Com. v. Giannantonio, J. ( 2015 )

J-A02031-15
2015 Pa. Super. 89
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMES GIANNANTONIO
Appellant No. 1669 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order May 7, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-MD-000712-2013
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and WECHT, J.
OPINION BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 20, 2015
In June 2005, Appellant, James Giannantonio, entered into a
negotiated plea agreement in federal court to child pornography charges,
and served a term of incarceration. Because of his conviction, Giannantonio
was required to comply with applicable state laws regarding sex offender
registration after his release from prison. At the time of his release in 2007,
Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law III required Giannantonio to register with the
Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) for ten years. In 2012, however,
Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”)1
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1
SORNA, codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41, became effective on
December 20, 2012. In this Opinion, we refer to this statute as “SORNA.”
Pennsylvania courts have also referred to the current statute as “Megan’s
Law IV,” “Act 111 of 2011,” “Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act,”
and the “Adam Walsh Act.” See, e.g., Commonwealth v. M.W., 39 A.3d
958, 968 (Pa. 2012) (Baer, J., concurring); Coppolino v. Noonan, 102
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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became effective and Giannantonio’s required registration period changed
from ten years to fifteen years. He commenced the instant action in June
2013, requesting that the trial court enter an order barring application of
SORNA to his case, arguing that it was not in effect at the time of his
release. The trial court denied his petition and this timely appeal followed.
Giannantonio raises two primary issues on appeal. First, whether an
implied contract existed between Giannantonio and the Commonwealth as a
result of his federal plea agreement that bars the application of SORNA to
his conviction; and, second, whether SORNA, as applied to Giannantonio,
violates the ex post facto provision of the United States Constitution.2 We
affirm.
Our legal discussion necessitates a more detailed procedural history of
the case and a review of the relevant provisions of SORNA. In June 2005,
with the assistance of counsel, Giannantonio pled guilty in federal court to
one count of the crime of possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C.A. §
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
A.3d 1254 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014); Commonwealth v. Partee, 86 A.3d 245,
246 (Pa. Super. 2014); Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444,
445 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 276 (Pa. 2014).
2
Giannantonio makes no argument with regard to Article I, Section 17 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, which also prohibits ex post facto laws. This is of
no significance because our Supreme Court has previously declined to hold
that this provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution imposes any greater
protections than Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution. See
Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 733 A.2d 616, 622 (Pa. 1999).
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2252A(a)(4)(b). The United States District Court subsequently sentenced
Giannantonio to incarceration in a federal penitentiary for a period of one
year and one day, to be followed by three years of supervised release. The
federal court’s judgment order included a standard list of five requirements
for supervised release, each followed by a box to be checked.
Giannantonio’s judgment order contained the following standard paragraph,
which was not checked:
The defendant shall register with the state sex offender
registration agency in the state where the defendant resides,
works, or is a student, as directed by the probation officer.
(Check here).
Id., at 3.
The federal order is devoid of any reference to an agreement with
either federal prosecutors or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania regarding
state registration following release from prison.
After his release from prison in May 2007, Giannantonio re-established
residency in Pennsylvania. On June 20, 2007, he began registering with the
PSP as required by Megan’s Law III, then in effect.3 The relevant provisions
of Megan’s Law III required Giannantonio to register annually as a sex-
offender for ten years.4
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3
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.2(b)(4) (expired).
4
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.2(b)(4)(iii) (expired).
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The Pennsylvania General Assembly passed SORNA in 2011 and the
governor signed it into law on December 20, 2011. The passage of SORNA
brought Pennsylvania into compliance with the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16991, and provides a means
for the public and law enforcement officials to obtain information on sex
offenders. SORNA includes legislative findings and a declaration of policy. It
explains that the “Commonwealth’s laws regarding registration of sexual
offenders need to be strengthened.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.11(a)(2). “The
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 provides a mechanism
for the Commonwealth to increase its regulation of sexual offenders in a
manner which is nonpunitive but offers an increased measure of protection
to the citizens of this Commonwealth.” Id.
