In the Interest of: A.M.P., a Minor ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A.M.P., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: P.H., FATHER : No. 2759 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree, August 4, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court Division at Nos. CP-51-AP-0000648-2016,
FID: 51-FN-002688-2012
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MOULTON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 06, 2017
P.H. (“Father”) appeals from the decree dated and entered August 4,
2016,1 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, granting the
petition of the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (“DHS”)
and involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his minor, dependent
child, A.M.P. (the “Child”), a female born in May of 2008, pursuant to the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).2 After
review, we affirm.
1 While review of the record, including the trial court docket, indicates that
the decree was dated and entered August 4, 2016, the trial court docket
appears to incorrectly reflect that the decree was filed on August 1, 2016.
2 By separate decrees entered the same date, the trial court additionally
involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Child’s mother, E.A.P.
(“Mother”), as well as Unknown Father. An appeal has not been filed by
either Mother or any unknown father, nor is Mother or any unknown father a
party to the instant appeal.
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The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and/or factual
history, in part, as follows:
On November 30, 2011, the Department of Human
Services (DHS) received a General Protective
Services (GPS) report alleging that A.M.P.’s Mother
contacted A.M.P.’s school requesting A.M.P. be
placed on [the] school bus to be transported home
because she was feeling ill. Mother was advised
A.M.P. was not on the bus transportation list and
could not be transported home. Mother arrived to
retrieve A.M.P. from school and appeared to be
intoxicated. The report alleged Mother slurred her
words, and was unable to walk in a straight line,
smelled of alcohol and wore sunglasses. The report
alleged Mother contacted her therapist, and that her
therapist went to the school to retrieve Mother and
A.M.P. The report further alleged that Mother was
diagnosed as suffering from depression and was
prescribed medication. A.M.P. suffered from
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ([A]DHD)
and required close supervision. The report was
substantiated.
On October 4, 2012, DHS received a GPS report
alleging that 15th District Philadelphia Police officers
responded to a call alleging that Mother was
intoxicated and bleeding from her head. The report
alleged that Mother told police officers she fell.
Mother was observed hitting her head against the
window of her apartment. A.M.P. was crying and
appeared to be extremely upset. Mother was unable
to provide information for any family resources to
care for A.M.P. because she was very intoxicated and
incoherent. The report further alleged that Mother
was transported to Frankford Hospital. A.M.P.’s
stepfather went to Frankford Hospital and provided
the staff with his telephone number and the
telephone number of A.M.P.’s maternal grandmother.
Both numbers were called and there was no answer.
This report was substantiated.
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On October 4, 2012, Philadelphia Police officers
transported A.M.P. to DHS. DHS located the name
and telephone number of A.M.P.[’s] paternal
grandmother and Father. DHS attempted to contact
both parties, however no one answered the calls.
DHS left a voicemail message for paternal
grandmother and requested she contact DHS. DHS
was unable to leave a voicemail message for Father
because his voicemail was not activated. There were
no family or friends available to care for A.M.P.
On October 4, 2012, DHS obtained an Order of
Protective Custody (OPC) for A.M.P. and placed her
at Youth Services, Inc. (YSI) Baring House Crisis
Nursery.
At the Shelter Care Hearing held for A.M.P. on
October 5, 2012, the OPC was lifted and the
temporary commitment to DHS was ordered to
stand.
On October 15, 2012, an Adjudicatory Hearing for
A.M.P. was held before the Honorable Thomas M.
Nocella, who adjudicated A.M.P. dependent and
committed her to DHS. Judge Nocella ordered that
Mother comply with all recommendations for mental
health treatment. Mother was referred to the Clinical
Evaluation Unit (CEU) for a dual diagnosis
assessment and forthwith drug screen. Mother
[was] referred to the Behavioral Health System
(BHS) for monitoring.
On November 14, 2012[,] by administrative order,
the DHS commitment was discharged and DHS was
ordered to supervise A.M.P. residing with her Father.
....
On March 14, 2013, Mother was arrested and
charged with possessing an instrument of a crime
with the intent to employ it criminally, terroristic
threats with the intent to terrorize another, simple
assault, recklessly endangering another person, and
harassment. Mother had allegedly attempted to stab
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Father. Father posted partial bail for Mother on
April 13, 2013.
