Com. v. Staton, F. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
FLINT ANDREW STATON
Appellant No. 2085 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 31, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Criminal Division at Nos: CP-39-CR-0000671-2013; CP-39-CR-0000681-
2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 25, 2016
Appellant, Flint Andrew Staton, appeals from the March 31, 2015
judgment of sentence imposing 18 years and 6 months to 43 years of
incarceration for stalking, unlawful possession of a firearm, terroristic
threats, harassment, possession of an instrument of crime, and possession
of a prohibited offensive weapon. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the pertinent facts in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion:
Anne Staton and [Appellant] were married in 2002.
During the course of their marriage, Anne suffered from various
forms of abuse and, in 2010, she left the marital home in
Perkiomenville, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. At the time,
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Anne was pregnant with their daughter, Evelyn, and she and the
couple’s 2 year old daughter, Grace, stayed at a women’s shelter
in Allentown for approximately two weeks. After staying with a
family friend, Anne returned to the marital home. In November
of 2011, the couple got into a physical fight in front of the
children. According to Anne, [Appellant] ‘manhandled’ her and
punched her in the head while she was in the fetal position.
Anne went to the police the next day. At the suggestion of
police, Anne sought and received a temporary protection from
abuse (PFA) order in Montgomery County. Anne again left the
home with the children and stayed at her mother’s home in
Emmaus, Lehigh County, Pennsylvania. Though the couple was
still apart in December 2011, they spent Christmas day together.
Anne planned to have brunch with [Appellant] and then take the
children to her grandfather’s house. An argument ensued
because [Appellant] wanted to go along with them, but Anne
explained she was just taking the children. [Appellant] told
Anne if he was not going, then nobody was going, and he took
Anne’s cell phone and car keys away from her. After brunch,
Anne took Evelyn upstairs for a nap, and [Appellant] followed
her. Anne got Evelyn to fall asleep, but [Appellant] would not
allow Anne to leave the bedroom. [Appellant] forced Anne to
bend over the bed, twister her arm up behind her back, took her
clothes off, and forced her to have sex with him. [Appellant]
pushed Anne’s face into the mattress and hooked his finger in
her mouth in an attempt to prevent her from screaming.
Following this incident, Anne and [Appellant] went back
downstairs to open presents with Grace. At some point,
[Appellant] grabbed a roll of duct tape and said to Grace,
‘wouldn’t it be funny if we taped up mommy.’
Several hours went by and [Appellant’s] brother, Matt,
arrived at his house. Anne relayed to Matt while he was outside
that [Appellant] would not allow her to leave the house. Matt
gained access to the house and helped Anne get her car keys.
Anne and the children exited the home, and got in her car.
[Appellant] followed and entered the back seat of Anne’s car.
Anne exited her car and entered Matt’s car. Eventually, Anne
was able to get back in her car without [Appellant]. She started
to pull away and [Appellant] punched at her driver’s side
window, causing it to shatter. Anne went to her grandfather’s
house and called the police.
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In January 2012, Anne was living with her mother in
Emmaus. She and Grace were in a second story bedroom
watching TV when they observed what appeared to be a cell
phone attached to a pole slowly pan across the window. At the
time, a temporary PFA order was in effect preventing [Appellant]
from contacting Anne. On February 15, 2012, Anne received an
envelope in her mailbox, which contained three Walmart gift
cards. The envelope had Anne’s name and address written on it,
but did not have a stamp on it. Anne recognized the handwriting
as Appellant’s. On March 20, 2012, a final PFA order was
entered in Montgomery County prohibiting [Appellant] from any
verbal or physical contact with Anne. [Appellant] was permitted
to contact Anne in writing regarding the children only, but he
consistently texted and emailed Anne regarding personal
matters. Based on statements made by [Appellant] in some of
the messages, it appeared as though he knew various places
Anne had visited.
[Appellant] continued to contact Anne, despite the PFA,
and based on some of his actions, Anne sought and received a
PFA on behalf of her daughter Grace in November 2012. The
order prevented [Appellant] from contacting Grace and
prevented him from possessing any firearms. Around this same
time, Anne was taking classes at Northampton Area Community
College. One evening, around 8:30-9:00 p.m., when she
finished class and went to her car, Anne saw an “X” drawn on
her driver’s side window. It appeared to be written with Chap
Stick. Anne left and was driving on Route 22 when she realized
a car had followed her from the school. She proceeded to
Boscov’s at the Lehigh Valley Mall and parked. The same car
she saw following her on Route 22, a dark sedan, followed her
and also parked. She entered the store and within a few
minutes, Anne saw [Appellant]. He immediately turned around
and walked quickly away. Anne advised a sales associate that
she had a PFA order against a person that just followed her into
the store. Security was alerted, and subsequently the police
were called. Anne viewed video surveillance footage and saw
[Appellant] enter the store soon after she entered.
[Appellant] continued to text and email Anne for the next
few months. On January 31, 2013, sometime between 5:00-
6:00 a.m., Anne left her apartment to go to work, and she
observed a dark sedan following her. Anne made several turns
until she was perpendicular with the vehicle, and she observed
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[Appellant] driving the vehicle. [Appellant] was wearing a
baseball cap and glasses. Anne called 911 and reported what
was happening. Anne was directed by dispatch to drive to the
police station, where she was met by Sergeant Timothy Hoats.
No vehicles followed Anne to the police station. Hoats advised
Anne to stagger her route to work in the future. Subsequently,
[Appellant] was charged with stalking and an arrest warrant was
issued.
The next morning, February 1, 2013, Sergeant Hoats
parked his vehicle near Anne’s apartment at around 4:30 a.m.
From his vantage point, he could see her entranceway and
where her car was parked. Hoats observed Anne leave her
apartment around 5:10 a.m. and enter her vehicle. She pulled
away going east on Main Street and staggered her route as
Hoats had suggested. He paralleled her and followed her for
approximately ¼ to ½ mile, but did not see anyone following
Anne that day.
On the morning of February 4, 2013, Sergeant Hoats again
parked his patrol vehicle near Anne’s apartment. Around 5:12
a.m., he observed Anne exit her apartment and eventually saw
her vehicle pull out onto Main Street, this time heading west. At
that time of day, there was virtually no traffic jam on the street,
but Hoats saw a dark sedan following behind Anne. The driver of
the sedan was a male wearing glasses and a baseball hat. Hoats
pulled out behind the vehicle and accelerated to catch up with
the car. When he caught up, the driver hit the brakes and made
an abrupt right turn onto 3rd Street without signaling. Hoats
followed and entered the license plate into his mobile computer.
