Com. v. Johnson, V. ( 2017 )


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  • J-A08004-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    VERQUEL JOHNSON
    Appellee                  No. 3446 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Order October 15, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000968-2015
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:               FILED AUGUST 14, 2017
    I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the suppression court properly
    concluded that Officer Marchetti did not have reasonable suspicion to believe
    that Johnson was involved in criminal activity to support an investigative
    detention. I would affirm the suppression court’s order.
    Officer Marchetti responded to a report of a burglary in progress on
    the 6500 block of Linmore Avenue in Philadelphia.        The flash information
    described the suspects as two black males.      As Officer Marchetti proceeded
    to that street, he saw two people in a silver Chevy Malibu, which was parked
    on that block, but not at the address where the robbery in progress was
    reported.    Officer Marchetti was asked whether he could tell whether the
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A08004-17
    occupants of the Chevy were male or female when he saw them, to which
    Officer Marchetti responded, “Initially I couldn’t tell who they were.”   N.T.
    Suppression Hearing, 10/15/15, at 12.      Officer Marchetti, who was in full
    uniform, backed up his patrol car to “block them in” because he had decided
    he was going to “investigate the two gentlemen.”         Id. at 10.   Officer
    Marchetti acknowledged that the occupants of the Chevy were not at the
    scene of the reported burglary. He testified:
    Q:    So the 75-48 says you’re doing a vehicle investigation,
    correct?
    A:    Correct.
    Q:    The notes from the preliminary hearing said that you back
    up to block them in, correct?
    A:    Correct.
    Q:    Because you wanted to investigate them, right?
    A:    Yes.
    Q:    They weren’t at the scene of the burglary, right?
    A:    No.
    ****
    Q:  You didn’t see either one of the people in the car
    committing any crime, did you?
    A:    At that time, no.
    Q:    Okay.     So you were going to do either a vehicle
    investigation or block them in for what charge?
    A:    At that time I was just going to investigate them.
    Id. at 26-27.
    -2-
    J-A08004-17
    The law in this Commonwealth is clear: in order to effectuate an
    investigative detention, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that
    criminal activity is afoot and that the person seized is involved in such
    activity.   In re M.D., 
    781 A.2d 192
    , 196 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citing Terry v.
    Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 30 (1968); see also Commonwealth v. Hicks, 
    253 A.2d 276
    , 280 (Pa.1969); Commonwealth v. Ranson, 
    103 A.3d 73
     (Pa. Super.
    2014); Commonwealth v. Taggart, 
    997 A.2d 1189
     (Pa. Super. 2010);
    Commonwealth v. Martinez, 
    588 A.2d 513
     (Pa. Super. 1991).
    As this Court has previously stated:
    [I]n order for a stop to be reasonable under Terry [1], the police
    officer's reasonable and articulable belief that criminal activity
    was afoot must be linked with his observation of suspicious or
    irregular behavior on the part of the particular defendant
    stopped. Mere presence near a high crime area ... or in the
    vicinity of a recently reported crime ... does not justify a
    stop under Terry. Conversely, an officer's observation of
    irregular behavior without a concurrent belief that crime is afoot
    also renders a stop unreasonable.
    Commonwealth v. Espada, 
    528 A.2d 968
    , 970 (Pa. Super. 1987)
    (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
    Here, the suppression court determined that Officer Marchetti’s
    blocking the Chevy amounted to an investigative detention, which the
    Commonwealth does not dispute.             The suppression court also determined
    that Officer Marchetti was unable to base that detention on specific and
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
     (1968).
    -3-
    J-A08004-17
    articulable facts that Johnson was involved in criminal activity. The fact that
    Johnson was sitting in a parked car on the same block of the reported
    burglary in progress does not amount to specific and articulable facts that
    Johnson was engaged in illegal activity or that criminal activity was afoot.
    Glaringly absent is some independent corroborating basis that gave rise to a
    reasonable belief on Officer Marchetti’s part that the two individuals sitting in
    a parked car were engaged in criminal activity.       See Commonwealth v.
    Ayala, 
    791 A.2d 1202
     (Pa. Super. 2002).          Simply put, the investigative
    detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion.          I agree with the
    suppression court’s reasoning, and therefore, I would affirm.
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Johnson v. No. 3446 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 8/14/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/14/2017