Com. v. Wolfram, J. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S54017-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JONATHAN HOLLIN WOLFRAM
    Appellant                   No. 10 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 16, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000839-2013
    CP-25-CR-0002133-2013
    BEFORE: OTT, J., MOULTON, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.:                          FILED OCTOBER 13, 2017
    Jonathan Hollin Wolfram appeals from the December 16, 2016
    judgment of sentence entered in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas
    following his revocation of probation. Wolfram’s appellate counsel has filed
    an Anders1 brief and a petition to withdraw from representation. We affirm
    and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
    The trial court set forth the history of this case in its Pennsylvania Rule
    of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) opinion, which we incorporate herein. See
    Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 1/18/17, at 1-2 (“1925(a) Op.”).
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    Anders v. California 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967).
    J-S54017-17
    Because counsel has filed a petition to withdraw pursuant to Anders
    and its Pennsylvania counterpart, Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
     (Pa. 2009), we must address counsel’s petition before reviewing the
    merits of Wolfram’s underlying claim.    Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 
    928 A.2d 287
    , 290 (Pa.Super. 2007). We first address whether counsel’s petition
    to withdraw satisfies the procedural requirements of Anders.            To be
    permitted to withdraw, counsel must:
    1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that,
    after making a conscientious examination of the record,
    counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous;
    2) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant; and 3)
    advise the defendant that he or she has the right to retain
    private counsel or raise additional arguments that the
    defendant deems worthy of the court’s attention.
    Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 
    83 A.3d 1030
    , 1032 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en
    banc).
    Here, counsel has stated that after a conscientious examination of the
    record, she believes this appeal would be wholly frivolous. Pet. to Withdraw,
    6/1/17, at 1. Counsel furnished a copy of the Anders brief to Wolfram, as
    well as a letter advising Wolfram that he could seek new counsel or proceed
    pro se. We conclude that counsel’s petition to withdraw complies with the
    procedural dictates of Anders.
    We    next   address   whether    counsel’s   Anders   brief   meets   the
    requirements established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago.
    The brief must:
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    (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
    with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the
    record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal;
    (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
    frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding
    that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the
    relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or
    statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the
    appeal is frivolous.
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
    Counsel’s brief provided a summary of the procedural history and the
    facts with appropriate citations to the record. Anders Br. at 4-6. Counsel’s
    brief states that she reviewed the record and determined that any appeal
    would be frivolous, and set forth her reasons for that conclusion. Id. at 8-9.
    Accordingly, counsel has substantially complied with the requirements of
    Anders and Santiago.
    Wolfram has not filed a pro se brief or a counseled brief with new,
    privately-retained counsel.   We, therefore, review the issue raised in the
    Anders brief.
    Wolfram raises the following issue: “Whether the sentence of the trial
    court is manifestly excessive, unreasonable and inconsistent with the
    objectives of the Sentencing Guidelines given the fact that the trial court did
    not give consideration to mitigating factors presented to the court by
    [Wolfram].” Anders Br. at 3.
    Wolfram is raising a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence.   “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
    entitle an appellant to review as of right.”   Commonwealth v. Allen, 24
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    J-S54017-
    17 A.3d 1058
    , 1064 (Pa.Super. 2011). Before we address such a challenge, we
    determine:
    (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether [a]ppellant
    preserved his issue; (3) whether [a]ppellant’s brief
    includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
    allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary
    aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise
    statement raises a substantial question that the sentence
    is appropriate under the [S]entencing [C]ode.
    Commonwealth v. Austin, 
    66 A.3d 798
    , 808 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Malovich, 
    903 A.2d 1247
    , 1250 (Pa.Super. 2006)).
    Wolfram has timely appealed and has included a concise statement of
    reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal in his brief. Wolfram, however,
    did not preserve his issue in his post-sentence motion or at the time of
    sentencing.   See Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 
    52 A.3d 365
    , 371
    (Pa.Super. 2012) (“Issues challenging the discretionary aspects of a
    sentence must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the
    claim to the trial court during the sentencing proceedings.”) (quotation
    omitted). Wolfram has, therefore, waived his sentencing claim.
    Further, Wolfram has failed to raise a substantial question for our
    review. A substantial question exists where a defendant raises a “plausible
    argument that the sentence violates a provision of the [S]entencing [C]ode
    or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.”
    Commonwealth v. Dodge, 
    77 A.3d 1263
    , 1268 (Pa.Super. 2013)
    (quotation omitted).    Additionally, “this Court has held on numerous
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    J-S54017-17
    occasions that a claim of inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does
    not raise a substantial question for our review.”        Commonwealth v.
    Caldwell, 
    117 A.3d 763
    , 769 (Pa.Super.) (quoting Commonwealth v.
    Disalvo, 
    70 A.3d 900
    , 903 (Pa.Super. 2013)), app. denied, 
    126 A.3d 1282
    (Pa. 2015). Therefore, Wolfram’s claim that the trial court did not properly
    consider mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question for our
    review. See 
    id.
    Even if Wolfram had preserved his issue and raised a substantial
    question, we would conclude it lacks merit. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the
    trial court applied the relevant law and concluded that there were substantial
    reasons for the sentence imposed and that it considered the mitigating
    factors presented via post-sentence letters. We agree with, and adopt, the
    well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable William R. Cunningham.            See
    1925(a) Op. at 3-9. Further, at the revocation hearing, the trial court stated
    that it read the revocation summary and the pre-sentence report,2 listened
    to the evidence presented, and explained the concerns it had in regards to
    Wolfram.
    ____________________________________________
    2
    “Where pre-sentence reports exist, we . . . presume that the
    sentencing judge was aware of relevant information regarding the
    defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with
    mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Macias, 
    968 A.2d 773
    ,
    778 (Pa.Super. 2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Devers, 
    546 A.2d 12
    ,
    18 (Pa. 1988)).
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    J-S54017-17
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.   Petition for leave to withdraw as
    counsel granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/13/1027
    -6-
    Circulated 10/04/2017 10:47 AM