The registration came back to [Appellant]. Hoats was aware of
the outstanding arrest warrant, so he radioed for another patrol
unit. Officer Bryan Hamscher received Hoats’ call. Hoats
advised Hamscher that he was following a car with a possible
wanted person and that they were heading towards Hamscher’s
location. Hamscher and Hoats conducted a vehicle stop of
[Appellant].
Sergeant Hoats approached the vehicle and spoke with
[Appellant]. Hoats advised Appellant of the warrant, and took
[Appellant] into custody. Based on the location of [Appellant’s]
vehicle, it needed to be towed. Pursuant to Emmaus Police
Department policy, the vehicle was inventoried before being
towed. During the inventory search, Officer Hamscher located a
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wallet, a pocketknife, a folding butterfly knife, and stun baton in
the center console. Hamscher opened the trunk and found a
large kitchen knife in plain view. At this point, Hamscher
stopped the inventory search and contacted Hoats. Hoats
decided to secure the vehicle and apply for a search warrant.
[Appellant] was transported to the police station and
placed in a holding cell. At the station, Sergeant Hoats
performed a search of [Appellant] and discovered he was
wearing a bulletproof vest. Additionally, Hoats found a balaclava
style ski mask and a Samsung cell phone. Officer Kevin Schmidt
spoke to [Appellant] in the holding cell and asked him if he was
willing to talk to the police; [Appellant] agreed. Schmidt read
[Appellant] a Miranda[1] rights and waiver form, and [Appellant]
signed the form. Schmidt interviewed [Appellant] for
approximately three hours.
[Appellant] told Officer Schmidt he was coming from
Allentown, but when asked, [Appellant] could not tell Schmidt
where in Allentown. He also indicated he was dropping someone
named ‘Sam’ off, but said he did not know Sam’s last name.
[Appellant] indicated he was randomly driving through Emmaus
and did not know he was behind Anne. He also stated he always
wears body armor. [Appellant] inquired about his car, and when
Schmidt asked if there was something in there that should not
be, [Appellant] said he did not know if there was a gun in there.
Police subsequently obtained a search warrant for
[Appellant’s] vehicle. During the search, police discovered
numerous items, including a loaded .40 caliber Walther P990
handgun, rubber gloves, wigs, a camouflage mask, walkie-
talkies, a Kevlar military helmet, a shoulder holster, a crowbar, a
stun gun, duct tape, nylon cable restraints, binoculars, a planner
belonging to Anne Staton, a Valentine’s Day card that read ‘A
Promise For My Wife,’ a Motorola Razr flip phone, a Cannon [sic]
digital camera, a Dell laptop, brass knuckles, a handcuff key, OC
spray, a large machete with a sheath, various knives, and a copy
of the PFA order against [Appellant]. There were also several
items related to the family seafood business, including some of
the knives.
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1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Sergeant Hoats also secured search warrants for the cell
phones and digital camera. The photographs recovered from the
camera depicted Anne’s apartment entrance, her license plate,
her grandfather’s home, her mother’s partner’s license plate,
doors at Northampton Community College, and Anne at different
stores and gas stations. Anne was unaware these photos were
taken. Phone records showed various threatening texts [sic]
messages from [Appellant] to Anne. […]
[Appellant] testified at his trial, and denied the allegations
of abuse made by Anne. According to [Appellant], Anne abused
him. [Appellant] also contradicted Anne’s version of the incident
that occurred on Christmas day 2011: he indicated the sexual
encounter was consensual; that Anne was free to leave, but
refused to leave the house; that Anne indicated she was coming
back home for good; and that Anne hit him with her car, causing
him to put his hands up, which in turn broke the window.
[Appellant] denied following Anne on January 31, 2013, and said
he was just driving home through Emmaus from a bar in
Allentown when he was pulled over on February 4, 2013. He
also indicated that he believed Anne, Sergeant Hoats, and Officer
Schmidt set him up that day. [Appellant] testified that Hoats
and Schmidt both lied under oath at trial.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/21/15, at 2-8.
The case proceeded to a jury trial on February 25, 2015, at the
conclusion of which the jury found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned
offenses. The trial court imposed its sentence on March 31, 2015, and
Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on April 2, 2015. The trial
court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions on June 24, 2015. This
timely appeal followed.
Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion in
imposing sentences above the aggravated range or at the statutory
maximum. Appellant also argues the trial court erred in denying his pretrial
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motions to suppress evidence. Finally, Appellant also argues his convictions
are contrary to the weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 4-8. We will
address these arguments in turn.
To preserve a challenge to the trial court’s sentencing discretion, an
appellant must include in the appellate brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement
explaining why the appeal raises a substantial question that the sentence is
in appropriate. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b); Commonwealth v. Harvard, 64
A.2d 690, 701 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 77 A.3d 636 (Pa. 2013).
A substantial question requires a demonstration that the
sentence violates either a specific provision of the sentencing
scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular
fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process. This
Court’s inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is
sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are
necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits. Whether a
substantial question has been raised is determined on a case-by-
case basis; the fact that a sentence is within the statutory limits
does not mean a substantial question cannot be raised.
However, a bald assertion that a sentence is excessive does not
by itself raise a substantial question justifying this Court’s review
of the merits of the underlying claim.
Id. Appellant asserts that the trial court relied on matters outside the
record and that the court imposed aggravated range sentences based on
findings that the guidelines already account for. This Court has held that a
trial court’s alleged reliance on matters outside the record raises a
substantial question. Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 990 A.2d 732, 745 (Pa.
Super. 2009). An allegation that the trial court enhanced a sentence based
on factors accounted for in the guidelines also raises a substantial question.
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Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 732 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en
banc), appeal denied, 759 A.2d 920 (Pa. 2000). We therefore turn to the
merits.
We review a challenge to the trial court’s sentencing discretion as
follows:
[T]he proper standard of review when considering whether
to affirm the sentencing court’s determination is an abuse of
discretion. ...[A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere error
of judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its
discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment
exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. In more expansive terms,
our Court recently offered: An abuse of discretion may not be
found merely because an appellate court might have reached a
different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest
unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or
such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.
The rationale behind such broad discretion and the
concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the
sentencing court is in the best position to determine the proper
penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the
individual circumstances before it.
