Com. v. W.A.H., III ( 2017 )


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  • J-S33040-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                      :
    :
    v.                                 :
    :
    W.A.H., III,                               :
    :
    Appellant                   :   No. 1516 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 14, 2016
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
    Civil Division at No(s): 2015-190
    BEFORE:        BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:                   FILED AUGUST 01, 2017
    W.A.H., III (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
    July 14, 2016, following his conviction for indirect criminal contempt of a
    temporary Protection from Abuse (PFA) order.1 We affirm.
    The trial court aptly set forth the relevant factual and procedural
    history of this matter as follows.
    On January 14, 2015, [Appellant’s] wife, [T.A.H.] filed a
    [PFA petition] seeking protection from [Appellant]. On January
    15, 2015, the Honorable Carol L. Van Horn entered a temporary
    PFA order which prohibited [Appellant] from, inter alia, abusing,
    harassing or contacting [T.A.H.], and from contacting [Appellant]
    and [T.A.H.’s] children, [including the parties’ daughter, G.H.,]
    pending the outcome of a final hearing on the matter. On
    February 5, 2015, Sergeant Matthew T. Cody of the
    Chambersburg Police Department filed a criminal complaint
    against [Appellant], alleging a violation of the temporary PFA
    1
    23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122.
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S33040-17
    order. On February 12, 2015, the Honorable Douglas W. Herman
    entered a final [PFA] Order. Following a hearing on March 12,
    2015, the court determined that [Appellant had] violated the
    provisions of the temporary PFA Order entered against him by
    contacting [T.A.H.], and engaging in conduct which was
    harassing to her.
    At [Appellant’s] March 12, 2015 hearing, [T.A.H.’s] aunt,
    [M.B.], testified that [Appellant] sent an envelope with a letter
    enclosed to [M.B.’s] home, addressed to [M.B.] with attention to
    G.H., [Appellant] and [T.A.H.’s] daughter. [M.B.] testified that
    inside the envelope, in [Appellant’s] handwriting, were the words
    “I love you very much, all you girls. I love your mother. Stop the
    hate.” The envelope was admitted into evidence as
    Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1. [M.B.] testified that she initially
    opened the envelope and read the letter and after reading it,
    informed G.H. to not read the letter. [M.B.] also testified that the
    letter enclosed in the envelope was two and one half pages long
    and dated January 28, 2015. The letter was admitted into
    evidence as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2. After [M.B.] testified,
    the Commonwealth requested that the court read the letter,
    Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2, in its entirety.
    In the letter, addressed [to] G.H., [Appellant] wrote that
    most, if not all, of [T.A.H.] and [Appellant’s] arguments are
    because [T.A.H.] refuses to confront any wrongdoing against
    their family and [T.A.H.] refuses to tell the truth. [Appellant]
    called [T.A.H.] a severe hypocrite and two-faced. [In the letter,
    T.A.H.] is alleged to be a backstabber and [Appellant] further
    alleges that her communication skills are passive. He claimed
    that [T.A.H.] has a “nasty” habit of believing everything she
    hears and refuses to get to the facts. [T.A.H.’s] previous
    relationships were discussed; those before she and [Appellant]
    were married. [Appellant] alleged [T.A.H.] is playing the system
    because of her false/fabricated PFA statements and [indicated
    that] he has a lot of anger issues with [T.A.H.’s] manipulation
    and backstabbing. Hatred for [T.A.H.] was discussed, as
    [Appellant] stated that he hates [T.A.H.’s] actions and that
    [T.A.H.] and [Appellant] need counseling to fix their situation.
    He claimed that [T.A.H.] has walked away from him and from
    what has [“]unlawfully[”] happened to [Appellant]. The letter
    concluded with, “I love all of you - I love your mother very much
    and I wish (pray to God) your mother realizes she’s hurting
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    J-S33040-17
    everyone with her passive/aggressive behavior. I pray for my
    wife (your mom) - I pray for ending stress/anger, I pray for
    healing, I pray for faith and love. I pray for myself to remove the
    anger and resentment your mother caused everyone.”
    By order of court dated March 12, 2015, [the court found
    Appellant in indirect criminal contempt of the temporary PFA
    order and Appellant’s] sentencing hearing was scheduled for
    March 26, 2015. On March 26, 2015, counsel for [Appellant]
    requested a continuance to explore the possibility of filing a
    motion to have a mental health evaluation for [Appellant]. A stay
    of prosecution was entered on April 7, 2015 for all of
    [Appellant’s] cases pending in Franklin County, including two
    criminal cases. On April 27, 2015, at the request of counsel for
    [Appellant] and without objection from the Commonwealth, the
    court ordered [Appellant] undergo a mental health evaluation,
    over [Appellant’s] strenuous objection. At a hearing held
    December 8, 2015, pursuant to the Mental Health Procedures
    Act, the Honorable Carol L. Van Horn determined [Appellant]
    was incompetent to stand trial and ordered the stay of
    prosecution to continue until [Appellant’s] incapacity was
    restored through treatment. By order of court dated May 20,
    2016, the stay of prosecution was vacated and directed the case
    to be listed for sentencing. On June 7, 2016, the court ordered
    sentencing to be held on June 27, 2016. Sentencing was later
    deferred to July 14, 2016, because counsel for [Appellant] was
    never notified of [Appellant’s] original sentencing date.
    On July 14, 2016, [Appellant] was sentenced for             the
    indirect criminal contempt conviction and ordered to pay a       fine
    of $300.00, pursuant to 23 P[a].C.S.[] § 6114(b)(1)(i)(A),       and
    to serve 180 days in the Franklin County Jail, with credit for   180
    days of time served from February 5, 2015.
    [Appellant], through [counsel], filed a notice of appeal on
    August 8, 2016. Thereafter, [Appellant’s] actions caused a
    breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. New counsel was
    appointed and granted an extension of time within which to file a
    concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant
    to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). [Appellant’s] concise statement was
    ultimately filed on November 11, 2016.
    -3-
    J-S33040-17
    Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/2016, at 2-5 (citations to notes of testimony,
    footnotes, and unnecessary capitalization omitted).
    Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to find him in
    contempt of the temporary PFA order. Appellant’s Brief at 6. “When
    reviewing a contempt conviction ... we are confined to a determination of
    whether the facts support the trial court decision. We will reverse a trial
    court’s determination only when there has been a plain abuse of discretion.”
    Commonwealth v. Kolansky, 
    800 A.2d 937
    , 939 (Pa. Super. 2002)
    (citations omitted). Further,
    Our standard of review in assessing whether
    sufficient evidence was presented to sustain
    Appellant’s conviction is well-settled. The standard
    we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
    is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial
    in the light most favorable to the verdict winner,
    there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder
    to find every element of the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt. In applying [this] test, we may
    not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment
    for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts
    and      circumstances       established     by      the
    Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility
    of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s
    guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
    evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a
    matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn
    from      the     combined       circumstances.     The
    Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
    every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
    Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
    record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
    received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact
    while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
    -4-
    J-S33040-17
    the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
    believe all, part or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Brumbaugh, 
    932 A.2d 108
    , 109–10 (Pa.
    Super. 2007) (citations omitted). To establish indirect criminal
    contempt, the Commonwealth must prove: 1) the order was
    sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to
    leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had
    notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must
    have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted
    with wrongful intent. 
    Id.
     