On May 7, 2013, a termination of court of
supervision [h]earing was held before the Honorable
Allan L. Tereshko, who found A.M.P. was not a
dependent child, and discharged DHS supervision
and the dependent petition. A.M.P. continued to
reside with Father. At the time, Mother was
reportedly incarcerated at Riverside Correctional
Facility (RCF). IHPS continued to be provided in the
home of Father.
On June 20, 2013, Mother pled guilty to possessi[on]
of an instrument of crime with intent to employ it
criminally and terroristic threats with intent to
terrorize another. The remaining charges were
withdrawn[.] Mother was sentenced to 12 months of
reporting probation.
On or about July 20, 2013[,] Mother was released
from incarceration and returned to living with A.M.P.,
[] Father and A.M.P.’s paternal half-sibling.
On August 30, 2013, DHS visited the family’s home.
Father and Mother both requested that the Safety
Plan be modified to allow Mother unsupervised
visitation with the children. DHS explained to Father
and Mother that the Safety Plan could not be
changed until DHS received confirmation f[ro]m
Northeast Treatment Center ([N]ET) that Mother was
attending drug and alcohol treatment.
On September 11, 2013, DHS learned that Father
and Mother were involved []in a heated argument in
front of A.M.P. and A.M.P.’s sibling. DHS learned
that the IHPS worker remained in the home because
the IH[]PS worker was concerned for the safety of
the children. Father eventually took A.M.P. and
A.M.P.’s sibling to a friend’s home for the night.
On September 24, 2013, DHS filed an urgent petition
for A.M.P.
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On October 9, 2013, an Adjudicatory Hearing for
A.M.P. was held before Judge Tereshko, who found
that A.M.P. [was] residing with Father in the home of
A.M.P.’s paternal grandmother and deferred
dependent adjudication. Judge Tereshko granted
Mother twice weekly supervised visits with A.M.P. at
DHS. Judge Tereshko ordered Mother to be referred
to the CEU for a drug screen, dual diagnosis
assessment and monitoring. Judge Tereshko found
it was not contrary to A.M.P.’s health, safety, and
welfare for her to remain in Father’s care.
On October 16, 2013, DHS received allegation[s
that] Father had been angry with A.M.P. and
grabbed her right arm, causing bruising to
A.M.P.’s right arm. A.M.P. complained of pain in her
arm. A.M.P. stated she was afraid of her Father and
was afraid to return to his home. The report alleged
that Father grabbed A.M.P. by the hair and slapped
her face. A.M.P. attended Marshall Elementary
School and suffered from autism. Father was not
seeking services to assist A.M.P. with her autism.
Mother had a history of mental health and drug and
alcohol issues. Mother and Father had a history of
domestic violence. Father had difficulty managing
his anger. It was alleged that A.M.P. was residing
with Father because of Mother’s history of mental
illness. Mother was not seeking treatment and
Father resided with A.M.P.[’s] paternal grandmother.
On October 16, 2013, DHS obtained an OPC for
A.M.P. and placed her in an Asociacion De
Puertorriquenos En Marcha (APM) foster home.
At the Shelter Care Hearing for A.M.P. held on
October 18, 2013, the OPC was lifted and the
temporary commitment to DHS was ordered to
stand. Father was granted supervised visits at
A.M.P.’s discretion. A.M.P. was referred to BHS for a
consultation and an evaluation. DHS was ordered to
explore kinship resources for A.M.P. The Court
ordered that if A.M.P. returned to the care of her
parent(s), IHPS be reinstated by agreement of the
parties.
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On January 8, 2014, an Adjudicatory Hearing for
A.M.P. was held before Judge Allan Tereshko, who
discharged the temporary commitment to DHS,
adjudicated A.M.P. dependent and committed
A.M[.]P. to DHS. Judge Tereshko ordered that
Mother be referred to ARC and to the CEU for a drug
screen, a dual diagnosis assessment, and
monitoring. Mother was granted liberal supervised
visits with A.M.P. in the community. Father’s visits
were suspended.
