Com. v. Swingle, B. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S77035-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,           :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :           PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee             :
    :
    v.                    :
    :
    BEAU ROBERT SWINGLE,                    :
    :
    Appellant            :     No. 1686 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 13, 2014,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-64-CR-0000094-2011
    BEFORE: STABILE, JENKINS, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:                 FILED FEBRUARY 05, 2015
    Beau Robert Swingle (Appellant) appeals from the May 13, 2014 order
    which dismissed his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
    In April 2011, Appellant was charged with possession with the intent to
    deliver a controlled substance (PWID), possession of a controlled substance,
    and possession of drug paraphernalia.       On July 18, 2011, Appellant pled
    guilty to PWID; the remaining charges were nolle prossed. It is undisputed
    that both the written and oral guilty plea colloquy incorrectly informed
    Appellant that the maximum sentence he could receive was five years of
    incarceration and a $15,000 fine.
    Following the entry of Appellant’s guilty plea, the lower court issued an
    order for a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI), and sentencing was
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S77035-14
    scheduled for September 1, 2011.          Prior to the sentencing hearing, the
    mistaken maximum sentence was discovered and noted on the front page of
    the PSI. The correct maximum sentence was fifteen years in prison and a
    $250,000 fine. Ultimately, Appellant was sentenced on September 1, 2011
    to 16 to 60 months’ incarceration and a $500 fine. Appellant did not file a
    post-sentence motion or a direct appeal.
    On November 14, 2013, Appellant filed pro se a “Nunc Pro-Tunc
    Petition for Reconsideration of Sentence,” which the lower court treated as a
    PCRA petition.1 PCRA counsel was appointed, and an amended petition was
    filed on February 18, 2014. A hearing was held on March 25, 2014, and on
    May 13, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely
    filed.    Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.    The PCRA court ordered
    Appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, and Appellant complied.
    Appellant presents the following issues for our consideration:
    I.    Whether the trial court erred in determining that …
    [Appellant’s] PCRA [petition] was not timely filed, and that
    it did not fall within any of the statutory exceptions to the
    one-year time limit?
    II.   Whether the trial court erred in determining that …
    [Appellant] did not prove that the facts upon which his
    1
    “It is . . . well-settled that ‘the PCRA provides the sole means for obtaining
    collateral review, and that any petition filed after the judgment of sentence
    becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition.’” Commonwealth v.
    Fowler, 
    930 A.2d 586
    , 591 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v.
    Johnson, 
    803 A.2d 1291
    , 1293 (Pa. Super. 2002)).
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    claims are predicated were unknown to him and could not
    have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence?
    III.   Whether the trial court erred when it failed to make a
    determination that … [Appellant’s] constitutional rights
    were violated?
    IV.    Whether the trial court erred when it failed to make a
    determination that trial counsel did not render []effective
    assistance of counsel?
    V.     Whether the trial court erred when it failed to make a
    determination that the guilty plea was induced by
    ineffective assistance of counsel?
    VI.    Whether the trial court erred when it failed to make a
    determination that … [Appellant’s] amended PCRA
    [petition] had merit?
    Appellant’s Brief at 5-6 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested answers
    omitted).
    This Court’s standard of review regarding an order
    dismissing a PCRA petition is whether the determination of the
    PCRA court is supported by evidence of record and is free of
    legal error. Commonwealth v. Burkett, 
    5 A.3d 1260
    , 1267
    (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted). “In evaluating a PCRA
    court’s decision, our scope of review is limited to the findings of
    the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light
    most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level.” 
    Id.
    Commonwealth v. Brandon, 
    51 A.3d 231
    , 233 (Pa. Super. 2012).
    Under the PCRA, all petitions must be filed within one year of the date
    that the petitioner’s judgment became final, unless one of three statutory
    exceptions applies. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Chester,
    
    895 A.2d 520
    , 522 (Pa. 2006).      For purposes of the PCRA, a judgment
    becomes final at the conclusion of direct review. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
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    “The PCRA’s time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature.”   Chester, 895
    A.2d at 522. Pennsylvania law makes clear that no court has jurisdiction to
    hear an untimely PCRA petition.   See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
    837 A.2d 1157
    , 1161 (Pa. 2003).
    Instantly, Appellant was sentenced on September 1, 2011.       Because
    he did not file a post-sentence motion or direct appeal, his judgment of
    sentence became final on October 3, 2011. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3);
    Pa.R.A.P. 903.   Thus, Appellant had until October 3, 2012, to file timely a
    PCRA petition. He did not do so. Accordingly, Appellant had to plead and
    prove how his petition met one of the following exceptions to the timeliness
    requirement:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
    interference by government officials with the presentation of the
    claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
    Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
    to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
    exercise of due diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
    recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
    this section and has been held by that court to apply
    retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
    Where the petition is untimely filed, the petitioner bears the burden of
    pleading and proving in the petition that one of the exceptions to the one-
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    year deadline for filing a PCRA petition applies. Commonwealth v. Bretz,
    
    830 A.2d 1273
    , 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003).              When pleading one of the
    foregoing exceptions, a litigant is subject to a 60-day deadline for invoking
    an exception which commences from the date on which the claim could have
    been presented. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
    Appellant alleges that his petition is timely filed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.
