Com. v. Fields, R. ( 2015 )

J-S24029-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RAHMIL FIELDS,
Appellant No. 2887 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered September 23, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003495-2007
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2015
Rahmil Fields (“Appellant”) appeals from the order denying his petition
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§
9541-9546. We affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history
as follows:
On October 26, 2006, [Appellant, who was then sixteen
years old,] shot and killed Mr. Antonio Johnson on Cantrell
Street in Philadelphia. [Appellant] was subsequently
charged with murder, generally, and other offenses, and
went to trial thereon in October of 2008. On October 14,
2008, a jury convicted [Appellant] of first-degree murder
following a trial before this Court. After the jury rendered
its decision and the verdict was recorded, this Court
imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment on
[Appellant]. [Appellant] filed a direct appeal to the
Superior Court; however, it was dismissed on February 4,
2010, because counsel failed to file a brief. (3194 EDA
2008).
J-S24029-15
On September 13, 2011, [Appellant] sent a letter to the
Pennsylvania Attorney Discipline Board, which informed
[Appellant] by letter dated September 29, 2011, that his
appeal had been dismissed. [Appellant], who was a
juvenile at the time the crime herein occurred, took no
action in his case until August 2, 2012, when he mailed a
pro se pleading requesting the appointment of counsel for
purposes of seeking relief pursuant to the decision
rendered by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v.
Alabama, [132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)], wherein the Supreme
Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those
under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual
punishments.’” On October 10, 2012, [Appellant] filed a
pro se [PCRA petition,] and counsel was appointed to
represent him. Counsel thereafter filed an amended
petition and an amended petition seeking habeas corpus
relief.
After conducting an extensive and exhaustive review of
these filings, the record and applicable case law, this Court
found that [Appellant’s PCRA petition] was untimely filed.
Consequently, on September 23, 2014, after having served
[Appellant] notice of this Court’s intent to dismiss his
petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907,
this Court issued an Order denying [Appellant] PCRA relief.
PCRA Court Opinion, 11/4/14, at 1-2. This timely appeal followed. Both
Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issues:
I. Is [A]ppellant, a juvenile at the time of the shooting
that resulted in his conviction, entitled to be resentenced
since his life sentence is illegal under the United States
Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution and in
accordance with Miller v. Alabama, [supra]?II. Is [Appellant] entitled to post conviction relief in the
form of the grant of leave to file a notice of appeal nunc
pro tunc to the Superior Court or a remand for an
evidentiary hearing since trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel when he failed to protect
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J-S24029-15
[A]ppellant’s appellate rights by complying with the
Superior Court’s briefing order resulting in the dismissal of
the appeal?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
After careful review, we conclude that the Honorable Jeffrey P.
Minehart has prepared a thorough and well-reasoned opinion that correctly
refers to the timeliness restrictions of the PCRA, and explains why
Appellant’s argument of an exception based on Miller v. Alabama, supra,is unavailing. See PCRA Court Opinion, 11/4/14, at 3-5 (citing
Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237 (Pa. Super. 2014);
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013). In addition, Judge
Minehart correctly held that Appellant’s request for habeas corpus relief is
subsumed within the PCRA. Id. at 6-7 (citing Commonwealth v.
Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. Super. 1998); Seskey, supra). Thus, we
adopt Judge Minehart’s November 4, 2014 opinion as our own in determining
that Appellant’s PCRA petition is untimely.
With regard to Appellant’s second issue, our review of the certified
record supports Judge Minehart’s conclusion that this issue is also time
barred. See PCRA Court Opinion, 11/4/14, at 7-8.
In sum, we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying post-conviction relief
on the basis of the PCRA Court’s November 4, 2014 opinion.
Order affirmed.
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J-S24029-15
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/13/2015
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POS1 Teki 1. rn
By: P. GRA
IN THE
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PMLADELPHIA COUNTY
CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : CP-51-0003495-2007
v.
RAHMIL FIELDS HOMICIDE
CONCISE STATEMENT OF
ERRORS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL
The defendant, RAHMIL FIELDS, by and through counsel,
JANIS SMARRO, ESQUIRE, complies with the Order pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P, 1925(b), and files this Concise Statement of Errors Complained of
on Appeal stating that he intends to complain of the following on appeal:
1. The defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief in the form
of resentencina or an evidentiary hearing since the life sentence imposed on
the defendant, a juvenile at the time of the incident, is illegal pursuant to the
recent -United Supreme Court cases of Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v.
Hobbs as the life sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 13 cif the Pennsylvania Constitution. The arguments made
in the defendant's amended post-conviction petition are adopted herein.