On April 23, 2014[,] a Permanency Review hearing
was held for A.M.P. before Judge Allan Tereshko[,]
who ordered A.M.P.’s commitment to DHS
discharged and she be reunified with Mother.
DHS supervise[d] A.M.P.’s care. The Court further
ordered that Mother continue to attend drug and
alcohol and mental health treatment.
On June 6, 2014, DHS received [a] GPS report
alleging A.M.P. contacted emergency services [the]
morning of June 6, 2014 and reported her Mother
was incapacitated. An Emergency Medical Services
(EMS) team arrived at the family’s home and
transported Mother to Frankford Hospital where she
was found to be highly intoxicated and in an agitated
state of mind.
Frankford Hospital was treating and performing
additional screens for Mother. The report further
alleged that[,] subsequent to contacting emergency
services, A.M.P. went to school. A.M.P. suffered
from autism. A.M.P. was reunified with Mother. The
report was substantiated.
On June 6, 2014, DHS visited John Marshall
Elementary School and met with A.M.P. and
A.M.P.’s teacher, who stated that Mother had been
exhibiting bizarre behavior since June 3, 2014. It
appeared that A.M.P. had been caring for herself for
quite some time. A.M.P. stated that her Mother had
been sick and that she had been unable to wake her
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that morning. It was reported when the ambulance
arrived at Mother’s home, she was unconscious. The
emergency medical technician (EMT) was able to
revive Mother.
On June 6, 2014, DHS obtained an OPC for A.M.P.
and placed her in a foster home through Turning
Points for Children.
At the Shelter Care Hearing for A.M.P. held on
June 9, 2014, the OPC was lifted, the temporary
commitment to DHS was discharged, and A.M.P. was
recommitted to DHS. The Court ordered Mother to
be offered twice weekly visits with A.M.P. and []
referred to the CEU for a drug and alcohol screen, a
dual diagnosis assessment and monitoring.
At that time, DHS was informed Father was not
involved in A.M.P.’s care.
On September 23, 2014, a Permanency Review
Hearing for A.M.P. was held before the Honorable
Vincent L. Johnson[,] who ordered that A.M.P.
remain committed to DHS. Judge Johnson ordered
that A.M.P. be referred to the Center for Autism.
Father was referred to the CEU for monitoring and
full drug and alcohol assessment[.] Father was
ordered to attend anger management counseling,
domestic violence counseling and parenting
education classes. Father was referred for a
parenting capacity evaluation.
....
On April 21, 2016[,] a Permanency Review Hearing
for A.M.P. was held before the Honorable Lyris F.
Younge, who ordered that she remain as committed
to DHS. The Court found that A.M.P. was doing well.
A.M.P.[’s] concurrent permanency goal was
adoption. The Court stated Father had exhibited no
compliance with the permanency plan. Father was
non-compliant with the recommendation of the
parenting capacity evaluation and was not visiting
A.M.P. consistently. The Court ordered Father was
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to be prohibited from visiting A.M.P. until further
order of the Court.
Trial court opinion, 3/27/17 at 1-5.
On July 20, 2016, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the
parental rights Child’s parents. Thereafter, the trial court conducted a
combined termination and goal change hearing on August 4, 2016. In
support of its petitions, DHS presented the testimony of CUA case managers,
Kimberly Keene and Shalisa Smith, from Turning Points for Children. Father
and Mother, both represented by counsel, testified on their own behalf.
By decree dated and entered August 4, 2016, the trial court
involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights to Child.3 On August 30,
2016, Father filed a timely notice of appeal, along with a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i)
and (b).
On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the Trial Court erred in Terminating
[Father]’s Parental Rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
section 2511(a)(1), the evidence having been
insufficient to establish Father had evidenced a
settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim,
3The trial court announced its decision, memorialized by subsequent decree,
on the record on August 4, 2016. (Notes of testimony, 8/4/16 at 89.) In so
doing, the court additionally noted a goal change to adoption. (Id.)
Although we cannot confirm whether the goal change was reflected by order,
as the dependency record was not included with the certified record, as
Father does not appeal a goal change, any such claims related thereto are
not preserved. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (a notice of appeal shall be filed within
30 days after entry of the order from which the appeal is taken).