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 169–70 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Several of Appellant’s sentences fall within the top of the aggravated
guideline range, and several are above the aggravated guideline range. We
may vacate a sentence within the guideline range only if it is “clearly
unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2). We may vacate a sentence that
falls outside the guideline range if it is “unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9781(c)(3).
Section 9781 also governs our review of the record:
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(d) Review of record.--In reviewing the record the appellate
court shall have regard for:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
defendant, including any presentence investigation.
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d).
At Appellant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court provided a dozen
reasons supporting his decision to sentence Appellant at or above the top of
the aggravated guideline range. In summary: 1) Appellant shows no
contrition for his offenses; 2) Appellant is a danger to society; 3) Appellant
inflicted mental cruelty on the victim; 4) a lesser sentence would not
sufficiently protect the victim; 5) Appellant had a prior conviction involving
the victim; 6) Appellant’s victimization of the victim extended over a period
of 2½ to 3 years; 7) Appellant exhibited elevated sophistication in how he
committed the offenses; 8) Appellant has an exceptional proclivity for using
firearms and other weapons; 9) Appellant blames the victim; 10) Appellant’s
“undeterrable” persistence in contacting the victim after she obtained
protection under the Protection From Abuse Act; 11) Appellant has low
potential for rehabilitation; and 12) Appellant’s offense had an extreme
impact on the victim. N.T. Sentencing, 3/31/15, at 139-41; N.T. Post-
Sentence Motion Hearing, 6/24/15, at 19.
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Appellant asserts that the record does not support findings that a
lesser sentence would not protect the victim; that his persistence in
contacting the victim is undeterrable, or that his potential for rehabilitation is
very low. We will consider these matters in turn. Concerning the protection
of the victim, the record supports the trial court’s findings that Appellant’s
conduct persisted over 2½ to 3 years, that Appellant persistently followed
and photographed the victim and her whereabouts, that he had a prior
conviction involving her, and that he was heavily armed when police
apprehended him, including unlawful possession of firearms, possession of
brass knuckles, and possession of a stun baton. Given the persistence of
Appellant’s unlawful conduct and given the potential threat to the victim
arising from Appellant’s weaponry, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s decision to impose a lengthy sentence in order to protect the
victim.
Next, we consider the trial court’s finding that Appellant’s persistence
in contacting the victim is undeterrable. As the court noted, Appellant’s
unlawful conduct persisted for several years, including after the victim
obtained a PFA against him. At sentencing, Appellant accused the victim of
lying under oath about his abusive behavior. N.T. Sentencing, 3/31/15, at
113. Again, the record supports the trial court’s findings, and we discern no
abuse of sentencing discretion. Finally, we consider Appellant’s potential for
rehabilitation. In addition to the aforementioned facts, Appellant insinuated
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at sentencing that the prosecutor was manipulative and had a personal
vendetta against Appellant. Id. at 113-14. Given the persistence of
Appellant’s unlawful conduct, his lack of contrition, and his comments
blaming the victim and the prosecutor, the record supports the trial court’s
finding that Appellant is not amenable to rehabilitation.
Appellant also argues the trial court imposed sentences at or above
the aggravated range based solely on the gravity of his offenses. Appellant
notes that the sentencing guidelines account for the gravity of each offense.
The record fails to support Appellant’s argument. As noted above, the trial
court provided twelve reasons for imposing a sentence at or above the
aggravated guideline range. The trial court did not rely merely on the
gravity of the offense, but on the unique facts of this case. Finding no abuse
of sentencing discretion, we reject Appellant’s first assertion of error.
Next, Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s pre-
trial motions to suppress evidence.
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the
denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether
the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the
record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts
are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record
as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and
may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous.
Where, as here, the appeal of the determination of the
suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an
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appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the
conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary
review.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010).
First, Appellant argues that his wallet, pocketknife, butterfly knife, and
stun baton were the fruits of an unlawful vehicle inventory search. Appellant
develops no legal argument regarding the inventory search, and we could
deem this issue waived on that basis. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b); Commonwealth
v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2008). Nonetheless, we
conclude that the trial court’s April 11, 2014 opinion accurately addresses
the merits. Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/14, at 12-14.
Next, Appellant challenges the admissibility of inculpatory statements
he made to the police. Appellant asserts that he was coerced into talking to
police, and that police continued the interview after he asked for an attorney
and that the interview continued after he asked for it to stop. The
voluntariness of a confession is a question of law, and our review is plenary.
Commonwealth v. Nester, 790 A.2d 879, 881 (Pa. 1998). Instantly, the
voluntariness of Appellant’s statements depended entirely on the trial court’s
resolution of the conflicting testimony offered by Appellant and Patrolman
Kevin Schmidt. Indeed, Appellant’s brief concedes that this argument “can
only be resolved with a credibility determination between [Appellant] and
Officer Schmidt.” Appellant’s Brief at 27.
The trial court found as follows:
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Officer Schmidt credibly testified that he read [Appellant] a
Miranda rights and waiver form, that [Appellant] agreed to
speak with him, and that [Appellant] signed the form. Schmidt
stated [Appellant] appeared to understand his rights and did not
appear to be under the influence. Schmidt also testified that
[Appellant] never asked to stop the interview and did not ask for
an attorney. [Appellant] does not deny he signed the Miranda
waiver form, but rather alleges he did not know what the form
was, and felt threatened and coerced into signing it.
Specifically, [Appellant] testified Schmidt asked him about dead
bodies and about sexual matters involving Anne Staton.
[Appellant] also stated he asked for an attorney multiple times.
I find [Appellant’s] testimony incredible.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/14, at 14-15.
Thus, the record contains evidence—Officer Schmidt’s testimony—
supporting the trial court’s findings. As noted above, the standard of review
permits our consideration of the Commonwealth’s evidence and only so
much of Appellant’s evidence as is uncontradicted. Jones, 988 A.2d at 654.
Here, Appellant relies on his own testimony, which the Commonwealth
witnesses contradicted and which the trial court deemed not credible.
Viewing the evidence in accordance with our standard of review, the record
supports the trial court’s finding that Appellant made a voluntary statement
to the police. The trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to
suppress his statement.
