Com. v. Robinson, H. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S79028-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    HENRY GLEN ROBINSON
    Appellant                  No. 927 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the PCRA Order March 12, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0001101-1981
    CP-39-CR-0001102-1981
    BEFORE: ALLEN, OLSON and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                         FILED JANUARY 21, 2015
    Appellant, Henry Glen Robinson, appeals pro se from the order entered
    on March 12, 2014 dismissing his fourth petition for relief filed under the
    Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
    This Court has previously outlined the factual background and
    procedural history of this case as follows:
    Appellant was arrested on May 30, 1981, for his involvement in
    the armed robbery and murder of Perry Minich. On February 26,
    1982, Appellant pled guilty to criminal homicide[1] and nolo
    contendere to robbery.2     Appellant was sentenced to life
    imprisonment on September 15, 1983. On direct appeal, this
    Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for
    allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
    488 A.2d 1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a).
    2
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §[ 3701(a)(1)].
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S79028-14
    1167 (Pa. Super. 1984) (unpublished memorandum), appeal
    denied, 107 E.D. Alloc. Dkt. 85 (Pa. 1985).
    On May 8, 1997, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition, and
    subsequently in 2010, Appellant filed his second PCRA petition.
    Appellant was not afforded relief on either petition.      See
    Commonwealth v. Robinson, 2433 PHL 1997 (Pa. Super.
    19[9]8) [(unpublished memorandum)], and Commonwealth v.
    Robinson, 
    31 A.3d 742
     (Pa. Super. 2011) [(unpublished
    memorandum)], appeal denied, 
    34 A.3d 829
     (Pa. 2011).
    Appellant filed [his third PCRA petition] on July 23, 2012. In said
    petition, Appellant asserted a newly recognized Constitutional
    right pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 
    132 S. Ct. 2455
     (2012).
    Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
    93 A.3d 503
     (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished
    memorandum) (certain footnotes omitted), at 1-2. Appellant was ultimately
    denied relief with respect to his third PCRA petition. See generally 
    id.
    Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on January 16,
    2014. In his petition, Appellant alleged that his sentence was illegal. The
    PCRA court treated Appellant’s habeas corpus petition as a PCRA petition
    and issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition pursuant to
    Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907.      On February 20, 2014, the
    PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as time-barred. This timely appeal
    followed.3
    Appellant presents three issues for our review:
    3
    On March 27, 2014, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise
    statement of errors complained of on appeal (“concise statement”). See
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On April 14, 2014, Appellant filed his concise statement.
    On April 15, 2014, the PCRA court issued a statement in lieu of a Rule
    1925(a) opinion. Appellant’s first and second issues were included in his
    concise statement while his third issue addresses the sufficiency of the PCRA
    court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion.
    -2-
    J-S79028-14
    1. Did the [PCRA] court err as a matter of constitutional law by
    construing [Appellant]’s common law habeas corpus petition
    as an untimely, serial PCRA petition based upon an
    unconstitutional statute, 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9542, that was
    enacted in violation of the prohibitory language contained in
    Article I, § 14 and Article I, § 25 of the Pennsylvania
    Constitution?
    2. Did the [PCRA] court err as a matter of constitutional law by
    dismissing [Appellant]’s common law habeas corpus petition
    by applying 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b) in an unconstitutional
    manner, thereby depriving him of his inherent right to seek
    habeas corpus relief pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the
    Pennsylvania Constitution which cannot be suspended,
    limited[,] or altered except as the Constitution adopted by the
    people provides?
    3. Did the [PCRA] court err as a matter of law when it failed to
    include and substantively address the constitutional claims
    raised by [Appellant] in his Rule 1925(b) statement in its Rule
    1925(a) opinion?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.
    On appeal, Appellant concedes that his petition is patently untimely
    and that his petition does not satisfy any of the statutory exceptions to the
    PCRA’s timeliness requirement. Courts lack jurisdiction over untimely PCRA
    petitions that do not satisfy a timeliness exception. See Commonwealth v.
    Callahan, 
    101 A.3d 118
    , 121–122 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).
    Appellant argues, however, that the PCRA is unconstitutional in two
    respects. First, he contends that the PCRA’s subsuming of the common law
    writ of habeas corpus violates Article I, §§ 14 and 25 of the Pennsylvania
    Constitution. Second, he contends that the PCRA’s timeliness requirement is
    unconstitutional because it denies him the ability to seek post-conviction
    -3-
    J-S79028-14
    relief. “As the constitutionality of a statute presents a pure question of law,
    our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”
    Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 
    99 A.3d 116
    , 118 (Pa. Super. 2014)
    (citation omitted).
    Our Supreme Court rejected the same claims advanced by Appellant
    relating to the constitutionality of the PCRA.       In Commonwealth v.
    Peterkin, 
    722 A.2d 638
    , 641 (Pa. 1998), our Supreme Court held that the
    PCRA did not violate the Pennsylvania Constitution’s prohibition against the
    suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Furthermore, our Supreme Court
    held that the PCRA’s one year time-bar was a reasonable restriction on the
    right to seek habeas corpus relief. Id. at 642. Appellant argues throughout
    his brief that Peterkin was incorrectly decided.    It is axiomatic, however,
    that this Court is bound by our Supreme Court’s decisions. See Strausser
    Enters., Inc. v. Segal & Morel, Inc., 
    89 A.3d 292
    , 300 (Pa. Super. 2014)
    (citation omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s two challenges
    to the constitutionality of the PCRA are without merit.
    The PCRA court correctly treated Appellant’s petition as seeking relief
    under the PCRA.       See Commonwealth v. Eller, 
    807 A.2d 838
    , 842–843
    (Pa. 2002) (All claims cognizable under the PCRA, such as Appellant’s, must
    be brought under the PCRA and not through habeas corpus proceedings.).
    As Appellant’s petition was patently untimely, and he failed to satisfy any of
    the statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement, the PCRA
    -4-
    J-S79028-14
    court properly dismissed the petition without addressing the merits of the
    constitutional issues raised by Appellant.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/21/2015
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 927 EDA 2014

Filed Date: 1/21/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024