Com. v. Nwani, I. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
IFEANYI NWANI
Appellant No. 3542 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order August 1, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0007130-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JULY 25, 2017
Appellant, Ifeanyi Nwani, pled guilty to a charge of unlawful restraint
arising from allegations that he had sexually assaulted an 18-year-old
female. The court imposed a sentence of time served to 23 months’
imprisonment, to be followed by a two-year probationary period. Nwani was
released on parole prior to serving his maximum term of imprisonment, but
his parole was revoked on March 23, 2016. As a result, the court sentenced
Nwani to serve the remainder of his sentence.
On April 19, 2016, he filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act. The PCRA court appointed counsel, and counsel
promptly filed a no-merit letter. The PCRA court issued a notice of its intent
to dismiss Nwani’s petition and granted counsel leave to withdraw. Nwani
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filed a response to the notice, but the court entered an order dismissing the
petition on August 1, 2016.
On October 17, 2016, Nwani filed the instant notice of appeal. The
appeal was facially untimely, as he did not file it by August 31, 2016. See
Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). An untimely appeal divests this Court of jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal. See Sass v. AmTrust Bank, 74 A.3d 1054, 1063 (Pa.
Super. 2013). As a result, we ordered Nwani to show cause why the appeal
should not be quashed.
Nwani responded by arguing that he filed a timely notice of appeal on
August 25, 2016. A review of the certified record reveals that a document
was filed with the trial court on August 25, 2016, after it had been forwarded
from this Court’s Prothonotary, where Nwani had originally attempted to file
it.
The document consists of a single hand-written page that lists
challenges to Nwani’s conviction for unlawful restraint as well as challenges
to the revocation of his parole. Attached are several photocopies of prior
pleadings, an alleged affidavit signed by the victim, and a copy of the
preliminary hearing in this matter. We are unable to locate the word
“appeal” anywhere in these documents.
Rule 904 of our Rules of Appellate Procedure provides a template for
appellants to follow in drafting a notice of appeal. However, “[a] timely
notice of appeal triggers the jurisdiction of the appellate court,
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notwithstanding whether the notice of appeal is otherwise defective.”
Commonwealth v. Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 587 (Pa. 2014). The question
raised here is what constitutes the bare minimum necessary for a document
to qualify as a notice of appeal?
As noted above, the document filed by Nwani on August 25, 2016 is
untitled. It does not contain the word “appeal,” nor does it contain any
statement that the PCRA court committed error. Rather, Nwani raises
challenges to prior final orders. For example, Nwani asserts that the
“probation officer made a false report after she snatched petitioner’s cell
phone without his consent when she read petitioner’s personal text
messages and without [] prior approval from her supervisor for property
search[.]” Furthermore, it does not reference, in any way, the order dated
August 1, 2016, that dismissed his PCRA petition.
Arguably, the fact that Nwani filed these documents with this Court
initially could support an inference that he intended them to constitute a
notice of appeal of some order. However, we refuse to create a standard
whereby prothonotaries are required to be mind readers. Such a standard is
contrary to the intent of Pa.R.A.P. 902, which seeks to simplify the appeals
process and remove discretionary power from prothonotaries in the process.
See Commonwealth v. Willis, 29 A.3d 393, 396 (Pa. Super. 2011).
In order to qualify as a notice of appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 904, a
document must, at a minimum, evince its face, a desire to appeal. We are
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not requiring any specific combination of language or technical
requirements—Rule 902 and our interpretive case law counsel against such a
course. Rather, we merely conclude that Nwani’s August 25, 2016 filing does
not meet this minimal standard.
While we will liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, such
appellants are not entitled to any particular advantage due to their lack of
legal training. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 685 A.2d 1011, 1013 (Pa.
Super. 1996). “To the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in
a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of
expertise and legal training will be his undoing.” Commonwealth v.
Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Even given
a liberal construction due to his pro se status, Nwani’s August 25, 2016 filing
does not meet the minimal standards imposed by our Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
As a result, Nwani’s October 17 notice of appeal does not qualify as an
amendment to an earlier, timely notice of appeal. It is the first and only
notice of appeal filed by Nwani. It is also indisputably untimely. We therefore
have no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.
Appeal quashed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/25/2017
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