Next, Appellant argues the trial court should have suppressed items
that police seized from his car pursuant to a search warrant. Appellant
argues the affidavit of probable cause did not support issuance of the
warrant. Appellant’s argument depends on the success of his challenges to
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the inventory search and to his statement, as the affidavit of probable cause
referred to both. Appellant argues we must analyze the affidavit of probable
cause without reference to any unlawfully obtained evidence. We have
found no error in the trial court’s refusal to suppress the inventory search or
his statement, and therefore have no reason to conclude that the affidavit of
probable cause contained tainted evidence. Appellant’s argument lacks
merit.2
Appellant next argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress data retrieved from a Samsung cell phone, a Motorola cell phone,
and a Dell laptop computer because police lacked probable cause to obtain
the search warrant. Appellant also argues the scope of the warrant was
overbroad, in that it permitted retrieval of data other than text messages,
emails, or phone calls.
The record reveals that the Motorola cell phone and the Dell laptop did
not yield any evidence. We therefore confine our analysis to the Samsung
cell phone.
The legal principles applicable to a review of the sufficiency
of probable cause affidavits are well settled. Before an issuing
authority may issue a constitutionally valid search warrant, he or
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2
Appellant also argues that the firearm should be suppressed, as there is
no evidence he told police that a firearm was in the vehicle. Appellant
recognizes, correctly, that his argument depends on the trial court crediting
his testimony over that of Patrolman Schmidt. As noted above, the trial
court credited Patrolman Schmidt’s testimony, and we can consider
Appellant’s evidence only insofar as it is uncontradicted.
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she must be furnished with information sufficient to persuade a
reasonable person that probable cause exists to conduct a
search. The standard for evaluating a search warrant is a
totality of the circumstances[.] A magistrate is to make a
practical, common sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the
veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. The
information offered to establish probable cause must be viewed
in a common sense, non-technical manner. Probable cause is
based on a finding of the probability, not a prima facie showing
of criminal activity, and deference is to be accorded a
magistrate’s finding of probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Ryerson, 817 A.2d 510, 513–14 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Appellant also relies on Commonwealth v. Grossman, 555 A.2d 896
899 (Pa. 1989).
Although some courts have treated overbreadth and
ambiguity as distinct defects in warrants, […] both doctrines
diagnose symptoms of the same disease: a warrant whose
description does not describe as nearly as may be those items
for which there is probable cause. Consequently, in any
assessment of the validity of the description contained in a
warrant, a court must initially determine for what items probable
cause existed. The sufficiency of the description must then be
measured against those items for which there was probable
cause. Any unreasonable discrepancy between the items for
which there was probable cause and the description in the
warrant requires suppression. An unreasonable discrepancy
reveals that the description was not as specific as was
reasonably possible.
Id. at 899-900.
As is evident from the recitation of facts above, police knew that
Appellant continued to contact the victim via phone call, text message, and
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email, even after she obtained a PFA against him. The affidavit of probable
cause set forth several of the unwanted messages. Plainly, the police had
sufficient probable cause to get a warrant for a cell phone found in
Appellant’s possession and for which he had the passcode. Appellant argues
the warrant was flawed in that it permitted police to search for all user-
generated data that may be relevant to the investigation, rather than just
emails, text messages, and phone calls. Whatever the merit of Appellant’s
argument, his brief fails to specify precisely whether police retrieved any
evidence from the Samsung cell phone other than emails, text messages, or
phone calls. Likewise, Appellant’s brief does not address the law governing
search warrants for digital information. In Commonwealth v. Orie, 88
A.3d 983, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2014), this Court noted that warrants
authorizing seizure of all information found in a computer are overbroad, but
warrants authorizing seizure of information relevant to the criminal
investigation are valid. Indeed, a warrant must provide enough guidance for
the executing police officers to distinguish items of evidentiary value from
items of no evidentiary value. See United States v. Wecht, 619
F. Supp. 2d 213, 229 (W.D.Pa. 2009).
In summary, the warrant was limited to data recovered from devices
found in Appellant’s car among all the other paraphernalia he used in
commission of the offenses at issue. Likewise, Appellant acknowledges that
the warrant authorizes seizure only of data relevant to the investigation.
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Ultimately, Appellant’s overbreadth argument is underdeveloped. He argues
the warrant should have been limited to email, phone call, and text message
data, but he fails to describe whether police seized any other data or why
the warrant did not authorize that seizure. We therefore discern no basis
upon which to disturb the suppression court’s order.
Appellant’s final argument is that the jury’s verdict is contrary to the
weight of the evidence.
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted
because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge
on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion.
Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that
notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of
greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight
with all the facts is to deny justice. It has often been stated that
a new trial should be awarded when the jury’s verdict is so
contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and
the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given
another opportunity to prevail.
An appellate court’s standard of review when presented
with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard
of review applied by the trial court:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the
trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence
presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration
to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when
reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons
for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction
that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the
evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of
justice.
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Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054–55 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis in
original; citations omitted).
Appellant argues that many of the items recovered from his vehicle
are innocuous. The knives, according to Appellant, were used in his family
seafood business. Appellant’s Brief at 35. Appellant also states that both he
and the victim collected guns, knives and ammunition during their marriage.
Appellant claims other items, including the camouflaged facemask,
arrowheads and orange rubber gloves are consistent with hunting. Id. He
claims he obtained body armor after he was robbed at gunpoint. Id. at 36.
He claims his statement to police does not support his conviction because
police did not create an audio or video record and because Appellant did not
sign the statement. Id. Appellant claims there was no evidence he knew of
or possessed the firearm found in his vehicle. Id. at 36-37. Finally,
Appellant argues that he had permission to contact his child, and that this is
a domestic relations case rather than a criminal case, and that the victim is
at fault for failing to abide by a governing custody and visitation order. Id.
at 38-40.
The trial court explained its discretionary decision as follows:
The verdict in this case does not shock one’s sense of
justice. As summarized above, [Appellant] was secretly
following Anne and taking pictures of her, her school, her
vehicle, and her family and friend’s vehicles; he contacted her
via text messages, emails, and phone calls, in violation of an
active PFA; he made various threats toward Anne via text
messages, emails, and phone calls; he was caught following
Anne, in violation of the PFA; he was found in possession of a
- 18 -
J-S52028-16
firearm for which he did not possess a license, and which was
also in violation of the PFA; and he was found in possession of
body armor, brass knuckles, and a stun baton. There was
overwhelming evidence presented to find [Appellant] guilty of
the crimes charged. Although [Appellant] testified and denied all
the allegations, the jury was free to believe all, part, or none of
his testimony. The jury evidently chose to believe the version of
events that proved [Appellant’s] guilt, and in doing so, rendered
a verdict that was consistent with the weight of the evidence.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/21/15, at 11.