    § 9545(b)(1)(ii). To satisfy that section, a petitioner must allege and prove
    that the factual basis of his claim was previously unknown to him and that
    he could not have discovered the facts earlier through the exercise of due
    diligence.     See    42     Pa.C.S.   §    9545(b)(1)(ii);   Commonwealth      v.
    Huddleston, 
    55 A.3d 1217
    , 1220 (Pa. Super. 2012). “Due diligence
    demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own
    interests.” Commonwealth v. Monaco, 
    996 A.2d 1076
    , 1080 (Pa. Super.
    2010). As such, a petitioner must provide reasons for why, through the
    exercise of due diligence, he did not discover the facts earlier. 
    Id.
     “This rule
    is strictly enforced.” 
    Id.
    Upon review, we conclude that Appellant has failed to meet his
    burden. Appellant alleges that he is entitled to PCRA relief on the basis that
    he was misinformed as to the applicable maximum sentence at the time he
    entered his guilty plea. The PCRA court found that, prior to sentencing, trial
    counsel reviewed Appellant’s PSI with Appellant.              Trial Court Opinion,
    5/14/2014, at 4. The PCRA court also found that the corrected maximum
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    sentence was clearly noted on the front page of the PSI. 
    Id.
     Additionally,
    the PCRA court found that the only correction Appellant made to his PSI
    pertained to the time at which he withdrew from high school. 
    Id.
    The PCRA court’s findings above are supported by the record.
    Although trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that he could not
    definitively recall having discussed the corrected maximum sentence in
    particular with Appellant, he did testify that he reviewed the PSI with
    Appellant prior to sentencing.   N.T., 3/25/2014, at 6-13.     Trial counsel
    similarly indicated at the sentencing hearing that he and Appellant had
    reviewed the PSI and that the only correction to be made was that Appellant
    believed he withdrew from school in 10th grade rather than 9th grade.2 N.T.,
    9/1/2011, at 2-3. Moreover, the front page of the PSI provides the following
    information with regard to the applicable maximum sentence:
    Maximum Penalty(s):
     15 years/$250,000 fine
    Investigator’s Note: [Appellant’s] signed guilty plea colloquy
    indicated the maximum penalty as 5 years/$15,000 fine, which
    is incorrect. ADA Bompadre and [trial counsel] were contacted,
    and they agreed the maximum penalty in the signed colloquy
    was incorrect.
    2
    Appellant testified at the PCRA hearing that trial counsel briefly reviewed
    the PSI with him prior to sentencing, though trial counsel did not hand the
    PSI to Appellant to allow Appellant to go through it at his own leisure,
    Appellant could not see the front page clearly, and the paragraph regarding
    the maximum penalty was never brought to Appellant’s attention. N.T.,
    3/25/2014, at 17.
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    PSI, 9/1/2011, at 1.      Thus, Appellant has failed to prove that he was
    previously unaware of the mistake and that he could not have discovered
    the mistake through the exercise of due diligence.
    Appellant also alleges that he was entitled to PCRA relief on the basis
    that there were inaccuracies in the criminal history portion of the PSI that
    were considered during sentencing.         Appellant, however, has made no
    attempt to demonstrate that these alleged inaccuracies were previously
    unknown to him and that they could not have been ascertained through the
    exercise of due diligence.    In fact, Appellant testified at the PCRA hearing
    that he first became aware that the PSI contained inaccuracies with regard
    to his criminal history during the course of the PSI investigation.       N.T.,
    3/25/2014, at 19.      Moreover, Appellant concedes that he notified trial
    counsel of the     alleged inaccuracies.      Id.; Amended PCRA Petition,
    2/18/2014, at ¶13(b)(3); Appellant’s Brief at 32. Thus, it is apparent that
    Appellant knew of the alleged mistakes in his criminal history well before the
    instant petition was filed.
    Finally, to the extent that Appellant alleges that PCRA counsel’s
    discovery of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to advise Appellant of
    the proper maximum sentence or address alleged inaccuracies in the PSI
    constitutes the factual basis for his claim, such a position is unavailing. “Our
    Supreme Court has made clear that the section 9545(b)(1)(ii) exception will
    not apply to alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims, even if the
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    claims were not knowable until advised of their existence by present
    counsel.”     Commonwealth v. Perrin, 
    947 A.2d 1284
    , 1287 (Pa. Super.
    2008).
    In light of the above, we conclude that Appellant has failed to meet his
    burden to prove that his petition should be treated as timely filed pursuant
    to section 9545(b)(1)(ii).     Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in
    dismissing Appellant’s petition as untimely filed.   Therefore, we affirm the
    PCRA court’s order.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/5/2015
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