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2. The defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief in the form
of reinstatement of appellate rights mine pm tune or an evidentiary hearing
since trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed
to protect the defendant's appellate rights by complying with the Superior
Court's briefing order resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. The
amuments made in the defendant's amended post-conviction petition are
adopted herein.
JANIS SMARRO, ESQUIRE
ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT
ATTORNEY NO.36429
SUITE 1200-1515 MARKET STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19102
2I 5.854.6406
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
OFFENSE TRACKING NUMBER
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA: CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
v. CP-51-CR-000305-2007
RAHMIL FIELDS HOMICIDE
PROOF OF SERVICE
I certify that l am this day serving a true and correct copy of the attached
by First Class Mail or hand delivery, to the following:
Trial Judge:
Hon. Jeffrey P. Minehart
1206 Crirninal Justice Center
1301 Filbert Street
Philadelphia,PA 19107
Attorney for the Commonwealth
Hugh Burns, Esquire
Chief-Appeals Unit
District Attorney-s Office
Three South Penn Square
Philadelphia., PA 19107
JANIS SMARRO,ESQUIRE
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
ATTORNEY NO.36429
SUITE 1200-1515 MARKET STREET
PHILA.,PA 19102
215.854.6406
DATE:
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRIAL DIVISION-CRIMINAL SECTION
FILED
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
KOV 0 4 2014
rtiti
kahfl
Pest Trial Unit
CP-51-01-0003495 2007 Comm v Fiekiš.
v. Opinion
RAHMIL FIELDS 1,1\1 .1\319.4\1\11111 CP-51-CR-0003495-2007
OPINION
PROCEDURAL RISTORY
On October 26. 2006, defendant shot and killed Mr. Antonio Johnson on Cantrell Street
in Philadelphia. Defendant was subsequently charged with murder, generally, and other
offenses
and went to trial thereon in October of 2008. On October 14, 2008, a jury convicted the
above-
named defendant of first-degree murder following a trial betbre this Court.
After the jury
rendered its decision and the verdict was recorded. this Court imposed the mandatory
sentence of
life imprisonment on defendant. Defendant filed a direct appeal to the Superior Court;
however
it was dismissed on February 4,2010, because counsel failed to file a brief.(3194 EDA
2008).
On September 13, 2011, defendant sent a letter to the Pennsylvania Attorney
Disciplin ary
Board, which informed defendant by letter dated September 29, 2011, that his
appeal had been
dismissed. Defendant, a juvenile at the time the crime herein occurred, took no action
in his case
until August 2, 2012, when he mailed a pro se pleading requesting the appointm
ent of counsel
for purposes of seeking relief pursuant to the decision rendered by the United States
Supreme
Court in Miner v. Alabama, _US , 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L, Ed. 2d 407 (2012),
wherein the
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Supreme Court held that -mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time
of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against 'cruel and unusual
punishments.'" On October 10, 2012, defendant filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post-
Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq, and counsel was appointed to represent him.
Counsel thereafter filed an amended petition and then an amended petition seeking habeas
corpus relief.
After conducting an extensive and exhaustive review ofthese filings, the record and
applicable case law, this Court found that Petitioner's petition for post conviction collateral relief
was untimely filed. Consequently, on September 23,2014, after having served defendant notice
ofthis Court's intent to dismiss his petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, this
Court issued an Order denying defendant PCRA relief. Defendant thereafter filed a timely notice
of appeal and a requested Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of issues to be raised on appeal.
DISCUSSION
In his 1925(b)statement defendant first argues that he was entitled to post-conviction
relief because his sentence of life imprisonment without parole is illegal and unconstitutional as
it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to thc holding of Miller, supra. This claim
entitled defendant to no relief because he did not file his petition in accordance with the time
strictures of the PCRA.
In reviewing the propriety of the PCRA eourt's dismissal of a petition without a hearing,
the reviewing court is limited to determining whether the court's findings are supported by the
record and whether the order in question is free of legal error. Cornmonwealth v. Holmes, 905
A.2d 707, 509 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) citing Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 799 (Pa.
2005). The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the
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findings in the certified record. Cornmonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166(Pa. Super. 2001).
A PCRA court may decline to hold a hearing on the petition if the petitioner's claim is patently
frivolous and is without a trace of support either in the record or from other evidence.
Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2001). The reviewing court on
appeal must examine each of the issues raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record in order
to determine whether the PCRA court erred in concluding that there were no genuine issues of
material fact and denying relief without an evidentiary hearing. Id. See also Commonwealth v.
Hardcastle, 701 A.2d 541, 542(Pa. 1997).