SORNA expanded the list of offenses requiring registration, and
grouped offenders into one of three “Tiers,” depending on the severity of the
offense. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(a)-(d). The legislation changed the
mandatory registration periods for adults to fifteen years, twenty-five years,
and lifetime, depending upon the offense and Tier classification. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(a). Offenders classified in Tier I are required to register
in person annually with the PSP, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(e)(1), and
provide the information listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.16(b). When it
became effective, SORNA applied to individuals already required to register,
and anyone who was already subject to registration was to “receive credit
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for any time registered with the PSP prior to December 20, 2012.” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.10(4). See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(a.1)(1). The
prior registration requirements of Megan’s Law III expired when SORNA
became effective on December 20, 2012.
On December 3, 2012, because Giannantonio was already subject to
registration, the PSP notified him of the applicable changes and, pursuant to
SORNA, classified him as a Tier I sex-offender. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9799.14(b)(13). This classification requires Giannantonio to register
annually for a period of fifteen years, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(a)(1) and
(e), thus changing his registration end date from June 2017 to June 2022.
In response to the notification, Giannantonio filed, through counsel, a
“Petition to Enforce Implied Contract and/or For Writ of Habeas Corpus
and/or For Exemption from Applicability to Continue to Re-Register Under
Pennsylvania’s ‘New’ Megan’s Law as a 15-year Registrant,” in the Court of
Common Pleas of Delaware County. The petition requested an exemption
from SORNA’s registration requirements. The trial court held a hearing on
January 7, 2014, during which Giannantonio testified that he had pled guilty
in exchange for a term of one and a half years’ incarceration followed by
three years’ supervision. He acknowledged that he had been aware when he
entered the plea that upon his release from prison, he would be required to
register as a sex offender pursuant to the applicable law then in effect in the
state in which he chose to reside. See Notes of Testimony Hearing (“N.T.”),
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1/7/14, at 7-8. Giannantonio was the sole witness to testify at the hearing.
Significantly, he did not offer into evidence a written plea agreement, the
notes of testimony from the federal proceedings, or evidence from the
attorney who had assisted him in negotiating the federal plea. See Trial
Court Opinion, dated 7/14/14, at 14. The trial court denied the petition.
This timely appeal followed.
We will reverse a denial or grant of a habeas corpus petition only for a
“manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 787 A.2d 1036,
1038 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Giannantonio argues that when he entered into the plea agreement in
2006 with the federal prosecutor, it was with the understanding “easily
inferred from the surrounding circumstances,” that he would be required to
register as a sex offender in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for ten
years. Appellant’s Brief at 10. He maintains that because of this
agreement, the Commonwealth entered into an implied contract with him.
Alternatively, he argues that the Commonwealth was a “quasi party or third-
party beneficiary to the [federal] plea agreement.” Id. Giannantonio
further contends that the Commonwealth breached that alleged agreement
in 2012 by requiring him to register under the new requirements of SORNA,
and asserts that this Court “should enforce the implied contract as is
required by fundamental fairness and contract law, and the Contracts
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Clauses” of the Constitutions of the United States and Pennsylvania. Id., at
9.
The Commonwealth responds that it does not owe a contractual duty
to Giannantonio because it was not a party to the plea in federal court, and
the record contains no evidence that the Commonwealth took any action
whatsoever with respect to his federal guilty plea. Therefore, the
Commonwealth argues, it cannot be seriously contended that the
Commonwealth acted in any way that would create an inference that it
entered into an agreement, express or implied, with Giannantonio regarding
sexual offender registration.
