made of the indictment,
    information, or complaint.” Art. III(a). Upon such a
    request, the prisoner “shall be brought to trial within
    one hundred eighty days,” provided that for good
    cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his
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    counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction
    of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable
    continuance. . . . If a defendant is not brought to
    trial within the applicable statutory period, the [IAD]
    requires that the indictment be dismissed with
    prejudice. Art. V(c).
    New York v. Hill, 
    528 U.S. 110
    , 112 (2000).
    As our supreme court further explained in Williams, “Article III of the
    [IAD] permits a prisoner to seek a temporary transfer to the jurisdiction that
    has filed a detainer for final disposition of outstanding charges in the
    transferee jurisdiction.     A prisoner utilizing Article III must transmit his
    request to the prosecutor and the court in the detaining jurisdiction.”
    
    Williams, 896 A.2d at 554
    (emphasis added); see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9101.5
    5   Article III(a) of the IAD provides as follows:
    (a)    Whenever a person has entered upon a term of
    imprisonment in a penal or correctional
    institution of a party state, and whenever
    during the continuance of the term of
    imprisonment there is pending in any other
    party state any untried indictment, information
    or complaint on the basis of which a detainer
    has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall
    be brought to trial within 180 days after he
    shall have caused to be delivered to the
    prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of
    the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written
    notice of the place of his imprisonment and his
    request for a final disposition to be made of
    the indictment, information or complaint:
    Provided, [t]hat for good cause shown in open
    court, the prisoner or his counsel being
    present, the court having jurisdiction of the
    matter may grant any necessary or reasonable
    continuance. The request of the prisoner shall
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    Instantly, the procedural requirements of the IAD are not applicable
    here, as this is not an instance where the Commonwealth failed to take
    adequate steps to secure appellant’s presence in Pennsylvania or failed to
    exercise due diligence to bring appellant back to this jurisdiction for a
    timely trial. Rather, appellant is already serving a sentence of confinement
    in this Commonwealth, and it was New Jersey, the “detaining jurisdiction,”
    see 
    Williams, 896 A.2d at 554
    , that lodged a detainer against appellant in
    2012 so that he could be tried there.
    In reaching this conclusion, we note that decisions of the Court of
    Common Pleas, while not binding upon this court, may serve as persuasive
    authority.   See Boehm v. Riversource Life Ins. Co., 
    117 A.3d 308
    ,
    322 n.6 (Pa.Super. 2015) (stating, “[w]e recognize that decisions of the
    Court of Common Pleas are not binding precedent; however, they may be
    considered for their persuasive authority[]”), appeal denied, 
    126 A.3d 1281
    (Pa. 2015). We find the reasoning of the Cumberland County Court of
    be accompanied by a certificate of the
    appropriate official having custody of the
    prisoner, stating the term of commitment
    under which the prisoner is being held, the
    time already served, the time remaining to be
    served on the sentence, the amount of good
    time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the
    prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole
    agency relating to the prisoner.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9101, Art. III(a).
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    Common Pleas in O’Connor v. Cole, 17 Pa.D.&C. 3d 233 (Pa.Com.Pl.
    1980), to be particularly informative. The O’Connor court stated:
    Although the purpose of the [IAD] is to encourage
    the    expeditious   and    orderly  disposition  of
    outstanding charges, the act does not give a sending
    state[, in this case Pennsylvania,] the authority to
    dismiss a detainer filed by a party state[, in this
    case, New Jersey] either through the courts or
    through the governor’s office.
    
    Id. at 234-235
    (internal quotation marks omitted; text in brackets added).
    We also find that appellant’s ancillary argument with respect to the
    UCEA is also misplaced. In In re Garcia, 
    984 A.2d 506
    (Pa.Super. 2009), a
    panel of this court explained that,
    [t]he [UCEA] is inapplicable to sentenced prisoners.
    At least one Pennsylvania federal district court has
    similarly concluded that the UCEA is inapplicable to
    persons [] who are sentenced prisoners in
    Pennsylvania and who are facing criminal charges in
    another state which is also a party to the Interstate
    Agreement on Detainers.
    In re 
    Garcia, 984 A.2d at 508
    (internal quotation marks and case citations
    omitted; brackets in original). Here, there is no evidence in the record that
    New Jersey ever requested extradition of appellant pursuant to the UCEA.
    Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly
    denied habeas corpus relief in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
    court’s July 10, 2017 order.
    Order affirmed.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/25/18
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