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or having refused or failed to perform parental
duties[?]
2. Whether the Trial Court erred in Terminating
[Father]’s Parental Rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
sections 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8), the
evidence having been not sufficient to establish
that [Father] had refused or failed to perform
parental duties, caused children to be without
essential parental care, that conditions having
led to placement had continued to exist, or
that any of [the] above could not have been
remedied[?]
Father’s brief at 5.
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental
rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record.”
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
2012). “If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id.
“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will.” Id. The trial court’s decision, however, should
not be reversed merely because the record would
support a different result. Id. at 827. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts
that often have first-hand observations of the parties
spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9
A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to
make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
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In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f
competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if
the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of
T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis
of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the
child.
Our case law has made clear that under
Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated
process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially,
the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the
court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
status of the emotional bond between parent and
child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We
have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting
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Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998). In
this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We have long
held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only
agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as
well as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super.
2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s termination decree pursuant
to Subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in
regard to a child may be terminated after a
petition filed on any of the following grounds:
....
(2) The repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal of the parent has caused
the child to be without essential
parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his
physical or mental well-being and
the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
....
(b) Other considerations.--The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give
primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of
the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of
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environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control
of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8),
the court shall not consider any efforts by the
parent to remedy the conditions described
therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three
elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that
cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the
contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to
perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216
(Pa.Super. 2015), quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super.
2002).
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Instantly, in finding grounds for termination pursuant to
Section 2511(a)(2), the trial court concluded that DHS presented clear and
convincing evidence. (Trial court opinion, 3/27/16 at 7.)
Father, however, argues that the evidence does not support any deficit
in his capacity to parent Child. (Father’s brief at 13.) Father highlights his
completion of a CEU drug screen, parenting classes, and anger
management. (Id.) Father, likewise, maintains as instructive that three
children are in his care. (Id.) We disagree.
A review of the record supports the trial court’s determination of a
basis for termination under Section 2511(a)(2). The evidence establishes
that Father failed to complete his established SCP objectives. Former
CUA case manager, Kimberly Keene, recounted Father’s objectives as
including parenting classes, anger management, domestic violence
counseling, a forthwith CEU screen, and a parenting capacity evaluation.
(Notes of testimony, 8/4/16 at 25.) While Ms. Keene indicated that Father
completed parenting classes, anger management, and a CEU screen from
2014, she reported that he never completed a parenting capacity evaluation.
(Id. at 25.) Ms. Keene testified that Father “became involved for a brief
period” during her participation in the case. (Id. at 24.) She explained,
“[Father] became involved like late 2014 and he was going to court hearings
and, you know, he was following his court orders. But it was like early 2015,
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for some reason he just -- you know. [A]ll communication just ceased ever
since.” (Id. at 24-25.)
Similarly, the current CUA case manager at the time of the hearing,
Shalisa Smith, testified to a lack of proof regarding completion of domestic
violence counseling, through Menergy as court ordered, as well as the
parenting capacity evaluation.4, 5 (Id. at 54.) Ms. Smith further indicated
no contact from Father until June of 2016, despite monthly letters, when he
called to determine what he would need to do to re-engage. (Id. at 54-55.)
Father came to the CUA office on June 27, 2016; however, there has been
no subsequent contact. (Id.) Critically, beyond acknowledgement of failure
to complete his SCP objectives, Ms. Smith additionally expressed concerns
about Child’s safety if returned to Father’s care due to lack of completion of
his SCP objectives. (Id. at 56.)
As this court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume
parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child's need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims
of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d
502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006). Hence, the record substantiates the conclusion
4 Ms. Smith acknowledged that Father’s SCP objectives had not changed
since her involvement in the case. (Notes of testimony, 8/4/16 at 53.)
5Ms. Smith indicated that her agency referred Father “multiple times” for a
parenting capacity evaluation. (Notes of testimony, 8/4/16 at 54.)
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that Father’s repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal
has caused Child to be without essential parental control or subsistence
necessary for her physical and mental well-being. See In re Adoption of
M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. Moreover, Father cannot or will not remedy this
situation. See id. As noted above, in order to affirm a termination of
parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one
subsection of Section 2511(a) before assessing the determination under
Section 2511(b), and we, therefore, need not address any further
subsections of Section 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.