Giannantonio’s argument that the Commonwealth entered into an
implied contract with him is untenable. “An implied contract is an
agreement which legitimately can be inferred from the intention of the
parties as evidenced by the circumstances and the ordinary course of dealing
and the common understanding of men.” Martin v. Little, Brown and Co.,
450 A.2d 984, 987 (Pa. Super. 1981) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Nowhere in the record is there any indication that the Commonwealth
was a party to Giannantonio’s plea agreement. In fact, there is absolutely
nothing in the record demonstrating that state prosecutors or the PSP
participated in Giannantonio’s plea agreement in any way. The record
indicates that Giannantonio entered into a plea agreement with a federal
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prosecutor after being charged with federal offenses stemming from his
possession of child pornography. There is no indication of any involvement
by Commonwealth representatives. Because the Commonwealth had no
involvement or participation in the plea negotiation there is no implied
contract between Giannantonio and the Commonwealth.
To circumvent this deficiency, Giannantonio alternatively argues that
the “Commonwealth, though not a direct party to the plea agreement, is a
quasi-party or third party beneficiary to all Megan’s Law cases involving plea
agreements.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. No case law or other authority is cited
in support of this contention.
In Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983), our Supreme Court
explained that Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
(1979), mandates the following two-part test to determine whether one is a
third-party beneficiary to a contract:
(1) the recognition of the beneficiary’s right must be appropriate
to effectuate the intention of the parties, and (2) … the
circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the
beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.
Id., at 751.
Of course, in the instant case, there is no express contract. See, e.g.,
Appellant’s Brief at 10 (noting “[e]ven though the parties did not create an
express written agreement…”). Under the aforementioned test, however,
even when there is no express contractual clause, an entity may still be a
third-party beneficiary. However, “Guy did not alter the requirement that in
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order for one to achieve third-party beneficiary status, that party must show
that both parties to the contract so intended, and that such intent was within
the parties’ contemplation at the time the contract was formed.” Burks v.
Federal Ins. Co., 883 A.2d 1086, 1088 (Pa.Super. 2005) (emphasis in
original).
We agree with the trial court that there was no intent here to create
any contractual obligations on the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania was not a party to the agreement in any manner, thereby
negating any notion of a “quasi-party.” Furthermore, there is no evidence
that Pennsylvania was a third-party beneficiary. Not only was there no
intent to benefit Pennsylvania, no benefit at all inured to Pennsylvania
because of the guilty plea. The statutorily mandated burden to supervise
Giannantonio passed to Pennsylvania once he resumed residency here
following his release, but certainly no benefit was realized.
Giannantonio also argues that SORNA cannot apply to him because his
plea deal was structured around the 10-year Megan’s Law III registration
period then in effect. In support, he relies on Commonwealth v.
Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 95
A.3d 276 (Pa. 2014), and Commonwealth v. Partee, 86 A.3d 245 (Pa.
Super. 2014), appeal denied, 97 A.3d 744 (Pa. 2014). The Commonwealth
responds that Giannantonio mistakenly relies on Hainesworth and Partee
because the evidence of record does not even demonstrate that the ten-year
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registration period was a negotiated term of the federal plea, let alone
something to which the Commonwealth acquiesced. The Commonwealth is
correct; Hainesworth and Partee are inapplicable. Hainesworth and
Partee stand for the proposition that this Court will specifically enforce
parties’ plea bargains.
In Hainesworth, this Court affirmed the trial court’s decision that the
retroactive application of SORNA would offend a negotiated term in the plea
agreement between the Commonwealth and Hainesworth. See 82 A.3d at
450. In Partee, the panel found that Partee’s negotiated plea “was
structured so that he would only be subject to a ten-year rather than a
lifetime reporting requirement[.]” 86 A.3d at 249. The panel explained that,
“[u]nder our reasoning in Hainesworth, [Partee] arguably would be entitled
to the benefit of that bargain.” Id. The panel nevertheless rejected Partee’s
challenge because he had violated his initial plea agreement by violating the
terms of his probation, holding that, “having failed to abide by the terms of
the plea bargain, that agreement is no longer in effect, and hence, [Partee]
is not entitled to specific performance.” Id., at 250.