Under the P.C.R.A., a defendant has one year frorn the date a judgment becomes final to
file fOr collateral relief. 42 Pa. C.8. §9545. A petitioner may file a petition after that date but, in
order to avoid having it dismissed on timeliness grounds, he must plead and prove that one of
the
three exceptions to the filing requirements apply. 42 Pa. C.S. §9545(b) provides:
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including
a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed
within one year of the date the judgment becomes
final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner
proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim preriously was
the result ofinterference by government officials
with the presentation of the claim in violation
ofthe Constitution or laws ofthis Commonwealth'
or the Constitution or laws ofthe United States:
(ii) the facts upon which the clairn is predicated
were unknown to the petitioner and could not
have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right
that was recognized by the Supreme Court ofthe
United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
after the time period provided in this section and
has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
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(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in
paragraph (1)shall be filed within 60 days of the
date the claim could have been presented.
(3) For purposes of his subchapter, ajudgment becomes
final at the conclusion ofthe direct review. including
discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking the review.
(4) For purposes ofthis subchapter,"government
officials" shall not include defense counsel, whether
appointed or retained.
The P.C.R.A.'s time limit is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581(1999). Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638,641 (1998). Thus, an untimely petition rnay
not be addressed simply because it is couched in terms of ineffectiveness. Peterkin, 722 A.2d
at
643. Moreover, to successfully invoke one of these exceptions a petitioner must plead and then
prove that an exception to the time for filing the petition set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1
)(i)-
(iii) applies. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2); Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264. 1272 n.11
(Pa.
2007); Commonwealth v. Crews,863 A.2d 498, 501 (Pa. 2004),
Defendant's judgment of sentence became final on March 8, 2010.1 IA] judgn-ient
becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration
of time
for seeking the review." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2)(a)(providin
g that if
defendant files timely post-sentence motion, notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty
days of
order deciding motion); Pa.R.A.P 903 ("Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule,
the notice
'Although a conviction usually becomes final thirty days after the Superior Court affirms a
judgment of sentence,
the thirtieth day fell on March 6, 2010, a Saturday and by rule, defendant had until the next date the
Court was open
for business to file a petition of allowance of appeal. See 1Pa.C.S.§ 1908. This Court considered
the mailing of the
request for counsel to be a request for post-conviction collateral relief as it was filed after defendant's
conviction
becarne final. It is noted that it was deemed to be filed when defendant mailed it pursuant to the
prison "mailbox"
rule.
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of appeal ... shall he filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is
taken.").
Here defendant mailed his petition for appointment of counsel on August 2, 2012, well
past March 8, 2010, and thus, his petition clearly was untimely filed under the PCRA, even
though he filed the aforementioned petition within sixty days of the date on which Miller was
issued. While defendant did file his petition for the appointment of counsel within sixty days of
the date Miller was handed down, the only potentially applicable exception to the one-year filing
deadline is the one set forth in section 9545(b)(1)(iii). Although defendant did not waive
his
Miller claim because he raised it within sixty days of the date Miller was handed
down,
defendant still had the burden of establishing that this Court had jurisdiction to address
the claim.
See Commonwealth v, Seskey, 86 A.3d 237, 241 (Pa. Super. 2014). He failed in this endeavo
r
because Miller was held in Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (2013), cert.
denied, 573
U.S. -- (U.S. June 9, 2014)(No. 13-1 038), not to apply retroactively. As the
Superior Court
explained in Seskey:
Subsection (iii) of Section 9545[(b)(1)] has two requirements.
First, h provides that the right asserted is a constitutional right that
was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or [the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania] after the time provided in this
section. Second, it provides that the right "has been helr by "that
courr to apply retroactively. Thus, a petitioner must prove that
there is a "new- constitutional right and that the right "has been
held" by that court to apply retroactively. The language "has been
held" is in the past tense. These words mean that the action has
already occurred, i.e., "that courr has already held the new
constitutional right to be retroactive to cases on collateral review.
By employing the past tense in writing this provision, the
legislature clearly intended that the right was already recognized at
the time the petition was filed.
Seskey, 86 A.3d at 242-43 (quoting Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 941 A.2d 646,
649-50)(Pa.
2007)(citation omitted)).
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Thus, defendant's claim that this Court erred by dismissing his Miller claim entitles him
to no relief becau.se it is clear that defendant failed to establish that Miller set forth a new
constitutional right that applied retroactively at the time he filed his pro se petition, and
therefore. his request fbr PCRA relief was untimely filed. This Court had no authority to ignore
the Cunningham ruling.
This Court notes that even though defendant challenged the legality and constitutionality
of his sentence, the one-year deadline of the PCRA still applied. See Commonwealth v.
Slotcavage, 939 A.2d 901, 903 (Pa. Super. 2007)(citing Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d
214,
223 (Pa. 1999)("Although a legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA,
claims must still first satisfy the PCRA's time limits or one of the exceptions thereto."