Appellant would have us view various pieces of evidence in isolation.
While many of the items retrieved from Appellant’s car have lawful uses,
Appellant’s argument fails to account for the presence of all of these items
together in his car while he was surreptitiously following the victim. Viewing
the record as a whole, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
denial of Appellant’s motion for a new trial based on the weight of the
evidence.
In summary, we have found no merit to any of Appellant’s assertions
of error. We therefore affirm the judgment of sentence. We direct that a
copy of the trial court’s April 11, 2014 opinion be filed along with this
memorandum.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
- 19 -
J-S52028-16
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/25/2016
- 20 -
Circulated 09/29/2016 12:10 PM
) )
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEHIGH COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 671-2013
681-2013
vs.
FLINT ANDREW STATON,
Defendant
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APPEARANCES: --
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Robert W. Schopf, Esquire, Assistant District Attorney,
For the Commonwealth
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Carol Marciano, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, :-< .- N
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For the Defendant :::.-- J.l o,
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OPINION
James T. Anthony, Judge:
The defendant is charged in the above-captioned cases with firearms not to be
carried without a license, persons not to possess a firearm, four counts of stalking, two
counts of terroristic threats, three counts of harassment, two counts of possessing an
instrument of crime, and two counts of prohibited offensive weapon. On September 9,
2013, the defendant filed an Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion consisting of ( 1) Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus and/or Motion to Dismiss charges for Failure to Establish Prima
Facie Case, (2) Motion to Suppress, (3) Motion to Compel Discovery, and (4) Motion to
Allow Additional Pre-Trial Motions. A hearing was held on October 22, 2013 and
November 6, 2013. Following the hearing, I took the motions under advisement, and the
parties submitted briefs. This opinion follows.
1
Findings of Fact
Anne Staton and the defendant, Flint Staton, were married in 2002. In October
2010, the couple began having marital issues, and Anne left their home in
Perkiomenville1 and stayed at a women's shelter with her 2 year old daughter, Grace. At
the time, Anne was pregnant with their daughter Evelyn. Anne left the shelter after two
weeks and went to stay with a friend. Anne eventually returned to the marital home, but
problems continued when she confronted the defendant about having an affair. In
November of 2011, the couple got into a physical fight in front of the children where the
defendant "man-handled" Anne and punched her in the head.2 Anne again left the home
and began staying at her mother's home with the children.3 At the suggestion of the
State Police, Anne sought and received a temporary protection from abuse (PFA) order
against the defendant in Montgomery County.
The couple was still apart in December 2011, but spent Christmas day together.
Anne planned to have brunch with the defendant and then take the children to her
grandfather's house. An argument ensued because the defendant wanted to go along
with them, but Anne explained she was just taking the children. The defendant told
Anne if he was not going, then nobody was going. At some point, the defendant took
Anne's cell phone and car keys away from her. After brunch, Anne took Evelyn upstairs
for a nap, and the defendant followed her. Anne got Evelyn to fall asleep, but the
defendant would not allow Anne to leave the bedroom. The defendant forced Anne to
bend over the bed, twisting her arm up behind her back, and forced her to have sex.
The defendant put a pillow over Anne's head to prevent her from screaming. Following
1
Perkiomenville is located in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.
2
Notes of Testimony, October 22, 2013, p. 70.
3
Anne's mother lived in Emmaus, Lehigh County, Pennsylvania.
2
this incident, Anne and the defendant went back downstairs to open presents with
Grace. Anne did not attempt to leave because the defendant had her phone and car
keys, and she did not want to leave the children with him.
Several hours went by and the defendant's brother, Matt, arrived at the house.
Anne told Matt that the defendant would not allow her to leave the house. Matt entered
the house and helped Anne get her car keys. Anne took the children, exited the home,
and got in her car. The defendant followed and entered the back seat of Anne's car.
Anne exited her car and entered Matt's car. Eventually, Anne was able to get back in
her car without the defendant. She started to pull away and the defendant punched at
her driver's side window, causing it to shatter. Anne went to her grandfather's house
and called the police. She was taken to Abington Memorial Hospital to have a rape kit
done, and she eventually went to the State Police barracks to give a statement.
In January 2012, Anne was living with her mother in Emmaus. She and Grace
were in a second story bedroom watching TV when they observed a cell phone
attached to a pole slowly pan across the window. At the time, a temporary PFA order
was in effect preventing the defendant from contacting Anne. Around this same time,
Anne discovered two flat tires on her car and contacted the police. Officer Alfred Kloss
of the Emmaus Police Department was dispatched for the incident and made a report.
Kloss was made aware of the PFA, but told Anne that he could not do anything more
without a witness as to who slashed her tires.
On February 15, 2012, Anne received an envelope in her mailbox, which
contained three Walmart gift cards. The envelope had Anne's name and address written
3
on it, but did not have a stamp on it. Anne recognized the handwriting as the
defendant's.
On March 20, 2012, a final PFA order was entered in Montgomery County
prohibiting the defendant from any verbal or physical contact with Anne. The defendant
was permitted to contact Anne in writing regarding the children only. Despite the PFA,
the defendant texted and emailed Anne regarding personal things not related to the
children. The text messages continued, and on July 7, 2012, Anne contacted the police
again, and Officer Kloss filed a PFA violation against the defendant. Kloss spoke to the
defendant on the phone and he agreed to turn himself in. However, the defendant never
showed up, and an arrest warrant was issued.
On Halloween 2012, Anne was with the children at her sister's house, and Grace
went upstairs to have a phone call with the defendant. Grace came back downstairs
quickly, and when Anne asked her what happened, Grace said the defendant had
threatened to kill her and put her in a plastic bag. Thereafter, Anne sought a PFA order
on behalf of her daughter. A final PFA order for Grace was entered on November 15,
2012, preventing the defendant from contacting Grace and preventing him from
possessing any firearms.
Around Thanksgiving of 2012, Anne was taking classes at Northampton Area
Community College. One evening, around 8:00 PM, Anne finished a class and went to
her vehicle in the parking lot. When she approached her car, she saw an "X" drawn on
her driver's side window. It appeared to be written with chapstick. Anne left and was
driving on Route 22 when she realized a car had followed her from the school. She
proceeded to drive to Boscov's at the Lehigh Valley Mall and park. The same car, a
4
dark sedan, followed her and also parked. She entered the store and began shopping.