Unlike in Hainesworth and Partee, there is no evidence here that
Giannantonio’s guilty plea was negotiated or structured to insure that he
would register for only a ten-year period. The record contains neither a
colloquy from the federal guilty plea or sentencing hearings nor testimony or
any other evidence demonstrating that counsel negotiated a specific ten-
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year registration period. Rather, the guilty plea required Giannantonio to
register and report pursuant to the law of the state in which he would reside
following his release (not necessarily Pennsylvania). We agree with the trial
court’s conclusion that “because [Giannantonio] has failed to demonstrate
through credible evidence that registration for a ten-year period was a
bargained[-]for element of his negotiated plea, the petition for relief from
SORNA’s requirements for an additional [five] years was properly denied.”
Trial Court Opinion, dated 7/14/14, at 13.
Giannantonio next avers that “SORNA is unconstitutional as enacted
and applied to him because it substantially impairs the implied contract in
violation of the contract clauses of the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions.”
Appellant’s Brief at 16. As we have already found that there was no contract
between Giannantonio and the Commonwealth, we need not address this
contention further.
Giannantonio’s final contention also lacks merit. In this argument,
Giannantonio concedes that prior versions of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law
have been determined to be collateral consequences of a conviction, and
therefore, the laws were deemed constitutional. However, he argues that
the aggregated requirements of SORNA are much more restrictive than the
prior versions and are accordingly “punitive in nature as applied to [him],”
thus violating the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution.
Appellant’s Brief at 25. He blames SORNA for requiring that he disclose
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personal information that was not required under Megan’s Law III, which he
alleges led the Border Patrol to conduct an intrusive search of his person and
property upon his return from Bermuda. He also emphasizes the
embarrassment and inconvenience he feels for having to appear in-person to
register for an additional five years. Giannantonio also claims that, because
SORNA did not afford him a hearing before he was classified as a Tier I
offender, his right to due process was violated. See Appellant’s Brief at 39.5,
6
The Commonwealth responds that the legislature’s express intent in
enacting SORNA was “to provide a non-punitive statutory scheme to protect
____________________________________________
5
Giannantonio also summarily argues that “SORNA has no rational basis in
law” and “SORNA is unconstitutional as it lacks due process.” Appellant’s
Brief at 29 and 38. He provides no discussion of, or citation to, authority
pertaining to substantive and procedural due process. He also fails to cite to
or analyze any case law pertaining to the test used to determine whether a
statute has a “rational basis” to pass constitutional muster. Because his “due
process position is underdeveloped, … we will not determine whether
SORNA’s retroactive increase of registration requirements can withstand
either strict scrutiny or the rational basis test.” Commonwealth v. Nase,
104 A.3d 528, 530 (Pa. Super. 2014). This undeveloped claim is waived.
6
Gionnantonio also contends that SORNA violates due process because
SORNA does not provide notice for an end date for registration, nor does it
provide a hearing for offenders “to challenge the requirements imposed upon
him.” Appellant’s Brief at 39. A simple calculation of adding the number of
years of required registration onto the year of release quickly provides an
end date. As demonstrated by the filing of his petition for habeas corpus,
his participation in the hearing before the trial court, and the filing of the
instant appeal, Giannantonio has been provided, and taken full advantage
of, all available processes to challenge the requirements imposed on him.
Accordingly, his due process claim is without merit.
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the general public” and our Supreme Court has twice held that substantially
similar language in previous versions of SORNA demonstrates a non-punitive
intent. Appellee’s Brief at 27 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 832
A.2d 962, 971 (Pa. 2003), and Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 733 A.2d 616,
619 (Pa. 1999)). The Commonwealth asserts that SORNA is a non-punitive,
collateral consequence and, therefore, retroactive enforcement does not
violate the federal ex post facto clause. Both parties analyze SORNA using
the seven factors provided in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 168-69 (1963), a test used to determine whether the effects of a
statute are punitive or civil in nature.
An issue involving a constitutional challenge presents a question of
law. Thus, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
plenary. See Commonwealth v. Molina, 104 A.3d 430, 441 (Pa. 2014).