)).
Therefore, to be entitled to relief even on his sentencing claim it was incumbent on
defendant to
establish that one of the exceptions to the one-year filing requirement applied to excuse
the late
filing of his petition. As noted above, defendant failed to meet his burden.
Finally, although defendant sought relief from his life sentence pursuant to
a writ of
habeas corpus, in Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 640, the Pennsylvania Suprerne Court
explained that
"the PCR A subsumes the remedy of habeas corpus with respect to remedies offered
under the
PCRA and that any petition seeking relief under the PCRA rnust be filed within one
year offinal
judgrnent." The writ of habeas corpus "continues to exist only in cases in
which there is no
rernedy under the PCRA." Id.In the instant rnatter, defendant argued in his habeas petition that his sentence
is illegal
because it is unconstitutional under Miller, supra. Such claims are cognizable
under the PCRA.
42 Pa,C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii)(vii). As such, the PCRA subsumed defendant's
issue and this
Court lacked jurisdiction to address the issues raised in defendant's habeas
petition because
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defendant failed to prove that one of the PCRA time exceptions excused the late filing of his
petition. In Seskey,supra, the Superior Court stated:
Throughout his brief, Appellant attempts to circumvent the
effect that Cunningham has upon our jurisdiction by arguing, inter
alia: that he is entitled to relief under Article 1, § 13 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution ("Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted."),
independently of the Eighth Amendment. Brief for Appellant 10-
13; that Miller should be applied retroactively based upon
Pennsylvania's broader retroactivity principles, Brief for Appellant
at 19-26; and that the inequitable result that Miller created violates
Pennsylvania's due process and equal protection principles. Brief
for Appellant at 27-30. While these arguments someday may
require consideration by our courts, today cannot be that day.
Before a court may address Appellant's arguments, or similar
contentions, that court must have jurisdiction. We cannot
manufacture jurisdiction based upon the substantive claims raised
by the parties. Presently, we are confined by the express terms of
subsection 9545(b)(I )(iii) and our Supreme Court's decision in
Cunningham. Combined, those two elements require us to
conclude that we lack jurisdiction. No substantive claim can
overcome this conclusion.
Seskey, 86 A.3d at 243.
Therefore. under the holding of Seskey, this Court's determination that defendant was not
entitled to habeas relief, respectfully, should be affirmed.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, it is suggested that this Court's ruling finding
no
merit to defendant's claim that he is entitled to relief because his sentence is illegal
should be
affirmed.
Defendant's next and final issue was also properly dismissed on timeliness grounds.
As
an initial matter. in order to invoke an exception to the Act's timeliness provision, there
is a
requirement that a petitioner file his claim "within 60 days of the date the claim could
have been
presented." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). The 60-day rule requires a petitioner to plead and
prove
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that the information on which he relies could not have been obtained earlier, despite the exercise
of due diligence. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720(Pa. 2008),
In the instant case. defendant was made aware that his appeal had been dismissed because
appellate counsel had not filed a brief on September 29, 2011, when he received a letter
informing him of that fact. Defendant did not file his petition for appointrnent of counsel until
August 2,2012, well after sixty day period set forth in section 9545 had expired.
Defendant attempts to overcome the late filing by claiming that the letter he received on
September 29, 2011, failed to inform him of the steps necessary to have his appellate rights
reinstated and that he did not have the transcript from his trial or discovery materials. Neither
ground excuses defendant's late filing because he waited over ten months after receiving
the
letter before he filed his petition for the appointment of counsel. Moreover, defendant
did not
need his trial transcript or discovery material to seek PCRA relief. Finally, defendant has failed
to explain why he could not have learned prior to his receipt ofthe letter that his appeal had been
dismissed. For all of these reason, it is clear that defendant's second claim was time
barred and
it is respectfully sugaested that this Court's dismissal of it be affirmed?
2 Defendant cited to Bennett, supra, as supporting his claim. In Bennett, the Supreme Court
ruled that if a defendant
proves that he was abandoned by counsel and raises the claim within sixty days of the date
he learned ofthe
abandonment, he meets the newly discovered time exception set forth in section 95459b). Here
defendant, failed to
meet his burden because he did not seek relief within sixty days of the date he learned that his
appeal had been
dismissed. Consequently, Bennett did not apply to excuse defendant's untimely request for
relief.
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CONCLUSION
In sum,defendant failed to file his claims within the PCRA's necessary time limitations,
or establish that any ofthe exceptions applied to his case. Accordingly. for all of thc foregoing
reasons, defendant's petition was properly dismissed as untimely and, respectfully. it is
suggested that the ruling be affirmed.
BY THE COURT,
DATE:
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