Within about five minutes, Anne was walking around a display when she saw the
defendant come into her view. He immediately turned around and walked quickly away.
Anne advised a sales associate that she had a PFA order against a person that just
followed her into the store. Security was alerted, and subsequently the police were
called. Anne viewed video surveillance and it showed the defendant in the store.
The defendant continued to text and email Anne threatening messages. On
several occasions, Anne went to the Emmaus Police Department to inform them of the
messages. On January 31, 2013, around 5:30 am, Anne left her apartment to go to
work, and she observed a dark sedan with its headlights off following her on Main
Street. Anne made several turns until she was perpendicular with Main Street, and she
saw the same vehicle driving in the opposite direction on Main Street. The defendant
was the driver of the car. Anne called 911 and reported what was happening.
Sergeant Timothy Hoats was working the night shift and received the 911
dispatch at the station. Hoats was advised that a caller was on the phone indicating she
was being followed by her estranged husband, against whom she had an active PFA
order. Dispatch advised Anne to drive to the police station, so Hoats went outside to
wait for her. In the meantime, a patrol officer attempted to intercept the defendant, but
was unable to do so. Hoats observed Anne arrive at the station, but no vehicles were
following her at that time. Hoats spoke with Anne, and she said the defendant was
following her in a green sedan, wearing a baseball cap and glasses. Hoats advised
5
Officer Kloss about the incident. Kloss subsequently contacted the District Attorney's
office and filed stalking charges against the defendant on February 1, 2013.4
Sergeant Hoats advised Anne to stagger her route to work and to call 911
immediately if she saw the defendant following her again. The next morning, Hoats
parked near Anne's apartment at around 4:30 am. From his vantage point, he could see
her entranceway and where her car was parked. Hoats observed Anne leave her
apartment around 5:10 am and enter her vehicle. She pulled away going east on Main
Street and staggered her route as suggested by Hoats. He paralleled her and saw her
drive on 5th Street to Chestnut Street. He followed for approximately X to Y2 mile, but did
not see anyone following her that day.
On the morning of February 4, 2013, Sergeant Hoats again parked his patrol
vehicle near Anne's apartment. Around 5:12 am, he observed Anne exit her apartment
and eventually saw her vehicle pull out onto Main Street, this time heading west. At that
time of day, there was virtually no traffic on the street, but Hoats saw a vehicle follow
Anne soon after she left. The vehicle, a dark sedan, passed directly in front of Hoats's
vehicle, and the driver was wearing glasses and a baseball hat. Hoats pulled out behind
the vehicle and accelerated to catch up with the car. When he caught up, the driver
looked in the rearview mirror and made an abrupt right turn onto 3rd street without
signaling. Heats followed and entered the license plate into his mobile computer. The
registration came back to the defendant, Flint Staton. Heats was aware of the
outstanding arrest warrant from the PFA violation, so he radioed for another patrol unit.
Officer Bryan Hamscher was parked in the area of State Avenue and Harrison
Street and received a call from Sergeant Hoats advising that he was following a car with
4
CP-39-CR-671-2013
6
a possible wanted person and was heading towards Hamscher's location. Hamscher
observed the vehicles driving directly towards him, and along with Hoats, he conducted
a vehicle stop of the defendant on Harrison Street.
Sergeant Hoats approached the vehicle and spoke with the defendant. The
defendant said he was coming from Allentown and was on his way home. Heats asked
the defendant to exit the vehicle and put his hands on the roof. Hoats patted down the
defendant and told him there was a warrant out for his arrest. Hoats handcuffed the
defendant and placed him in the back of his patrol car. Because the vehicle was not
legally parked and was in the lane of traffic, it needed to be towed. Per Emmaus Police
Department policy, an inventory search of the vehicle was performed by Officer
Hamscher.
Officer Hamscher initially observed some electronic devices inside boxes located
on the back seat of the defendant's car. Hamscher started the inventory search and
located a wallet, a pocket knife, a folding butterfly knife, and stun baton in the center
console. Hamscher then opened the trunk and found a large kitchen knife inside. Based
on the various knives found, Hamscher stopped the inventory search. He contacted
Hoats, and the police subsequently obtained a search warrant for the vehicle. During
the search, police discovered numerous items including, a loaded .40 caliber Walther
P990 handgun, gloves, a wig, a camouflage mask, arrows, a Kevlar military helmet, a
shoulder holster, a crowbar, a stun gun, duct tape, nylon cable restraints, binoculars, a
calendar book belonging to Anne Staton, a Valentine's Day card that read "A Promise
for My Wife," a Motorola Razr flip phone, a Cannon digital camera, a Dell laptop, brass
7
knuckles, a handcuff key, OC spray, a large machete with a sheath, various knives, and
copies of the PFA orders against the defendant.
The defendant was transported to the police station and placed in a holding cell.
At the station, Sergeant Hoats performed a more thorough search of the defendant and
discovered he was wearing a bullet proof vest. Additionally, Hoats found a balaclava
style ski mask in the defendant's coat pocket and a Samsung cell phone. Officer Kevin
Schmidt spoke to the defendant in the holding cell and asked him if he was willing to
talk to the police; the defendant agreed. Schmidt read the defendant a Miranda rights
and waiver form, and the defendant signed the form.5 The defendant appeared to
understand the form and did not appear to be under the influence. Schmidt interviewed
the defendant for almost four hours. The defendant never asked to stop the interview
and did not ask for an attorney. A narrative of the interview was prepared by Schmidt
and entered into evidence.6
Sergeant Hoats secured search warrants for the cell phones, digital camera, and
laptop. Some of the photographs recovered depicted Anne's apartment entrance, her
license plate, her grandfather's home, doors at Northampton Community College, and
Anne and her daughter shopping. Phone records showed various texts messages from
the defendant to Anne that were threatening in nature. The Walther P990 handgun was
submitted to the Pennsylvania State Police and was deemed functional. Hoats
contacted the District Attorney's Office, and along with Officer Schmidt, filed additional
charges against the defendant on February 7, 2013.7
5
A copy of the form was admitted into evidence as Commonwealth's Exhibit 9.
6
Commonwealth's Exhibit 10.
7
CP-39-CR-681-2013
8
The defendant testified at his pretrial hearing. According to the defendant, the
police said they wanted to talk to him, put a piece of paper in front of him, and told him
to sign it. The defendant said he did not know what the paper was, and did not read it.