    932 A.2d at 110
     (citation omitted).
    Commonwealth v. Walsh, 
    36 A.3d 613
    , 618–19 (2012).
    In his brief, Appellant concedes the first three prongs of the
    aforementioned test.    Appellant’s Brief at 14.     Appellant focuses his
    argument on the fourth prong, arguing that the Commonwealth “failed to
    produce sufficient evidence to allow the trial court to conclude beyond a
    reasonable doubt that Appellant intended to communicate with [T.A.H.]
    through his letter to G.H.” 
    Id.
     The lower court addressed Appellant’s
    argument as follows.
    Last, there is sufficient evidence to show that [Appellant]
    acted with wrongful intent by writing and sending a letter which
    contained references to and about [T.A.H.]. The temporary PFA
    order [entered] against [Appellant] specifically directed him not
    to have any contact of any type with [T.A.H.] and to refrain from
    harassing her. [Appellant] was directed to refrain from
    communicating to or about [T.A.H.] through [] third persons,
    including their children. [Appellant] mailed the envelope and
    letter to [M.B.’s] home address just fifteen (15) days after the
    temporary PFA order was issued. [Appellant] clearly acted with
    wrongful intent when he sent messages to a third party about
    [T.A.H.] in violation the temporary PFA order.
    -5-
    J-S33040-17
    Trial   Court   Opinion,   12/13/2016,   at   8-9   (unnecessary   capitalization
    omitted).
    We agree.   Moreover, the temporary PFA order prohibited Appellant
    from, inter alia, having contact with T.A.H. or any of the couple’s
    children, including G.H., pending the outcome of the final PFA hearing.
    Temporary PFA Order, 1/15/2015, ¶¶ 4, 14(b) and (c). Appellant concedes
    that he was aware of the strict no-contact provisions of the temporary PFA
    order; nonetheless, barely two weeks after the order took effect, he wrote a
    letter detailing his anger at T.A.H. and her perceived shortcomings which he
    then sent to M.B.’s residence, to the attention of the parties’ daughter, G.H.
    There was a substantial certainty that the letter would be read by either
    G.H. or T.A.H.; thus, wrongful intent can be imputed. Accordingly, because
    we find no error in the court’s determination that the Commonwealth met its
    burden of establishing that Appellant violated the temporary PFA order, we
    affirm the court’s order holding him in indirect criminal contempt of the
    same.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/1/2017
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. W.A.H., III No. 1516 MDA 2016

Filed Date: 8/1/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/1/2017