This Court recently reviewed, analyzed, and rejected an ex post facto
argument nearly identical to the one raised here. In Commonwealth v.
Perez, 97 A.3d 747 (Pa. Super. 2014), the appellant pled nolo contendere
to one count of indecent assault. The trial court sentenced him to a term of
nine to twelve months’ imprisonment, plus two years’ probation, and
ordered him to register as a sex offender for a period of twenty-five years
pursuant to the requirements under SORNA. On appeal, Perez argued that
the application of SORNA’s registration requirement period was prohibited
under the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions
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because Megan’s Law III was the law in effect when he committed his
offenses.
After observing that Pennsylvania courts apply the two-prong test
articulated in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), to determine if a law
inflicts punishment,7 a panel of this Court thoroughly analyzed SORNA
utilizing the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors8 before concluding that the
retroactive application of SORNA did not violate the ex post facto clauses of
the federal or state constitutions. See id., at 752-759.
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7
The first prong of the Smith test requires examination of legislature’s
intent in enacting the law. If the intent is punitive, the statute constitutes
punishment and that is the end of the analysis. If the intent is civil and non-
punitive, however, the second prong of the test applies, requiring an
examination of “whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in
purpose or effect as to negate [the legislature’s] intent to deem it civil.”
Perez, 97 A.3d at 751 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 92).
8
The United States Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza–Martinez,
372 U.S. 144 (1963), mandated a seven-factor test to be applied in
determining whether the effects of a statute are sufficiently punitive to
override the legislature's preferred categorization. Courts were directed to
consider: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3)
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and
deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime;
(6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned. See id., at 168–169. The Supreme Court
recognized that each factors’ review may result in different conclusions
which were to be balanced in making an overall determination of whether
the statute was punitive. See id.
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In a case decided less than two weeks after Perez, a different panel of
this Court specifically held that SORNA’s requirement of 15 years registration
for a Tier I offender was not unconstitutional. In Commonwealth v.
McDonough, 96 A.3d 1067 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 108 A.3d 34
(Pa. 2015), the appellant was found guilty after a jury trial of indecent
assault and sentenced to a term of one to two years’ incarceration. He was
classified as a Tier I sexual offender under SORNA, subject to a 15-year
registration period. On appeal, McDonough argued, as does Giannantonio
here, that the 15-year registration requirements of SORNA for a Tier I
offense are not civil in nature because they impose restrictions and
requirements which, if violated, can result in imprisonment. This Court
rejected that contention, stating:
While [Commonwealth v.] Gaffney[, 733 A.2d 616 (Pa. 1999)]
and [Commonwealth v.] Benner[, 853 A.2d 1068 (Pa. Super.
2004)] were decided prior to the effective date of SORNA, the
same principles behind the registration requirements for sexual
offenders under Megan’s Law apply to those subject to SORNA.
Namely, to effectuate, through remedial legislation, the non-
punitive goal of public safety. Gaffney, 733 A.2d at 619; see 42
Pa.C.S. § 9791(a) (legislative findings and declaration of policy
behind registration of sexual offenders). In fact, one of the main
purposes behind SORNA is to fortify the registration provisions
applicable to such offenders. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.10 (purpose
of registration of sexual offenders under SORNA); see also H.R.
75, 195th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Pa.2012). With this purpose
in mind, we cannot find that the law is unconstitutional as it
applies to McDonough. He has offered neither competent nor
credible evidence to undermine the legislative findings behind
SORNA’s registration provisions. Accordingly, we find no error.
96 A.3d at 1071.
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Similar to the case presented in McDonough, Giannantonio has not
offered any evidence to “undermine” the Legislature’s remedial justification
in enacting SORNA. Accordingly, his claim that the application of SORNA in
the instant case violates the ex post facto clause of the United States
Constitution fails.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Giannantonio’s habeas corpus petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/20/2015
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