He testified that he was never read his Miranda rights. When asked why he spoke to the
police, the defendant said he felt threatened and coerced. He testified that Officer
Schmidt asked him if he knew anything about dead bodies and asked him personal
questions regarding sex with Anne. The defendant said he asked to speak with an
attorney three times and told Schmidt more than once that he did not want to answer
any more questions. The defendant testified that he felt like he was under the influence
of alcohol because he drank the night before. However, he stated he drank five beers
and had the last one approximately five hours before he was interviewed. Finally, the
defendant said the police fabricated information to put in their reports just so they could
secure search warrants.
Discussion
I. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
The Court's sole determination during a habeas hearing is to determine whether
the Commonwealth has set forth a prima facie case with respect to each element of the
crimes charged. Commonwealth v. Miller, 810 A.2d 178, 180 (Pa.Super.2002). A prima
facie case consists of evidence, read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
that establishes that a crime has been committed and that the defendant is probably the
one that committed the crime. Id. In other words, the Commonwealth must produce
evidence that, if accepted as true, would warrant the case going to a jury.
Commonwealth v. Austin, 575 A.2d 141, 143 (Pa.Super.1990); Miller, 810 A.2d at 180.
9
This does not require the Commonwealth to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt nor
that evidence is available for trial to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Austin, 575
A.2d at 143.8
a. Prohibited Offensive Weapons
"A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if, except as authorized by
law, he makes repairs, sells, or otherwise deals in, uses, or possesses any offensive
weapon." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a). An offensive weapon includes metal knuckles. 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 908(c).
Officer Schmidt testified he recovered brass knuckles from the defendant's glove
compartment. It is the defendant's contention that the item was meant to be utilized as a
belt buckle. I reviewed a photograph of the item, and while it is contained in a box
labeled "Heavy Duty Belt Buckle," there is nothing depicted to show how it could be
utilized as a belt buckle. To the contrary, the item appears to be exactly what it is
alleged to be - metal knuckles - an offensive weapon specifically prohibited by statute.
Furthermore, even if I were to find the knuckles could be fashioned into a belt buckle,
they would still be prohibited by law. 'The statute does not prohibit only items with no
Conceivable lawful purpose, but, more broadly, items with no Common lawful purpose."
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 400 A.2d 1284, 1288 (Pa. 1979). As such, the defendant's
allegation is without merit.9
6
The defendant initially challenged several counts in case 671-2013 as being duplicative of counts in
case 681-2013, but withdrew the claim after the Commonwealth amended the criminal informations, and
due to the holding in Commonwealth v. Leach, 729 A.2d 608 (Pa.Super. 1999).
9
The defendant has offered no evidence from which I could find that he possessed the weapons solely as
a curio. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(b)(1 ).
10
b. Possessing Instruments of Crime
"A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any
instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a). An
instrument of crime includes "[a]nything specifically made or specifically adapted for
criminal use" or "{a]nything used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor
under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have." 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 907(d).
The defendant alleges the possessing instruments of crime (PIC) charge cannot
stand pursuant to Commonwealth v. Williams, 808 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 2002). In
Williams, the defendant was convicted of PIC when he utilized a walkie-talkie to
facilitate a drug sale by directing people into a nearby house. In reversing that
conviction, the Superior Court held that the walkie-talkie was not an instrument of crime
since it was not used in the crime itself, but rather only facilitated the crime.
The instant case is easily distinguishable from Williams. In that case, the
defendant used the walkie-talkie as it was meant to be used, and that action did not
constitute a crime. Here, however, the defendant adapted the cell phone by attaching it
to a pole in order to spy on Anne Staton, which itself was a crime since a PFA was in
effect preventing the defendant from having any contact with Anne."
Read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence establishes
that a crime was committed and that the defendant was likely the one that committed
the crime. As such, the defendant's motion must fail.
10
I also find the circumstances under which the defendant possessed the cell phone were not manifestly
appropriate for its lawful use, and thus find the Commonwealth presented prima facie evidence under
either definition.
11
II. Motion to Suppress
When deciding a motion to suppress, the court is required to make findings of
fact and conclusions of law in order to determine whether the challenged evidence was
legally obtained. Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 581(H); Commonwealth v. Wilmington, 729 A.2d
1160, 1162 (Pa.Super. 1999). It is the Commonwealth that bears the burden of
establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged evidence was not
obtained in violation of the defendant's rights. Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 581 (H);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 784 A.2d 182, 186 (Pa.Super. 2001). Any determinations of
witness credibility and what weight should be afforded their testimony are within the
exclusive province of the suppression court. Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 666 A.2d
323, 325 (Pa.Super. 1995).
a. Inventory Search
Inventory searches are a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement.
Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 254 (Pa.Super. 2000) (citing Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987)). The purpose of such searches is not to discover
criminal evidence, but rather to safeguard an individual's property while in police
custody and to protect the police against claims of lost or stolen property. Hennigan
753 A.2d at 255.
A warrantless inventory search of an automobile is different from a
warrantless investigatory search of the same. An inventory search of an
automobile is permitted where: ( 1) the police have lawfully impounded the
automobile; and (2) the police have acted in accordance with a
reasonable, standard policy of routinely securing and inventorying the
contents of the impounded vehicle. [South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 368-372 ( 1976)]....
In determining whether a proper inventory search has occurred, the
first inquiry is whether the police have lawfully impounded the automobile,
12
i.e., have lawful custody of the automobile. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368,
96 S. Ct. 3092. The authority of the police to impound vehicles derives
from the police's reasonable community care-taking functions. Id. Such
functions include removing disabled or damaged vehicles from the
highway, impounding automobiles which violate parking ordinances
(thereby jeopardizing public safety and efficient traffic flow), and protecting
the community's safety. Id. at 368-369, 376 n. 10, 96 S. Ct. 3092.
The second inquiry is whether the police have conducted a
reasonable inventory search. Id. at 370, 96 S. Ct. 3092. An inventory
search is reasonable if it is conducted pursuant to reasonable standard
police procedures and in good faith and not for the sole purpose of
investigation. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374, 107 S. Ct. 738 .... Said another
way, the inventory search must be pursuant to reasonable police
procedures, and conducted in good faith and not as a substitute for a
warrantless investigatory search.
Hennigan, 753 A.2d at 255.
There is no doubt the police had lawful custody of the defendant's vehicle,11 and
it appears the defendant is not specifically challenging that fact. Rather, the defendant
claims the police conducted a warrantless investigatory search instead of an inventory
search. The defendant's allegation is without merit.