We next determine whether termination was proper under
Section 2511(b). Our supreme court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a)
are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b).
The emotional needs and welfare of the child have
been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles
such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re
K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re
E.M., 620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court
held that the determination of the child’s “needs and
welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost
attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on
the child of permanently severing the parental bond.
In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed
below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an
easy task.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any
bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
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exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on
the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753,
762-763 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted).
Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b)
best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of
many factors to be considered by the court when
determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the
trial court can equally emphasize the
safety needs of the child, and should also
consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the
child might have with the foster parent.
...
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219, quoting In re N.A.M., 33
A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Our supreme court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that
courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are
in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
parents.” T.S.M., supra at 268. The court directed that, in weighing the
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bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the
ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. court
observed that “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we
have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts
fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.”
Id.
In determining that termination of Father’s parental rights favored
Child’s needs and welfare, the court reasoned, “In the instant matter, the
testimony of the social worker stated A.M.P.’s day to day needs were being
met by her foster parent. Furthermore, social worker testified that A.M.P.
would not suffer any irreparable emotional harm if Father’s parental rights
were terminated.” (Trial court opinion, 3/27/17 at 7 (citations to record
omitted).)
Father, however, failed to preserve a challenge related to
Subsection (b) by failing to raise the issue in both his concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal and the statement of questions involved
section of his brief, and by failing to present argument related thereto in his
brief. As such, we find that Father has waived such claims. See Krebs v.
United Refining Co. of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa.Super.
2006) (stating that a failure to preserve issues by raising them both in the
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and statement of
questions involved portion of the brief on appeal results in a waiver of those
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issues); In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal
denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011), quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897
(Pa.Super. 2010) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion
of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in
any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”).
See also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 2017 WL 2153892 (Pa.Super. 2017) (holding
that the appellant waived her challenge to Section 2511(b) by failing to
include it in her concise statement and statement of question involved).
Nevertheless, in light of the bifurcated analysis, we review Subsection (b)
below and determine that, had Father preserved this issue, we would have
found it lacked merit.
Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Child’s
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare favor termination
of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). There was sufficient
evidence to allow the trial court to make a determination of Child’s needs
and welfare, and as to the existence of a bond between Father and Child
that, if severed, would not have a detrimental impact on her.
While Father testified to approximately five phone calls with Child
during Child’s visitation with Mother (notes of testimony, 8/4/16 at 65-66,
68), and current CUA case manager, Shalisa Smith, stated that Child
occasionally asks about Father (id. at 56), Father has not had consistent
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visitation with Child since early 2015.6 (Id. at 25.) In fact, in noting no
visits since her involvement in the case, Ms. Smith observed that the most
recent court order did not allow for visitation between Father and Child. (Id.
at 55.) Further, Ms. Smith expressed safety concerns should Child be
returned to Father’s care. (Id. at 56.)
Moreover, and more importantly, Child is in a pre-adoptive foster
home where she is doing well. (Id. at 49, 53.) Foster parent has been
Child’s consistent caregiver, and Child looks to her foster parent to meet her
daily needs. (Id. at 53, 58.) When asked to describe Child’s interaction
with and response to her foster parent, Ms. Smith testified, “It’s positive.
She’s happy. She enjoys being in the home. She has other girls in the
home that she hangs out with so to speak and they get along well.” (Id. at
53.) As such, Ms. Smith expressed that Child would not experience “harm
beyond repair” if Father’s parental rights were terminated. (Id. at 56.) She
further opined that it would be in Child’s best interests to be freed for
adoption. (Id.)
Thus, as confirmed by the record, termination of Father’s parental
rights serves Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare. While Father may profess to love Child, a parent’s own feelings of
love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental
6Father testified that he has twins who were in and out of the hospital and
he “lost contact.” (Notes of testimony, 8/4/16 at 67-68.)
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rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. As we stated, a child’s life “simply
cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to
handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s
basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted,
upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to
have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super.
2004) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Father’s
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/6/2017
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