It is the policy of the Emmaus Police Department to conduct vehicle inventories
in order "to protect motor vehicles and their contents while in police custody; the agency
against claims of lost, stolen or damaged property; and to protect departmental
personnel and the public against injury or damaged property due to hazardous materials
or substances that may be in the vehicle."12 There is no evidence that the police
searched the vehicle in bad faith or as a substitute for a warrantless investigatory
search. Id. Officer Hamscher would have been justified in continuing his inventory
11
There was an active arrest warrant for the defendant, and his vehicle was stopped in the lane of traffic
and in an area where there was no legal parking.
12
Emmaus Police Department, Procedure No. 18, Motor Vehicle Inventories. A copy of the policy was
admitted into evidence as Commonwealth's Exhibit 3 at the hearing on November 6, 2013. Note: There
was another Commonwealth's Exhibit 3 - a copy of a Final PFA of 11 /15/12 - entered into evidence at
the hearing on October 22, 2013.
13
search, regardless of whether he found possible evidence of a crime. The fact that he
stopped his search upon discovering criminal evidence only supports the conclusion
that he was acting in good faith in conducting an inventory search. As such, the search
of the vehicle was lawful and suppression is not warranted.
b. Defendant's Statements
When a defendant challenges inculpatory statements given to the police, a
totality of the circumstances test is employed to determine the voluntariness of the
confession and whether the accused knowingly and intelligently waived his or her rights.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 683 A.2d 1181, 1189 (Pa. 1996) (citing Commonwealth v.
Edmiston, 634 A.2d 1078 (Pa. 1993)). Factors to be considered include: the duration
and means of interrogation; the defendant's physical and psychological state; the
conditions attendant to the detention; the attitude exhibited by the police during the
interrogation; and any other factors which affect a person's power to resist suggestion
and coercion. Id. The defendant contends he gave statements to the police without
being advised of his Miranda rights or waiving said rights. I find this allegation to be
without merit.
Officer Schmidt credibly testified that he read the defendant a Miranda rights and
waiver form, that the defendant agreed to speak with him, and that the defendant signed
the form. Schmidt stated the defendant appeared to understand his rights and did not
appear to be under the influence. Schmidt also testified that the defendant never asked
to stop the interview and did not ask for an attorney. The defendant does not deny he
signed the Miranda waiver form, but rather alleges he did not know what the form was,
and felt threatened and coerced into signing it. Specifically, the defendant testified
14
Schmidt asked him about dead bodies and about sexual matters involving Anne Staton.
The defendant also stated he asked for an attorney multiple times. I find the defendant's
testimony incredible.
Aside from the defendant's testimony, there was no evidence that the police
acted inappropriately or coerced the defendant into giving statements. Based on a
totality of the circumstances, I find the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights and spoke with the police. The defendant's motion is without
merit.
c. Search Warrants
In determining whether a search warrant is based on probable cause, a totality of
the circumstances approach is utilized. Commonwealth v. Torres, 764 A.2d 532 (Pa.
2001) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)). "This determination must be based
on facts described within the four corners of the supporting affidavit." Commonwealth v.
Dukeman, 917 A.2d 338, 341 (Pa.Super. 2007). An affidavit of probable cause does not
require a prima facie showing of criminal activity on the part of the occupants of the
place to be searched, but rather that "the totality of the circumstances demonstrates 'a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'
"Id.
In reviewing a search warrant, a suppression court cannot conduct a de novo
review to determine whether the warrant was supported by probable cause, but rather is
limited to determining whether there was a substantial basis for the issuing authority's
finding of probable cause. Commonwealth v. Cramutola, 676 A.2d 1214 (Pa.Super.
1996). A reviewing court must give great deference to the issuing authority's finding of
15
probable cause, and must view the information in the affidavit in a common-sense,
nontechnical manner. Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649 (Pa. 2010) (citations
omitted).13
I find there was a substantial basis for the magistrate's finding of probable cause
to issue a search warrant for the defendant's vehicle.14 The information within the four
corners of the affidavit established the following: the defendant made a statement to
Officer Schmidt that a handgun may be found in his vehicle; during an inventory search,
police discovered several knives and a stun baton; the defendant was wearing body
armor when he was taken into custody; the defendant had an active PFA order against
him prohibiting him from possessing any firearms;15 the defendant had previously
violated his PFAs; there was an active arrest warrant for the defendant; Anne Staton
reported being followed by the defendant; and the defendant was stopped by police
after being observed following Anne in his vehicle. Based on a totality of the
circumstances, there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would
be found in the defendant's vehicle.
I also find there was a substantial basis for the magistrate's finding of probable
cause to search the Samsung and Motorola cell phones, the Dell laptop, and the
Cannon digital camera.16 The affidavits of probable cause established Anne Staton was
13
For reasons stated previously, I do not find any of the evidence in this case was obtained unlawfully.
Therefore, redaction is unnecessary, and I have reviewed the affidavits of probable cause in their entirety.
14
A copy of the search warrant was admitted into evidence as Commonwealth's Exhibit 11.
15
The affidavit mistakenly indicates both active PFAs prohibited the defendant from possessing firearms.
However, I do not find this misstatement to be deliberate or material. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 24
A.3d 1006 (Pa.Super. 2011).
16
Copies of the search warrants for the cell phones were admitted into evidence as Commonwealth's
Exhibits 4 and 5. The affidavits of probable cause were identical except for the descriptions of the
phones. A copy of the Cannon digital camera search warrant was admitted into evidence as
Commonwealth's exhibit 6 and a copy of the laptop search warrant was admitted into evidence as
Commonwealth's Exhibit 7.
16
receiving unwanted text messages from the defendant despite an active PFA order
prohibiting him from contacting her; the defendant was caught by police following Anne
on her way to work; when the defendant was arrested, he was wearing body armor and
was found in possession of a ski mask and a Samsung cell phone; the defendant knew
the pass code for the Samsung phone; and during a search of the defendant's vehicle,
police recovered restraints systems, OC spray, wigs, knives, incapacitation devices,
drawings depicting violence, a Motorola cell phone, a Dell laptop, and a Cannon digital
camera. Given all this, and the charges in this case, specifically stalking and
harassment, each affidavit demonstrated a fair probability that evidence would be found
on the electronic devices recovered from the defendant and his car. As such, the
defendant's motion must be denied.
April 11, 2014
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